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Abstract 
Modemisation of Russian pulp and paper industry would reduce the energy consurnption 
related costs and impacts to the environment. But Russia is a transition economy in which 
the market rules are not always applied to modemisation investments. This study looks at 
the reasons why pulp and paper companies do or do not modemise their production 
facilities. and whether Finland could provide lessons to the Russian pulp and paper sector 
on modernisation and energy consumption. 
13 pulp and paper plants were visited, in two Russian regions, Karelia and Archangelsk, 
and in Finland. in order to collect material for the analysis. The methodology is based on 
case studies. and includes both qualitative and quantitative approaches. The main 
methodological work conducted focuses on recording and comparing the capital cycles 
between plants. and on applying theoretical literature on drivers and barriers to energy 
efficiency in the context of a transition economy. Energy efficiency is compared based on 
the Energy Efficiency Index methodology. 
The main drivers and barriers. economic signals and the availability of financial 
resources. are the same in both countries while all the res-t of the drivers and barriers 
identified differ between them. In Russia. the other main barriers consisted of low energy 
price, lack of enforced property rights. and arbitraTy governance practices. while in 
Finland there are only few profitable energy saving opportunities left. In Finland, 
corporate practices and government energy saving policies drive modernisation. There 
would be a range of potentially useful lessons and practices which might be transferred 
from Finland to Russia. however. the unfinished reforms in Russia deter this process. 
This study also provides evidence that the theoretical discussion on drivers and barriers to 
energy efficiency developed based on market economies is applicable to countries under 
economic transition. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background 
4.30 am, 9 December 2004, -27C and dark. I was standing outside the Severnaya hotel 
in Petrozavodsk, Karelia, alone, waiting. for a man unknown to me to drive me through 
the UIA ), VI . 
forest to the Segezha pulp andpaper mill hundreds of kilometres a, for m' firs 
case-study interview. I thought I -was mad to get into a stranger's car under these 
circumstances and was ready to put the whole project on hold. Then Valera arrived, I got 
into the car and we were of 
.T 
When -we finally arrived in Segezha, he bought me a cup Qf 
lea and. fought me through the security, guards inside the Sege.: ha plant to meet m, v. first 
inlerviewee. Valera is the J ever needed a lit in Karelia again. . 
first person I would call if 
I think I was lucky many times during this research prqject. I met many Russian plant 
managers, experts and members of the public who are enthusiastic about modemising 
their plants and their country. Energy efficiency has been a topic of discussion and focus 
of policies in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
since the oil crises of the 1970s. However, the issue is fairly new in Russia as a result of 
the Soviet attitude to energy consumption. Since the country was. and still is, rich in 
energy resources, almost no attention was paid to the efficiency of energy use. The result 
is the well -acknowledged inefficiency throughout the economy. 
In order to change this culture of inefficiency. not just in energy but in all activities in the 
economy, a new economic system needed to be introduced. Economic transition focuses 
on shifting the planned economies towards the more viable market-based models. But 
transition is not straightforward or without opponents. Some people always benefit ftom 
the status quo. and try to block change. This is what happened (and continues to happen 
to some extent) in Russia. After a successful start, and the excitement of the Western 
world who praised the opening up of the monolithic Soviet state. the pace of reforms 
slowed down and finally stalled. Currently, the Russian economy is something in 
between a planned economy and a market economy. Consequently. policies and rules that 
apply to market economies may not always work in Russia. at least not the way they 
work in the OECD. Actually, applying any policies successfully is difficult in the absence 
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of the basic societal framework based upon the rule of law. transparent governance 
system and well-defined ownership rights. 
The pulp and paper industry is a significant energy consumer. Energy has an important 
input to the process and is a large expenditure category - up to 40% in Russia. Like all 
Russian industrial sectors, the pulp and paper sector suffers from obsolete capital stock 
and inefficiency. Not much modernisation has been carried out in Russia so far due to 
transition uncertainties and lack of financial resources. The modermsation of the pulp and 
paper industry would not only improve the quality of products. potentially increase the 
volume of production and cut production costs in Russia, but also contribute to the 
adequacy of local energy supplies. employment and the state of the environment. The 
Russian pulp and paper industry has many opportunities to modernise its operation and 
reduce its energy consumption. Without modeniisation, Russian products cannot keep up 
with international competition and. eventually, production facilities will have to be closed 
down. 
A regional approach to energy efficiency has been judged as essential by the International 
Energy Agency (lEA 2002a. p. 241) because the energy situation can differ radically 
among Russian regions. This is because regions varýy in their natural resources. their 
distance from energy distribution networks and their consumption patterns. it is true that 
every region has its peculiarities. and I have identified barriers to modemisation in both 
case-study regions which were not reported on the other region in question. 
The Finnish pulp and paper sector developed in a market-based economy. It is regarded 
as one of the most energy -efficient in the world (Finnish Forest Industries 
Federation. 
2006b, p. 24) and its contribution to the national economy has been and is significant. 
Finland has similar natural conditions to those in Karelia and Archangelsk. a similar lack 
of endogenous energy resources and wide forest resources. In addition. the contribution 
of the sector to the econon-ties of the chosen Russian regions is significant. some 50% of 
the value of the regional industrial product. Based on all this, Finland was judged to be a 
good comparison country. especially as a non-transition country had to be chosen in order 
to estimate the influence of economic transition to the modernisation prospects of the 
sector. 
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This study focuses on the reasons why Russian and Finnisb pulp and paper plants do or 
do not modernise their production facilities. what the outcome has been from an energy 
efficiency point of view, and what Russia could learn ftom the Finnish experience. The 
topic is interesting as the modernisation of the Russian pulp and paper industry can 
influence society in a number of ways as discussed below. 
1.2 Research Premises 
1.2.1 Interdisciplinary approach 
The focus of this study. the modemisation of technological processes. i. e.. technological 
catch-up, is a dynamic interdisciplinary question. In the words of Fagerberg and 
Verspagen (2002. p. 1292). "technological catch-up is like tlýving to hit a moving 
target... technological catch-up is not a question Qfreplacing an outdated technological 
set up ivith a more modern one, but to continuallv tranýform technological, economic and 
institutional structures ". This illustrates the need for an interdisciplinary approach. 
Indeed. this research involves various disciplines including quantitative energy efficiency 
measurements. policy analysis, economics related to drivers of and barriers to energy 
efficiency and transit] on-rel ated economic structures. the social scientific study of 
reasons to moden-fise or not to modernise, and the socioeconomic concept of transition. 
It would not be possible to study this question without an interdisciplinary approach. 
Without the social scientific investigation. it would be impossible to establish the reasons 
behind modernisation. In the absence of quantitative energy efficiency measurements. it 
would not be possible to tell whether energy efficiency has been improved. And without 
the transition background. it would be difficult to explain the peculiarities in the results. 
1.2.2 Economic transition as a framework 
Due to the peculiar nature of transition economies as a mixture of the former planned 
economy system and a set of new institutions and structures. theories and concepts 
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developed in the context of the OECD do not always apply as such in transition 
economies. In addition, transition economies are all different depending on the depth of 
their reforms, and the length of their planned economy phase. 
Economic mechanisms as elements of market economy developed slowly over time in the 
OECD countries. while in the case of transition economies they have been installed 
within a short timeframe. When the introduction of economic structures and institutions 
does not happen in parallel. the new structures do not work effectively. and in some cases 
not at all. It was almost impossible to change all the required institutions at the same time 
in a coordinated way, as a market economy involves several crucial elements. As a result. 
the new systems had dysfunctions and, in the cases when the reforms were not finalised. 
permanent failures which affect businesses and consumers. Russia was one such 
economy and the unfinished reforms continue to hamper economic activities in the 
country. Reforms would almost certainly drive modermsation in Russia- and only limited 
investments in replacing and retrofitting capital stock can be expected in the absence of 
further reforms. 
Constant change is one outcome of an unfinished reform process. This creates uncertainty 
as it is difficult to predict whether. when and how the rules of the game may change next 
time. This also has implications for doing research work in Russia. The results of studies 
can go out of date fairly fast. However, in the absence of reforms they can be valid longer 
as the stalled reforms in Russia have led to a "stable" instability. 
Business actors in transition economies. in this case Russia. can be at different stages of 
economic transition depending on various issues. The orientation of the business, i. e., 
focusing on the export market or the domestic market, dictates bow much the influence of 
the international rules filters into their business environment. Ownersl-4 relations and 
control over the company affect enthusiasm to reform the business. In the case of insider 
control. it is difficult to take decisions on redundancies or changing the management as 
these decisions may conflict with the interests of some of the owners. Organisational 
culture still has elements of the Soviet system. but can also have repercussions for 
western practices that can influence the real level of economic transition the company has 
adopted. 
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1.3 The Wider Implications of Modernising the Russian Pulp and 
Paper Sector 
1.3.1 Regional economies 
Russia consists of 88 regions which can have three different statuses: oblast. krai and 
republic. A republic (state) has its own constitution and legislation. A krai, oblast. city of 
federal significance, autonomous oblast or autonomous okrug has its own charter and 
legislation (Constitution of the Russian Federation, Article 5). In practice. the federal 
government has a lot of power over the regions in Russia. 
The power of the federal government has been strengthened in the regions following the 
"wild" years In the 1990s under President Yeltsin. Governors represent the regions in the 
Council of Federation, which is the Upper House of the Russian Parliament (the Duma). 
For a decade, governors were chosen by a popular vote in the regions. In 2000. a law was 
passed to change this and governors are currently chosen by the federal governance 
system. This was criticised as reducing the powers and autonomy of the regions (Soviet 
Federatsu website). 
The position of regional governments in relation to the federal government was vague at 
the beginning of transition, and richer regions in particular withheld tax payments to the 
federal government while poorer regions were happy to pay taxes against federal 
transfers. The 1993) constitution gave the federal government powers to negotiate bilateral 
agreements with regional governments for tax payments which were used for political 
interests rather than in order to equalise and balance the wealth of the regions (Martinez- 
Va-zquez & Boex. 2001, pp. 8-9). A new system of equalising transfers was introduced 
by the government in 1994 - however, the inequalities and political negotiations of 
redistribution continued. Over time, the system has been implemented in a more equal 
way (Dabla-Norris & Weber, 200 1, pp. 17.2 1). 
Regional economies (except those of the main cities; Moscow and St Petersburg) are z1- 
typically focused on only a few or even one industrial sector as a result of the past Soviet 
policies to centralise sectors to regions and divide responsibilities between regions which 
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has lefl regions in unequal positions (see, for instance. Dabla-Norris & Weber. 2001. p. 
5). Consequently. one industrial sector can provide very significant contributions to the 
regional economy. For instance, the forestry sector contributes 46% of the Karelian 
industrial product and 45% of that of Archangelsk. As a result. the perfon-nance of a 
single industrial sector can have serious impacts on the welfare of the region. including 
employment and tax revenue. 
Modernising the pulp and paper sector in Karelia and Archangelsk could contribute to the 
regional performance. employment and development. The link between the regional 
economy and the topic of this study is strong. 
1.3.2 Environment and health 
The modemisation of the pulp and paper industry in Finland has led to a significant 
improvement of the quality of the environment. In the 1960s and 1970s. the pulp and 
paper industry polluted water systems with chemical and organic compounds. As a result 
of public pressure, technologies were developed in a more environmentally friendly 
direction and solved most of these local environmental problems (Finnish Forest 
Industries Federation 2006a- p. 101). Such problems are still experienced in Russia. 
especially around pulp production units. As a result of the low-quality drinking water 
supply, technologies such as short-intake pipes that hardly reach the outside inhabited 
areas and emissions from pulp and paper plants into water systems affect the quality of 
drinking water in many Russian towns (Helanter5 & Tynkkynen, 2002, pp. 61152-153). 
The combustion of fossil fuels can have two main impacts on the environment and human 
health, namely 'conventional' pollution and carbon dioxide. Emissions of oxides of 
sulphur and nitrogen. hydrocarbons and particulate matter affect human health, especially 
by causing damage to the lungs. Sulphur dioxide (S02) and nitrogen oxides (NOx) are the I 
primary causes of acid rain, which affects ecosystems. especially forests. Carbon dioxide 
emitted when burning fossil fuels contributes to global warming. which can have a severe 
effect on economies, the environment and human health in the future. By improving the 
efficiency of fossil-fuel combustion, less fossil fuel is required. which reduces the 
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contribution of the pulp and paper industry to the above-mentioned problems. Local 
human health problems related to the combustion of fossil fuels can also be addressed bN 
switching to less-damaging fuels, namely gas or bio fuels. which has been common in the 
development of the Finnish pulp and paper sector. 
1.3.3 Regional energy balances 
Energy security and a guaranteed supply of energy are important issues. respectively. on 
national and regional levels. Insecurities add to the risks of businesses, especially energy- 
intensive industries. The Finnish pulp and paper sector has improved its energy efficiency 
and switched to using its own waste streams as fuel to decrease the risks related to energy 
supply. 
The problems of the adequacy of energy supplies in Russian regions are related to the old 
Soviet structure of the energy transportation system. Many regions, including Karelia and 
Archangelsk are not served by oil pipelines and the gas distribution system is inadequate. 
only reaching the southern parts of both regions. Deliveries of fossil fuels by rail are 
unreliable due to technical failures. Even though pulp and paper plants have not 
experienced shortages of fuel supplies recently, their high consumption can influence the 
amount of fuel and electricity available to other consumers. and therefore. to regional 
energy security. Modemisation and improved energy efficiency can address this issue as 
well as improve the competitiveness of pulp and paper manufacturing. 
1.4 Drivers and Barriers to Modernisation 
1.4.1 The concept of "modern isation " 
Both retrofitting of existing equipment and replacing old equipment with new are 
included in the concept of "modernisation". Modernisation was chosen as the main 
concept of the study for two main reasons. Firstly. "capital cycle" is too mild a term to 
describe what is needed in the Russian pulp and paper sector. Most of the capital stock is 
so old that it needs to be replaced and the more recent pieces of equipment need to be 
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refurbished. The wave of decommissioning obsolete equipment in the early 1990s 
illustrated the useftil state of a large share of the capital stock. 
Secondly. the conceptual discussion around "energy efficiency" and -energy saving'" is 
complicated and no definition has been agreed by the research community. Typically, the 
terms are eitber defined based on the focus of the study or not at all. 
1.4.2 Drivers and barriers approach 
Drivers and barriers to modernisation were chosen as the main theme of this study in 
order to have a method with which to approach the issues considered when deciding on 
investments that influence energy consuinption. There is a body of literature available on 
barriers to energy efficiency in particular. and some material on the drivers. The initial 
mismatch of -modernisation- and "energy efficiency- as the focus of drivers and barriers 
proved to be more minor than expected due to the vague definition of energy efficiency 
in the literature. In addition. there was no literature on modernisation as a combination of 
retrofitting and capital cycle and therefore no mention of the drivers of and barriers to 
this process. 
1.5 Aims, Objectives and Scope of Study 
1.5.1 Aims and objectives 
This thesis focuses on the following main question: 
"at are the drivers of and barriers to the modernisation Qfpulp andpaper industry in 
Russia and Finland, and whal can Russia learn fi-om Finland? 
I have divided the main research questions into sub-questions as follows: 
m How has energy efficiency on average developed in the pulp and paper sector in 
the focus regions? Is Finland more efficient than Russia? 
a Have Russian companies modemised their production facilities or not? 
w What were the main reasons for the Russian companies to modernise or not? 
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0 Did the energy policies of regional and federal administrations contribute to the 
development of energy efficiency? 
a What has been the technological and policy path to efficiency in the pulp and 
paper sector in Finland? What have been the reasons for modemising capital 
stock? 
w Can Finnish lessons be learned for the pulp and paper sectors in Karelia and 
Archangelsk? 
9 Are there lessons to be leamt from this empirical material to the drivers/barriers- 
related theoretical literature? 
These questions were divided into more concrete research tasks. The research oýjectives 
of the study are as follows: 
1) Introduce the Russian Soviet background and the concept of economic transition. 
2) Introduce the development of transition and the business environment in Russia 
during the observation period. 
3) Describe the Russian energy-saving and energy price policies and the main 
structures and problems of the Russian energy sector during the observation 
period. 
4) Present the methodology adopted, including energy efficiency indices. the 
technology path and analysis of drivers and barriers. Explain the background of 
choosing interviews as the main method for material collection. 
5) Investigate the literature available on drivers of and barriers to energy efficiency. 
6) Present a list of theoretical drivers of and barriers to energy efficiency to be used 
as a comparison with empirical drivers and barriers. 
7) Introduce the pulp and paper sector. including manufacturing technologies, their 
energy consumption, developments of the sector in Finland since the 1970s and a 
short review of the sector in Russia. 
8) Provide the background of each focus region, namely Karelia, Archangelsk and 
Finland, including economic developments, the energy sector and energy policies 
relevant to the topic. 
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9) Report the outcomes of interviews on plant-level case studies, including 
description of the plant's products. facilities and ownership, the technology path. 
development of energy efficiency based on energ efficiency indices (wbere data Ily I 
is available) and drivers of and barriers to modernisation. 
10) Summarise for each plant whether modernisation has been carried out. whether 
this is reflected in the energy efficiency trends (where data is available). and 
conclude whether the drivers of and barriers to modernisation were consistent 
with the technology path. 
11 )Investigate the development of energy efficiency on the pulp and paper sector on 
a regional level. based on energy efficiency indices drawn from regional statistics. 
12) Triangulate the drivers of and barriers to modemisation reported by the plants 
with the drivers and barriers reported by the regional administration and experts. 
13) Compare the development of energy efficiency between pulp and paper plants. 
and the pulp and paper sectors of the focus regions. 
14) Compare the development of technology between plants based on the technology 
path analyses, and suggest trends in energy, efficiency of plants which did not 
provide quantitative data. 
15) Draw lessons from Finland on how to support the modernisation of the pulp and 
paper sector in Russia based on the drivers and barriers analyses. analysis of the 
development of technology and regional backgrounds. 
16) Compare the drivers and barriers identified in the theoretical literature to those 
found in the empirical material. Analyse the relevance of the theory. and suggest 
amendments to the theory. 
17) Provide a list of conclusions based on the work above. 
18) Indicate the originality of the work. provide a critique of the study and 
recommend areas for finiher research. 
1.5.2 Scope of study 
As time and financial resources are restricted in the case of a PhD study. the focus has to 
be chosen in such a way that a meaningful piece of work can be carried out. 
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Only one industrial sector. pulp and paper manufacturing. was chosen. T'he advantage of 
focusing on one sector only is the depth of study. However. the results of this study are 
not directly applicable to other industrial sectors. Steel manufacturing was originally 
considered - however. smaller amounts of production units would have added to the risks 
of failing with interviews, and my Russian colleagues argued that the steel sector has 
been more secretive in the past than the pulp and paper sector. which had previously 
participated in energy efficiency studies. 
Geographically. this study is limited to the Russian Federation and Finland. Two regions 
of Russia. the Republic of Karelia and Archangelsk Oblast. were chosen, although of the 
88 Russian regions in 2002,15 regions produce a meaningful amount of pulp. 27 of paper 
and 43 of cardboard (Goskomstat. 21003, pp. 458-460). The two chosen regions provide 
comparison on a manageable scale. and their proximity to Finland and my existing 
contacts in the regions contributed to the decision. Research in the comparison country 
Finland was limited to six case studies. This is only a fraction of plants in Finland. 
I could only visit each case-study plant once. and the aim was not to study the drivers of 
and barriers to modernisation which may occur in the internal dynamics of the plants. 
which would have been an interesting addition to the study but would have required far 
greater resources to interview a number of actors from each plant. This could also have 
been more difficult to set up with the Russian plants, some of which were reluctant to 
provide even one interview. 
The time horizon of the study is limited to 1960-2004 with an emphasis on more recent 
developments within this timeline. The energy efficiency comparisons presented on the 
plant level are limited to 1990-2004. The qualitative technology path comparisons reach 
from 1960 until 2003/2004. as a capital cycle typically takes several decades in the pulp 
and paper industry. As the interviews were conducted in 2004/2-005. the views on drivers 
of and barriers to modernisation cannot be expected to cover the period before 1990 - 
mostly because drivers and barriers change. but also because the people responsible 
change in companies. i. e., the detailed organisational memory can be short. In addition, in 
Russia the drivers of and barriers to modernisation have changed radically as a result of 
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the systemic change. and the interviews concerned the time after economic transition 
began. 
1.6 Structure of Thesis 
The main text of the thesis is divided into II chapters. 
Part 1: Introduction and Russian background Chapters 1 -3 
Part 2: Methodology and theoretical framework Chapters 4-5 
Part 3: Pulp and paper industry: background and case studies Chapters 6-9 
Part 4: Discussion and conclusion Chapters 10-12 
Pan I provides the introduction to the research task and the background of Russia. its 
economic transition and the Russian energy sector. Pan 2 explains the methodology 
applied in this study in detail and provides a literature review of the theoretical literature 
on drivers of and barriers to energy efficiency. Part 33 focuses on the pulp and paper 
sector: firstly, a description of the manufacturing processes and industry; and secondly. 
the plant-level case studies per focus region. Part 4 discusses the findings of Part 3 in the 
context of the framework set out in Part 2 and. finally, draws conclusions on the main 
findings. The content of the chapters is as follows: 
Part 1 
Chapter I 
This chapter presents the background to this research, its aims. objectives and scope. It 
has been argued that the modernisatlon of the Russian pulp and paper industry has wider 
implications. namely for the economy of the region. the environment and human health, 
and regional energy balances. 
Chapter 2 
The task of Chapter 2 is to cover the big picture - the framework - of this research. This 
includes the Soviet background of Russia. the Russian mentality. the econornic transition 
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and its implementation in Russia. and the conditions of doing business in Russia. This 
chapter is based on literature review. 
Chgpter 3 
The Russian energy sector is the stage on which this study takes place. This chapter 
provides a more in-depth picture of the Russian energy sector. including the supply of 
and demand for energy, the main actors and their roles, energy price policies. the 
development of energy efficiency, and energy-saving policies and their implementation. 
Part 2 
Ch4pter 4 
The chosen research topic required an interdisciplinary methodology, including both 
qualitative and quantitative methods. Chapter 4 defines the main concepts and discusses 
the terminology related to energy efficiency. The quantitative Energy Efficiency Index 
and qualitative case-study and technology-path methodologies are described. The 
approach of this study to the drivers and barriers analysis is discussed and research 
material and data introduced. 
Chamer 5 
This study focuses on the drivers of and barriers to the modernisation of the Russian pulp 
and paper sector. Chapter 5 provides the theoretical background for the discussion and a 
point of comparison for the drivers and barriers identified in the empirical material. The 
chapter is based on a literature review and is divided into discussions on first drivers and 
then barriers. The chapter provides a list of drivers and barriers identified in the 
theoretical literature. 
Part 3 
ChQter 6 
The focus sector of this study - pulp and paper manufacturing - is first introduced in 
Chapter 6. Production processes and products are described in detail to facilitate the 
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analysis of the plant-level case studies discussed in subsequent chapters. The pulp and 
paper vocabulary for the technology path method is set out. The energy consumption of 
pulp and paper production processes and the changes in technology and energy efficiency 
in the Finnish pulp and paper sector are discussed. 
Chgpters 7-9 
These chapters report the outcomes of interviews with case-study plant managers. 
regional administrations and experts in the focus regions. namely Karelia- Archangelsk 
and Fiffland. First, the economy. energy sector and relevant energy policies and measures 
of the region are described. The case-study plants are then discussed sequentially, 
including a general description of products and processes, the technology path. the 
development of energy efficiency (if data is provided), and the drivers of and barriers to 
modernisation. At the end of each chapter, the development of energy efficiency on a 
regional level is reported and the plant-level drivers and barriers are compared with those 
identified by the regional administration and expert interviewees. 
Part 4 
Chqpter 10 
This chapter provides discussion on the main energy and technology related topics of this 
thesis including the development of energy efficiency on the plant and regional levels and 
the development of technology on the plant level. which provides more evidence of the 
trends in energy efficiency. 
Chqpter II 
This Chapter covers the discussion on the drivers and barriers analysis and lessons on the 
modernisation of the pulp and paper sector in Finland are drawn for Russia. Finally, the 
outcome of the empirical drivers and barriers analysis is compared with the theoretical 
drivers and barriers identified in Chapter 5 and lessons on the theory drawn up. 
Chqpter 12 
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This chapter outlines the main findings of this study. summarises the originality of the 
work. and makes recommendations for further work. 
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2. Russia, Economic Transition and the Business 
Environment 
2.1 Soviet Background 
The Soviet system prevailed in Russia for more than a generation and. consequently. the 
traditions and behavioural patterns are deeply rooted in people's M-Inds. They still 
influence the behaviour of many Russians today, partly due to the tradition. partly 
because some of the practices of the Soviet system have been merged into the current 
Russian system. The memory of market institutions made transition easier for the Central 
and Eastern European Countries (EBRD 1994. p. 48, Zanini. 2002. p. 40). This may 
suggest that the lack of a tradition of market institutions will make it more difficult for 
the Russians to establish a functional market economy. 
2.1.1 Ideology vs reality 
The ideas of socialism were inspired by the dissatisfaction of the working classes. The 
economic and political philosophy of socialism and communism was created by the 
Germans Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. who taught that the working class - the 
proletariat - was enslaved by the owner class - the bourgeoisie - and industrial 
machinery. They considered a revolution in which the proletariat overthrows the regime 
of the bourgeoisie inevitable and a solution to the inequalities of capitalist society (Marx 
and Engels, 1848, pp. 88,96). The basic messages of Marx and Engels were clear: the 
working class would best represent the economically productive forces in society and it 
should therefore rule the other classes. Workers would then convert capital and all the 
instruments of production into common property in the hands of the state (Marx and 
Engels, 1848. pp. 95,97). 
In practice. the party elite forming the bureaucratic class in the society ruled all other 
classes in the Soviet Union. Classless society remained a utopia and ordinary citizens had 
no democratic say in political issues. Indeed, the Soviet system has been regarded as a 
dictatorship rather than a socialist democratic system by Western observers (see for 
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instance Davies, 1978. pp. 64--65). The problems of the Soviet system were admitted by 
the political leadership and discussed in public. but the emphasis was that the ideology of 
socialism - in particular Leninism - would not be abandoned. 
Neither was centralism 
abolished (Gorbachev. 1987. pp. 86.90). 
2.1.2 Basic ideas of the economic system 
The main elements of a socialistic economy were planning and state ownership (Goldman 
1968. p. 90). The Soviet economy was based on the "visible hand" of the central 
planners. Planning the economy was interpreted as an engineering problem and. 
consequently, the country was run by engineers for decades (Rautava and Sutela, 2000. p. 
22). In this non-market model, central planners had to find out what needed to be done 
(produced, transported, etc. ) because individual production management did not receive 
this information through market signals (Dyker, 1976. pp. 5.10). However, it was 
impossible to find out all the detailed needs that should be fulfilled. which led to the 
production of vast amounts of goods that nobody wanted while other desirable products 
were unavailable (Pomer, 2001, p. 142. Dyker, 1976. pp. 10,27,30). Due to this lack of 
flexibility and innovation. the Soviet system was also unable to keep up with the growing 
complexity of modem industrial societies - information technology. telecommunications 
and modem service sector (Aslund, 1995, p. 26). 
The main practical goal of the Soviet economy was fulfilling plans. It overrode all other 
considerations. such as covering production costs, fulfilling delivery contracts etc. 
(Brown et al., 1982. p. 355). In the absence of subcontractors' liabilities, barter. mutual 
agreements between managers and deals with friends were common practice to secure the 
fulfilment of plans. Making profits was not regarded as a priority and loss-making units 
were supported by government subsidies (Gregory and Stuart, 1998. P. 102, Lane. 1985, 
p. 20; Pomer, 2001, pp. 141-143). Hiring people to produce anything to sell. or to buy 
and sell for profit was the monopoly of the state, i. e. private entrepreneurship was illegal 
(Goldman, 1968, p. 66; Lane. 1985. p. 4). 
All prices were set by the state and did not reflect costs, demand and scarcities (Mehta, 
1999, p. 39, Porner. 2001. p. 142; Dyker. 1976. p. 60). Foreign trade was also kept in 
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state hands. The main goal of this policy was to keep the Soviet Umon isolated from the 
global economy and its market prices (Nove. 1977. pp. 201.206.2126.243.268-270). 
The social system provided all citizens with basic health. housing. educational, 
recreational and pension services, either free or for a nominal charge (Goldman. 1968. 
pp. 41-50). The state also subsidised basic food stuffs. housing. public transport. 
telephones and energy services (Pomer. 2001. p. 141 ). The state ensured that every Soviet 
citizen was employed (Mandel. 1989. p. 153). All these "welfare" services were of 
famously low quality and not always available due to the failures of the system. 
However, the scarcity was equally distributed between the majority of Soviet citizens as 
income levels were fairly equal between citizens (Ellman, 1979. p. 268). 
The Marxist ideal was the withering away of the state and, eventually, also law. Soviet 
authorities wanted to develop a law-free system based on state administration and 
regarded the legal structure as transitional (Conquest. 1968. pp. 13-15, Sharlet, 1977, p. 
158. ) Officially, judges and courts were established to be independent - however, in 
practice they were controlled by the Party just like everything else in society (Conquest, 
1968, p. 27). Authorities could take decisions that were regarded as legislation but these 
docw-nents were sometimes confidential. Consequenfly. lower levels were "free' to 
choose which pieces of legislation to follow and which to ignore (Rautava and Sutela. 
2000, p. 31). 
The Soviet planning was focused on production rather than sales (Zamni, 2002, p. 39) 
and the basic growth policy was to increase the amount of output while the quality or 
efficiency of production were less important (Qjankov & Murrell, 2002, p. 7). This was 
possible as the country had a practically unlimited supply of natural resources. The 
economy grew fast from the 1930 to the 1960s (Mehta- 1999. pp. 24.82). Until the 
1970s, the system provided strong economic growth, contributed greatly to the education 
level of the people and produced major technical achievements (Aganbegyan, 1988, p. 
90), such as the first Sputnik satellite. the Mir space station, the large atomic energy 
program-me and progress in the exact sciences (Goldman, 1968. pp. 79-80). However, by 
the early 1990s a technology gap had grown between the Soviet Union and the OECD. 
which had continued technological progress during the years of Soviet stagnation 
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(Aslund, 21002. p. 41-42. Kornai, 1995. p. vii. ). The growth of all sectors of the Soviet 
economy declined between 1971 and 1985 and almost total stagnation was experienced 
from 1981 to 1985 (Aganbegyan. 1998. pp. 2.72). This led to perestroika. or the 
restructuring of policies. which is discussed below. The lack of capacity to cope with 
modem economic challenges led to a crisis in the Soviet economy as the system was 
unable to respond to the pressure to renew (Goldman. 1968. p. 95). Internal logic was 
against change, which was regarded as criticism (Rautava and Sutela. 2000, p. 23). 
2.2 Economic Transition and Russia 
2.2.1 The theory of economic transition 
A transition economy or Economy in Transition (EIT) is a formerly centrally planned 
economy that is undertaking reforms towards a market economy system. Transition 
economies shared a political system based on socialism and they began their transition to 
a market economy in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Transition is a top-down facilitated 
systemic change of economic, political and social structures. Even though the word has 
commonly been used to describe all sorts of changes. in this study transition refers to a 
process of systemic change in which the starting point was a planned economy system. 
As recognised by the European Bank, for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) 
(1994, p. 4), transition is not a simple, linear, one-dimensional progression to a 
"standard" market economy. Every market economy is different and every system has its 
unique peculiarities (Rautava and Sutela, 2000, p. 241). Consequently. the goal of 
transition cannot be defined strictly; rather the aim is some kind of market-based 
economy. often including democratic elements in political administration. The basic 
elements of a market economy consist of. 
e private ownership and profit; 
e enterprises and households that take decisions on consumption and productlon in 
response to market information, 
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& competition and freedom to enter into the market: 
a markets as a means by which goods and resources are exchanged. and 
0 financial institutions whose task is to channel savings and investments, organise 
payments and enforce the financial discipline of households and enterprises 
(EBRD, 1994, pp. 4-5). 
The theory of transition consists of applying existing theoretical structures of neoclassical 
and neoliberal economic theories to the new situation of converting planned economies to 
market economies. Even though institutional economics and evolutionary theories have 
also been applied to economic transition (Pavlinek. 200.3, p. 85), neoclassical and 
neoliberal ideologies dominated the "theory" of transition (Csaba, 2003. p. 4). 
In practice. the tasks of economic transition were based on the requirements of the 
Bretton Woods institutions. especially the Internatlonal Monetary Fund (IMF). which 
required a country to follow a tailored economic programme as a condition for financial 
support (Rautava and Sutela. 2000. pp. 84-95, Csaba. 200-33. p. 4). This "IMF orthodoxy"' 
and the concept of economic transition in general (Havi-ylyshyn and Wolf. 1999, p. 12) 
included the following basic elements: 
9 liberalisation of prices, entrepreneurship and foreign trade. 
o stabilisation of the monetary economy and status of money-. 
a privatisation; and 
a structural changes to institutions, legislation. etc. 
It took centuries to develop the well -established OECD market economies. whereas ElTs 
wanted to develop such a system over a couple of years. This seemed unrealistic to some 
analysts. Economists were looking for examples in Latin America. China and Asia but no 
precedents on how to establish a market economy fast were available. However. 
something had to be done. 
view shared by many in the West was that the faster radical economic reforms are 
implemented, the more advantageous they are likely to be. Successful transItion had to be 
implemented in a rapid tempo and the switch to a market economy bad to be 
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comprehensive (EBRD, 1994, p. 45: Aslund. 1993. p. 168). Some analysts argued that a 
"window of opportunity" to decide on the basics of the future system may close soon as a 
result of some domestic actors gaining power (Stiglitz. 2001. p. xxii). The basic criticism 
against the IMF orthodoxy is that the decisive factors in moving a successful market 
economy forward are the political will to impose the rule of law and establish the security 
of property rights. and that the reformers should have focused more on institution 
building. Even leaming from the Chinese experience has been suggested. The 
macroeconomic stabilisation has been accused of devastating domestic production 
(Havrylyshyn and Wolf, 1 1999. p. 15, Mau, 2000. pp. 4-11). 
2.2.2 The main elements of transition in Russia 
The Soviet reform programme, perestroika (rebuilding), launched in the last years of the 
Soviet state, focused on political reforms but failed to reform the Soviet system enough to 
gain the support of the people. Perestroika destroyed old institutions but failed to create 
new ones. This led to the collapse of production, shortages of supplies and the collapse of 
monetary policy. It has been argued that perestroika destroyed the credibility of 
economic reforms (Rautava and Sutela. 2000, pp. 1-23-124. ) 
The starting point of transition in Russia was in the Soviet system and practices. In 
Russia. this system had been in place for more than a generation and therefore the 
population was unfamiliar with the market economy, including competition. initiative and 
risks, and economic freedom. unlike in Central and Eastern Europe (Vasiliev. 1997. p. 
25). 
Liberalisation of prices, entrepreneurship and fioreign trade were to establish a 
favourable environment for the market economy and to transfer economic power from 
producers to consumers (Aslund, 2002, p. 159). In Russia. some price liberalisation was 
already taking place in the last days of the Soviet Union (Doyle and Krasnoselsky. 1993. 
P. 33) while most prices were liberalised in 1992. However. basic commodities and energy 
remained regulated by the state (Ahrend and Tompson, 2005. p. 28). Entrepreneurship 
was also liberalised and small services in particular increased quickly. Quotas for 
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exporting strategic goods (e. g. minerals. energy) were kept by the government. which led 
to corruption. (Gregory and Stuart, 1998. p. 395; Rautava and Sutela. 2000. p. 130. ) 
However, corruption was common in transition countries and it could be argued that It Is 
inevitable when the governance system changes radically. 
Stabilisation of the monetary economy and the status ofmonev was the second line of the 
IMF orthodoxy. The establishment of a stable. convertible currency and price 
liberalisation are prerequisites for a successftil market economy. Inflation is typically 
high and prices rise after liberalisation. In Russia- stabilisation failed as a result of 
policies which were incomplete and too soft (Mau. 2000. p. 11. Sachs. 1997, p. 127). The 
deficit in the public budget was dealt with by printing more money. and subsidising, 
unprofitable industrial units continued. This maintained the soft budget constraints 
instead of making economic actors accountable for their actions. This extra money was 
used to increase salaries, which contributed to rising prices. High inflation continued and 
hindered the development of the economy. Monetary and fiscal policies were only 
properly reconsidered after the August 1998 economic crisis. (Zanini, 2002. pp. 46.49- 
Rautava and Sutela, 2000. p. 154.159ý 187). 
Privalisation creates private ownership. The fundamental objective was to create a 
diverse ownership structure in the economy, promote the clanification of property rights 
and establish new objectives to companies. However, in practice privatisation served as 
an instrument of consolidation of ownership as powerful individuals started fighting over 
the ownership of assets (Commander et al.. 1996, p. 208, Shumilov & Volchkova. 2004, 
p. 4). The privatisation of small and medium-sized companies was fast and based on 
vouchers and insider or spontaneous privatisation, i. e. managers and employees who had 
strong claims to state enterprises assumed ownership (Aslund, 2002. p. 274. Zanini, 2002. 
p. 40. ) However, Russian privatisation has also been called the "robbery" of the century 
as a lot of the material basis of the Soviet Union was taken out of the country by the rich 
few who got hold of it through the loans-for-shares scheme (see page 38) and 
spontaneous privatisation (Guriev & Rachinsky 2004. p. 3 3.11. Zanini 2002, p. 40). 
Russian privatisation has been regarded as a failure by some (Perevalov et al., 2001, p. 4). 
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The structural change qf an economy is necessary in order to improve the efficiency of 
the system to facilitate a market economy to change the structures in such a way that the 
state mostly Wthdraws from economic decision-making (Rautava and Sutela. 2000, pp. 
142,168-172,255). In practice, structural changes refer to various issues including 
establishing a banking system. a new legal system, including a tax system, economic 
institutions such as competition and bankruptcy legislation. and enforcing them. Afier the 
prompt start of radical reforms in 1992, structural changes proceeded slowly in Russia 
until the 1998 economic crisis (Ahrend and Tompson, 2005. p. 2 1; Zanini. 2002, p. 49). 
2.3 Development of the Russian Economy and Reforms 
2.3.1 Indicators 
This section outlines two sets of indicators, the development of Russian GDP and the 
EBRD transition indicators. which are used in the sections below to assess the transition 
and development of the Russian economy. 
Table 2.1 Growth of Russian GDP in real terms 1992-2005 
1992-- 
T1993 
1 995 199- 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
% 14.8 8.7 -12.7 -4.0 -3.6 1.4 -5.3 
1 
64 10.0 11 4ý7 
] 
7 
-3 
7.2 6.4 
Source: EBRD, Transition report 2004, p. 12 (Russian version), BOFIT (2006), P. I- 
Table 2.1 surnmarises the GDP development since the beginning of the transition period. 
It is characterised by a significant annual decrease of GDP during most of the 1990s. and 
a strong growth after the 1998 collapse. The structure of the Russian economy has 
changed dramatically since the early 1990s. The share of industrial production in GDP 
formation has fallen from 61.8% in 1991 to 36.2% in 2003. At the same time, the share of 
services has increased from 36.7% to 53.5% (Goskomstat, 2002a, p. 279; Federal Service 
of Statistics 2004, pp. 150-15 1). 
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The EBRD has created indicators to analyse the proceeding of economic transition. The 
annual development of Russia is illustrated in Table 2 ') 
Table 2.2 EBRD indicators on the proceeding of transition in Russia 
Large-scale Small-scale Governance Price Trade andCompetition Banking Securities I 
privatisatio privatisati onand liberalisatio foreign policy reform andmarkel aný 
n enterpri se n exchange interest ratenon-bank 
restructuring svstem liberalisatio financial 
n institutions 
1994 3 3 2 3 3 N/A 2 N/A 
1995 3 4 2 1 1 
-1 
2 2 
1996 3 4 2 3 4 2 2 3 
1997 3 4 2 3 4 2+ 2+ 1 
1998 4 2 2+ 2+ 2 2- 
1999 3+ 4 2- 3- 2+ 2+ 2- 2- 
2000 3+ 4 1) 3 2+ 2+ 2- 2- 
2001 3+ 4 2+ 1 I 1- ')+ - 2- 
2- 
2002 3+ 4 2+ 3 ')+ 2 2+ 
2003 
_3+ 
4 2+ 4 3+ 2+ 2 3- 
2004 3+ 4 2+ 4 1 3+ 2+ 2 3- 
2005 3 4 2+ 4 
_3 + 
2+ 2+ 3- 
Source: EBRD. Transition reports 1994-2005. 
Key: The scale is from I to 4+, of which I refers to a planned economy and 4-+ to market economy. 
The indicators show that Russia made a prompt start with privatisation. price 
liberalisation and its trade and foreign exchange system in the early 1990s. Towards the 
mid- I 990s. the speed of reforms ceased. In the 2000s. some of the reforms were resumed. 
The 1998 economic collapse is clearly visible in some sectors and obviously caused a 
delay in Russian economic reforms. If compared to other Former Soviet Union (FSU) and 
Central and Eastern European economies in transition, Russian development is average. 
These indicators clearly show that work remains to be done, especially on competition 
policy, governance and enterprise restructuring. and banking sectors. 
The EBRD methodology could be criticised as such a quantitative and one-dimensional 
approach that it is likely to miss many qualitative details (regardless of what the EBRD 
may state in its publications, see for instance EBRD 1994. p. 4) such as what still needs 
to be done to achieve a higher score for an indicator and bow the indicators might be 
interlinked. Nevertheless, these indicators are widely used by the EBRD Transition 
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reports (see for mstance EBRD 1994-, EBRD 2004: EBRD 2005) for measuring the 
progress of economic transition. 
2.3.2 The early 1990s 
After the break-up of the Soviet Union, Russia experienced a dramatic economic 
recession while the economy declined by some 40% of the pre-transition level. as also 
illustrated by the negative growth figures in Table 2.1. This was partly explained by 
closing down old, inefficient industrial facilities but the perestroika period also paralysed 
the economy. However. the growth of exports exceeded imports in the mid- I 990s and the 
share of exports to CIS countries fell to some 20-30% in 1996. The country remained 
dependent on raw material exports. especially fuels (Zanini. 2002. p. 42). 
The first governments started with fairly fast and radical reforms including price 
liberalisation and privatisation of small and medium-sized enterprises, but the attempts to 
balance the budget failed (Zanini, 2002. p. 49). However. many analysts argue that these 
reforms were not radical enough and stopped halfway (see for instance Aslund, 1993. p. 
19. Dabrowski, 1993'. p. 9). Furthermore, the EBRD transition indicators in Table 2.1 
show this, as during 1994-1997 development in most areas was either slow or stalled. 
Political struggles between the president and the Duma as well as short-term governments 
in the early 1990s made stable. long-ten-n policy-making and implementation of the badly 
needed reforms difficult, and the focus was on crisis management (Zanini. 2002, pp. 40- 
41). Political leadership is very important for the credibility of economic reforms, 
especially in Russia as the country has historically had strong leaders. President Yeltsin's 
time in office was coloured by numerous changes of prime minister and disputes with the 
Duma. Many important economic decisions were left unresolved. The president's health 
was fragile, which influenced his policy-making and leadership. The Yeltsin era left 
people with a feeling of uncertainty. 
Aslund (1999) defines rent-seeking as an attempt to make money from government 
transfers, either directly through state subsidies or indirectly through government 
regulation, or from market distortions. The best-known major companies were privatised 
by the "loans-for-sbares" arrangement. under which the state auctioned custody of large 
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blocks of the natural -resource-holding companies amongst private investors against loans 
which it was not planning to repay. The scheme was created to gain support for the 
election campaign of President Yeltsin. The rich few who took these dynamics to their 
ultimate forms are known as the oligarchs. However. only some ofthe oligarchs gained 
their wealth through the scheme while others, who worked as managers or high-level 
officials. converted their de facto control over state companies into ownership rights. 
which has also been called spontaneous privatisation (Guriev & Rachinsky. 2004, pp. 3. 
11; Zanini, 2002, p. 40), and smaller scale rent-seeking was much more common in the 
Russian economy. Rent-seekers were opposed to further radical reforms because they 
benefited from the status quo (Aslund, 2002, p. 91). 
Non-payment. i. e. non-cash settlements and payment arrears, characterised the Russian 
economy during this period (Pinto, Drebentsov and Morozov, 2000. p. 1). The share of 
barter was some 40% of turnover of companies in 1998 (Rautava and Sutela- 2000. pp. 
150,249,252-253). Substitute money (in Russian veksel). i. e. promissory notes. was also 
common (Bernstam and Sitnikov 2001. pp. 229-230). The national currency. the rouble. 
was avoided mostly for the following reasons: 
" In the Soviet Union money had a passive role as a planning tool (Gravy. 1977. p. 
42, Schaffer, 1998. p. 84) and barter was widely used between state companies 
(Goldman, 1968, p. 64; Nove. 1977. p. I 11). Therefore. companies may have had 
little experience of the functions of money in a market economy; 
" The banking system had its shortcomings and the monetary policy led to a 
scarcity of currency; 
" Tax evasion in the very complex and arbitrary tax system was easier when the 
rouble was substituted, and 
" Some regions were promoting promissory notes in order to demonstrate their 
independent character (Bernstam and Sitnikov, 2001. p. 230; Rautava and Sutela. 
2000.1 p. 253). 
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The problem with these non-rouble arrangements was their inefficiency. According to 
Adam Smith (1977. p. 37). monev makes the exchange of goods much more efficient 
than barter. which does not create a cash flow that could be saved for investments. 
Soft budget constraints have been defined by Kornai et al. (2002. p. 5) as a situation 
when a supporting organisation is prepared to cover all or part of a company's deficit. 
Soft elements of budget constraints were partly maintained in Russia during this period as 
a result of subsidies. tax benefits. investment grants and transfers from local budgets. 
However. budget constraints hardened somewhat as the federal government subsidies 
declined in real terms in 1992-1994 (Commander et al.. 1996, pp. 2.197). The remaining 
elements of soft budget constraints interfered with the evolutionary development 
including the advancement of competitive firms and the insolvency of uncompetitive 
companies in the market by supporting a loss-making company to enable it to survive 
(Kornai. 1998. p. 15). Systemic change also led to a softening of administrative 
constraints in the fort-nat of director liability but did not always exclusively facilitate hard 
budget constraints. Gaidar (1999, p. 6-7) argued that this means having the bad sides of 
both systems. 
Bribery was widespread in Russia. The overthrow of communism created false 
expectations of democracy and the market economy. while in reality people experienced 
severe difficulties in their lives at the beginning of the transition period. Government 
officials misusing their powers led to people bribing their way out of trouble (Stephan, 
1999. pp. 9.13; Martinot, 1995. pp. 113-114). 
A clear definition of property rights and their enforcement are prerequisites of a market 
economy system. In the Soviet Union, it was official policy that there was no private 
property beyond personal items. Land, minerals, waters. and forests as well as means of 
production were the property of the state while the property of individuals consisted of 
earned income, small personal items and a house (The Constitution of the USSR, 1977. 
Chapter 2: the Economic System). The legal definition and implementation of property 
rights has proceeded incrementally since the systemic change. For instance. the law on 
joint-stock companies includes only a narrow and ambiguous definition of beneficial 
ownership right (Ahrend and Tompson, 2005. p. 55). Polishchuk (2002) introduced the 
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concept of "demand"' for property rights, which is based on the assumption that 
institutional development is driven by demand in society. lie argued that in the beginning 
of the 1990s there was no demand - and rather opposition - for well-defined property 
rights in Russia because: 
managers and other insiders of newly privatised companies opposed transparent 
corporate-governance procedures because they would have restricted the 
opportunities for asset-stripping and other types of abuse: 
small business showed little interest (perhaps because it was unable to 
demonstrate it) in influencing official rules. This was also partly because their 
business did not involve the ownership of significant production assets that 
required protection, 
publicly provided protection of property rights would have Implied endorsing the 
new economic system, which many regarded as ur1just, especially because this 
would also protect the oligarchs' property rights, which were widely seen as 
illegitimate (Guriev & Rachinsky 2004. p. 13): 
the oligarchs gained from the redistribution of wealth due to the lack of protection 
of property rights. They could afford private protection of property rights and, 
therefore. did not support their public protection (Sonin, 2003. p. 716). and 
a sophisticated legal system can be too expensive for a poor country (Hay et aL. 
1996). 
During the period of dismantling the Soviet Union. both Soviet and Republic legislation 
was in force. This led to a pick and choose situation from the individual's point of view. 
The rule of law was embryonic and, therefore. it was easy to ignore legislation altogether 
(Martinot, 1995. p. 114). For example. at the beginning of the transition period, Russians 
were unfamiliar with the concept of tax collection in a market economy. The newly 
established system had inherited the elements of a fiscal crisis from the Soviet Union, and 
the early reforms. especially privatisation, sought to overcome this by establishing a 
source of income for the state (Mau, 2000, pp. 43-46). Old tax legislation was still in 
force while new taxes were introduced, and some of the old and new taxes overlapped. 
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Consequently, the tax burden grew unreasonably large and the legislation was so 
confusing that tax-payers found it almost impossible to tell what they should be paying. 
These loopholes also made corruption possible: no one really knew which taxes one 
should pay and. therefore. it was easy for officials to introduce further "taxes" and "fees"' 
(Martinot. 1995, p. 114: Rautava and Sutela. 2000. p. 163. ) As a result of these 
developments. the fiscal system remained weak and a stable budget income small 
(Zanini. 2002, p. 43). 
In order to keep up production and employment during the transition period and gain 
support for the reforms from the industrial actors, the Russian government continued to 
allocate subsidies like in the Soviet Union (Mau. 2000, p. 47). Industries and many 
politicians opposed cancelling subsidies as they preferred the status quo. i. e. benefits 
allocated by the government. Subsidies financed by external debt and printing more 
money kept the high inflation going (Rautava and Sutela, 2000. pp. 143.154.1A 162). 
2.3.3 The 1998 crisis and beyond 
In addition to the poor fiscal performance. non-payment and increasing debt, the 
international market price for the most important export products oil. ' gas and metals 
started declining and the international financial cfisis led to the collapse of the economy 
(Zanini, 2002. p. 43. Ahrend and Tompson, 2005. p. 21). By August 1998, Russia was 
unable to pay its debt. the monetary system collapsed and the banking sector was in crisis 
(Rautava and Sutela. 2000. p. 149). This crisis led to dramatic changes in monetary and 
fiscal policies such as floating the rouble. exchange control. a debt moratorium and the 
requirement to bfing export revenues back to Russia (IMF, 1999. PP. 18,22; Rautava and 
Sutela, 2000, p. 187). Bills were routinely not paid, and about half the banks had to close. 
The crisis made many Russians feel that the country was back to square one. 
A period of structural reform started in 1999 and continued into the 2000s (Ahrend & 
Tompson. 2005, p. 21). The 1998 crisis had forced the Russian government to introduce 
1 The price of the important export good oil was very low - some US$12 per barrel - in the world market as 
a result of the decreasing Asian economic growth and higher Organisation for the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) production (WTRG economics website), 
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fiscal discipline and improve the opportunities for state energy companies to discipline 
their non-paying customers (Zanini. 2002. p. 46; lEA, 2002. p. 40). The 1998 collapse is 
clearly reflected both in the development of the GDP in Table 2.1 as well as in the EBRD 
indicators in Table 2.2. The economy already experienced strong growth in 1999. partly 
because the devaluation of the rouble by some 50% in real terins provided Russian export 
industries with high prices (JEA, 2002, p. 32). However, the reforms are mostly not 
obvious from the EBRD indicators before the early 2000s. 
Polishchuk, (2000) argues that since the 1998 economic collapse, demand for enforceable 
r-ule of law has grown in Russia. The timing could be partly explained by the wealth the 
oligarchs had gained by then, and by the fact that the economy had started growing. 
Polishchuk lists the following reasons why this happened: 
The willingness of companies to transfer operations from the shadow economy to 
the formal sector, including tax payments, was growing in order to reach a -social 
contract" with the government, 
Russian companies were using courts more actively in order to resolve 
commercial disputes: 
m Knowledge, expertise and awareness of existing legislation was growing; 
The widely supported President Putin had outlined the idea of law and order as 
one of his political priorities: 
Economic transactions were growing in scope, scale and complexity as businesses 
developed and, consequently, "natural laNV' was becoming insufficient to support 
such transactions; 
0 Introducing a rule of law would have enforced the status quo; and 
m The investment climate was suffering from the lack of the rule of law. 
Investments were needed in order to expand economic activity. Investing requires -1 
predictable rules of the game and outsiders would not be interested in investing in 
an economy that cannot secure their property rights. 
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Political and ideological diskgreements on market reforms continued until the end of the 
1990s and more han-nonious relationships were established under President Putin only 
from 2000 (Zanim. 2002. p. 40). 
2.3.4 The early 2000s 
In the late 1990s and 2000s. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth has been supported 
by high world market oil prices, as clearly shown by the development of the GDP in 
Table 2.1. 
Vladimir Putin took Yeltsin's place when the latter resigned on New Year's Eve 1999 
and be worked as Acting President until be was officially elected later in 2000. Putin 
appeared as a strong. healthy. young reformer. Putin has managed to provide Russia with 
stability, although his influence on democratic development has been critically debated 
(Shevtsova. 1999. p. 2: Shearman. 2001. p. 226. Olcott, 2004, pp. 3-4, Johnston, 2005). 
However. average annual GDP growth of above 7% during the period 22000-2005 (see 
Table 2.2) proves that Putin has successfully facilitated the strong growth of the 
economy. 
Putin"s administration has achieved considerable progress on tax, judicial, banking. 
bankruptcy, administrative and federal structure reforms, as also shown in the EBRD 
indicators in Table 22.2. However, during the post-election period after the 2004 
presidential election. the pace of structural reforms slowed down (Ahrend & Tompson. 
2005, p. 22). The ongoing administrative and judicial reforms have been reported to be 
stalled and substantial further reforms are still required in the fields of corporate 
governance. state monopolies, pensions and civil service (Aslund. 2005. Ahrend and 
Tompson. 2005, pp. 21-22; EBRD. 2005, p. 170; Yudaeva, 2004). 
In the 2000s, the state has taken steps towards "state capitalism- by renationalising 
assets, especially those in the energy sector. This has been regarded as worrying by many 
observers (Radygin et al.. 2002, p. 62. Ahrend & Tompson. 2005, p. 22). Furthermore, 
other problems prevail in addition to the need for further reforms. Corruption continues to 
be systemic (EBRD. 2005. p. 170). and the conditions for private business remain 
challenging (see section 2.4 on corporate governance). 
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According to the EBRD. Russia is still regarded as a transition economy. as can also be 
seen from the indicators in Table 2.2. However, there is no standard end-point of 
economic transition. while change is also ongoing in a market economy (Rautava and 
Sutela, 2000. pp. 117,24 1 ). 
2.3.5 Investment 
Investment decreased during the transition period even more than production. However. 
it is difficult to compare market-based investments with the Soviet investments, which 
were very low in efficiency and decided on a political basis (Rautava and Sutela. 2000, p. 
223. ) Historically, Russia has had one of the lowest rates of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) among the economies in transition countries. There is practically no FDI in 
industry other than the energy, mostly oil, sector (Russian Government, 2003). FDI made 
up only 4% of domestic fixed-capital formation in 1995. but had increased to 14% in 
200' ) (UN CTAD, 2006). 
However. there is no reason to believe that foreign investments would play a central role 
in generating growth in Russia. Investments have to come from domestic savings. The 
Russian banking sector has failed to fulfil its main purpose. i. e. to channel money from 
savings to investment (Bernstam and Sitnikov, 2001, p. 231). This was mainly because 
there were easier and faster ways of making profit (Rautava and Sutela. 2000. p. 236). In 
addition. the OECD (2004, p. 10) argues that the problem was not the lack of domestic 
savings to fund investments but the lack of confidence of Russian investors in the 
Russian business environment. 
Uncertainty over the future stopped investments and shortened the planning periods of 
private-sector actors dunng the 1990s. The focus rationally shifted to short-term 
economic activities and bartering increased. (Rautava and Sutela. 2000, p. 143. ) The 
OECD (2004) reported that Russia opened its economy to foreign investors, for instance, 
by protecting the rights of foreign investors through the 1994 Constitution and additional 
legislation. According to the EBRD (Fankhauser and Lavric. 2003. p. 17). the Russian 
investment climate is gradually improving in terrns of financial. legislative and crime 
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indicators. However. the recent trend of renationalising assets is likely to have the 
opposite impact. 
2.4 Business Environment in Russia 
2.4.1 Corporate governance 
Corporate governance aims to overcome problems by using incentives generated by the 
separation of ownership and control in non-owner-operated firms. The main mechanisms 
of corporate governance include internal control and management compensation. which 
aligns the interests of the manager and the owner(s) (Januszewski et al.. 1999. p. 4). Fox 
and Heller (2000. pp. 1727-1739) Identified five pathologies that show the damage that 
managers who are loosely constrained and have poor incentives may inflict on 
companies: 
1) Continued operation of value-destroying companies. which can be possible due to 
subsidies provided for social reasons. 
2) Failure to use existing capacity efficiently. i. e. costs are not minimised. the best 
practice is not obtained for the given level of output or a non-profit-maximising 
level of output is chosen. 
3) Misinvestment of internal]), generated cash flow. i. e. investing in new negative 
net present value proýjects instead of paying out the cash flow to shareholders; 
4) Failure to implement positive net present value projects. i. e. the company 
identifies but fails to act on positive net present value prQjects. and 
5) Failure to identify positive present net value projects. 
Most of these pathologies were common in Russia in the 1990s. This section aims to 
understand the reasons behind such problems. 
2.4.2 Soviet production units 
Profitability did not matter significantly to a Soviet manager (Gaidarý 1999. p. 6). Making 
profit was not the top priority and loss-making urdts were not closed (Lane, 1985, p. 20, 
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Nove, 1977. pp. 24,104.111,179,182). Plan fulfilment was the main goal and overrode 
all other considerations. such as covering production costs and fulfilling delivery 
contracts (Brown el al., 1992. p. 355. Djankov & Murrell. 2002. p. 7). 
Budget constraints were soft as plan fulfilment was negotiable (Qjankov & Murrell, 
2002, p. 8). If an enterprise found itself in financial trouble. the state bailed it out 
unconditionally without expectation of future repayment. Consequently. the state 
guaranteed the survival of chronically loss-making companies. The main motive of such 
an arrangement was the unwillingness of the state to accept the social consequences of 
companies going bankrupt. i. e. unemployment. Soft budget constraints led to inefficiency 
at companies (Schaffer, 1998, pp. 81-85). However, managers acted under hard 
administrative constraints. i. e. there were negative consequences to failure to fulfil duties 
(Gaidar, 1999. p. 6). 
The role of money was passive from a production unit's point of view. The way to use 
the money a production unit had earned was dictated by the planners and, consequently. it 
only measured production (Schaffer. 1998, p. 84). Five-year plans provided a division of 
new investments between production units (Rautava and Sutela, ý 2000, p. 24) and there 
was no link between investment and the perforinance of the production unit. The main 
problem for Soviet production units was how to secure the delivery of resources as a 
shortage could lead to failure to ftilfil a plan (Goldman, 1968. p. 91). The main strategies 
included convincing the planners distributing the resources of the need for additional 
allocations, bartering with other units or storing resources in order to avoid shortages. 
Consequently. good networks and personal relations were important for a unit in order to 
barter or negotiate more resources (Rautava and Sutela, 2000. pp. 26.34). 
Production capacities and performance were underestimated by managers of enterprises 
due to the uncertainty of supplies and units provided only this understated infori-nation. 
Such margins were required because central planners added to planned amounts to be 
produced. and units exceeding the plan were "punished" by higher subsequent plans. If 
an enterprise failed to fulfil a plan. personal bonuses were withdrawn (Aganbegyan, 
1988. p. 157). As the reality of statements was not monitored, there was an incentive to 
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hide existing capacity in order to avoid failures in the near future (Goldman. 1968, p. 91. 
Rautava and Sutela. 2000, pp. 28-29). 
Planning agencies and ministries took the decisions on what to produce. how much. from 
where to receive supplies and to whom to sell the output. and the state set the prices 
(Goldman, 1968. p. 9' )). Typically, companies produced the same products from year to 
year for the same consumers. Suppliers had a "monopoly" because buyers had no right to 
go to other suppliers. Consequently, enterprises had very few potential tools with which 
to influence the economic outcome of their activities (Nove. 1977. pp. 51.62) or take 
decisions on product development (Rautava and Sutela. 2000. p. 33). 
Before economic transition, Soviet production units were not fit to function in a market 
economy. Companies had no financial independence from the state and seldom had direct 
contacts to their suppliers or customers. Incentives to innovate were weak, and the capital 
stocks largely obsolete and unsuitable for production in a market economy (Zanini, 2002. 
p. 3 9). 
Inherent in the centrally planned economy. however. was the priority of certain branches 
of industry compared with others, in terrns of the allocation of available resources for 
production and product development. The defence-related industries were at the top in 
tenns of priorities, followed by the (mainly) heavy industries required to supply the 
defence sector and to develop industrial infrastructure. with the consumer goods 
industries (additional to basic necessities) as the lowest priority of all (Nove, 1986, pp. 
75-112,145-172). The competitiveness of Soviet products compared with their Western 
counterparts can be seen to have been influenced by these planning priorities from the 
examples provided by Berliner (1976), Amann, Cooper and Davies (1977), and Amann 
and Cooper (1982). as well as comparative natural resource endowments, the priorities of 
the Western economies themselves, the total level of resources available in the Soviet 
economy, and the levels of specialisation of component production. 
The Soviet pulp and paper industry was therefore probably of medium to high priority as 
it produced a basic necessity and its natural resource endowments provided a basis for 
some international competitiveness, although probably for a narrow range of 
unsophisticated products rather than the complete range of papers and packaging 
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materials used in the West. Furthermore, a high proportion of the fixed assets would 
have been energy equipment in view of the large quantities of beat and electricity 
required in the processes. Energy equipment design and production had a fairly high 
priority in the Soviet economy, however, in view of the early and continuing necessity to 
generate and distribute electricity and heat for industrial expansion and household 
consumption, and Soviet power stations were also early adopters of combined beat and 
power (or cogeneration) technologies (Dobb, 1966, pp. 255-440). 
Another feature of the Soviet economy referred to previously is the apparent separation 
of suppliers. manufacturers and customers in the supply chain, and the preference for 
standardisation of finished products in order to gain economies of scale through the 
central planning system (Nove, 1977, pp. 75-112.145-172). Dobb, 1966, pp. 16-18.414. 
415). Furthen-nore. the separations in the supply chain referred to above, combined with 
the production-orientation of the economy and output indicators used as a basis for 
economic incentives. often led to quality shortcomings frequently mitigated by ease of 
maintenance and repair (Berliner. 1976. Amann. Cooper and Davies, 1977; Amann and 
Cooper, 1982). Although a pulp and paper mill contains many items of standardised 
equipment. it often requires an element of speclalisation to meet specific operating 
conditions and a high level of integration. High levels of competence are therefore 
required in design, production and on-site erection, and although the latter activity may 
be done by the mill's own personnel a relatively high element of contact would have been 
required between mill designers and operators. to obtain capable machinery. 
In some ways, therefore. it could be expected that Russian pulp and paper mills would be 
more able to meet the demands of transition than some other sectors. in view of their 
continuing resource endowments and the previous installation of heating and electricity 
equipment of proven design. Furthermore, the pulping and paper machinery should have 
been fit for its intended purpose, and the mills and energy equipment should have been 
robust and fairly easy to maintain. The equipment would probably have been designed 
primarily to meet output requirements (a common design parameter. and not just in the 
Soviet economy), but with less attention given to energy efficiency when compared to 
Western designs. as energy prices were lower in the Soviet planned economy. Soviet 
energy prices and Soviet energy efficiency are discussed in more detail in Chapter 3 of 
48 
this thesis, and their implications for post 1991 operation form a substantial part of the 
case study research. 
2.4.3 Business Environment in the 1990s 
During Gorbachev's regime. managers of state enterprises gained considerable autonomy 
(Randall. 2001, p. 75). Early transition introduced even more freedom to managers in the 
form of more economic power and money as administrative constraint softened, i. e. 
accountabilities were not enforced or even established in this new situation (Zanini. 2002. 
p. 40; Aslund, 2002, p. 287). 
Insider ownership is characterised by the lack of capital needed for investments and the 
rejection of external investors (Rautava and Sutela, 2000. p. 215.247, Estrin and Wright. 
1999, p. 408). External ownership, especially by investment funds and foreigners. has 
been proven to improve the perfon-nance of a company while the workers tend to be the 
group who as owners improve the company's performance the least (Qjankov & Murrell. 
2002. p. 29). Insider control often keeps external investors away due to poor corporate 
governance practices (Commander et al.. 1996, p. 4) and managers may be hostile 
towards outsider investors if they are perceived to be concerned only with shallow 
restructuring, including replacing the managers themselves (Estrin and Wright. 1999. p. 
416). Rachinsky (2002. pp. 15-16) further explains this hostility by concluding that the 
turnover of managers was fairly intensive during 1997-2001. and that roughly every 
other manager was replaced by an outsider. 
On average. in 1994 insiders accounted for some 60-65% of shares of enterprises. 
outside shareholders accounted for 15-25% while the state's ownership remained as high 
as 15-20%. By 2000. the share of insiders had fallen to 30-35% while outsiders 
accounted on average for 50-55% and the state 10-12% (Radygin et al.. 2002, p. 54). 
The majority of mid-sized companies became owned by insiders as a result of the 
voucher privatisation. Owner-managers had insufficient incentives to restructure 
companies and maximise their benefit in the long run. Firstly. they had a short time 
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horizon because they regarded their titles to firms as uncertain and subject to 
expropriation. Consequently, asset stripping may have seemed like the best option. 
Secondly, it would have been difficult to realise the value of their company, as companies 
were difficult to sell in the undeveloped capital market. which reduced the incentive to 
increase a company's value. Thirdly, dividends were taxable and had to be shared with 
other stockholders (Desai and Goldberg. 2000, p. 9, Martinot. 1995, p. 132-, Fox & 
Heller, 2000, p. 4. ) Gaddy and Ickes (2002) discussed at length the idea of the rationality 
of a Russian plant manager being alien to standard Western thinking. Their main thesis is 
that Russian managers in the 1990s wanted to avoid making a profit as it was costly. This 
is because profit and cash flow attract the attention of tax authorities, criminal 
organisations. potential takeover attempts, higher prices by natural monopolies, and a 
profit-making company also found it harder to delay payments of salaries (ibid., p. 70). 
During the 1990s. violations of minority shareholders' rights were common in Russia. 
Numerous mechanisms to suppress the decision-making power of outsider and employer 
shareholders were applied by insiders- especially managers, for instance by keeping the 
share registries locked away. refusing to acknowledge the ownership of disfavoured 
individuals and threatening to fire employees (Fox & Heller, 2000. p. 1754) as well as 
dilution of authorised capital, asset stripping, reorganisation of companies and restricting 
the voting powers of shareholders (Radygin et al., 2002. pp. 50-51). Even though 
managers did not initially gain majority ownership of the voucher-privatised companies. 
they often had de facto control over the other owners (Desai and Goldberg, 2000, p. 3; 
Commander et aL, 1996, p. 225). 
During this period. reallocation of the ownership of the privatised assets was ongoing. 
Even in 1990-2000. there were several corporate conflicts in Russia. some of them 
involving firearms. However. the struggle over property rights was estimated to be 
stabilising towards the end of this period (Radygin et al.. 2002, pp. 50-54; Vasyliev. 
2002, p. 1-3). 
The Russian government was willing to negotiate how companies should follow the law 
rather than apply the same rules to everyone. partly because some areas of legislation 
were so strict that they were impossible to enforce in practice. This weakened the 
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possibilities for transparent governance and the rule of law to take over (Gaidar. 1999. p. 
8). 
The corporate tax system was generally unpredictable and burdensome as it was based on 
gross revenues, rather than profits. The laws were often not enforced, new taxes were 
introduced without cancelling the old ones and compames widely evaded taxes. New 
corporate structures were designed to "limit" the tax obligation (Aslund. 2002, p. 233, 
IEA. 2002a, pp. 30-31). 
In 1994, a government programme that allowed companies to use half of their daily 
balance to pay wages led to the rapid growth of tax arrears in Russia and weakened tax 
discipline by sending the signal that tax arrears would be tolerated and could be 
negotiated (Schaffer, 1998). The new 1998 government institutional 1 sed tax negotiations 
with companies and payments to the government in kind (Gaidar. 1999, p. 8). Non-cash 
settlements of taxes. utility bills. etc.. and subsidies aimed at avoiding the social costs of 
redundancy by paying workers and supplier companies were regarded as generating 
positive added value (Schaffer. 1998). 
Barter was one consequence of the Russian system of taxation and payment. The State 
Tax Service deducted tax payments from the bank, accounts of debtor companies. To 
avoid this, companies made payments through offshore bank accounts. Barter was also 
used to hide the real state of affairs from tax authorities and minority shareholders. These 
practices put potentially productive companies at a cost disadvantage and. therefore, 
blocked investment and growth (Desai and Goldberg, 2000, pp. 8.12). 
The Russian court system functioned slowly and corruption of judges was common. 
There was also a lack of training in business cases. which had a negative impact on 
companies in Russia that were looking for greater legal certainty (Fox & Heller, 2000, p. 
1764). The first insolvency law was passed in 1992. It was based on the value of the 
company being lower than its debts. As the calculation would have required a lot of 
expertise from the weak courts. the law was not commonly implemented. The second law 
on insolvency was passed in 1998, and its approach was to facilitate a bankruptcy if a 
company was unable to fulfil its obligations in a timely manner. This legislation was 
abused to cause premeditated bankruptcies to protect directors from shareholders 
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(Radygin et al.. 2005, pp. 52-61). There were common obstacles to filing for insolvency 
or pursuing debtors. such as creditors having bargaining power to collect a debt outside 
the court system. the lack of experience of the legal procedure and the dubious assets of 
creditors which might have been revealed (see also Tompson. 2004, p. 12. Commander el 
al., 1994, pp. 8 9.1 _3 )I). 
A large number of companies (47%) had no bank credit in 1994. Most bank- loans were 
short term. more than 80% of them were shorter than a year in 1994. Commander et al. 
(1996. pp. 141-157) found that, in the early 1990s, more than half of Russian companies 
that had had a loan had failed to repay it in time but none of them had faced legal action. 
Two-thirds of the companies found it easy or fairly easy to obtain short-term credit but 
three-quarters found it difficult or impossible to obtain long-term loans. Bank credit 
holding companies were more troubled than on average, and credit was seen as an 
unfavourable dependency on outsiders. Only some two-thirds of Russian industrial 
managers would be prepared to give ownership to external investors against the 
investment needed (Rautava and Sutela. 2000, p. 210). Consequently, companies mostly 
relied on retained earnings to fund fixed investment but also continued to hope for state 
credits. 
The general view by researchers was that the Russian corporate governance instruments 
failed in Russia in the 1990s (Qjankov & Murrell 2002. p. 68). Radygin et a]. (2002. PP. 
48-49) summarised the main characteristics of corporate governance in Russia in the 
1990s as including the non-stop process of reallocation of property within corporations, 
insider interest in control over financial flows and asset stripping, the loose role of 
external corporate governance mechanisms such as the stock market and bankruptcy, a 
considerable share of the state ownership in joint-stock capital, active role of the regional 
authorities as owners. regulators and commercial agents. and ineffective and selective 
enforcement of property rights. 
2.4.4 Business Environment in the 2000s 
Non-payment and barter were largely abolished by the beginning of the 2000s as they 
contributed to the 1998 economic collapse (Zanini, 2002. p. 50). The insolvency 
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legislation was reformed again in 2002 and this time the outcome included strengthening 
the rights of owners of companies ftom dishonest action through the bankruptcy process 
(Radygin et al., 2005. pp. 67-69). 
The 2002 tax reform introduced a profit-based corporate tax. The tax rate is currently 
24%, of which 5% is payable to central government. 17% to the regional government and 
2% locally (www. lowtax. net: lEA, 2002a. p. 41). 
In the mid-2000s. interest rates for loans from Russian banks were up to 18-25% and the 
loan term remained short. even though it has lengthened (up to three years) since the mid- 
1990s. as the investment climate was stabilising. An additional problem is that 
investment loans that include an initial period of paying interest only are not available. 
This forces investors to borrow more money in order to keep some to start paying the 
loan back while waiting for the prqjJect to return the investment (interview with 
Archangelsk expert). 
Ownership remains very concentrated in Russia as, the top ten families or ownership 
groups owned over 60% of Russia's stock market in 2003) (Guriev & Rachinsky. 2004. p. 
12; Ahrend & Tompson 2005. p. 54). 
During his second-term election carnpaiv mi ar , n, 
President Putin pro sed to treat the olig chs 
equally to other entrepreneurs. In 2000, he offered the oligarchs a pact that as long as 
they paid their taxes and refrain from getting involved in politics. he would respect their 
property rights and not revisit privatisation of their assets (Guriev & Rachinsky, 2004. p. 
21). As some of the oligarchs entered politics as Putin's opponents. the president ended 
the pact. The most famous example of this was the imprisonment of Mikhail 
Khodorkovsky. the owner of the oil company Yuk-os, for tax evasion, and the 
renationalisation of his company (BBC, II November 2003. Barnett. 2003. Kraus. 2005). 
The state capitalism trend of renationalising private assets in Russia has been influencing 
the business environment and investment climate in the 2000s (Radygin et a] 2002, pp. 
64-65). The fact that private business remains over-regulated provides further evidence 
that more reforms are needed to facilitate entrepreneurship in Russia. Ahrend and 
Tompson (2005. pp. 53-54) report on excess of rules and procedures posed on companies 
as well as the difficulties caused by the inconsistency in the interpretation and 
administration of regulations as well as frequent changes of legislation that make it 
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challenging for a company to comply with the law. A de-bureaucratisation package was 
introduced by the government but its implementation has been slow in the 2000s as 
officials have been resisting it. Companies also continue to suffer from corruption. 
Corporate law emerged in the late 1990s. improving the rights of stakeholders. As a 
result. some stabilisation of property rights could be observed by the early 2000s 
(Radygin el al.. 2002. p. 57). However, Vasiliev (2002, p. 8) still regarded the protection 
of shareholders' rights and the enforcement of existing legislation as very weak in Russia. 
According to Ahrend and Tompson (2005. p. 55). Russian law still lacks a clear and 
explicit definition of beneficial oAmership as the one defined by the law on joint-stock 
companies remains narrow and ambiguous. 
The Federal Financial Markets Service published a Corporate Governance Code in April 
2002 (FFMS website). The code is voluntary and aims to educate Russian business actors 
(Radygin et al., 2002. pp. 61-62). An OECD work-shop held in Helsinki in May 2007 
concluded that a more responsible business conduct can be recognised as emerging in 
Russia (OECD. 2007. pp. ' )-4). 
2.5 Summary 
This chapter has focused on the following research objectives: 
1. Introduce the Russian Soviet background and the concept of economic transition-, 
2. Introduce the development of transition and the business environment in Russia 
during the observation period. 
The Soviet tradition still influences business activities in Russia today as the 
administrative burden remains high for companies and the Russian law still lacks an 
explicit definition of beneficial ownership (Ahrend & Tompson, 2005. pp. 53-55). 
However. many refonris have already been implemented to overcome these old habits. 
Many of the basic structures of a market economy have been established including 
private ownership. market-based pricing of most products and many other market 
institutions. However. further reforms are required before the transition to a market 
economy is complete. The judicial system requires further attention, mostly on the 
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implementation side, in order to establish the rule of law. The state has to privatise the 
remaining monopolies to facilitate competition and the administrative system needs to be 
developed in a more transparent direction in order to support business activities and 
encourage investments. 
The business environment has improved in Russia since the beginning of transition. 
flowever, there is still work to be done on property rights and the state administrative 
burden that businesses are subject to. Corporate governance has become more transparent 
since the beginning of the 2000s, but the trend towards renationallsing assets is 
discouraging investments. 
55 
3. Russia, energy efficiency and energy prices 
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the Russian policies relevant to energy 
efficiency and modemisation, namely energy-saving policies and energy price policies. 
The chapter also introduces the main structures and actors of the Russian energy sector. 
which are referred to in the case studies. For the most part, the chapter focuses on 
developments in the energy sector that were relevant during the observation period 1990- 
2003. 
3.1 Energy efficiency 
3.1.1 Background to inefficiency 
The Soviet system was extremely inefficient as the efficiency of energy use was not a 
priority and was overridden by plan fulfilment. The lack of efficiency was recognised and 
discussed in the country and the potential to improve energy efficiency was established as 
a target of the Soviet energy policy (Makarov el aL. 1987, p. 946). Several attempts were 
made to increase the importance of economic efficiency. but they all failed (Nove. 1977. 
pp. 49-50). 
Prices in general did not reflect production costs or the scarcity of materials and products. 
Energy was regarded as a basic need of individuals and its production and utilisation 
were strongly subsidised (Nove, 1977. p. 266). The Soviet Union was also largely 
isolated from the oil-price shocks that awakened the need by consumers to save energy in 
the OECD countries in the 1970s (Cooper and Schipper, 1991, p. 344). 
Even though the Soviet system was not unable to innovate. as proven for instance by the 
success of exact sciences and the space programme, there were only few links between 
research and development by academics and the product development needs of industry. 
it was also difficult to get innovations approved by the governmental funding bodies 
(Goldman, 1968, pp. 79-80,87; Nove, 1977, pp. 162-163). The repair culture that 
prevailed in the Soviet Union led to a very slow stock turnover in industry and there were 
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no incentives for plant managers to innovate (Dyker, 1976. p. 45; Goldman, 1968, p. 90. 
Nove, 1977, p. 165). 
Fulfilment of the plan was the most important factor. to which improving efficiencN 
would not have contributed. In practice, plans had a short-terrn focus as fulfilling the 
current yearýs plan dominated activities. This was not conducive to the improvement of 
economic (or energy) efficiency, which provides longer-term rather than the required 
short-term benefits. In addition, ways to measure plan fulfilment did not support 
improvements in economic efficiency: production was measured in tons. ton/kms. etc.. 
and therefore saving materials required producing more items in order to fulfil the plan. 
Consequently. fuel was also wasted in order to consume the planned amount. For 
instance, Lenenergo. which provides heating in the-then Leningrad region. failed to fulfil 
its plan due to a reduced need for heating caused by an exceptionally warrn winter (Nove. 
l977. pp. 24.4&94-96,99). 
Developing under this general approach to efficiency of activities, it is hardly surprising 
that the Soviet economy was extremely inefficient. Lack of' investment in replacing 
obsolete production equipment was recognised and addressed by peresiroikd policies 
that emphasised that no more new construction should be done before the old production 
units had been modernised. One of the slogans of perestroika was to reach world 
technological standards (Gorbachev, 1987, pp. 92-93). 
3.1.2 Development of energy efficiency 
Russia is one of the most energy -intensive economies in the world. According to the IEA, 
Russia was almost three times as energy -intensive as OECD countries in 2000 (IEA, 
2002b, p. 270) and manufacturing energy use per unit of output is up to twice as high as 
in western European countries (IEA, 2002a, p. 35). Indeed. Bashmakov (1993. p. 469) 
described Russia as the Saudi Arabia of energy efficiency due to the large and cheap 
improvement potential available. Currently. the Russian energy sector risks hampering 
overall economic growth (Bashmakov 2006, JEA, 2002a. p. 202). Table 3.1 shows the 
development of the ratio of total primary energy consumption (TPES) to GDP. Country- 
2 'rhe Russian word 'perestroika" means rebuilding or reconstruction. 
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level average energy intensity peak, ed in the mid- I 990s and the economy has become less 
energy -intensive in the 2000s. compared to the beginning of the observation period. 
Table 3.1 Development of TPES/GDP M toe per thousand 2000 US$ 
1992 1993 1994 1995 [-71-9-9-6-ý, --19? 7ý 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 20 
2.5 16 2.6 2.6 2.7 15 2.6 2.6 2.4 2.3 22 
Source: IhA, Bevond 2020 database 
The increased energy intensity in some manufacturing industries during the economic 
downturn can partly explain the mtensit-ý, peak. When the output of ten production lines 
for one product drops by half. for example. Western management would try to shut down 
five entirely and run only the other five. In Russia. due to social welfare and technical 
reasons, all ten lines might have stayed in operation when reduced output would have 
justified their shutdown (IEA. 2002a. p. 234). 
It is officially accepted that higher energy efficiency would be beneficial (Russian 
Government. 2003. p. 21). However. the Russian government has been criticised for the 
lack of action (Aslanian. 2006). Bashmakov (1993. pp. 469-470) outlined a list of 
benefits energy efficiency improvements can deliver, including reductions in consumers . 
energy bills. growth of competition for Russian products in international markets and the 
growth of energy export potential. 
Energy Saving Companies or Energy Service Companies (ESCO) have been suggested as 
a partial solution to the widespread inefficiency of the Russian economy (Martinot. 1998. 
p. 911. Martinot and Usiyevich, 2001, p. 6. Legro, 1998. Evans, 2000; Chandler et aL. 
1999). Intermediation by third parties is believed to resolve some of the transition-related 
barriers hindering energy efficiency improvements in Russia. 
3.1.3 Federal energy-saving legislation and policies 
The federal energy-saving law, N28-F-3), adopted in 1996, establishes energy efficiency as 
an important policy goal in Russia. It emphasises measurement of energy consumption, 
standardisation and certification. Organisations are obliged to measure their energy 
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consumption, otherwise the law mostly consists of general ideas rather than practical 
measures. The financial mechanism is unclear and the law only states that the measures 
will be financed by the federal and regional budgets together with Russian and foreign 
private funding (N28-F I 
The Russian Energy Strategy until 2020 (Russian goverment. 2003) published in 2000 
listed "improving the efficiency of production and consumption of energy resources" and 
"establishing the necessary stimuli and conditions for transition of the economy to an 
energy-saving path of development". In order to implement the Energy Strategy and the 
energy-saving law. in 2001 the government approved a federal "Energy Efficient 
Economy" programme for 2002-2005 and looking ahead to 2010. The programme covers 
the whole country and its political goals remain vague. The aims repeat the goals of the 
energy strategy and energy-saving law on turning the economy towards an energy- 
efficient development path. The numeric target outlined in the Energy Efficient Economy 
program-me is to reduce the energy intensity of the economy by 13.4% by 2005 and by 
26% by 2010 from the 2000 level (Russian Government. 2001, p. 9). The IEA (2002a. 
pp. 225-226) argued that the 2005 target was very easy to achieve even without any 
targeted measures. as structural changes in the economy would automatically deliver a 
reduction in energy intensity. Based on the 1EA data (Beyond 2020 database). the 
TPES/GDP ratio had already improved by 12.5% of the 2000 level by 2003 (see Table 
3.4), so it seems that the lEA's argument is valid. Typically for Russian policy-making, 
the programme does not only cover issues related to energy efficiency but also wider 
fuel-supply security. nuclear safety. and environmental and employment-related issues 
(Russian Government, 2001, p. 9). 
The energy-saving law has not been implemented in practice - for instance, only a 
limited amount of programmes have been drafted and implemented. Bashmakov (2004b) 
and IEA (2002a, pp. 225-226) have argued that energy efficiency policy was very weak 
during 1994-2004. as no division of responsibilities had been established or financial 
support provided. The lEA (2002a, 226) has also argued that the implementation of the 
federal energy saving programme depends on the success of the regional programmes. 
Aslanian (2006) added that the Energy Efficient Economy programme valid until 2005 
failed as it did not achieve its targets (which were vaguely defined as discussed above). 
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He also argued that the absence of a state body responsible for energy efficiency policy is 
a shortcomýing of the system, and gave an example of the lack of definition of 
responsibilities with the implementation of the current programme,,. 
According to Bashmakov (1993. p. 464), a process of transformation to a market 
economy cannot be successful if the old structure of the economy is not changed. 
Structural changes influence energy efficiency. This is illustrated in Figure 3.1, which 
shows the potentially enormous impact of economic reform compared to business as 
usual and separate, technical energy-saving measures. 
Figure 3.1 Impact of energy saving and economic reform on energy consumption in Russia 
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The Russian government estimated in the Energy Strategy that about 20% of Russia's 
energy-efficiency potential per year could be implemented at US$15 per the energy- 
saving of a tonne of coal equivalent while 65% of the costs of the potential energy- 
savings are between US$15 and US$60 per tonne of coal equivalent. These savings were 
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estimated to require a total investment of U S$7-1 7 billion from 2002 to 2010 and another 
US$25-50 billion in the period to 2020 (IEA. 2002a, p. 239). 
3.2 Energy price policies 
3.2.1 Development of prices 
Tables 3.2 and 33.3 show that real energy prices have multiplied since 1995. Electricity 
tariffs generally increased in 1996-1997, but with the 1998 financial crisis and the 
devaluation of the rouble, tariffs dropped to an all-time low. which was a dramatic 
setback for electricity tariff reform (lEA, 2002a- p. 209). Dunng the 1990s, electricity 
and heat prices rose much less than inflation or industrial producer prices. which reduced 
the incentive of consumers to save energy (IEA. 2002a. p. 207; IEA. '2002b, p. 273). The 
falling prices of electricity and other fuels than oil after the 1998 economic downturn are 
obvious from Table 3.3. 
Table 3.2 Development of average consumer electricity and gas price, 2000 US$ 
Unit 1992 1995 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 1 200 
Electricitv 1,000 5.8 13.5 14.4 12.4 13.9 16.0 18.7 18.7 
kWh (N/A) (0.27) (10.41) (1.77) (11.01) (12.56) (15.75) (16.14) 
Gas Month/ 0.06 0.16 0.27 0.21 0.20 0.21 0.25 0.28 
person (N/A) (0.003) 0.24 (0-03) (0.16) (0.16) (0.21) (0.24) 
uenatea prices aajustea with consumer price inflation in brackets. For instance. tne cleTialea 
electricity price in 2003 when the consumer price inflation was 13.7% was calculated as follows: 
(100- 13.7/100)* 18.7. 
Source: Federal Service of State Statistics, 2004, pp. 27,383; GoskomstaL 2002b, pp. 36,599. 
Conversion from rouble based on JEA Beyond 2020 database GDP. Consumer price inflation 
figures based on the World Economic Outlook Database of the International Monetary Fund. 
Tables 3.2 and -3 ). 3 illustrate that there is a difference in electricity prices 
between 
households and industry; however, it seems to be fairly small in the case of these average 
figures (and the industrial prices were even lower in the case of deflated figures in 1995 
and 2001), given the lEA reports that the gap between industrial and residential prices 
widened after the rouble devaluation (IEA. 2002a, p. 209). Indeed. some analysts argue 
that many companies and households are overwhelmed by high energy costs (Martinot 
and Usiyevich 2001. p. 365--67) because the proportion of energy costs of their total 
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income is high, even compared to that of the OECD. The units of consumer and industrial 
gas prices shown in Tables 3-2 and 3.3 are not comparable. 
Table 3.3 Development of average energy prices for industrial consumers, 2000 US$ 
I Unit 1995 1998 1999 1 2000 2001 
0.03 20.00 13.95 14.57 16.02 
Electricirv 1,000 kWh (0.02) (16.29) (3.85) (7.19) (13.38) 
0.07 43.11 102.95 147.59 79.89 
oil t (0.004) (35.12) (28.42) (91.93) (66.72) 
0.27 167.48 300.32 308.84 225.27 
Petro] (0.02) (136.43) (82.92) (192.38) (188.15) 
0.21 138.62 253.87 267.60 219.90 
Diesel (0-01) (112.92) (70.09) (166.69) (183.66) 
0.07 59.06 70.35 105.43 61.95 
Heavy fuel oil (0.004) (48.11) (19.42) (65.67) (51.74) 
0.05 28.52 18.11 16.64 17.46 
Gas 1.000 m3 (0.003) (2.33.2-3)) (5.00) (10.37) (14 * 
58) 
0.02 19.91 14.93 13). 86 15.75 
Coal (0-001) (16.22) (4.12) (8.63) 1 (13. IýL 
Deflated prices adjusted with consumer price inflation in brackets. For instance, the deflated 
electricity price in 2001 when inflation was 16.48% was calculated as follows: (100- 
16.48/100)* 16.02. 
Source: Goskomstat 2002b, p. 411. Conversion from rouble based on lEA Beyond 20-10 database 
GDP. GDP deflator figures based on the World Economic Outlook Database of the International 
Monetary Fund. 
Table 3.4 illustrates the differences in industrial energy prices between Finland. two other 
EU countries and the Russian regions in question. Electricity prices in Karelia and 
Archangel sk are at 3 8.03 % and 64.1 % of the Finni sh list prices. however, pulp and paper 
corporates buy electricity in bulk on long contracts and own shares in electricity 
companies, which brings the real price down. The difference between the Russian and 
European gas prices is even more dramatic. Table 33.4 also shows that even though oil 
products and coal are supposed to be market-pnced in Russia. the Finnish price for coal is 
about five times as high and heavy fuel oil some 3.1-3.7 times as high as in Russia. This 
is mostly due to taxes. including 22% value-added tax (VAT). In 200_3, Finnish taxes on 
electricity were IF4.53/MWh plus VAT, heavy fuel oil C59.6/t plus VAT. gas 
3 C19.04/1.000 m plus VAT. coal E44.7/t plus VAT and petrol IF587.6/t plus VAT (JEA, 
2004. p. 23). 
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Table 3.4 Comparison of industrial electricity and fuel prices between Karelia, 
Archangelsk, Yinland, the United Kinjzdom and Germanv in 2003 
Unit 
EUR/ Karelia Archangelsk Finland UK Germany 
Electricity Mwh 21.68 36.29 56.6 511.9 69.7 
Heavy 
fuel oil 1 71.04 84.25 265.8 N/A N/A 
Gas GJ 0.71 0.66 6.37 4.87 6.73 
Coal t 22.63 21.4 106.7 N/A N/A 
Petrol t 3 021.8 7 
_287.36 
1490.5 1494.3 1494.4 
source: Kareikomstat. 2UU4, Promishlennost respubliki Karelii, pp. 126-7. Archangelskii 
oblkomstat. 2004. Sotsialno-ekonornitseskoje polozenie, p. 94; Eurostat website - section EnerfD. 
Table 3.5 shows the development of prices of other fuels compared to that of unregulated 
oil. It shows that most other fuels had become relatively cheaper than oil in 2001 since 
1994. Only the price of gas increased compared to oil between 1994 and 2001: however, 
its pnce remains very low compared to oil or even coal. 
Table 3.5 Development of energy prices compared to oil price 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 20017 
Oil 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Electricity 58 58 61 67 71 28 27 36 
Petro] 264 268 257 269 386 464 363 304 
Diesel 228 227 241 269 
. 
322 338 337 318 
Heavy fuel oil 112 101 HI 117 134 125 145 94 
Gas 7 6 11 10 13 6 6 10 
Coal 26 25 38 37 42 17 16 19 
Source: Goskornstat. 2002a- p. 606. 
RAO Unified Energy Systems (RAO UES) and Gazprorn are lobbying for domestic price 
reforrn as they need money to invest in updating their networks. Many regional electricity 
distribution companies are experiencing difficulties with infrastructure maintenance due 
to lack of funding. Without an increase in electricity tariffs to cover all costs and a return 
on investment. companies will not be able to reinvest in maintaining and increasing 
generating capacity (lEA, 2002a, p. 211). 
3.2.2 Price seffing 
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Oil and coal prices were liberalised in 1992 while electricity, gas and heat prices are still 
regulated by the state (IEA, 2003 p. 42; IEA, 2002a, p. 35). The Federal Energy 
Commission (FEC)3 was established in 1995 to regulate all natural monopolies. It is 
responsible for: 
& setting the maximum wholesale prices for RAO UES-owned fossil-fuel and 
hydropower plants; 
* regulating nuclear power plants and energos, as well as the recommended selling 
price for sales on the Federal Wholesale Market (FOREM); 
" setting charges for services provided by RAO UES in FOREM; 
" setting tariffs for the use of the RAO UES transmission grid; 
" setting purchase prices for electricity from nuclear plants; 
" regulating gas prices and gas pipeline transportation; and 
" supervising the regional energy commissions (RECs) by setting an indicative 
range of consumer tariffs for each region and approving the nominations of the 
management of the RECs. 
The RECs set consumer tariffs for electricity and heat at regional level, within guidelines 
and boundaries set by the FEC. Even though RECs are supposed to be independent, their 
independence from regional administrations is not always complete. For instance, 
budgets for most RECs had to be approved by their regional administrations (IEA, 2002a, 
p. 207; Federal Energy Commission website). 
According to the FEC, prices for residential consumers should cover the full costs of 
supply, plus a 5% profit margin. In practice, residential tariffs are set artificially low, 
often below production costs (IEA, 2003 p. 47). The IEA (2005, p. 17) has estimated that, 
for instance, electricity wholesale prices need to rise by 40% in order to make tariffs cost- 
effective. 
Electricity sales from co-generation are used to cross-subsidise losses from heat supply as 
one of the peculiarities of the Russian energy-pricing system is that industrial customers 
pay more for their electricity than residential customers (Korppoo and Stem, 2002, p. 26; 
JEA, 2002a, p. 220; IEA, 2003 p. 47). 
3 The FEC was replaced by the Federal Tariff Service in 2004 (Decree of the President of the Russian 
Federation #314) i. e. after the observation period of this study. 
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The Energy Strategy plans a reform of the energy sector towards competitive energy 
prices (Russian Government 2003, pp. 31,78; IEA, 2002a, p. 44). T'he price effect on 
consumers was indeed the main factor stimulating efficiency gains in the OECD 
countries in the 1970s (lEA, 2002a, p. 229), which provides the background to the plan of 
the Russian government. The first version of the Energy Strategy until 2020 aimed to 
increase energy prices significantly during 2002-2007.4 For instance, the price of gas was 
originally planned to increase at a pace which, according to the IEA, would have met the 
European price level by 2007 (lEA, 2002a, p. 24). This has not happened. According to 
the lEA (2006, p. 43), the maximum Russian regulated industrial gas price was US$40 
per thousand ml in 2005, while at the same time the European border price was US$260 
per thousand M3.5 Even though the planned tariff increases of I I% in 2006 and 8% in 
2007 were implemented, gas prices still remained significantly below European border 
prices. 
3.3.3 Non-Payment 
The non-payment problem also hindered investments during the observation period as it 
left energy companies with less money to invest in updating their equipment (IEA, 1995, 
p. 199). During the 1990s, non-payment of energy bills was widespread, which made 
increasing energy prices meaningless. (lEA, 1995, p. 55). The IEA (1995, p. 83) 
estimated that only some 40-50% of bills and penalties were collected. The lack of a 
legal basis made it impossible to enforce contracts and energy suppliers had no right to 
cut off non-paying customers. When the government banned non-monetary transactions 
in the public sector in 2000, the problem was largely resolved (lEA, 2002b, P. 272). RAO 
UES had to toughen its position against non-paying customers, as Gazprom imposed hard 
budget constraints on RAO UES by demanding 100% payment for gas deliveries (IEA, 
2002a, p. 211). Many of the largest non-payers were state bodies and, therefore, a major 
part of the solution to the non-payment problem was in the hands of federal and local 
governments. The federal government increased the budgets of administrations in 2000 to 
" The Russian government has updated the Energy Strategy document since it was published, and this goal 
has been deleted from the version currently available on the website of the Ministry of Industry and 
Energy. 
5 However, additional transportation costs and export taxes mean that Russian prices can be significantly 
below European border prices and still be equivalent. 
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allow them to pay their energy bills (lEA, 2002a, p. 211), but this has not worked 
completely as the interviewed pulp and paper plants were still experiencing non-payment 
for heat delivered to the local administrations in 2003-2004. 
3.3 Main structures and actors of the energy sector 
Russia is divided into seven regional grids or energy systems. Almost 75% of Russian 
electricity is produced in three of the seven systems: Urals, Siberia and Central. Nuclear 
power production is largest in the Northwest system. Hydroelectricity accounts for almost 
half of production in the Siberia system and almost a quarter in the Volga and Far East 
systems. Thermal power generation accounts for 70-90% of production in the Urals, 
North Caucasus and Far East systems (IEA, 2002a, p. 194). 
The Federal Wholesale Market was established in 1995 to redistribute surplus electricity 
and generation capacity. The sellers on the market are nuclear power stations, RAO UES 
power plants and regional utilities (energos) enjoying a surplus, while the buyers are 
energos in deficit and large industrial consumers. Most electricity imports and exports 
also go through FOREM. Electricity is bought from a pool rather than from the chosen 
supplier. It is difficult for customers to enter the market even though the process was 
simplified in 2000; the customers are required to be large enough (100 million kWh per 
year) and RAO UES can influence the outcome of entry applications. FOREM is a 
"technical market" which does not involve competition or market-based price setting as 
RAO UES can influence the regulator and the prices are set by FEC6 (Bashmakov, 2002, 
pp. 5-6; IEA, 2002a, p. 205; IEA, 2003, p. 48). A restructuring of the electricity market 
and RAO UES was launched in 2001. The main idea involves reorganising the generating 
companies belonging to RAO UES into independent companies, while a state 
transmission company will be formed to handle the high-voltage grid. Tbe regional 
energy companies will be obliged to create separate companies for generation and 
distribution (Bashmakov, 2002, p. 7; RAO UES website, 2006). However, the lEA 
FEC became the Federal Tariff Service in 2005. 
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reports delays with implementing the plan even though also positive developments have 
been observed (IEA, 2005, p. 19-20). 
The Western and Central regions of Russia have the highest penetration of the gas 
distribution network, while 53% of all communities are linked to a gas pipeline. 
Gasification is more common in towns and cities than in the countryside (lEA, 2006, p. 
37). The state-controlled dominant company Gazprom controls the entry of gas to the 
transport network and operates a quota system of gas available to the customers at 
regulated (low) prices. Plans to reform the gas sector have been established but not yet 
implemented (Ahrend and Tompson, 2005b, p. 805-810). 
A major disadvantage for the Russian energy sector is the location of many fossil-fael 
resources far away from populated areas. Many regions are not connected to oil and gas 
pipelines, which makes them dependent on unreliable and expensive fuel supplies by rail 
and road. Interregional fuel transport lacks reliability and, therefore, areas connected to 
pipelines can also experience fuel shortages in the case of pipeline failures as the 
infrastructure is old and in need of upgrades (IEA, 2003, p. 98; IEA, 2002a, pp. 46,200). 
Russian analysts sometimes refer to these uncertainties as energy security (see for 
instance Russian Government, 2003, p. 17-18), which departs from the mainstream 
definition of energy security as security of international supplies (see for instance 
Mitchell, 2000, pp. 1-2; Martin et al., 1996, p. 4; Bertel, 2005). Even the IEA (2002a, p. 
202) has referred to energy security in the Russian meaning of security of supply. 
3.4 Summary 
This chapter focused on the following research objectives: 
3. Describe the Russian energy-saving and energy price policies and the main 
structures and problems of the Russian energy sector during the observation 
period. 
Russian energy consumption remains, on average, inefficient in international comparison. 
Energy-saving policies lack ambitious targets and implementation. Economic reform is 
projected to have a significant impact on the development of energy efficiency. Energy 
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prices rose during the observation period. However, the prices of gas and electricity are 
kept artificially low by the state and, therefore, they do not always cover the production 
and transportation costs. During the observation period, the following changes related to 
energy prices, structures and energy saving policies took place in the Russian energy 
sector: 
the energy intensity of the Russian economy increased as a result of the 
decreasing production volumes and started decreasing towards the end of the 
observation period; 
energy prices increased as a result of deregulation of the oil and coal prices 
gas and electricity tariffs also increased; however, gas prices remained especially 
low compared to OECD prices; 
* the electricity wholesale market was established and restructuring of the 
electricity sector was launched but not fmalised; 
9 the gas market continued largely to be a monopoly of the state-controlled 
Gazprom; 
a non-payment of energy bills problem emerged after the break-up of the Soviet 
Union, and was resolved around 2000; and 
federal energy-saving legislation was adopted in 1996. Its implementation has 
been based on the regional energy-saving laws, examples of which are ftu-ther 
discussed in Chapters 7 and 8. 
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4. Methodology 
4.1 Research task 
4.1.1 Focusing the research 
Deciding on the topic of this PhD thesis was challenging as I wanted to focus on the very 
wide topic of energy consumption in Russian industry. Therefore, the topic had to be 
narrowed down carefully to suit PhD research to be carried out within three years. 
Narrowing down the topic to regional level seemed like the obvious solution. I had some 
contacts in the Republic of Karelia and Archangelsk oblast, which contributed towards 
choosing these regions. 
The pulp and paper sector is an important one and an important energy consumer in both 
of these Russian regions. In addition, the number of production units in the Russian 
regions was, at the same time, manageable to cover in this study and large enough to 
provide material even though some of the plants had not been interested in participating 
in the study. 
Finland was chosen as a comparison country because it is a market economy and has a 
well-established pulp and paper sector. Comparison of an industrial sector between a 
market economy and a transition economy is one of the key focuses of this study. This 
study looks at the remaining differences between the industrial sectors and also seeks 
similarities, in order to judge whether the Russian pulp and paper sector is far from a pulp 
and paper sector typical of a market economy. 
4.1.2 Hypotheses 
The hypotheses of this study are the following: 
1) The Finnish pulp and paper industry, acting in a market economy system, uses 
energy more efficiently than the Russian pulp and paper industry in a transition 
economy; 
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2) As an established market economy, Finland can provide lessons to the Russian 
regions on modernisation of the pulp and paper industry; 
3) Drivers of and barriers to modernisation are different in a market economy than in 
a transition economy; 
4) An empirical study on drivers of and barriers to modernisation of pulp and paper 
industry in a transition economy can amend the existing theoretical literature on 
drivers of and barriers to energy efficiency. 
The first hypothesis establishes the basis for drawing lessons for Russia. This is because a 
more energy-efficient country can be regarded as a good example of how to achieve a 
high level of energy efficiency. The second hypothesis spells out the assumption that the 
Finnish experiences of modernisation and energy-saving will provide lessons which are 
relevant to Russia. This may not necessarily be the case should the experiences be so 
different that drawing links between them would be irrelevant. 7 The third hypothesis 
continues this discussion by assuming that even though there are lessons to be learnt, the 
drivers of and barriers to modernisation will be different in Finland and Russia. Finally, 
the fourth hypothesis states the assumption that the theoretical literature on drivers of and 
barriers to energy efficiency will benefit from this analysis of drivers of and barriers to 
modernisation. This is because modernisation will deliver energy efficiency 
improvements and empirical results can test the applicability of the theory in practice. 
I had to develop a combination of methodology tools as there was no "shelf' 
methodology available for this kind of comparison, which involves both quantitative and 
qualitative comparisons. Sorrell et a]. (2004) published a study on barriers to energy 
efficiency during my PhD, including useful methodological approaches. However, it was 
too late to adopt this methodology for this PhD study, as the methodology for this study 
had already been formulated. In addition, Sorrell et al. had many more resources 
available, both financial and time, which made it possible to conduct more in-depth 
interviews. Therefore, their methodology would have been too ambitious for this study. 
However, Sorrell et al. have used many similar elements - what they call a 
multidimensional approach based on case studies. This includes using both quantitative 
' It is recognised that directly transplanting best practice from one country to another can be fraught with difficulties owing to the different political, economic, social and cultural contexts. 
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and qualitative methods with the emphasis on qualitative material and analysis. Indeed, 
Sorrell et al (2004, p. 8) argue, that "organisational performance in energy efficiency is 
difficult to measure and the factors that influence this performance are difficult to isolate 
through survey methods ... [while] multi-dimensional approach gives much richer picture 
of organisational decision-making and diversity of barriers". The main differences 
between this study and Sorrell et al. is their focus on barriers only, compared to my 
drivers and barriers approach, the fact that SorTell et al. are focusing on OECD countries, 
and that they have limited the amount of barriers to very few while this study had to keep 
a more open mind on the potential barriers in order to include the transition factors which 
may not fit into the existing theoretical categories. 
4.2 Definitions and key concepts 
Defining energy efficiency is a complex problem. In real life, the concept of energy 
efficiency is often used arbitrarily and the views on the meaning of energy efficiency 
differ (Hardell & Fors, 2005; IEA, 1997, p. 83). Similarly, the terms "energy saving" and 
44energy conservation" tend to be poorly defmed and often used as exchangeable with 
"energy efficiency". In order to clarify the discussion, it is desirable to make agreements 
on which types of measures should be called energy-efficiency improvements (Hardell & 
Fors, 2005). 
The table below collects definitions of energy saving and energy conservation. The main, 
repeated theme is that reduction of service is linked to energy saving and that it is 
regarded as undesirable. The last example links energy saving to energy efficiency 
programmes. 
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Table 4.1 Examnles of the definitions of enerpv saving and energv conservation 
Source 
_What 
concept contains? Focus 
IEA, 1987, P. 60 A practical example of energy conservation would Reduction of 
be to turn down the beat and wear warmer clothes service. 
indoors, or to cycle to work instead of driving. Undesirable. 
Such changes regarded as undesirable tend to be 
replaced by energy-efficiency improvements or 
just given up over time. 
US DoE: Glossary of Conservation: to reduce or avoid the consumption Reduction of 
Energy-Related Terms of a resource or commodity. service. 
Hollander & Schneider, Energy saving includes a connotation of Reduction of 
1995, p. 274 deprivation or of reducing amenities. service. 
Undesirable. 
www. teachmefinance. Energy saving is a reduction in the amount of Reduction of 
com electricity used by end-users as a result of electricity 
participation in energy-efficiency programs and consumption as a 
load-management programs. result of energy- 
efficiency 
programmes. 
The lEA (1987, pp. 60-61) has listed the following types of energy-saving measures: 
o Changes in services: for instance, change of room temperature, taking a bus instead 
of driving etc.; 
a Maintenance: improvement of efficiency without affecting services; 
Controls and monitoring: matching of timing and rate of use to consumers' needs; 
Discrete conservation investments: primarily improvements of end-use efficiency, for 
instance insulation, heat recovery equipment; 
e Integrated conservation investments: investments made primarily for reasons other 
than energy conservation, for instance replacing capital stock. 
Table 4.2 below lists examples of the definition of energy efficiency. The relationship of 
output value and energy input without affecting services is included in all definitions, and 
operational changes are included in the definition in most cases. MOTIVA even includes 
reducing fossil-fuel input in the concept of energy efficiency, which does not seem 
correct when compared with the other definitions. 
Table 4.2 Examples of the derinitions of energy efficiency 
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Source What concept contains? Focus 
Swedish Energy "To obtain an unchanged output value at a Relationship of output 
Agency (as reported reduced energy consumption level. " value and energy input 
by Hardell & Fors, "To obtain an increased output value with without affecting 2005, p. 6) unchanged energy consumption or to obtain an services. 
output value that in relative terms surpasses the 
increase on energy consumption. " 
JEA (1997), Energy Energy efficiency refers to the relationship Relationship of output 
Ei , 
ficiency Initiative, between the output (service) of a device or a value and energy input 
volume I, p. 83 system and energy put into it. Improving energy without affecting 
efficiency aims at doing more with equal or less services. Operational 
IEA (1987), Eneqy energy input. changes. 
conservation in Behavioural and managerial changes, i. e., 
IEA countries, p. operational changes of energy production, 
44 transportation and utilisation belong to the 
context of energy efficiency. 
MOTIVA, Finland Reducing the specific consumption (MJ/t) of Relationship of output 
(as reported by primary energy, end-use energy or fossil fuels value and energy or 
Hardell & Fors, or reducing the amount of primary energy or fossil-fuel input 
2005, p. 6) fossil fuels needed to produce one unit of without affecting 
economic activity. services. 
World Energy Energy efficiency improvements refer to a Relationship of output 
Council, London, reduction in the energy used for a given energy value and energy input 
2001. Energy service (heating, lighting ... ) or level of activity - without affecting Efficiency Policies This reduction in the energy consumption is not services. Operational 
andIndicators necessarily associated to technical changes, changes. Economic 
since it can also result ftom a better organisation changes. 
and management (e. g. domotics) or improved 
economic efficiency in the sector (e. g. overall 
gains of productivity). Energy efficiency 
includes technological, behavioural and 
economic changes. 
Blok (2003), Energy As energy is used to fulfill human needs, one Relationship of output 
Analysis, p. 117 may define energy efficiency of an activity as value and energy input 
the degree to which given human needs can be without affecting 
fulfilled through that activity with a minimum services. Operational 
amount of energy. Energy efficiency depends on changes. 
design of equipment (technical efficiency) and 
their operation (behavioural factors). 
As there are no agreed definitions of either energy saving/energy conservation or energy 
efficiency, definitions for this study are drawn from the examples above. 
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In this study, energy efficiency refers to the relationship between the output (service) of a 
device or a system and the energy put into it (IEA 1997, p. 83). Energy efficiency 
depends on the design of equipment (technical efficiency) and its operation (behavioural 
factors) (Blok, 2003, p. 117). The degree of utilising production capacity also influences 
energy efficiency (Hardell & Fors, 2005, p. 20) and is closely linked to the operation of 
equipment mentioned by Blok. However, such changes in energy efficiency tend to 
happen as a result of market fluctuation, which cannot be influenced by plant-level 
decision-making. In general, the energy efficiency of appliances and systems tends to 
improve over time in free markets. Amongst other things, a slow capital cycle can lock in 
energy-use patterns for long periods (lEA, 1997, p. 87). 
Energy saving is a reduction in the amount of energy used by end-users. Consequently, 
energy efficiency improvements can deliver energy savings as also recognised by 
Ostertag (2003, p. 15) and lEA (1987, pp. 60-61). Energy saving may also include a 
connotation of deprivation or of reducing amenities, as recognised by Hollander & 
Schneider (1995, p. 274) but it does not have to be linked to reducing activity as is often 
the case with energy-efficiency improvements which are included into the concept of 
energy savmg. 
Measures companies take to improve energy efficiency or save energy can be broadly 
classified as follows: 
1) measures with the main objective being to have a positive influence on the energy 
use (Hardell & Fors 2005, p. 19), or discrete conservation investments (IEA, 
1987, pp. 60-61); and 
2) measures taken for other reasons than to influence energy use, such as improving 
equipment, environmental performance etc. (Hardell & Fors, 2005, p. 19) or 
integrated conservation investments (lEA, 1987, pp. 6M 1). 8 
Hardell & Fors (2005, pp. 20-21) provide examples of energy-efficiency improvement 
measures by manufacturing industry and demonstrate how difficult it can be to 
distinguish whether a measure that reduces energy consumption is an energy-efficiency 
8 For ffirther explanation of the IEA (1987, pp. 60-61), and for the terminology used in the above 
classification, see p. 76. 
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measure. They rule out the above-mentioned change of utilisation of capacity as it is 
mostly caused by the fluctuations of the market. Outsourcing of production and an 
increase of purchased semi-manufactured goods are also not regarded as energy- 
efficiency improvements as they only transfer energy consumption from the energy 
balance of one company to the energy balance of another. Only changes in production 
technology, changes in the production layout and the introduction of internal power 
production based on own waste are regarded as genuine, active energy-efficiency 
improvements. 
Table 43 Distinction of indnqtrizal mpaenw-ou that caý. we imervv-efficienev measures 
Measure Background Energy-efficiency 
measure? 
Changes in the utilisation of Caused by fluctuations in the market. No 
capacity 
Changes in the production Replacing obsolete systems. Yes 
technology 
Changes in the production Closing unprofitable production lines, Yes 
layout similar lines of business merged. 
Internal power production No additional supply of primary energy. Yes 
Outsourcing1laying out of Selling own production facilities and No 
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process steps on other buying the product from the company 
companies which bought the production line. Only 
shifts energy use from company to 
another. 
Increasedpurchased ofsemi- Contractor uses energy which the No 
manufactured goods manufacturer would use otherwise. 
Change ofprimary energy Switching from own energy production to No 
source purchased. 
Source: Based on Hardell & Fors, 2005, pp. 20-21. 
The main concept of this study is modernisation, which consists of stock turnover, i. e., 
capital-cycle and retrofitting activities. The rationale to focus on modernisation in this 
study is the fact that it provides energy savings over time. The concept of modernisation 
is introduced because the rationale of capital cycle or even retrofitting in Russian industry 
is not to save energy but to change production patterns. Capital cycle consists of 
commissioning and decommissioning, i. e., introducing new production facilities and 
closing down old facilities. In practice, old production facilities are often replaced by new 
(therefore the name capital cycle) - however, in transition economies it is common to 
decommission unused production facilities without replacing them as many plants used to 
produce uncompetitive low quality products (see p. 29). Retrofitting refers to updating or 
replacing parts of the existing equipment (Schipper et al., 1992, p. 64). A series of 
retrofits combined with an optimising process is called rebuilding a paper machine. 
Modernisation is defined primarily as a technical process. Even though managerial 
changes in operation can save energy, these changes are not the focus of this study and 
therefore not included in the concept of modernisation. 
The concept of guaranteed availability of energy includes a secure supply of eneqy and 
fuel and the reliable functions of the transfer network. Fuel-supply security focuses on 
long transportation distances, inadequate transport and storage facilities, and payment 
failures, which cut fuel deliveries around Russia. Reliability of the transportation network 
is included, as network failures routinely leave people and industry in the dark and cold 
in Russia. The concept of guaranteed availability is often used interchangeably with 
energy security and energy-supply security by Russian actors, while in international 
discussions energy security refers to the security of international fuel supplies and 
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affordable prices (see for instance Mitchell, 2000, pp. 1-2; Martin et aL, 1996, p. 4; 
Bertel, 2005). However, the expansion of the meaning of energy security to cover 
domestic supply systems and international terrorism has been suggested (Yergin, 2006; 
Bartis et al., 2005). It has also been argued that the Russian definition of energy security 
refers to greater guarantees for the access of Russian energy to Europe (Weisman, 2006). 
A transition economy or economy in transition is a formerly centrally planned economy 
that undertakes reforms towards market economy system. Transition economies had a 
political system based on socialism in common. Russia is regarded as a transition 
economy, and economic transition was ongoing during the main observation period of the 
study, 1990-2003, which makes the concept of transition relevant to this study. 
In the context of Russian regions, foreign trade refers to the trade of companies vith 
actors in foreign countries and excludes the trade of companies with actors from other 
regions of Russia. 
Corporate organisational structure refers to governance practices which are usually 
linked with a format of ownership that combines the management of more than one 
production unit under a centralised governance system, however, also other types of 
companies can apply the same principles. The elements of corporate organisational 
structure can emerge in stages and under various combinations of owners, however, it 
usually requires the involvement of outsider owners i. e. that are not involved in running 
the plant. 
Corporate governance refers to the practices applied by the centralised governance 
system of a corporate and it involved neutral decision-making based on strategic 
thinking. Corporate governance aims at overcoming the problems with incentive 
generated by the separation of ownership and control in non-owner operated firms 
(Januszewski et al. 1999, p. 4). 
Non-payment problem refers to payment arrears to both the various levels of government 
and to a private sector actor as also defted by Pinto et al (2000, p. 2) and Desai and 
Goldberg (2000). 
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Pulp and paper-related concepts are defined in Chapter 6. Furthermore, the technical 
concepts "Specific Energy Consumption" and "energy intensity" are defined in the 
context of the Energy Efficiency Index methodology. 
4.3 Quantitative methods 
4.3.1 Energy Efficiency Index 
Energy consumption is an umbrella concept related to the energy use of an activity unit 
(country, sector etc. ). It is determined by three main factors: 
1) the level of activities, i. e., volume; 
2) the mix of different kinds of activities, i. e., structure; and 
3) the activity level per unit of energy consumed, i. e., energy efficiency (Phylipsen, 
et aL, 1998, p. 17). 
A major problem with measuring energy efficiency is how to separate the changes of 
energy efficiency from the structural changes. Energy Efficiency Index (EED 
methodology aims to separate these features in order to compare energy efficiency 
between actors (Blok, 2003, p. 120). 
ED methodology is an energy indicator used for comparisons of the energy efficiency of 
manufacturing. A number of types of energy and environmental indicators have been 
developed to assess the various aspects of sustainable development following the report 
of the Brundtland Commission in 1987 (IAEA, 2005, p. 5). The International Atomic 
Energy Agency (2005, p. 53) recognises ED methodology in category EC06: Industrial 
energy intensities, in its recent review publication on envirorunental indicators. EEI 
methodology is also linked to decomposition analysis methodology, which has been 
applied to the energy sector and developed following the oil crisis of 1973-1974 (Ang & 
Zhang, 2000, p. 1149). Decomposition analysis is applied to establish how energy 
efficiency, structural and volume-related factors influence the energy use of an activity. 
Similarly to decomposition analysis, EEI methodology aims to separate the influence of 
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energy-efficiency changes from the structural and production volume-related changes, 
even though some of the structural effects may remain present in the indicator (Blok, 
2003, p. 121,131). ED methodology has been mostly applied by Utrecht University, 
which has also published the key sources, including Blok's Energy Analysis (2003) and 
Phylipsen et al. 's Handbook on International Comparisons of Energy Efficiency in the 
Manufacturing Industry (1998). 
In the industrial sector the lack of detailed energy-consumption data for each production 
process is a problem, while production statistics are in general more detailed (Blok, 2003, 
p. 121). Indeed, pulp and paper production units often produce more than one type of 
product and therefore aggregated energy-consumption figures are problematic in the 
absence of information as to how the energy consumed has been divided between the 
product types. Such data is regarded as confidential by many companies for commercial 
reasons. Consequently, the best data available tends to be production-unit-specific total 
annual electricity and heat consumption figures, in some cases covering only the previous 
1-3 years. EEI methodology addresses this problem as follows. 
Specific Energy Consumption (SEC) is a physical energy-intensity indicator. SEC is 
defmed as the ratio of energy consumption to a measure of human activity in physical 
terms. SEC is expressed as energy consumption per weight unit of a product: 
SEC=E/P 
E is total energy consumption and P is total physical production. (Phylipsen et aL, 1998, 
p. 25; Farla et al., 1997, p. 746. ) The opposite concept of SEC is energy intensity (Blok, 
2003, p. 117) which reflects the combined effect of economic structure and energy 
efficiency (lEA, 1987, p. 41). 
If all comparison countries had the same structure of production among themselves and 
over time, the above formula could be used for comparisons. But as this is not the case in 
practice, the differences and changes of production mix have to be taken into account by 
weighting the physical production instead of simple summation of all products. For this, 
we can use the Physical Production Index (PPI): 
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PPI. (Pxw, ) jr "m I 
P is the production volume of each product and W is a reference weight factor based on 
energy used to produce each type of product, such as those given in Table 4.1 for some 
pulp products. The weight factors are based on a reference plant which can be the 
standard of best available technology or average consumption. Weight factors presented 
in Table 4.4 for basic pulp and paper production methods illustrate that some individual 
processes may produce heat as a side product (negative figures). 
Table 4.4 Weight factors for average beat and electricity consumption of the main pulp and 
paper production methods 
Fuel/beat Electricity 
Unit GJ/t GJ/t 
Mechanical wood 
pulp -2.1 5.3 
Chemical wood pulp 10 2.5 
Other wood pulp -3 6 
Other fibre pulp -3 6 
Recycled fibre pulp 0.4 1.4 
Newsprint 2.5 1.4 
Printing/writing paper 7 2 
Sanitary paper 5 2.4 
Packaging paper 5 1.5 
Other paper 6 1.8 
bource: r aria et al. I YY /, p. 749. 
In order to compare the energy efficiency between actors, the EEI has to be calculated by 
dividing total energy consumption E by PPI (Blok, 2003, p. 120). 
EEI = E/PPI 
The EEI of the reference plant (which establishes the weight factors) is 1. If the EEI of 
the plant in question is below 1, it is more efficient than the reference plant, and vice 
versa. For comparison, the same factors should be used for every country. 
Systemic boundary refers to the limitation of which energy use is included in the 
calculation (see Table 4.1). The data used in this study includes heat and electricity used 
80 
in pulp and paper production excluding losses9 from internal electricity and heat 
generation. Phylipsen el al. (1998. p. 6) and Blok (2003), p. 21-22) call this boundary 
limiting the energy consumption to. final enerD% It is not obvious from the data whether 
the consumption of a recovery boiler or the evaporation of waste liquids are included. 
Figure 4.1 Various possible dermitions of systemic boundary 
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Source: Phylipsen et al 1998. p. 8 
In this study. EEI is calculated separately for heat and electricity consumption in order to 
provide as accurate comparisons as possible. This division is facilitated by the 
methodology as it provides separate weighting factors for heat and electricity. 
' The data of Plant 5 is not explicit as to whether losses are excluded. 
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Figure 4.2 Example of interpreting Energy Efficiency Indices: beat efficiency index of plant 
X 
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Figure 4.2 shows the Heat Efficiency Index of an example plant X. The heat consumption 
of this plant has become more efficient over the years on average, as the index is smaller 
at the end of the observation period than at the beginning of it. However, there was a 
2001 peak in the index, which reflects a year when heat was used less efficiently. This 
could have been caused, for instance, by running the equipment on lower capacity or 
introducing and testing a new paper machine. As discussed above, value I of the EEI is 
the efficiency level of the reference plant upon which the weighting factors are based. 
When the EEI is above 1, the example plant is less efficient than the reference plant, and 
when the EEI is below 1, the example plant is more efficient. This example plant was less 
efficient than the reference plant at the beginning of the observation period - it reached 
the heat efficiency level of the reference plant in 1993 and by the end of the observation 
period the example plant was using heat more efficiently than the reference plant as the 
EEI value is below 1. The reference plant is a frozen comparison figure, i. e., the reference 
number remains the same over the observation period while the example plant is 
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developing dynamically. The task of the reference plant is to make comparisons between 
plants possible, and its efficiency level is not important in this study. 
4.3.2 EEI in the context of production volume 
I have also presented EEI figures in the context of the development of production volume 
as there has been a significant difference between the production trends of Russia and 
Finland in the 1990s. VVhile Finland has mostly continued to increase its production 
volume, Russian production volume collapsed after the systemic change in 1991. EEI 
calculations are presented in the context of the production volume of main products to 
illustrate the volatility of Russia in the 1990s in comparison to the stability of Finland. 
These figures show how collapsing volumes of main products have a negative effect on 
the energy efficiency of production processes, which tend to fall when equipment is run 
at low capacity. 
Presenting EEI figures in the context of production volume follows Batalov, Samorodov 
& Yulkin (2002, p. 7), who have used this method to illustrate the plant-level 
relationships of production and energy consumption trends. 
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Figure 4.3 Example of energy efficiency indices of Plant X in the context of pulp production 
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Figure 4.3 illustrates the electricity and heat efficiency indices of an example plant X in 
the context of its pulp production. Even though EEls are aggregate figures, it is useful to 
see them in the context of the production volumes of the main products, in most Cases 
pulp and/or newsprint or printing paper. Figure 4.3 shows how the volume of the pulp 
production of Plant X decreased from some 220,000 t in 1993 to some 70,000 t in 1997. 
At the same time, the electricity and heat efficiency indices increased until 1997, 
reflecting decreasing efficiencies. The indices then returned to the 1993 level and below 
in the pace of growing production volumes, which indicates improving energy efficiency. 
Both electricity and heat consumption of the example plant remain less efficient than that 
of the reference plant, i. e., above 1. 
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4.4 Qualitative methods 
4.4.1 Case studies 
Case studies report and analyse the outcome of each plant visit. I decided to provide all 
the information from each plant in order to demonstrate the detail and depth of the data 
available and to make it easier to follow the analysis and comparisons between plants and 
regions. 
A case study is an empirical inquiry that 1) investigates a contemporary phenomenon 
within its real-life context, when 2) the boundaries between phenomenon and context are 
not clearly evident, and 3) in which multiple sources of evidence are used (Yin, 1989, p. 
23). These characteristics apply to my case studies as the energy use of a pulp and paper 
production process is a contemporary phenomenon, it was unclear at the beginning of the 
study which dynamics influence the modernisation process, and multiple sources of 
information were used. According to Eckstein (2000, p. 135), case studies can prove 
established theories wrong should a theory which ought to fit not fit the case, and point to 
parts of a theory which require further research. The case studies in this research are used 
to test and amend the theoretical literature of drivers of and barriers to energy efficiency. 
Case studies can be single or multiple and are meant to be replicating, i. e., similar results 
are expected from each case to triangulate the information between the case studies (Yin, 
1989, p. 53). Case studies used in this study follow the latter description, i. e., are 
multiple. 
Yin (1989, p. 95-103) has outlined three Principles of data collection for case studies: 1) 
using multiple sources of evidence to triangulate them; 2) creating a case-study database; 
and 3) maintaining the chain of evidence in order to establish the validity of the study. 
This can be done by referTing back to the database. The case studies used in this study 
have followed these guidelines very closely. 
Typical sources of evidence for case studies include documentation, archive records, 
interviews, direct observation, participant observation and physical artefacts (Yin 1989, 
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p. 87-95). My case studies consist of documentation, archive records and interview 
materials, i. e., they combine multiple data sources. 
Table 4.5 illustrates the structure of the case studies in this research that makes them 
comparable, and easy to triangulate against each other. Most of the details were available 
for each plant; however, about half the case-study plants did not provide adequate 
numeric data on production and energy consumption and in these cases the EEI analysis 
was omitted from the case study. 
Table 4.5 Contents of a case study 
Element of case Issues to be analysed 
study 
Technology path 0 Waves of modernisation and/or replacement of equipment 
0 Changes of product mix 
0 Development strategies of company (moves from product to another , raw material to another, retiring/introducing facilities, 
increasing/reducing capacity) 
0 Changes of energy efficiency caused by changes of infrastructure 
0 Changes of capacity 
0 Age of existing capacity 
Developments of a Development of energy efficiency based on EEI figures 
energy efficiency - 0 Trends in energy efficiency based on EEI figures 
tables and graphs 
Developments of 0 Development trends of EEI in the context of the developments of 
energy efficiency production volumes 
in the context of 0 Influence of production volume changes to EEI 
production - 0 Statistical errors (significant peaks that cannot be explained), gaps in 
graphs data 
0 Comment on the scale of the figure: how significant are changes of 
energy efficiency? 
Drivers and a Most important D&B categories barriers (D&Bs) 0 Division of D&Bs between categories 
0 Plant-specific conditions and their influence on D&Bs 
0 Explanations of any complicated D&Bs 
Conclusion 0 Main characteristics of the technology path and corporate strategies it 
illustrates: progressive/regressive 
" Age of current infrastructure 
" Conclusion on development of energy efficiency 
" The main characteristics of drivers and barriers, and whether they link 
with the development of technology and energy intensitv 
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This data was first collected from case-study databases, which made it possible to follow 
the chain of evidence when comparing the studies. In practice, each case study had a 
physical file of data in different formats. The data on technology change, and drivers and 
barriers were recorded into standardised tables. The quantitative data of the case studies 
was triangulated in the EEI comparisons, and the qualitative data on the development of 
technology compared against the quantitative data when possible. The use of the case- 
study database is ftuther described in the section "drivers and barriers" below. 
4.4.2 Interviews 
Interviews were the main method to collect material for this study. According to 
Denscombe (1998, p. 110-111), when designing a study a researcher has to consider 
between collecting a smaller amount of in-depth data by interviews and gathering more 
superficial data from a larger number of people by a structured questionnaire survey. I 
also had the required financial resources and time available for interviews that are 
considered time-consuming by many (see for instance Denscombe, 1998, p. I 11; Robson 
1993, p. 229). Denscombe (1998, p. 110-111) encourages one to think: 
1) whether the research really requires the kind of detailed information that 
interviews supply, and; 
2) whether it is reasonable to rely on information gathered from a small number of 
individuals. 
Answering the first question, i. e., deciding in favour of face-to-face interviews was easy 
in the case of this study. It was considered crucial to visit the respondents to confirm that 
the information required would be made available as well as to engage in some dialogue 
over the nature of the hypotheses and related issues being raised. A survey questionnaire 
sent by (e)mail may have not taken me very far with the Russian industrialists, because in 
the Russian system personal trust needs to be established in order to expect people to take 
time to provide information for research that has no direct benefit to them. I attempted to 
establish such trust and credibility by using a local contractor to organise the interviews 
and convince the people chosen that I was a person they have worked with and should be 
taken seriously. This worked well in Russia, and all plants provided interviews. 
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The answer to the second question by Denscombe on the reliability of information 
gathered from a small number of individuals is positive as, even though the sample is 
small in numbers, the total population available on the topic in the focus Russian regions 
was targeted. There is a much larger number of Finnish pulp and paper units; however, 
only some needed to be covered in order to provide a comparison to the Russian regions. 
The same pattern started to repeat in the interviews with the Finnish companies, which 
showed that the data had saturated and there was no need for further interviews. All the 
plants had similar patterns of energy pricing, the same drivers and barriers were 
mentioned, the importance of corporate ownership became obvious, etc. As the lack of 
Finnish plant-level data seemed to penetrate through most of the sector, finther 
interviews were unlikely to solve the problem. 
After deciding to use interviews as the main method of data collection, I had to choose 
between fully structured/standardised and unstructured/unstandardised types of 
interviews. Fully structured interviews are based on a predetermined set of questions and 
responses recorded on a standardised schedule, while unstructured interviews are based 
on the researcher letting the conversation develop freely on a general area of interest 
(Berg, 2001, pp. 69-70). For the purposes of this study, the ideal type of interview was 
somewhere in the middle of these theoretical extremes. I chose semi-structured/semi- 
standardised interviews because this methodology allowed me to set quite a well- 
prepared set of questions but evolve on a topic that seemed fruitful or drop a question 
which was irrelevant to the respondent (Robson, 1993, pp. 23 0-23 1; Berg, 200 1, p. 70). 
1 chose my interviewees based on their expert knowledge. This privileged (Denscombe, 
1998, p. I 11) or elite (Guba and Lincoln, 198 1, p. 157) information can be provided by 
the key players on the field who are able to give information that others cannot, as a 
result of their expertise, position or insight. Denscombe (1998, P. 133) adds that the 
testimony of these key players carries a high degree of credibility with it. In many social 
sciences, the question of the validity of the interview material is related to focusing on 
personal issues such as a person's emotions, opinions or experiences. When discussing 
such topics, respondents may be lying or telling the interviewer what they think he/she 
"wants" to hear (see for instance Silverman, 2001, p. 233). However, since all the 
respondents of interviews conducted for this study can be regarded as more or less key 
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players and experts in their field, what they state I more or less regard as reliable 
information. Moreover, a number of their statements are verifiable by reference to data 
and other sources of information, so detection of false information can occur and 
respondents will be aware of this fact. 
However, it is worth using triangulation, i. e., checking the outcome of the interviews with 
other sources of information in order to validate the reliability of data (Denscombe, 1998, 
p- 83; Guba and Lincoln, 1981, p. 106-107). The idea of the "building-block technique" 
by Eckstein (2000, p. 137) is useful here. When numerous case studies can be conducted, 
the analysis of the first case study establishes the scene, and subsequent case studies 
refine and add to the findings until the accuracy of the interpretation seems adequate and 
unchanged when studying further cases. I developed my plant-level analyses this way and 
interpret this as a type of triangulation. 
"Pilot study" refers to a mini version of a planned study or, as in the case of this study, 
pre-testing a particular research instrument (Van Teijlingen and Hundley, 2001). Sets of 
interview questions must be piloted, i. e., tested with real volunteer interviewees before 
using them on the chosen population of informants (Baker 1999, pp. 210-211). Using 
the set of questions without piloting them first carries the risk of many types of failures 
such as lack of clarity in the questions, missing questions, too many questions, etc. I 
piloted my plant-level interviews with a Finnish pulp and paper production unit in 
Tervasaari, Valkeakoski, on 28 September 2004. The unit is a typical Finnish production 
unit in the sense that it is owned by an international corporation. The data collected 
during the pilot plant visit was not used in the research, as the pilot interview was used to 
revise the set of questions. It was impossible to pilot the set of questions with a Russian 
plant as the number of plants to visit in Karelia and Arkhangelsk (four units in Karelia 
and three in Arkhangelsk) was limited and using one for piloting - and therefore 
excluding it from the study - might have been a significant loss to the study. In addition, 
financial resources did not allow arranging a separate trip to pilot the interview in Russia. 
However, I had the Russian version of the interview language checked by two Russian 
colleagues, both of whom are energy experts and one, in addition, specialises in the pulp 
and paper sector. The questions to the Russian and Finnish companies were slightly 
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different based on the literature review and previous expert interviews with Finnish pulp 
and paper experts. 
Expert interviews were not piloted as they were conducted in order to collect preliminary 
information on the topic and construct the list of questions for the plant-level interview. 
The list of questions to experts was evolving continuously as I was narrowing down the 
research task. Interviews with the representatives of the Russian regional administrations 
and experts in both countries were designed to find out more about the latest 
developments of energy-saving legislation and policies, energy prices and drivers of and 
barriers to the modemisation of the pulp and paper sector. Consequently, these interviews 
are used to triangulate some of the interview data collected from the pulp and paper 
sector. 
4.4.3 Technology path 
The analysis of technological change must be dynamic and, as such, involve time. 
(Stoneman 1995, p. 6). The "technology path" approach is an attempt to demonstrate in 
qualitative terms the technological change which has or has not taken place at a pulp and 
paper plant over time. The technology path is a component of each case study that 
records the qualitative data available in the case-study database of the technological 
development of the plant. 
The main idea was to find out which pulp and paper production and energy infi-astructure 
was in use, when the equipment was installed and whether a major retrofit had taken 
place since. Whenever quantitative unit-level data was not available (which was the case 
with many Finnish and some Russian production units), the technology path would 
provide approximate information on how energy efficiency has developed. This 
information is not exact from a quantitative point of view; however, a comparison of 
these production-unit-specific "stories" can be used to analyse the differences in 
technological development, between both the chosen countries and regions, and 
individual plants. Technology paths also serve as a validating methodology for the 
drivers and barriers analysis, in the sense that the statements by plant managers can be 
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checked against real action/lack of action, i. e., whether the production facilities have been 
modernised. In the case of Finland and Russia, the differences were expected to be 
significant, and therefore, clearly observable by using this method. I have developed the 
technology path methodology myself, partly in order to solve the problem of the lack of 
quantitative data discussed below, but also to create a basis for my analysis on drivers of 
and barriers to modernisation. 
In practice, I asked my interviewees very detailed questions on the development of 
technology at the plant. This information was documented in a table divided into decades 
from the 1960s until the 2000s. Each main piece of equipment, namely paper machines, 
drying machines for producing market pulp, pulp production units and energy 
infrastructure, was recorded, including any equipment decommissioned since the 1960s. 
The capital cycle of each piece of equipment has been shaded in grey in order to make 
the table easier to read, and the years of commissioning and decommissioning have been 
included. Chapter 6 on pulp and paper provides the explanations of the technologies 
recorded in the technology paths. The brands of equipment have been reported when this 
information was available, as Soviet technology tends to be much less efficient than 
Western, which can support the efficiency analysis. Where refurbishment is described as 
"rebuilding", the equipment has been reset and, in some cases, old pieces of equipment 
have been replaced by new. "Modernisation" refers to replacing pieces of old equipment 
with new only. Types of paper produced have been reported in italics in order to follow 
the changes of product mix. Table 4.6 provides an example of a technology path. 
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Table 4.6 Example of a technology path methodology 
I Equipment I 1960s I 1970s I 1980s 1 1990S 1 2000s I 
Chemical Coni. 1964 
pulp plant 
"Kamyr" 
Decom. 1996 
Chemical 
sulphite 
pulp plant 
"Kamyr" 
PM 9 Kirafdiner Prinling Dec m. 1992 
"Voith" paper 
Com. 1955 
PM 10 
"Valmet" 
Recovery 2x Ix recovery Ix "Tampella" 
boilers "TampellaC' boiler com. 1970 modernised 2000 
"Tampella" Com. 1962 & 
1964 
AhIstrom &Ixi Boilers Ix "Ahstrom" 
BeIgorodskii 2x com. 1975 
Belgorodskii decom. Ix 
Belgorodskii i Com 1939 
modernised ,Ix fluidised bed 
boiler com. 2004 
1960s 1970s 1980s 1990S 2000s 
Key: Com. = commissioned; Decom. = decommissioned; PM = paper macbine 
4.4.4 Drivers and barriers 
The drivers and barriers analysis was a significant part of the case-study methodology. 
No well-established method of analysing drivers and barriers was available in the 
methodological literature, however, Sorrell et al. (2004) have done some work on the 
methodological side. A critical analysis of the material collected by interviewing 
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representatives of pulp and paper production units was conducted by systematically filing 
the data available of the drivers of and barriers to modemisation in the case-study 
database under themes, and later categories, emerging from the material (Berg 2001, p. 
103). 
Six main issue clusters emerged from the interview material: ftmding, corporate policy, 
technology and raw material, energy saving and other policies, energy prices and tariffs, 
and market signals. I also included an additional category on transition and attitudes in 
the analysis of the Russian plants. Table 4.7 outlines the issues each category covers. 
Table 4.7 Descriptions of driver and barrier categories 
Category Contains 
1: Funding Issues related to source and availability of funding 
2: Corporate Corporate strategies: involvement of energy experts in decision-making, 
policy cooperation between units, approach to technology, approach to payback period, 
role of shareholders 
3: Technology General development of energy efficiency, dynamics of technology and 
and raw modernisation, dynamics of energy-saving investments, heat/electricity ratio, 
material availability of fibre and bio fuels, plant-specific dynamics, technical 
requirements of customers 
4: Energy The effect of government and regional policies concerning energy saving, and 
saving and other relevant factors except energy price. Effect of decision-making and its 
other policies pace. No internal corporate policies 
5: Energy price Government, regional and corporate policies related to energy pricing and tariffs. 
and tariffs Relevance of energy price to investments. Fuel prices 
6: Market Market-related goals and realities that direct investments. Dynamics of 
signals producer--customer relations. Influential issues related to global market 
7: Transition Category specific to Russian plants. Dynamics of an economy in transition that 
and attitudes influence the investment decisions and potential of plants 
As drivers and barriers to modernisation are the main focus of this study, the interview 
frame had a separate section to cover the reasons behind investment/modernisation, and 
driving and hindering factors. Some specific questions were also asked in order to test 
hypotheses on drivers and barriers: 1) whether energy price had any influence on 
investment/modemisation decisions; 2) whether government (regional, national, 
European Union (EU)) policies have any influence on investment/modernisation 
decisions; and 3) whether energy experts are involved in investment decision-making. 
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The interviewees were told that this was my main topic, which was designed to 
encourage them to give detailed answers to this group of questions. 
There were also other potential drivers of and barriers to modernisation collected from 
the interview material as they spontaneously occurred in the context of other question 
groups. Some examples of such situations were the description of the plant at the 
beginning. Most interviewees briefly outlined the latest developments and, in the case of 
recent investments, some reasons behind them were mentioned. Another example was the 
formation of energy price by the Finnish corporations (see pp. 247,283,292-293,301 for 
explanation), which could not be anticipated from written material. Differences in 
practices may have different impacts on the attractiveness of cutting energy consumption 
and therefore some of these were picked as drivers or barriers. Some issues were not 
recognised as drivers or barriers by the interviewees, but in the context of the big picture 
they obviously constituted an important dynamic in the reality of the plant. Consequently, 
they were added to the analysis. An example would be Russian plants supplying heat to 
the local community. It became evident that the local community failed to pay for these 
deliveries. Such debt occupied the financial resources of the plants, which left less money 
for investments. Consequently, I concluded that this was a barrier to investment even 
though the interviewee did not underline it. 
The analysis process was started by collecting these statements from the interviews in the 
case-study database in a table which included the original statement (Russian) or note as 
written down when listening to the tape (Finnish) and the interpretation of a 
driver/barrier. Table 4.8 provides an illustration of this method. The main method to 
interpret the original statement was to 1) lift the message from the context explained in 
the discussion; 2) convert it to a plain comparable statement; 3) shorten long statements; 
and 4) divide statements into two to three main arguments if necessary. This practice 
made it possible to follow and check my own interpretations which made the approach 
consistent. 
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Table 4.8 Examples of collected original statements and interpretations 
Ori&al statement Interpretation 
Plant 1 
2 Ilvewme BCLrO,, WI51 YBejimmeHRA o61ema npOH3Bo2jcTBa. Most important factor is the 
Llem 6ojii6iDe oftem rIpOH3BO2jCTBa, HmKe H3, aepwKm volume of production due to the 
10 yaejTbHOI-0, ce6ecToHmOCTb naiiaeT. 3To nepBaA uejib. economics of scale 
3 BTopoe, BTOvaja neim, cripoc Ha pbrHKe npo)iyxiwm Demand in the market: old 
meHAeTCA, H CTapoe o6opy)IOBaHme iie o6ecnelmaeT 
KaqeCTBa Tpe6yemoro Ha pwHxe. 3TO BTopaA 
equipment cannot respond to the 
quality requirements of the 
market demand 
4 OTCYTCTBHe ýH! `IaHCOB. (I)axTopbi, RoTopbie A) Lack of money to invest 
riperLqTCTBYIOT mogepHH3aIU4H, 3TO HeaocTaTox B) Difficulties with taking a loan 
ýHMHCOB H CJIO)MOCTH H, KaK 3TO MOAKHO CKa3aTb, Hy, ftom a bank 
B03bmHTe B 6aHKe ýIeHbrii, iiy, CJIO)KHOCTTi C 3THM Towe 
eCTb. 12 1 1 
The statements were then arranged as 1) drivers; 2) barriers; or 3) potential drivers or 
barriers, i. e., factors in a table. The third option was kept because there were often 
statements of factors that influence modernisation decisions, but may be either drivers or 
barriers depending on the case. Leaving these factors out would have not revealed the 
whole set of considerations that are taken prior to a modernisation decision. Plant specific 
drivers and barriers are presented in each case study in table format distinguishing 
between drivers, barriers and factors. To rank their importance, the ones mentioned more 
often than others (i. e. several times by a single interviewee, by more than one interviewee 
when more than one person per plant was interviewed) are highlighted with bold font. 
The highlighted drivers, barriers and factors were used to guide drawing lessons for 
Russia. 
Drivers and barriers identified were also compared with the drivers of and barriers to 
energy efficiency discussed in the theoretical literature. In practice, all the drivers and 
barriers were arranged in an Excel table and similarities between theoretical and 
10 Translation: "Above all, in order to increase the volume of production. The higher the volume of 
production, the lower the divided costs, cost price decreases. This is the first goal. " 
" Translation: "Secondly, second goal, demand for product reduces in the market and old equipment does 
not provide the quality required in the market. That is second. " 
" Translation: "Lack of financing. Factors which deter modernisation include lack of finances and 
difficulties, well, how to put it, to take money from bank, well, there are difficulties with this. " 
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empirical drivers and barriers examined. 13 By using this method, the theoretical drivers 
and barriers were divided into two categories: relevant and irrelevant. The reasons why 
some theoretical drivers and barriers appear irrelevant were further examined, and the 
empirical drivers and barriers which had no theoretical match identified. This exercise 
was used to apply lessons from the empirical material to the theoretical literature, and to 
identify any need for further research and theory building. Again, the Excel table 
comparisons kept a record of the analysis, which could be revisited to ensure the 
consistency of the analysis. 
4.5 Material and data collection 
My main sources of information and data are interviews with the Finnish and Russian 
pulp and paper manufacturing companies and with experts in this field. Most of the plant- 
specific energy consumption and pulp and paper production data for EEI was collected 
during the visits to the plants. Table 4.9 outlines the numeric and interview data collected 
from each plant while other documentation is not included. Data sets refer to numeric 
information drawn from the archives of each plant - not all of them, especially the public 
ones, were used due to their quality. Some of the data on energy consumption was very 
detailed, even process-specific. 
" in the empirical material (horizontal axis), 103 drivers and barriers were identified, and in literature 
(verfical axis), 51 drivers and baniers. A CD-ROM copy is available upon request as the file is too large to 
present in an Annex. 
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Table 4.9 Data sets and interviews/interviewees per plant 
Information source Data sets Interviews / Interviewees 
Plant I KAR 3 1/2 
Plant 2 KAR 3 1/I 
Plant 3 KAR 1 2/2 
Plant 4 KAR 0 1 /1 
Plant 5 ARC 3 3/3 
Plant 6 ARC 3 1 /1 
Plant 7 ARC 0 3/4 
Plant 8 FIN Public data I /I 
Plant 9 FIN 1 1/2 
Plant 10 FTN 1 1/2 
Plant 11 & 12 FIN Public data I 
Plant 13 FIN 0 1 
4.5.1 Observation period 
Based on my interview with Dr Komelis Blok, an expert on quantitative energy analysis, 
I concluded that one decade is not too short a period for analysis of the development of 
energy efficiency. His main argument was that minianuin period of 3-4 years' is required 
for such an analysis, mainly in order to eliminate the possibility of a statistical mistake or 
a divergent year in the statistical run. I fixed the observation period for studying the 
development of energy efficiency as 1970-2003 for Finland and 1990-2003 for the 
Russian regions; however, the data availability of each plant dictated the observation 
period. Qualitative methods of estimating energy efficiency by technology-path method 
were applied to both countries for from 1960 to the date of the interview (2003-2004). 
I discussed the Finnish observation period and its meaningfulness with my Finnish expert 
interviewees, who approve it as a suitable period of time to study the development of 
energy efficiency and other relevant developments in the sector in Finland. The Russian 
observation period was chosen based on reasonable data availability. Regional statistics 
have been public since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Two activity levels were 
applied to this comparison: regional/national industrial sector level, and company level. 
4.5.2 Quantitative data 
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The ideal data for the quantitative analysis in order to compare the development of 
energy efficiency between plants is production-unit-level data on energy consumption 
and pulp and paper production per product. Where a required data set was not available, 
the development of energy efficiency per production unit is based on the technology path 
drawn from the interview and plant visit. The accuracy of this analysis is not as good as 
that based on EEL 
Russian regional-level data was purchased from the regional statistics offices as a special 
order. A table for the required data was sent to the statistics offices, which filled in the 
data. The advantage of this was that longer time series were available from the statistics 
offices than their publications, and a bulk order of data was made together with 
colleagues who needed other data sets. The Finnish country-level data had been collected 
by a research project funded by the Ministry of Environment of Finland in 1997-1998 
under the title "Development of energy and emission scenario model" (further referred to 
as "Finnish project data") and was provided to me by Finland Futures Research Centre. 
The data is very detailed as it was collected from the pulp and paper producers by the 
project. The data can be only partly triangulated with the official statistics available from 
Statistics Finland (2003). However, the total electricity consumption of the sector would 
seem to be similar to that appearing in the official statistics. 
Russian data is regarded as unreliable by many (Aslund, 2002, pp. 15-16,122) as the 
tradition of the Soviet government was to publish a very limited set of statistics that were 
typically biased. The statistical methods have been under reform since the systemic 
change began, and Plant managers have an incentive to underreport output in order to 
avoid taxes. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, individual interests have contributed 
to false reporting of production statistics, which distorts the energy efficiency and 
intensity figures. 
The problems with Russian energy statistics were addressed by interviewing the local 
statistics officials who collect and process the regional data at plant level. They were not 
permitted to hand out the plant-level data, but they did show me the data collection form 
(Forma No II -TER) and explained how the regional-level totals were calculated. There 
was no possibility to check the truthfulness of the submissions by plants when it comes to 
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production volumes, but the statistics officials were able to confirm which data is 
included in the energy consumption data. I specifically asked whether the plants include 
their own bio fuels, and whether the energy sold to local communities was excluded from 
the plants' consumption. According to the Karelian statistics office, own bio fuels are 
included and the plants have to report their energy balances including purchased and sold 
energy. 
I sampled the plant-level data myself Most plant-level data sets were acquired during 
visits. However, I also received some data sets from Russian colleagues who had been 
working with particular plants. I committed to refraining from publishing the plant- 
specific data sets as such, focusing on the energy efficiency and energy intensity figures, 
and not publishing the names of the plants in question. Some of the Finnish plants 
provided public data only, which was judged as inadequate for the purposes of this study 
and therefore abandoned. 
Availability of plant-level data was a problem for this study as not all plants were willing 
or able to provide the required data, or the provided data was insufficient for the analyses. 
The Finnish plants in particular caused problems, as many Finnish corporations have a 
policy against giving out data and, consequently, plants were unable to provide any. 
However, some plants, both Finnish and Russian, provided very detailed data sets which 
also illustrated which energy consumption was included and which excluded. These sets 
confirmed the statements of the regional statistics offices. I have included my evaluation 
of the reliability of plant-level data in each case study. 
4.5.3 Qualitative data 
The literature review provided the theoretical background of drivers of and barriers to 
energy efficiency. Such literature was not available on the wider concept of 
modernisation, but as my main interest was energy consumption, the theoretical 
background of drivers of and barriers to energy efficiency is relevant. I also conducted 
literature reviews on Russian transition and its background, the pulp and paper sector, 
and the energy sector and efficiency. 
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Interviews were the main source of qualitative material. Interviews with different groups 
of experts were used to collect the key data for this study. The main groups of 
respondents were 1) Finnish pulp and paper experts, 2) Finnish pulp and paper plants; 3) 
Russian pulp and paper plants; 4) Russian regional administrations responsible for energy 
policies, and 5) energy analysis and statistics experts. By experts to be interviewed I 
mean authoritative individuals who could provide me with privileged information. 
Interviewees were chosen in such a way that they were capable as a group of providing 
objectivity. The expert interviewees were chosen based on their scientific expertise to 
provide insights into the key issues in the field, or based on their observer status. The 
interviewees in the regional administrations were the officials responsible for the issues 
in question. In the pulp and paper production units, the interviewees were energy 
managers or heads of engineering departments. Directors might have been able to provide 
more insights into investment decisions but it was too difficult to gain access to them. In 
addition, the director might not have been able to provide all the practical details relevant 
to this study, such as technical details. In most cases, I spoke to various people at each 
plant, and in many cases also visited the plant itself to see the production process. 
All interviews were recorded with a tape recorder. I did not transcribe the interviews 
conducted in Finnish or English but only listened the tapes and took notes of the 
responses to each question. The interviews in Russian were transcribed from tapes into 
Russian text, as picking up the responses by taking notes in Russian would have taken 
much more time than in Finnish and English, which I use on a daily basis. Interviews in 
Russian were, however, not translated for me even though this would have saved time as 
I feared that translation might miss some valuable details. It was judged more reliable to 
work on the original dialogue in Russian. 
4.6 Reliability and validity of study 
Reliability refers to the degree of consistency in methods of analysing data (Silverman, 
2001, p. 225; Hammersley, 1992, p. 67), while validity refers to the truthfulness of a 
statement (Silverman, 2001, p. 232). There has been a discussion on how to ensure and 
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prove the reliability and validity of qualitative research as it is not based on hard numbers 
like purely scientific research. In order to overcome this challenge, some have suggested 
introducing new criteria to substitute the problematic reliability and validity. One of the 
substitute concepts was "trustworthiness", which contained credibility, 
t-ansferability, dependability and confirmability. More recently, this view has been 
challenged by arguing that a self-correcting mechanism ensures the reliability and 
validity of research (Morse et al., 2002). 
Morse et al. (2002) argue that participants in interviews cannot validate the study as they 
are unable to recognise, themselves in the abstracted study. They suggest that qualitative 
studies should be verified based on the following strategies. I have commented on how 
each strategy has been followed in this study: 
1) methodological coherence: congruence between research question and 
components of research methods; 
41 developed a methodology to meet the demands of the interdisciplinary research 
problem by combining qualitative and quantitative approaches. 
2) appropriateness of sample: choosing interviewees who best represent or have 
knowledge of the research topic, and proving this by saturation and replication; 
4 the responses of the Finnish plants saturated in the sense that the main messages 
were the same in the case of all six plants while the whole population ofpIants was 
included in the case ofthe Russian case-study regions. 
3) concurrent coflection and analysis of data: dynamic relationship between 
sampling, data collection and analysis; 
41 allowed the drivers and barriers categories to emerge from the interview 
material rather than use the categorisation found in the theoretical literature. I 
eliminated some quantitative datafrom the energy efficiency comparison that did not 
fit the requirements of this analysis. 
4) theoretical thinking: ideas emerging from data are reconfirmed in new data 
constantly checking and rechecking; 
4 In the case of Finland, I interviewed representatives of plants until the data 
saturated In the case of Russia, the population was limited and, therefore, the data 
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was checked against the views qf the experts of regional administrations and written 
materiaL 
5) theory development: 
4 The analysis of drivers of and barriers to modernisation was applied to the 
theoretical discussion on barriers to energy efficiency available in literature. 
Changes and additions to the theory were suggested 
4.7 Summary 
Research objectives of this chapter were: 
4. Present the methodology adopted, including energy efficiency indices, technology 
path, and drivers and barriers analysis. Explain the background of choosing 
interviews as the main material collection method. 
This chapter provided the necessary background for following the methodology used in 
this research. EEls are used for comparing the development of energy efficiency between 
the case plants. Technology path methodology was developed for this study in order to 
back the numeric data on the dynamics of energy efficiency with the details on the capital 
cycle. Drivers and barriers methodology, again developed for this study, is used to 
analyse the interview material, compare the reasons to modernise and not to modernise 
between Russia and Finland, and to apply the theoretical literature to the drivers and 
barriers found in the empirical material. 
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S. Drivers of and barriers to energy efficiency 
This chapter contains a literature review on drivers of and barriers to energy efficiency 
improvements as they have been discussed at the theoretical level. This was the body of 
literature closest to the topic of the Tbesis - modernisation of industrial plants - that was 
available and, as the focus of this study is on energy consumption, the theoretical 
literature on drivers and barriers to energy efficiency is a suitable point of reference and 
should provide an interesting comparison to the drivers and barriers to modernisation. 
Drivers and barriers to energy efficiency sound like clear concepts - elements supporting 
and hindering the improvement of energy efficiency. However, there are some practical 
bumps on the road of theory. Indeed, many factors influencing the development of energy 
efficiency could act as either a driver or a barrier, depending on the circumstances. One 
of the most famous examples when comparing Russia and the OECD would be the price 
of energy. In OECD countries, the price of energy would mostly be regarded as a driver 
of energy efficiency as it tends to cover the production and transportation costs, whereas 
in Russia this is not always the case and the low price of energy is often a barrier to 
energy efficiency improvements. Consequently, it is impossible to come up with clear 
theoretical categories that define a certain element as either a driver or a barrier on every 
occasion. 
The research objectives of this chapter are: 
5. Investigate the literature available on drivers and barriers to energy efficiency. 
6. Present a list of theoretical drivers and barriers to energy efficiency to be used as 
a comparison to empirical drivers and barriers. 
5.1 Definitions 
In this Thesis, drivers of energy efficiency are defined as factors supporting retrofitting 
and stock turnover investments and barriers to energy efficiency refer to factors 
hindering them. Drivers and barriers to energy efficiency may also influence the 
dynamics ofrunning the equipment in pulp and paper mills. 
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Schipper et al. (1992, pp. 64-66) have defined three basic processes through which 
energy efficiency changes over time: 
1) Retrofitting, i. e., modification of existing equipment and facilities; 
2) Changes in the operation of existing equipment; and 
3) Stock turnover, i. e., the addition of new and retirement of obsolete equipment and 
facilities. 
According to the definition of drivers of and barriers to energy efficiency used in this 
Thesis, all these three basic processes are relevant. 
Worrell and Biermans (2005) claim that in many economic sectors, such as the residential 
sector, energy efficiency improvements are completely dependent on stock turnover as 
domestic appliances are rarely retrofitted in order to improve energy efficiency. 
Nevertheless, for the industrial sector, retrofitting is an important source of energy 
efficiency improvement. Indeed, Worrell and Biermans define stock turnover as a vital, 
inevitable, ongoing process whereas they regard retrofitting as a supplementary process. 
In order to characterise stock turnover for the policy process, the lifetime of equipment 
and retirement are important concepts. 
Changes in the operation of existing equipment reflect the fact that running equipment at 
higher capacity tends to consume less energy per product unit than running the same 
equipment at lower capacity (Phylipsen et aL, 1998, p. 17; Sorrell et al., 2004, p. 6). It is 
difficult to detect less-significant changes of behaviour by operational staff, such as 
leaving doors open to the hood of a paper machine etc. Consequently, such smaller 
changes are reported if detected, but the main focus will be in the larger changes of 
operating the equipment. 
5.2 Drivers to energy efficiency 
There is no comprehensive body of literature on either drivers of energy efficiency in 
general or drivers of industrial energy efficiency that would be comparable to the 
substantial analysis available on barriers to energy efficiency. Only some short references 
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to the latter could be found. The most detailed analysis on drivers of (industrial) energy 
efficiency is the following work by Starzer (1999, p. 4): 
1) Internal drivers for energy efficiency - situational factors 
* problems affecting the core business (problems -Aith quality, processes, 
production, resources); 
* opportunities (end of technical lifetime, extension of production, new buildings, 
new products, new personnel) when a company might have to invest anyway. 
2) External drivers for energy efficiency 
o pressure (fmancial, legal, market); 
o incentives (subsidies, awards); 
e positive examples (from suppliers, other companies, planners etc). 
Even though the drivers are categorised he had not further analysed them. However, his 
categorisation gives a good idea of the range of drivers and where to look. Further, 
drivers to energy efficiency were collected from the work of various analysts. All the 
other references below are to single sentences in papers mainly focusing on something 
else than analysing drivers to energy efficiency. The drivers naturally fell into three main 
categories: economic, policy related and technology related. 
5.2.1 Economic drivers 
Economic drivers of industrial energy efficiency recognised by literature have been 
divided into further two categories; market signals and macroeconomic drivers. This 
division was chosen because some of the drivers were very clearly relevant to the 
implementation level that companies deal with, while others were larger issues related to 
economics and energy economics on the state level that are rather relevant to 
governmental decision-making. 
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5.2.1.1 Market Signals 
Market signals provide production-unit and corporate-level drivers, reflecting market- 
driven thinking typical to the private sector. This category includes corporate policy- 
related issues, which other authors have recognised earlier. 
Market-based energy prices are often referred to as the single main driver of energy 
efficiency (IEA, 1997, p. 99,105; IEA, 2000, p. 57; APERC, 2002, p. 43; EU website). It 
is obvious that if energy is expensive, reducing energy consumption could be a 
significant saving for energy-intensive manufacturing companies, such as the pulp and 
paper industry. The same point is recognised by APERC (2002, p. 47) and ECS (2001 a, 
p. 24) who have approached the same issue from a company perspective. They argue that 
the reduction of energy bills is a driver of energy efficiency and that energy efficiency 
projects lead to savings in energy costs. Full cost internalisation must accompany price if 
it is to be a direct driver. 
Competition was regarded as a driving factor of energy efficiency by many analysts (see 
for instance IEA, 1997, p. 99; Hennicke et al., 1998 p. 115; ECS, 2003, p. 15). Industrial 
competitiveness can be enhanced by reducing costs and improving production through 
energy efficiency improvements. Of the governments that are members of the Energy 
Charter Treaty, 65% regarded industrial competitiveness as an important driver of energy 
efficiency (ECS, 2003, p. 57). Hennicke et al. argue that competition with other 
companies is a driving factor of the technical development and innovation process of 
companies. However, some (EU website) regard competition as a barrier to energy 
efficiency. This is because increased competition makes it less likely that companies 
share innovations that improve energy efficiency. However, the source recognises that 
competition can increase the rate of introduction of new technologies, which improves 
energy efficiency. It sounds like the EU source is missing the main positive impact of 
market competition on energy efficiency and focuses on another, less important point, 
probably based on empirical experience in the EU market. The overall positive approach 
of the EU to common competitive market supports this assumption. Based on this 
discussion, competition can be regarded as either a driver or a barrier. 
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Financial pressure on companies leads to the requirement that energy efficiency 
improvement has to be cost-efficient in order to attract investment (Hennicke et a]., 1998, 
p. I IS). Resources for investment are limited and, consequently, managers choose the 
most cost-efficient investments, regardless of whether they improve energy efficiency. A 
closely related concept is the "energy efficiency gap" which refers to the difference 
between the actual energy efficiency implemented and the achievable cost-efficient level 
of energy efficiency (Jaffe and Stavins, 1994; Levine et al., 1994, p. 1). 
The cost-efficiency of an investment could be either a driver or a barrier, depending on 
whether there are other, more cost-efficient investment options. Economists believe that 
companies aim at maximizing profits due to which the most cost-efficient option should 
be chosen (Begg et al., 1984, p. 121) but non-payment of an energy delivery can thwart 
this potential benefit. For instance, opportunity cost i. e. the benefit given up by not using 
resources in the best alternative way (Lipsey et al., 1999, p. 6), afforded by generating 
additional heat to sell to the local government is a driver (in profit terms) but may also be 
a barrier if investment in additional production for the customer is not paid for by the 
authorities. In Chapter 11, the empirical nature of this dichotomy is identified. 
image improvement (Hermicke et al., 1998, p. 115) is a low importance driver of energy 
efficiency for small and medium-size enterprises. However, the case may be different 
with multinational pulp and paper companies. Consequently, this driver is worth 
considering. The associated investment cost might also be a factor when a company 
considers the benefits of an image created by a high level of energy efficiency. 
Problems affecting the core business (Starzer, 1999) are interpreted in this Thesis as 
demand factors influencing which items to produce and of what quality. Even though 
energy efficiency considerations may be part of every investment, they cannot direct the 
leading decisions on what to produce and of what quality. That is decided by demand in 
the market. Therefore, depending on the situation, core-business-related considerations 
might act either as a driver of or a barrier to energy efficiency improvement. Indeed, 
energy efficiency is not the primary reason to invest for companies (Sorrell et al., 2004, 
p. 6). Sorrell et al. (2004, p. 75) argue that managers are primarily concerned with 
107 
ensuring the long-term survival of their organisation, as a result of which issues such as 
energy efficiency can be regarded as less relevant. 
By the considerations of energy industry, I refer to the fact that improved energy 
efficiency can increase the export opportunities of countries that have fossil-fuel 
resources, and that improved energy efficiency will delay the need for investments in new 
energy supply capacity (ECS, 2003, p. 15). This is especially relevant as pulp and paper 
plants often produce beat and electricity as a side business. 
5.2.1.2 Macroeconomic drivers 
Macroeconomic drivers refer to factors that are not directly considerations of companies 
but rather economic policy established at state level. This categorisation is based on what 
has been discussed in the literature. 
Energy import dependence adds to the uncertainties of an economy. If an important 
external supply of energy suddenly fails, a country may experience serious problems to 
keep its economic activities going. When a foreign supply of energy is politically 
unstable, energy import dependence can be a driver of energy efficiency (APERC, 2002, 
p. 43). It tends to be governments that decide whether such a situation is a threat and 
cause action. The reactions can vary. One option is to develop domestic sources of 
energy; for instance, Finland is developing its nuclear power capacity in order to reduce 
its import dependence (see for instance Clark, 2004, p. 2). An extreme reaction can be a 
war against the energy provider to confirm the continuation of supply in the future; for 
instance, the aggressive US foreign policy towards Iraq has included this element. 
In this Thesis, the secure supply of energy (Labeyrie, 200 1, p. I) or energy security (ECS, 
2003, p. 15) is regarded as a separate issue from energy import dependence and renamed 
as guaranteed supply of energy. This concept includes elements of domestic problems 
such as network failures. Out-of-date transfer networks or a generation capacity that is 
too small for peak loads due to the underinvestment in it after market liberalisation have 
caused these problems in many countries lately (see for instance Perez and Ackere, 2003, 
p. 9). Of the Energy Charter Treaty member governments, 65% regarded a secure supply 
108 
as a driver of energy efficiency (ECS, 2003, p. 50). The problems of a guaranteed supply 
of energy are widely experienced in north-west Russia. Many of the regions have none of 
their own fossil-fuel supplies or they are not being exploited and, consequently, the 
regions have to rely on a supply of fossil fuels from other regions, sometimes far away. 
For instance, the Archangelsk region has such a problem and many local actors consider 
saving energy as one of the options to overcome it (Environmental Investment Center, 
2002, p. 4 1). Martinot (1998, p. 906) has also reported that the reduction of external fuel 
sources is desirable for Russian regions. 
Sustainable economic growth and stability (as compared to economic recession) has also 
been regarded as a driver of energy efficiency (EU website). The specific importance of 
the availability of capital investments is recognised under this category. The main 
argument is that economic growth provides industry with enough resources for fin-ther 
investments that improve energy efficiency. In addition, in Russia some analysts regard 
energy efficiency improvements as a driver of economic growth because higher 
efficiency of energy use could reduce energy consumption (see for instance Bashmakov, 
2004a). Indeed, continuous growth of domestic energy consumption could slow down the 
growth of the Russian economy, which is heavily based on the export of fossil fuels. 
ECONOMIC DRIVERS 
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5.2.2 Institutional drivers 
Institutional drivers to energy efficiency relate mostly to environmental considerations in 
the literature. 
Environmental regulations are established by government action. The literature lists 
concerns about climate change (Labeyrie, 200 1, p. 1; LNDP, 2000, p. 211, ECS, 2001 a, 
p. 25), other environmental and pollution concerns related to energy such as particle 
emissions into the air (APERC, 2002, p. 47; ECS, 2003, p. 38; ECS, 2001a, p. 25), and 
related legal requirements, for instance limits to particle emissions (Hennicke et al., 1998, 
p. 115). Of the Energy Charter Treaty member governments, 85% regarded sustainable 
development as an important driver to energy efficiency, 80% recognised climate change 
and environmental concerns, and 80% also mentioned international obligations (ECS, 
2003, p. 50). A related recognised concept is the care of human health (Labeyrie, 2001, p. 
1). For instance, emissions from coal combustion can cause a serious threat to human 
health that can be reduced by using energy more efficiently. 
Taxation can be used to encourage energy efficiency or discourage inefficiency and 
consumption by increasing the relative cost of energy consumption or decreasing the 
relative cost of effective practices (ECS, 2001b, p. 11). However, taxation can work 
against energy efficiency as well. For instance, if a government wants to support its 
manufacturing industry, it might decide to tax the industry's energy consumption less 
than other energy consumption (this can be regarded as a subsidy). Consequently, 
taxation can be either a driver or a barrier. 
Energy efficiency programmes (lEA, 1997, p. 105; McNaught, 2003; ECS, 2003, p. 13) 
were the only policy instrument mentioned in the literature that specially focus on energy 
efficiency. They provide government incentives to energy efficiency improvements. 
These programmes can take many forms, from information campaigns to concrete 
subsidies to energy efficiency improvements. For instance in Finland, the government 
established an energy efficiency programme based on voluntary agreements with 
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companies on energy saving. The scheme required companies to implement energy audits 
and report to the programme on their progress (Motiva, 2004). The EU website lists 
various types of policies included in European energy efficiency programmes, including 
national energy plans, statutory requirements for technologies or processes, electricity 
connection charges and tariffs, capacity levels and scales of production, support for 
research and demonstration, and information dissemination. Hennicke et al. (1998, p. 
115) argue that government subsidies to energy efficiency improvements have been one 
of the strongest drivers of energy efficiency. However, the system has also been abused 
by applying for subsidies for any equipment replacement investments that had to be made 
anyway but could be justified on the basis of energy efficiency improvement. In addition, 
positive examples such as demonstration programmes belong to this category (Starzer, 
1999). Carbon-content reduction requirements applied as a result of the Kyoto Protocol 
and related schemes may also have a similar effect on energy efficiency as the specific 
energy efficiency programmes. 
Energy-saving companies and agencies (ESCOs) can provide a strong institutional driver 
of energy efficiency by intermediating projects between market actors. Applications of 
this concept have been successful in several transition economies including Russia 
(Chandler et al., 1996). Martinot (1998, p. 912) and Bashmakov (2001, p. 2) have 
emphasised the importance of energy-saving companies in the case of Russia. Energy- 
saving companies are closely related to governmental energy-saving programmes 
because support is often needed in the beginning. However, the companies can become 
independent later on, which differentiates them from other government energy efficiency 
programme activities. 
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5.2.3 Tech nology-related drivers 
Only a couple of publications also listing other drivers of energy efficiency mention 
technology-related drivers. The sources define no further sub-categories. This category of 
drivers of energy efficiency is simply referred to as technological progress (APERC, 
2002, p. 10; IEA, 1997, pp. 99,105). Innovation literature seemed relevant as an 
additional source in order to find out more about this potential driver as the development 
of technology is a prerequisite for longer-term energy efficiency improvements. 
Stoneman (1995, p. 2) presents the Schumpeterian trilogy that divides the technological 
change process into three stages: 1) the invention process, i. e., the generation of new 
ideas; 2) the innovation process, i. e., the development of new ideas into marketable 
products and processes; and 3) the diffusion stage when new products and processes 
spread across the potential market. All these stages are relevant to modernisation as such, 
while most practical drivers might be related to the diffusion stage of technological 
change. Another useful distinction presented by Stoneman (ibid, p. 3) is innovation at 
global and local levels. The former refers to the first occurrence of a particular event such 
as the launch of a new product. The latter refers to the first occurrence of an event in a 
unit of observation. 
Domestic innovation systems, which have been defined by Freeman (1987) as "the 
network of institutions in the public and private sectors whose activities and interactions 
initiate, import, modify and diffuse new technologies", comprise key drivers to 
technological innovation (in Foxon, 2003, p. 20-21). The concept includes interactions 
and flows of knowledge between users and producers. According to Dyker (1997, p. 5) 
this element was missing from the Soviet system, which isolated plarming organs from 
the companies using the equipment planned. Consequently, economies in transition are 
experiencing many problems relevant to technology and innovation policy. These include 
fragmentation, i. e., lack of cooperation between actors; deterioration of human capital; 
obstacles to effective technology transfer, including lack of facilitation for cooperation 
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between domestic and western companies; and the lack of existing, transnational giant 
companies that can afford their own research and development departments that assist 
smaller companies (ibid, p. 11 -15). Domestic innovation system-related issues could act 
as either a driver or a barrier. 
In my opinion, the category opportunities provided by the capital cycle (Starzer, 1999) 
belongs to technology-related drivers as well. This is probably what analysts meant by 
the straightforward references to technological progress as a driver of energy efficiency 
(APERC, 2002, p. 10; IEA, 1997, pp. 99,105). Whenever a company needs to replace its 
old production capital, a window of opportunity opens to improve energy efficiency. This 
has been discussed by, for instance, Worrell and Biermans (2005) considering energy 
efficiency, while Lempert et al. (2002, pp. 48-49) focused on greenhouse-gas emission 
reductions. This is closely related to new technologies that improve energy efficiency. 
The process of the capital cycle as a driver of energy efficiency can even be regarded as 
an automatic process under market-economy circumstances, because the performance of 
new equipment constantly improves over time. Therefore, new equipment will lose its 
status as state-of-the-art technology quickly and by the time it will be replaced, the new 
equipment in the market has become more energy efficient than that due to be replaced. 
(Lempert et al., 2002, p. 5). Fast replacement of capital in order to improve 
competitiveness has been recognised as a driver of energy efficiency as such by an 
APERC study (2002, p. 47). This refers to the need to keep up with the fast pace of 
quality improvements of products by competitors. This factor could provide a driver of 
energy efficiency; however, capital-cycle considerations are more complicated than doing 
what competitors do. In practice, opportunities to improve energy efficiency provided by 
the capital cycle could be used in full or less so, which in most cases would keep the 
energy efficiency lower in the longer term, i. e., the window of opportunity would be lost. 
However, replacing old equipment would almost automatically deliver some energy 
efficiency improvements in most cases. Depending on the decisions as to whether to use 
the windows of opportunity, the capital cycle could create either a driver of or a barrier to 
energy efficiency. 
General conservatism to implement new technologies that have not been thoroughly 
proven so far could be regarded as a barrier. This is because investors compare high 
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technical risk to a minor competitive advantage (EU website). Stoneman (1995, p. 4) 
regards a change of attitude as a management innovation which could provide a driver of 
energy efficiency. However, it might also be rational to accept proven technology only. 
Consequently, the options are Best Available Technology (BAT), which might involve 
the risk of complications and lack of expertise to fix technical problems, and Best 
Available Practices (BAP), which would have already been tested by other plants. Based 
on this, a reluctance to invest in the latest technology might be a barrier but at the same 
time this attitude might protect the plant from equipment failures that would lead to 
interruption of production, and therefore, lower efficiency. 
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5.3 Barriers to energy efficiency 
Categorising barriers to energy efficiency shows a strong element of disagreement 
between economic schools on the role of the state in a market economy. Neoclassical 
economists assume that the market will lead to the optimal level of energy efficiency 
without intervention, while most of the modem economic schools recognise that 
government intervention is required in order to achieve economically, socially and 
environmentally favourable levels of energy efficiency. However, economists who 
disagree on this assumption also tend to recognise that the cost efficacy of energy 
efficiency improvements is of great importance (Sansted and Howarth, 1994, p. 811; 
Sorrell et al., 2004, p. 4). Neoclassical economic theory only recognises a need for 
government intervention in the case that a true market failure appears (Sloman, 2000, p. 
305). Sorrell et al. (2004, p. 26) argue that orthodox economic theory is necessary but 
insufficient to understand barriers to energy efficiency and, therefore, the introduction of 
other categories than market failures based on transaction-cost and behavioural 
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economics is necessary. Weber (1997, p. 833) has divided barriers to energy efficiency 
into four main categories: institutional, obstacles conditioned by the market, 
organisational and behavioural barriers. Weber's typology seems relevant based on the 
literature review and consequently is used in this Thesis. I have renamed the obstacles 
conditioned by the market as economic barriers. 
A number of studies report many barriers to energy efficiency and use various names to 
describe the same barriers. Russia-specific material on drivers of and barriers to energy 
efficiency is limited; however, some Russia-specific barriers were identified by the IEA 
(2002a), Bashmakov (200 1) and Martinot (1995,1998). 
5.3.1 Economic barriers 
According to Weber (1997, p. 833), obstacles conditioned by market can be divided into 
market failures and market barriers. Nevertheless, there have been other categorisations 
as well. Sorrell et al. (2000) divide economic barriers into market failures and non-market 
failures. The leading idea of separating market failures from other economic barriers is 
the justifiability of government intervention: consensus prevails amongst economists that 
a true market failure should be corrected by government intervention (see for instance 
Cowen, 1998, p. 1). However, in the case of energy efficiency the debate goes on (Levine 
et al., 1994, pp. 1-2). The definition of non-market failure by Sorrell et al. departs from 
the mainstream definition, i. e., miscarriage of public policy (Wolf, 1998, p. 37): Sorrell et 
al. are not referring to failed government action, but to market barriers other than 
neoclassical market failure. In order to avoid confusion, instead of non-market failure, I 
will be using Weber's term market barrier. Consequently, my sub-categories under 
obstacles conditioned by the market are marketfailures and market barriers. 
5.3.1.1 Market failures 
Externalities refer to "Costs and benefits of production or consumption experienced by 
society but not by the producers and consumers themselves" (Sloman, 2000, p. 291). This 
is obviously a market failure and has been widely recognised as one: the market 
mechanism fails to recognise expenses occurring in the market (Golove and Eto, 1996; 
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IEA, 1987). These costs are often difficult to depict or measure, or have no clear price. 
For instance, social and environmental costs (or in some cases benefits) are typical 
examples of externalities. 
Imperfect information prevails in every real market: all market actors have perfect market 
information only in a theoretically idealised market. Consequently, market actors have to 
base their rational decisions aiming at maximising benefits on imperfect information. 
This distorts the decisions, which consequently may f" to be rational and optimise the 
outcome of the economic activity. The IEA mentions short-term market considerations on 
energy prices that have negative impact on energy efficiency investments (IEA, 1987, p. 
86), and invisibility of energy consumption and conservation (IEA, 1987, p. 92). Martinot 
(1998, p. 909) reports the lack of information relevant to energy efficiency investments 
that prevails in Russia. He argues that historical reasons contribute to this barrier: in the 
Soviet Union, information used to be centralised and contacts were highly personalised. 
Consequently, relevant information can be difficult to acquire in Russia, especially for 
foreign investors. Bashmakov (2001, p. 4) also regards lack of information as a barrier to 
energy efficiency. According to him, it is mostly practical information that is lacking, and 
this barrier could be addressed by auditing and reporting energy consumption, organising 
awareness campaigns and demonstration projects, etc. All these barriers can be 
categorised as imperfect information. Lack of confidence (actually, the IEA refers to this 
as "confidence" only) among consumers has been caused by fraud, misleading 
advertisements and substandard performance of energy-efficient appliances (IEA, 1987, 
p. 93). In a market where perfect information is not available, this is a rational reaction by 
consumers. This barrier has a close link to imperfect information and, therefore, it was 
added into this category. According to Sorrell et al. (2004, pp. 58-59), imperfect 
information relevant to decisions on energy efficiency fall into three categories: 1) level 
and pattern of current consumption; 2) energy-saving opportunities; and 3) consumption 
of new and refurbished facilities. Martinot (1995, p. 105) reports similar elements. 
Public goods have been defined by Sloman (2000, p. 300) as follows: "A good or service 
that has the features of non-rivalry and non-excludability and as a result would not be 
provided by the free market". An example of a public-good-type market failure relevant 
to energy efficiency is provided by Golove and Eto (1996, p. 19): results achieved by an 
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investment in basic research easily become a public good, i. e., investors cannot protect 
their property rights. Obstacles to technical development (IEA, 1987, p. 95) include an 
example of the problem of public goods. Industrial fragmentation refers to the fact that no 
individual company can afford to support significant research, development and 
demonstration. 
Adverse selection refers to a situation when one party has relevant private information 
before entering into a contract to buy or sell. This could be the case when applying for a 
loan or tying to sell a superior quality product (Sorrell et al., 2000, p. 20. ) Principal- 
agent relationships refer to opportunistic behaviour by contracting parties. Because the 
interests of two parties may differ, and the actions of one party may be unobservable by 
the second party, there may be an incentive to act in an opportunistic manner after 
signing a contract. An example of this is the relationship between an employer and a 
worker (Sorrell et al., 2000, p. 21. ) In this Thesis, these barriers (following the example 
of Sorrell et al. ) are collected under the combination category asymmetric information. 
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5.3.1.2 Market barriers 
Access to capital has been recognised as a market barrier by several studies (IEA, 1987; 
Sorrell et al., 2000; Golove and Eto, 1996; Martinot, 1995, p. 102; Bashmakov, 2001; 
Levine et al., 1994; Evans, 1997, p. 1). According to economic theory, the market should 
provide capital for all investment needs for a risk-adjusted price (Golove and Eto, 1996, 
p. 10). In practice, high-risk borrowers may have no access to capital. This is mainly 
because there are costs involved in investigating the creditworthiness of risk borrowers 
that decreases the economic attractiveness of these loans (Soffell et al., 2000, p. 42. ) The 
IEA (1987, pp. 94-95) mentions two special groups of actors - low-income households 
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and small and even some medium-size businesses - that have problems accessing capital 
for energy-efficiency investments. Levine et al. (1998, p. 18) argue that discount rates 
applied to energy-efficiency projects are often greater than the cost of capital, which 
leads to capital market imperfections. According to Sorrell et al. (2004, p. 74), companies 
a) prefer internal to external finance; b) prefer debt finance to equity; and c) avoid high 
levels of gearing, i. e., the perceived risk of increasing the ratio of loan finance to equity 
finance. In the case of Russia, access to capital is very relevant. Based on discussions at 
the Adam Smith conference on the Russian pulp and paper sector in Vienna in October 
2004, it is clear that capital is very expensive for Russian pulp and paper companies. 
Graves (2004) estimated that capital is roughly a third more expensive for Russian pulp 
and paper companies than it is for Finnish companies. Only short-term capital is available 
from Russian banks due to uncertainty (Martinotý 1995, p. 103; Martinot, 1998, p. 909). 
This is mostly caused by the uncertainties concerning inflation, currency rates, changing 
and conflicting tax legislation, but the above-mentioned difficulty of obtaining reliable 
information of borrowing companies also plays a role (Martinot, 1995, p. 107). In 
addition, Bashmakov (2001, p. 5) argues that the financial support for energy efficiency 
from regional and local governments is inadequate and that small-scale energy-efficiency 
projects are not attractive from the banks' point of view. 
Hidden costs, it has been argued, occur because engineering-econornic studies fail to 
account for the general overhead costs of energy management, costs specific to 
technology investment and the loss of benefits associated with an efficient technology. 
This leads to overestimating the efficiency potential that is achievable by a certain size of 
investment (Sorrell et al., 2000, pp. 38-39; Levine et al., 1994, p. 5). Examples of hidden 
costs include hidden production costs and loss of utility, including attributes of 
technology and site-specific factors, for instance, production interruptions, market- 
transaction costs (search costs, bargaining and negotiating costs, etc. ) and organisational- 
transaction costs (monitoring and control, decision-making costs, etc. ) (Sorrell et al., 
2004, p. 68). Hidden costs have similarities to transaction costs, which have been defined 
by Coase (1991) as the costs of using pricing mechanisms. It is difficult to estimate 
either, and they make an investment less attractive, Levine et al (1994, p. 18) have 
reported, and these two concepts have been used interchangeably. 
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Risk Imbalances between investments in energy conservation and energy supply are a 
classic barrier to energy efficiency. Many (IEA, 1987, p. 83; Schipper et al., 1992, p. 
308) argue that energy-supply investments are typically allowed a longer payback period 
than energy-efficiency investments. Various factors may cause this. The industrial sector 
focuses on its main activities, of whicb energy supply may be one. Consequently, energy 
saving is regarded as a side activity that favours investing in new energy supplies. It is 
also easier to raise funds for larger, and perhaps more traditional, energy-supply 
investments than for energy saving. Industries 'With a small share of production costs 
related to energy use lack the motivation to save energy. In addition, lack of information 
may influence these considerations (IEA, 1987, p. 83-85). Levine et al., (1994, p. 18) 
report that discount rates for energy-efficiency investments tend to be several times 
greater than the cost of capital. However, high discount rates for efficiency investments 
or rejection of technologies may be a rational response to risk, rather than reluctance or 
the requirement of over performance by energy-efficiency investments (Sorrell et al., 
2000, pp. 40-41). Bashmakov (2001, p. 2) argues that in the Soviet Union, the energy 
shortage was routinely solved by producing more energy rather than addressing the 
consumption side. This continues to influence investments in energy efficiency in Russia. 
Subsidised energy prices may possibly further distort the imbalances between 
investments in energy supply and energy conservation. 
Inseparability offeatures was recognised by one of the studies only (Golove and Eto, 
1996, p. 11). Economic theories assume that all goods are available separately, but 
energy efficiency is coupled with other features, such as new production processes, and 
therefore not available separately. However, this can be regarded as a driver as well: 
when replacing old capital with new, companies cannot "avoid" improving their energy 
efficiency as well, i. e., integrated investments in energy efficiency deliver improvements. 
Consequently, this barrier/driver links closely to the opportunities provided by the capital 
cycle discussed above under drivers. 
Split incentives. The most common example is the landlord-tenant problem. The owner 
of a property is reluctant to invest in energy-efficiency retrofitting because tenants (who 
pay the energy bill) would get the benefit. Tenants are not willing to invest in energy- 
efficiency retrofitting as they cannot be sure for how long they will live in the same place 
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to enjoy the benefits of their investment. Nor can property owners get the message 
through to tenants that it would not make any difference to them if a retrofit investment 
contributed to the rent, while at the same time utilities bills would decline. If there were 
not these kinds of information problems, property owners and tenants would be able to 
share the costs and benefits of the retrofit investment (Sorrell et al., 2000; Golove and 
Eto, 1996, p. 9; Levine et al., 1994, p. 15). Sorrell et al., (2004, pp. 10,77) have also 
further applied this barrier to responsibilities on energy use between departments of 
companies, and to managers who are in their posts for only two or three years and 
therefore have no incentive to initiate investments that have a longer payback period. It 
seems that the studies have no consensus on characterising this barrier as a market failure 
- therefore, I have categorised it as a market barrier. Other reasons may be at least partly 
causing this barrier: the amount of money to be saved may be insignificant, which does 
not create enough motivation, and the time used in negotiating, finding information, etc. 
could be regarded as transaction costs that make the investment less attractive. 
MARKET BARRIERS 
> Access to capital 
)ý- Hidden costs 
> Risk 
> Inseparability of features 
ýO 
I 
Split incentives 
I 
5.3.2 Institutional barriers 
Weber (1997, p. 833) defined institutional barriers as barriers caused by political 
institutions, i. e., state government and local authorities. According to North (1993), 
institutions are made up of formal constraints (rules, laws, constitutions), informal 
constraints (norms of behaviour, conventions and self-imposed codes of conduct), and 
their enforcement characteristics. In this Tbesis, Weber's definition is used because 
North's definition is too detailed for the purposes of the empiric analysis. 
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Regulated energy pricing prevails due to government action. As discussed above, market- 
based energy pricing is a strong driver of energy efficiency. Electricity pricing has been 
deregulated in many OECD countries (see for instance IEA, 2000, p. 95) and fuel prices 
in most OECD countries are based on world market prices. Energy-market liberalisation 
is considered as beneficial because it improves overall economic efficiency, including 
that of energy use (ECS, 2002, p. 7). However, in Russia and many other countries 
energy pricing still includes government subsidies for domestic natural gas, and 
electricity prices remain low due to regulation and subsidies (IEA, 2000, p. 175; IEA, 
2002a, p. 164, Moltke et al., 2004, p. 69-70; Bashmakov, 2000, p. 47). In this case, 
energy price is an institutional barrier because the government is not enforcing market- 
based pricing. The low level of energy prices does not provide the incentive to reduce 
energy consumption that improved energy efficiency can deliver (ECS, 2003, p. 144; 
IEA, 2002a, p. 239). However, Bashmakov (2000, pp. 34,43) argues that increasing 
energy prices is problematic in Russia, and that some price rises so far have not given the 
consumers enough time to adapt. He (2001, p. 3) also reports that Russian energy pricing 
is lacking methodological clarity, which further reduces the motivation to save energy. 
Subsidies have been defined as financial aid given by the government to individuals or 
groups (www. investorwords. com). An example of a more complicated definition has 
been given by De Moor and Calamai (1997, p. 1): "Subsidies comprise all measures that 
keep prices for consumers below market level or keep prices for producers above market 
levels or that reduce costs for consumers and producers by giving direct or indirect 
support". According to Riedy and Diesendorf (2003, p. 126) there has been an extensive 
debate on how to define a subsidy. Here the exact definition is not crucial as long as the 
basic idea of a subsidy is clear. Subsidies cause mispricing of energy, which leads to 
other than optimum investment in energy efficiency (Golove and Eto, 1996). In 
particular, artificially low energy prices discourage investments in energy efficiency, 
which is the case in Russia (IEA, 2002a, p. 239; ECS, 2003, p. 144). According to 
Bashmakov (2001, p. 3), the main burden of cross-subsidies to energy between 
residential and industrial sectors is carried by the industrial sector in Russia. 
Imperfect competition refers to an unequal bargaining position in the market that leads to 
the exploitation of bargaining advantages. Sloman (2000, p. 156) has defined imperfect 
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competition as "the collective name for monopolistic competition and oligopoly". In this 
Thesis, imperfect competition is regarded as an institutional barrier because government 
can enforce the market to overcome imperfect competition if it decides to do so. 
Monopolies or other market situations under which only a limited amount of competing 
actors are in the market have indeed been typical of the energy market (Golove and Eto, 
1996, p. 19; IEA, 1987, p. 86; Sorrell et al., 2000, p. 31) and still are in many countries, 
for instance Russia. This barrier has also been called market structure, referring to 
powerful companies inhibiting competitors' more energy-efficient and cost-effective 
products access to the market. However, the market-liberalisation trend of the 1990s (see 
for instance IEA, 2000, p. 95) may have already solved part of this problem in some 
countries. However, this barrier continues to be very relevant in Russia (see for instance 
lEA, 2002a, pp. 223,239; Bashmakov, 2001, p. 3). 
INSTITUTIONAL BARRIERS 
> Regulated energy prices 
> Subsidies 
ýý- Imperfect competition 
5.3.3 Behavioural barriers 
Weber (1997, p. 834) regards behavioural barriers as barriers inside individuals. 
Neoclassical economic theory expects consumers to maximise their utility by taking 
economically rational decisions (see for instance Robinson and Eatwell, 1973, p. 36). 
However, real-life consumers cause disappointment to neoclassical economists: empirical 
studies show that consumption decisions involve plenty of elements other than economic 
rationality. Stem and Aronson (1984, p. 2) begin by listing laziness, trust and acting out 
of habit or duty. Indeed, Sorrell et al. (2000, p. 44) argue that neoclassical analyses of 
barriers are inadequate to explain why economically rational efficiency-improvement 
measures remain unimplemented. 
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Bounded rationality refers to agents' constraints on time, attention and ability to process 
information. Consequently, decisions are satisfýring rather than maximising. Decision- 
making is rational in the sense that it is goal-oriented, but time and attention-consuming 
optimising decisions are replaced by routines and rules of thumb (Sorrell et al., 2004, p. 
78; Sorrell et al., 2000, pp. 44-45; Levine et al., 1994, p. 16. ) Accurate information does 
not necessarily improve the economic rationality of decision-making, because consumers 
are sceptical about information in many ways, and information alone cannot get 
consumers to make changes (Stem and Aronson, 1984, pp. 39-40). Along these lines, the 
lEA (1987, p. 91) has recognised the lack of technical skills, and Golove and Eto (1996, 
p. 20) report that individuals and companies have limited ability to analyse information. 
Form of information is an important factor defining whether consumers will pick it up or 
not: people ignore useful information even if it is free of charge (it was earlier discussed 
that the cost of information creates a barrier). For instance, clear, simple, specific, 
personalised and vivid information works better than other forms (Sorrell et al., 2000, pp. 
47-48). 
Credibility of and trust in the source of information are crucial elements for consumers. 
Consumers seek a combination of expertise and trustworthiness when acquiring 
information for making investment decisions. This may be linked to the previous barrier: 
people may not regard free sources of information as credible and trustworthy (Sorrell et 
al., 2000, p. 49). Consumers take shortcuts in gathering information: the closest sources 
are more likely to be used than the best sources. When credible sources disagree, 
consumers are likely to believe the one that is the most trustworthy (Stem and Aronson, 
1984, p. 45-46. ) 
Inertia has been suggested as a partial explanation for the lack of adoption of cost- 
effective energy-efficiency improvements. The following facts create inertia: the status 
quo is favoured at the expense of change; gains are treated in a different way to losses, 
i. e., actors undervalue opportunity costs; and the uncertainty of expected gains makes 
them seem less attractive (Sorrell et al., 2000, pp. 50-51; Sorrell et al., 2004, p. 50). 
Values may cause an incentive or a barrier by providing an extra argument for or against 
energy-efficiency improvements. This might be true, for instance, with the groups of 
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consumers who promote/avoid products labelled environmentally fiiendly or "green". As 
discussed above, values as an (dis)incentive to energy-related investments were 
recognised also by Stem and Aronson (1984, p. 64). As Sorrell et al., (2000, p. 51) point 
out, economic considerations provide only one element of a decision. Values could create 
either a driver of or a barrier to energy efficiency. 
BEHAVIOURAL BARRIERS 
ýý Bounded rationality 
ýi- Form of information 
> Credibility and trust 
ýý Inertia 
> Values 
5.3.4 Organisational barriers 
Organisational barriers apply to companies (Weber 1997, p. 833). Organisational barriers 
are an important discussion point because this study focuses on organisations 
(companies) rather than individual energy users. Some of the behavioural barriers 
discussed are indeed very similar to those reported under this category. 
Stem and Aronson (1984, p. 2) have recognised that groups, organisations and 
governments often follow the routine, precedent, ideology or example of a leader rather 
than rational economic considerations. They (ibid., pp. 107-108) have also concluded 
that there are two major features affecting the fit of the assumed rationality of 
organisations to their real actions. First, an organisation is not a single actor but a 
collection of actors with potentially conflicting views. Second, organisations do not act 
based on complete and precise information, but rather on confusing amorphous stimuli. 
Organisational structure is not regarded as a barrier to energy efficiency, but rather a 
framework, which could constitute either a barrier or driver. Organisational structures 
vary, and some may be more favourable for energy-efficiency improvements than others. 
Structure will influence information flows and abilities to process information (Sorrell et 
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al., 2000, pp. 53-56. ) Consequently, organisational structure could act as either a driver 
or a barrier. 
Power reflects the realities of hierarchy, and divergent interests and conflicts in 
organisations. Power is the medium through which these conflicts are resolved. It is 
important how much power the actors responsible for energy efficiency have. Hennicke 
et al., (1998 p. 115) have recognised the importance of the internal key actor as a driver 
of energy efficiency. Traditionally, the responsible actors tend to have a low status, which 
may create a barrier (Sorrell et al., 2000, pp. 56-57. ) Consequently, internal key actors 
could act as either a driver of or a barrier to energy efficiency. 
Organisational culture is equivalent to personal values, discussed above under 
behavioural barriers. The role of top management in creating the values of an 
organisation is, therefore, crucial. The place of energy efficiency values within an 
organisation's culture might have a significant impact on adopting energy-efficient 
technologies (Sorrell et al., 2000, pp. 57-58). The Soviet organisational culture still 
prevails in many Russian companies, which may act against energy-efficiency 
improvements (see for instance Bashmakov, 2001, p. 2). Again, this category could act as 
either a barrier to or a driver of energy efficiency. 
Rules and routines dictate most decisions in organisations, rather than considering 
alternatives in terms of their consequences. Attention is a scarce resource in 
organisations, and energy issues have to compete with other issues for attention (Stem 
and Aronson, 1984, pp. 109,112-113. ) The routine basic production process in a 
company would often win an energy-efficiency investment, which is regarded as a 
marginal activity (Sorrell et al., 2000, p. 46). Energy efficiency should be established as 
routine in order to make it part of the "normal" activities. High-level responsibility is an 
important way to filter a goal such as energy efficiency through the whole organisation 
(Stem and Aronson, 1984, pp. 115-116). Rules and routines may work in favour of 
energy efficiency if it is established as a routine. However, in some cases, especially in 
Russia, increasing energy production as a response to a shortage of energy is a routine, 
rather than trying to use less energy (Bashmakov, 2001, p. 2). Consequently, this 
category could be either a barrier or a driver. 
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Risk Organisations value certainty and try to avoid uncertainty. They desire certainty 
over profit. Successful organisations are more likely to take risks such as energy saving 
than unsuccessful ones (Stem and Aronson, 1984, pp. 108-111). Regarding energy 
efficiency investments as a needless risk may create a barrier to profitable investments. 
Uncertainties over future costs and benefits, especially in transition economies (Martinot, 
1995, p. 104), are linked to risks. 
Credibility and trust. Organisations record information from familiar, trusted sources and 
may reject information from unfamiliar sources and informants that do not enjoy the trust 
of the organisation. Organisations also imitate what has been successfully done 
elsewhere, i. e., adopt good practices (Stem and Aronson, 1984, pp. 113-114). This 
information is probably in correct form and is credible because others have tested it in 
practice. This feature may be supportive to information-related government interventions: 
if a couple of large companies can be convinced that energy saving is profitable and this 
can be established as a routine, this good practice may spread through the network of 
companies. Consequently, credibility and trust can lead to either a driver of or a barrier to 
energy saving. 
Access to capital may also cause problems for organisations. Budget defines the 
availability of investments (Stem and Aronson, 1984, pp. I 10). This is especially true in 
the case of economies in transition, which has been regarded as a major barrier to energy 
efficiency (ECS, 2003, p. 13). 
External actors such as consultants were regarded as an important driver to energy 
efficiency. These actors can provide material to help energy-efficiency improvements 
such as quality standards. However, academic and research institutes were regarded as 
too theoretical to be useful in practice (Hennicke, 1998, pp. 115-117). Nevertheless, this 
analysis is based on one source only and, consequently, in other cases academic and 
research institutes that work as innovators may be regarded as more useful external 
actors. 
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ORGANISATIONAL BARRIERS (DRIVERS) 
Organisational structure 
ýO Power 
ýo Organisational culture 
Rules and routines 
ýo Risk 
Credibility and bust 
Access to capital 
)0. External actors 
6.3.5 Barriers specific to Russia 
Some barriers to energy efficiency were reported in the case of Russia only. Some of 
these barriers may be or may have been also relevant to other transition economies. 
Instability of the economic situation caused uncertainties that reduced the attractiveness 
of investments in general and, therefore, also energy-efficiency investments (Bashmakov, 
2001, p. 2). 1 have come across this barrier before when studying Russian pilot projects to 
mitigate greenhouse-gas emissions. Foreign investors reported that the unstable 
investment climate contributes to the uncertainties of return (Korppoo, 2005, p. 119; 
Martinot, 1995, p. 102). Economic stability has also been regarded as a prerequisite for 
energy-efficiency improvements in other sources discussed above (EU website). 
Lack of institutional support for energy-efficiency improvements has been reported by 
Bashmakov (2001, p. 4) and Martinot (1998, p. 910). Missing fi-ameworks such as 
regional energy-efficiency legislation, building codes, procedures of public finance, 
responsibility of consumers for their buildings and heat producers for their heat 
distribution networks, and the lack of local energy-efficiency services, make energy- 
efficiency investments less attractive in Russia. Basic market institutions are also still 
causing problems for contract enforcements. 
Existing inftastructure or the lack of it is causing problems for energy-efficiency 
improvements in Russia. Martinot (1998, p. 910) reported that heating meters are often 
missing. I came across this barTier when studying pilot greenhouse-gas reduction projects 
in Russia. Materials and equipment available locally are of poor quality, and even the 
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poor quality of basic materials such as the water supply can stop a modem district heating 
system working, as was reported by a foreign pilot investor (KoTppoo, 2005, p. 118). The 
importance of infrastructure as a basis for energy efficiency has also been recognised by 
the EU (EU website) and Sorrell et al. (2004, p. 6). 
Lack of skills and experience of local actors can hinder energy-efficiency improvements. 
It is common that local actors have no training on business planning, cost minimisation, 
innovation, Western-style accounting, finance and competition. In addition, independent 
and creative thinking was not part of working life in the Soviet Union and this attitude 
still prevails amongst many managers (Martinot, 1995, p. 125; Martinot, 1998, p. 910). 
Foreigners investing in projects reducing greenhouse-gas emissions in Russia also 
reported this barrier (Korppoo, 2005, p. 118). 
CorruptionlMqfia are widely recognised features of the Russian business environment, 
even though they are not recognised by most analysts as separate barriers. Martinot 
discusses the issues and gives an example of Finnish companies paying government 
officials in Russia for the right to do business (1995, p. 113). He (ibid., p. 114) also 
argues that mafias enforce property rights often more than government does, and regards 
this as an additional cost that can be a barrier to energy efficiency. Martinot also 
mentions the necessity of government approvals for projects (1995, p. 128), which can be 
influenced by corruption. 
In addition, the IEA (1996, pp. 55-56) lists old and new barriers to energy efficiency in 
Russia. Old barriers include artificially low energy prices, lack of metering and controls 
(also reported by Martinot, 1995, p. 108), focus on meeting production goals, limited 
availability of energy-efficient equipment, lack of habit to select among competing 
products based on multiple features, and a monopolistic fuel and energy supply system. 
These barriers have been mostly solved in the case of industrial actors. New barriers 
listed by the IEA include non-payment problems, keeping production capacity running on 
an employment basis even though production volume falls, limited availability of capital, 
and limited stability to create confidence that investments in energy efficiency will pay 
for themselves. This is the most thorough analysis of Russia-specific barriers to energy 
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efficiency available and therefore, even though partly out of date by now, worth 
reporting. Martinot (1995, p. 1] 4-115) adds the weakness of contract institutions. 
Many other Russia-specific barriers could be listed, e. g., those related to the institutional 
tradition of the Soviet-inherited conuTiand and control system. However, only the barriers 
found in the previous literature sources have been reported. This category of barriers is 
developed much further below, based on interviews with Russian actors. 
BARRIERS SPECIFIC TO RUSSIA 
; ý. Instability of economic situation 
> Lack of institutional support for energy-efficiency improvements 
> Infrastructure and lack of it 
> Lack of skills and experience 
; 0, Corruption/mafia 
> Low energy prices 
Lack of metering and control 
Focus on meeting production goals 
Limited availability of energy-efficient equipment 
Lack of habit to select among competing products 
; 0. Non-payment problems 
ýi. Running equipment on low capacity 
Weakness of contract institutions 
5.4 Summary of drivers and barriers in literature 
Table 5.1 below summarises the drivers and barriers identified in the theoretical 
literature. 
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Table 5.1 Drivers and barriers to enerffv efficiencv identified in literature 
Driver Barrier 
Economic drivers 
Market-based energy price x 
Competition x x 
Financial pressure x x 
Image improvement x 
Core business considerations x x 
Considerations of energy industry x 
Energy import dependence x 
Guaranteed supply of energy x 
Sustainable economic growth x 
Institutional drivers 
Environmental regulation x 
Taxation x x 
Energy efficiency programmes x 
Energy-saving companies and agencies x 
Technology drivers 
Domestic innovation systems x x 
Opportunities provided by the capital cycle x x 
General conservatism/management innovation x x 
Market-related barriers 
Externalities x 
Imperfect information x 
Public goods x 
Asymmetric information x 
Access to capital x x 
Hidden costs x 
Risk x 
Inseparability of features x x 
Split incentives x 
Insdtutional barrkrs 
Regulated energy prices x 
Subsidies x 
Imperfect competition x 
Behavioural barrkrs 
Bounded rationality x 
Form of information x x 
Credibility and trust x -x 
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Inertia x 
Values x x 
Organisational barriers I drivers 
Organisational structure x x 
Power/internal key actors x x 
Organisational culture x x 
Rules and routines x x 
External actors x 
Barriers specifw to Russia 
Instability of economic situation x 
Lack of institutional support x 
Infrastructure and lack of it x 
Lack of skills and experience x 
Corruption/mafia x 
Low energy prices x 
Lack of metering and control x 
Focus on meeting production goals x 
Limited availability of energy-efficient equipment x 
Lack of habit to select among competing products X 
Non-payment problems x 
Running equipment on low capacity x ýý 
Weakness of contract institutions X 
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6. Pulp and paper sector: description and energy 
consumption 
6.1 Products 
The basic product of the sector is pulp, which is traditionally made of cellulose fibres of 
wood; however, other materials such as straw can also be used. Wood pulp can be 
recycled and, consequently, waste paper is an important source of pulp. Pulp is used to 
produce various qualities of paper products. Farla et al. (1997, p. 749) have listed the 
following main paper categories as follows: newsprint, printing/writing paper, sanitary 
paper, packaging paper and other paper. Pulp and paper products can be divided into 
bulk and speciality products which have very different features: 
Bulkproduct 
- large market volumes 
- similar quality requirements by 
end-users 
interchangeability between 
producers 
sale price most important 
competitive factor 
raw material and production- 
oriented 
Speciality product 
small market volumes 
quality requirements differ 
between end-users 
quality levels differ between 
producers 
price levels vary with application 
and user 
- market-oriented 
- research to improve quality and 
service 
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(Diesen 1998, pp. 61-62) 
Table 6.1 provides examples of bulk and speciality products. 
Table 6.1 Examples of bulk and speciality products 
Bulk product Chemical pulp 
Newsprint 
Uncoated wood-free papers 
Liquid packaging boards 
Laminating papers 
Speciality product Cigarette paper, cable paper 
Source: Diesen 1998, p. 62. 
The production process can be integrated, i. e., both pulp and paper production can take 
place at the same site, or non-integrated, i. e., pulp is produced at a separate site of paper 
production and sold to a paper mill that has no pulp production line (LNEP, 2003, p. 7). 
Non-integrated production adds to the transport costs and energy use of pulp drying, 
which can be avoided by producing pulp and paper in an integrated mill. 
Transportability varies somewhat between products but most pulp and paper products can 
be transported cost-effectively, i. e., the pulp and paper market is global. Market pulp and 
kraftliner are the most transportable pulp and paper products (Diesen, 1998, p. 74). 
6.2 Pulp production process 
Pulp can be manufactured by two main processes, chemical and mechanical, and their 
combinations, semi-chemical and chemi-mechanical (Nilsson et al., 1995, p. 11). " 
In chemical pulping lignin, which is one of the main components of wood, is dissolved 
by cooking wood chips in chemical liquor in a pressurised digester. The main chemical 
agents are sulphite and sulphate. Tbe latter dominates the more environmentally harmful 
" Semi-chemical and cberni-mechanical processes are similar, the choice of the name depends on which 
part of the process dominates production. 
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former process on a world scale (European Commission, 2001, p. iii). The fibres are then 
separated from the pulping liquor by washing, and bleached if necessary. The leftover 
liquor can be used as a bio fuel (Nilsson et al., 1995, p. 12). Vvule sulphite pulp is easier 
to bleach than sulphate pulp, the latter pulp produces stronger paper. Consequently, 
sulphite pulp is used to produce high-quality printing paper whereas sulphate pulp is 
typically a raw material of packaging paper (Pbylipsen et al., 1998, p. 118). 
Figure 6.1 Chemical pulping process 
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Source: Siitonen and Ahtila, 2002, p. 3 1. 
Figure 6.1 presents the phases of chemical pulping process. The first part of the process 
prior to cooking focuses on preparing the raw wood material for cooking. The main 
methods of cooking pulp are continuous cooking and periodic cooking. Continuous 
cooking, which dominates the less modem periodic cooking (Rein, 2002, p. 62), is used 
for sulphate pulping. The raw material is fed continuously into the digester, while at the 
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same time pulp and black liquor are removed. In periodic cooking, a discrete quantity or 
batch of chips is individually processed (Helsinki University of Technology, Forest 
Product Glossary). The part of the process presented to the right of the main process is 
the chemical recovery cycle, which collects the waste stream of black liquor to be 
combusted. as a bio fuel and separates the cooking chemicals (causticising and lime kiln) 
to be reused. At the end of the process, the options of using the pulp in an integrated 
paper mill and as market pulp illustrate the additional drying the latter requires. 
Mechanical pulping process defibrises the raw material, either by grinding logs or 
refining wood chips. This process is technically simpler than the chemical pulping 
process (Komppa, 1993, p. 105). Another major advantage of the process is that it 
produces much higher yields than chemical pulp; up to 90-95% of the wood ends up as 
usable pulp compared with 40-55% of chemical pulp (Martin et al., 2000). The processes 
available can be divided into grinding and refining (Siitonen and Ahtila, 2002, p. 29; 
Rein, 2002 p. 78-79). The oldest grinding process, called stone groundwood pulping 
(SGW), is based on grinding logs with a rotating stone. This process is mainly used for 
newsprint and magazine papers. A more developed form of this grinding method is 
pressurised stone groundwood pulping (PSGW), which applies a pressurised atmospheric 
environment to the grinding process. The more recent refiner mechanical pulp (RMP) 
process grinds wood chips (instead of logs) between two discs. Since the 1960s, the 
thermomechanical pulping (TMP) refining process has been developed. In this process, 
wood chips are preheated with steam prior to the refining process. The chips are then 
ground between two discs in a pressurised environment. The refining process can be 
performed in one or two stages. Chemical thermomechanical pulping (CTMP) is a 
modified TMT refining process with some chemicals added to the wood chips before 
refining. The strength of pulp fibres improves from SGW towards CTMP. However, the 
opposite is true to optical properties (Htun et al., 1993, pp. 1087-1089). As the 
mechanical grinding process damages the wood fibres, mechanical pulp is used for 
lower-quality papers than chemical pulp (Phylipsen et al., 1998, p. 117-118). 
Figure 6.2 Mechanical pulping process 
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Figure 6.2 illustrates the stages of mechanical pulping, including the options of grindino 
and refinino. The refining process. \vhich is more modem. is illustrated in the middle Z7 -III 
column. while the more old fashioned grinding processes can he seen on the right. 
Sirnilarlý, to chemical pulp, the production process of mechanical pulp is divided into 
integrated paper production and market pulp production at the end of' the process 
description. 
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Recycled paper can be used as a fibre source instead of virgin wood fibre. Recycled 
material is repulped mechanically by adding water and turning it into slush (Nilsson et 
al., 1995, p. 13). Recycled pulp is used for lower-grade papers. Figure 6.3 illustrates the 
stages of pulping recycled paper. 
Figure 6.3 Process of pulping recycled paper 
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Different types of pulp are used to produce different types of paper (UNEP, 2003, p. 5- 
6). Table 6.2 surmnarises the use of different types of pulp. 
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Table 6.2 Pulp types by production process and their use 
Pulp type Products Product categories 
Chemical. bleached High-quality printing and Printing/writing paper 
writing paper 
Chemical, unbleached Liner board, sack paper Packaging paper 
Mechanical Newsprint, printing and writing Newsprint, printing/writing 
paper paper 
Semi-chemical, chemi- Box board, sanitary products Packaging paper, sanitary paper 
mechanical 
Recycled Box board, fluting, newsprint, Packaging paper, sanitary paper, 
sanitary tissue I newsprint. 
Source: Nilsson et aL, 1995, p. 11. Product categories based on Farla et aL, 1997, p. 749. 
Bleaching increases the brightness of pulp, but the process has led to toxic emissions into 
the environment, especially in the past. The traditional bleaching agent of chemical pulp 
was chlorine, which was replaced by a somewhat less environmentally harmful chlorine 
dioxide. More recently due to consumer pressure, the industry introduced elemental 
chlorine-free (ECF) bleaching, which avoids elemental chlorine by using the more 
environmentally f-fiendly chlorine dioxide and, further, the totally chlorine-free (TCF) 
(oxygen) pulp production. This bleaching technique is based on hydrogen peroxide and 
ozone. The main bleaching agents for mechanical pulp are dithionite and hydrogen 
peroxide. If mechanical pulp is used as newsprint, it is usually used unbleached (Nilsson 
et al., 1995, p. 3-4,12-13. LTNEP, 2003, p. 10). 
Drying is the end of the pulping process when producing market pulp, i. e., selling pulp to 
non-integrated paper plants as an end product. Drying is necessary in order to make the 
market pulp easier to transport. In integrated pulp and paper plants, pulp is only dried 
during the paper-making process, and therefore, fed to the paper machine as slurry 
(Phylipsen et aL, 1998, p. 125). 
6.3 Paper production process 
Papermaking is divided into three main steps: stock preparation, sheet formation and 
finishing (pressing and drying). Stock preparation refers to mixing pulp and additives to 
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form slurry. In the sheet formation stage, the slurry is spread on a moving wire and water 
is allowed to drain away. At the final stage, the paper is pressed to remove water and then 
dried. During the drying process, the paper can be coated and calendered in order to 
smoothen and polish the paper (Mar-tin et al., 2000). 
Figure 6.4 Paper-making process 
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Source: Siitonen and Ahtila, 2002, p. 36. 
Figure 6.4 presents the paper-making process described above. Head box is the storage of 
slurry after the stock preparation stage. Some types of paper are reeled while others are 
sheeted. 
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6.4 Technology path: vocabulafy 
The vocabulary for technology-path methodology (Table 6.3), which aims to record the 
change of technology over time at plant level, was included in this chapter as pulp and 
paper production technologies are explained above. The technology-path methodology is 
ftuther discussed in Chapter 4. 
Table 6.3 Glossary of terms used in technology paths 
Chemical Pulping 
Sulphite pulp plant Sulphite pulping is a chemical pulping by cooking wood in liquor 
containing sodium, magnesium, ammonium or calcium bisulphite. An 
obsolete, environmentally bannftil process that is being replaced by 
sulphate pulping. 
Sulphate pulp plant SuIpbate pulping is a chemical pulping by cooking wood in liquor 
containing sodium hydroxide and sodium sulphide. Sulphate pulping 
is the more modem method of chemical pulping. 
Semi chemical pulp Pulping in which the fibres have been separated mechanically after a 
plant preliminary chemical treatment. 
Periodic cooking Chemical pulping process during which a discrete quantity or batch of 
chips is individually processed. Less-modem process than continuous 
cooking. 
Continuous cooking Chemical pulping process during which the raw material is fed 
continuously into the digester, while at the same time pulp and black 
liquor are removed. More-modem process than periodic cooking. 
Digester The pressure vessel to treat pulpwood or other raw fibre material with 
chemicals to produce chemical pulp. The digester may be of either the 
batch or the continuous type. 
Mechanical pulping 
Groundwood plant Plant producing mechanical pulp by grinding. 
TMP Thermo-mechanical pulping plant producing mechanical pulp by 
refining. 
Grinder Equipment used in groundwood plant. 
Paper-making 
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PM Paper machine 
Pulp drying machine A type of paper machine which dries pulp to be sold as market pulp. 
CM Cardboard-making machine 
Parchment machine Paper machine specialising in parchment paper, which used to be 
produced for the Soviet market. 
Fluting machine Paper machine producing fluting for filling cardboard. 
Press Rolls between which the paper web passes. 
Rebuilding Retrofitting and optimising an existing paper machine in order to 
improve its performance. 
Head box Chamber at the beginning of a paper machine that dispenses pulp 
stock evenly onto a moving wire (former). 
Winder Machine for cutting the paper web longitudinally into narrower webs, 
which are then wound to reels. 
Coating Process by which paper or board is coated with an agent to improve 
its brightness and/or printing properties. 
Shoe press Rolls between which the paper web passes. 
Press section Part of paper machine where water is pressed out of the paper in order 
to dry it. 
Wire Flat belt of metal or plastic mesh on which the paper or board web is 
dewatered. 
Dry end Final part of the paper machine from the drying section onwards. 
Reeler Machine that reels up the web coming from a paper machine or other 
machine (coater, calender). 
Calender Machine in which paper is given a glazed finish by passing it between 
two or more rolls, either on or off the paper machine. 
Size press Machine in the drying section of the paper or board machine, used for 
paper or board surface sizing. 
Cutting machine Machine that cuts stacks of paper to desired sizes. 
Increased speed Increasing the speed of paper maebine is desirable in order to increase 
the productivity of the machine. 
Regulation/optimisation Improving the control systems of processes towards optimal level of 
system control. 
Other relevant processes of pulp and paper-making 
Evaporation Unit used at pulp mills to concentrate spent liquor to make it suitable 
for burning and chemical recovery. Evaporation equipment comprises 
evaporators and storage tanks. The plant increases the dry solids 
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content of spent liquor. 
Screening Process for removal of oversized and unwanted particles from pulp. 
Washing Washing the pulp before feeding it to the paper machine in order to 
separate pulping chemicals. 
Wood room - wet/dry Part of a pulp mill where logs are debarked. 
Causticising Process by which green liquor from sulphate pulping is converted to 
white liquor, thus allowing the cooking chemicals to be re-used. 
Lime kiln A rotating kiln shell where dried lime mud from the chemical pulping 
process is reburned by heat to lime. 
Sheeting The act or process of forming into sheets, or flat pieces. 
De-inking Removal of printing ink and impurities from recovered paper. De- 
inking is intended to produce recycled fibre pulp with maximum 
whiteness and purity. 
Bleaching 
ECF bleaching Elemental chlorine-free bleaching. 
TCF bleaching Totally chlorine-free peroxide-based bleaching. 
Oxygen bleaching A process in which pulp is initially treated with oxygen followed by 
4-5 bleaching stages. 
Energy 
Boiler Plants manufacturing pulp usually operate bark boilers. Pulp and 
paper plants often also have their own energy production facilities, 
which do not differ from standard combustion plants (European 
Commission, 2001, p. xiii). 
CHP Combined heat and power, energy-efficient combustion technology. 
Recovery boiler Boiler used to bum black liquor from chemical pulping for recovery 
of inorganic chemicals as well as for energy production. The recovery 
boiler uses strong black liquor as fuel, supplies heat for stearn 
generation and recovers the inorganic cooking chemicals in molten 
form. 
Fluidised bed boiler Efficient modem combustion technology. 
Steam boiler Boiler used for producing steam, i. e., beat for pulp and paper-making 
processes. 
Source: Partly based on Helsinki University of Technology, Department of Forest Products 
Technology. Forest product glossary. Available at 
http: //www. tkk. fi/'Yksikot/Puu/opiskelu/Sanasto/Sanasto-englantiC. 
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6.5 Energy consumption of the pulp and paper sector 
From the energy consumption point of view, integrated mills are more efficient as they 
require no drying of pulp before feeding it to the paper machine and no transport of pulp. 
Pulping is one of the most significant energy -consuming processes in paper-making 
(Martin et al., 2000). In the mechanical pulping process energy, mostly electricity, is 
required for refining wood logs or chips, while the chemical pulping process consumes 
energy for the cooking process. In addition, both processes require energy for pumping 
slush and water (Komppa, 1993, p. 104). However, the energy balances of the mechanical 
and chemical pulping processes are dramatically different. The chemical pulping process 
dissolves some 50% of the raw wood material while the mechanical pulp yield can be 
close to 100%, as discussed above. Consequently, half of the raw wood material remains 
in the cooking liquor of the chen-fical pulping process. This liquor can be combusted and 
therefore the chemical pulping process is a net energy producer. The mechanical pulping 
process is very electricity -intensive. However, some 60% of the heat produced during the 
refining process can be recovered by modem plants (Komppa, 1993, p. 104-105). 
Table 6.4 collects the estimates by Martin et al. (2000) of the heat and electricity 
consumption of various processes related to pulping and paper-making. Most of the 
energy required for pre-treatment and mechanical pulping is in the form of electricity, 
while for chemical pulping mainly heat is consumed. Mechanical pulping is becoming 
more electricity-intensive as the pulping process develops from the original method of 
stone groundwood pulping towards thermornechanical pulping. 
Chemical recovery of the black liquor produced in the chemical pulping process produces 
a significant amount of energy - up to 15 GJ/t of pulp net. Evaporating water 
from the 
black liquor is one of the main heat consumers of a chemical pulp mill (Rein, 2002, p. 
65). Table 6.4 does not include the energy supply available from heat recovered from the 
mechanical pulping process as this data was not available in the source. 
The traditional bleaching chemicals are bought by pulp producers whereas ozone used for 
the more modem and environmentally friendly method of bleaching is mostly produced 
on site. Consequently, ozone bleaching contributes to the energy coasumption of the 
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plant while the energy to produce the traditional chemicals is consumed somewhere else. 
Using ozone can increase electricity demand by 5-10% (Phylipsen et al., 1998, p. 127). 
Drying market pulp is a significant heat consumer (4.5 GJ/t) as it will, in any case, still 
have to be dried again when converted to paper (10 GJ/t)- 
Table 6.4 Estimated average consumptions of the steps and techniques of pulp and 
papermaking 
Process I Heat Electricity 
Pre-treatment of wood before pu in 
Debarking 1 0 0.03 GJ/t raw material 
Chipping 0 0.11 GJ/t raw material 
Pulping processes 
Stone groundwood pulping 0 5.94 GJ/t pulp 
Refiner mechanical pulping 0 7.10 GJ/t pulp 
Thermomechanical pulping 0.9 GJ/t pulp 7.3 5 GJ/t pulp 
Chemi-thermomechanical pulping Total ener2v consumptio 26.8 GJA pulp 
Pulping recovered paper 0 1.41 GJ/t raw material 
Sulphate (kraft) pulping 4.4 GJ/t pulp 1.46 GJ/t pulp 
Sulphite pulping 4.2 GJ/t pulp 2.06 GJ/t pulp 
Semi-chemical pulping 5.3 GJ/t pulp 1.82 GJ/t pulp 
Chemical recovery 
Black liquor concentration 4.4 GJ/t pulp 0.09 GJ/t pulp 
Energy recovery (produces energy) 11-17 GJ11pulp - 1.1 
GJltpulp = 9.9-15.9 
t Pulp 
0.21 GJ/t pulp 
Lime kiln 2.3 GJ/t pulp 0.05 GJ/t pulp 
Bleaching and drying pulp 
Bleaching average 4.3 GJ/t pulp 0.57 GJ/t pulp 
Pulp drying (if transported) 4.5 GJ/t Dulp 0.56 GJ/t pulp 
Paper-nwking 
Stock preparation 0.7 GJ/t paper 0.99 GJ/t paper 
Forming and pressing 0 0.86 GJ/t paper 
Drying section 10 GJ/t paper 0.08 GJ/t paper 
Source: Martin et al., 2UUU. 
Conversion of electricity from original data in kWh: I GJ is equivalent to 277.7 kWh. 
The paper-making process consumes energy for pumping pulp slush, water and air, 
processing energy and drying paper (Komppa, 1993, p. 104). The drying section 
consumes typically some 80% of all steam energy used in the process. Most of this 
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energy leaves the drying hood as very hot air and water vapour. This energy is a good 
source for energy recovery. With an efficient heat recovery system, it is possible to 
recover about 50% of it in winter conditions (European Commission, 2001, p. 395). 
6.6 Technology change in Finland 
In this section, Finland is used as an example of technology change since the 1970s. 
Similar reliable information is not available for Russia during the Soviet period. The 
purpose of this analysis is to create a picture of how Russian pulp and paper sector could 
have developed under market conditions, and how it could develop now. 
The pulp and paper sector is an important sector of the Finnish economy. The sector 
produced I I% of the value added in production and 2.3% of GDP in 2004. Only the 
electronics industry is more important to the economy, by a share of 21% of the value 
added and 4.5% of GDP (www. stat. fi). However, the export share has been decreasing 
since the 1980s (see Table 6.5). Two-thirds of forests in Finland are privately owned 
(Diesen, 1998, p. 24). 
Table 6.5 Development of pulp export percentage 
I 197C: 1975 1980 1985 - 1990 1995 
1% 25.3 1 14.3 22.8 17.2 15.1 12.1 
Nource: Pinnish project data. 
The share of production of printing and writing papers and fine papers has increased 
dramatically since the 1970s in Finland, while the volume of newsprint production has 
remained more or less the same (Diesen, 1998, p. 22). 
Corporate organisational structure is a very strong element in the Finnish pulp and paper 
industry. Since the late 1980s, pulp and paper companies (and companies of other 
sectors) have been merging and intemationalising in order to achieve better 
competitiveness, economics of scale as well as flexibility. By the 2000s, most Finnish 
pulp and paper producers had merged to form a few large players (Finnish Forest 
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Industries Federation, 2006a, p. 13). The main Finnish forestry corporates are M-Real. 
UPM Kyrnmene, Stora Enso, Botnia and Metsdliitto Group. 
During the period 1980-1995, the Finnish forest industry in an average year invested 
slightly more than I I% of its sales value (Diesen, 1998, p. 26). 
6.6.1 Capital cycle 
Old equipment is regularly replaced by new equipment that is more energy -efficient 
(Worrell and Biermans, 2005, p. 949). A Finnish expert interviewed divided the lifetime 
of a paper machine into three phases: 1) new machine with high debt but paying for itself, 
2) machine has mostly paid for itself and is productive but requires some updating 
investment; and 3) machine is technically old and therefore not competitive. It requires a 
change of product in order to find a new market where it can be competitive for a bit 
longer. 
This capital cycle is illustrated in Figure 6.5. The timings are directive and based on the 
Finnish experience. In practice, a plant may be in use for much longer than 30 years. For 
instance, Worrell and Biermans (2005, p. 955) estimate that the average lifetime of a 
paper plant is 43 years. 
Figure 6.5 (Directive) capital cycle of a Finnish pulp plant 
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Source: Interview with a Finnish expert 
Various timings for retrofits have been estimated in Figure 6.5. Even though they depend 
on the plant and its management, this figure provides an idea of a planned capital cycle of 
a plant. Two major updates serve the purpose of keeping the equipment in good condition 
by replacing some of the equipment and their parts around the middle of the expected 
lifetime of the plant, and another update towards the end of the lifetime to give some 
more years of operation. These updates can provide more efficient versions of the 
existing technology (for instance pumps etc. ) or change the existing technology to a new 
technology (for instance press nip to the new type of shoe nip in the case of a paper 
machiDe). 
6.6.2 Trends since 1970 
Table 6.6 presents the main trends of production, technology and energy in the Finnish 
pulp and paper industry during the period 1970-2000. The increase of very high quality 
(printing and writing) paper production is outstanding, with average annual growth of 
7.8%. Another very strong trend was the growth of plant size, which has multiplied. 
Paper machine speeds have also more than doubled, which is a typical development 
direction of paper-making, together with increasing the, %Nidth of paper machines (Diesen, 
1998, p. 12). Sizes of recovery boilers which are used for combusting black liquor from 
the chemical pulping process have grown sevenfold - together with the consumption of 
wood fuel. Power consumption increased threefold during the observation period, mainly 
due to the increase in mechanical pulping and the production of high quality papers (VVT 
Energy, 2001, p. 138; expert interviews). 
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Table 6.6 Development of technology in the Finnisb pulp and paper sector in 1970-2000 
I Absolute change Annual change, % 
Production of pulp and paper (197&-2000) 
Pulp production. chemical 1 4.2 4 6.9 Mt/a +1.8 
Pulp production, sulphate (replacing sulphile) 2.7 4 6.9 Mt/a +1 3.3 
Pulp production. mechanical 2.0 4 4.7 Mt/a +3.0 
Paper and board production 4.2 13.1 Mt/a +4.0 
Printing and writing paper production 0.9 8.0 Mt/a +7.8 
Pulp and paper industry's share of export 39422% -2.0 
Technology (1970-2000) 
Pulp mill size 1 280.000 600.000 t/a +2.6 
TMP production line size (1975-2000) 0.000 250.000 t/a +6.7 
Paper mill size 100.000 350.000 t/a +4-3 
Recoverý boiler size 500 --) 3800 tds/d +7.0 
Paper machine speed 700 4 1800 m/min +3.2 
Energy (1975-2000) 
Share of own production 73443% -2.3 
Power consumption 9.1 -4 24.4 TWh/a +4.4 
Oil consumption 55.1 --> 15.3 PJ/a -5.4 
Wood fuel consumption 62.1 -4 186.5 PJ/a +4.9 
Source: VI-I Energy (2100 1)p. 13 8. 
Tds/d: tonnes of dry solids per day 
Figure 6.6 Key technological change-, in the Finnish pulp and paper sector in 1970-2000 
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Figure 6.6 illustrates changes in technology in the Finnish pulp and paper sector during 
the period 1970-2000. Many of these developments are too complicated to be covered by 
this study. However, some technologies are relevant. For instance, heat recovery in paper 
production, introduction of fluidised bed-boiler technology and improvements in the 
pressing and drying of paper were mentioned in the interviews. Elementary chlorine-free 
bleaching technology was discussed above and is also within the scope of this study. 
The main differences between the 1970s and 2000s paper production technologies are: 
9 Better management of the formation of paper on the machine; 
9 Higher speed of machines; 
e Production process has become more complicated as quality of papers has 
improved; 
* Measurability of the process has increased to enable better management of 
physical and chemical factors of the process; 
- Development of roller technology: coatings, reorganisation of rollers. 
The most important technological innovations introduced since the 1970s include: 
Change of boiler technology: from grate boiler to fluidized bed boiler; 
Increase of developed CHP technology; 
Improved heat recovery from the chemical pulping process; 
Heat recovery from the grinding process for drying; 
Increased utilisation of waste streams; 
improvement of the efficiency of the press section, which leaves less drying to the 
drying section; w 
* Formation of paper improved, which increased efficiency; 
e Thermal efficiency has improved as the hood (which covers the paper machine 
drying section) is closed; 
* Improvement of the efficiency of evaporation during the drying section. 
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Figure 6.7 Paper machine in the 1970s 
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The paper machine in the 1970S (Figure 6.7) consisted of a rectifier roll head box which 
was controlled manually. The old pressing technique press nip was still in use. The 
drying section was based on a twin wire which did not allow high speeds. The surface of 
paper was treated by spread coating, and not all sections were driven by computers. The 
reeler was a drum reel-up. and the paper was wound by a two-drum winder. 
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Figure 6.8 Paper machine in the 2000s 
Paper machine in the 2000s 
Wire section Shoe Front dryer 
Source: Metso Paper 
The paper machine in the 2000s (Figure 6.8) has a hydraulic head box. The wire section 
has a gap former and the press nip has changed to the shoe press., which is about twice as 
efficient. The drying section consists of a single wire which allows a higher speed of 
production. The surface of the paper is typically treated by several computer-controlled 
calenders and several coating sections. Reelers, have become fully automated and centre- 
driven and the paper is wound by a multi-station WiDder. '-5 
Tables 6.7 and 6.8 compare the specific energy consumption for various pulp and paper 
products in 1970 and in 2005. From Table 6.7 it is obvious that the specific electricity 
consumption of paper-making and chemical pulping has reduced i. e. the activity has 
become less energy intensive while the electricity intensity of mechanical pulping, 
especially that of refined mechanical pulp. has increased. This can be pardly explained by 
the improving energy efficiency of production processes. and by the adoption of more 
complicated mechanical pulping processes which are more electricity intensive than the 
previous technologies. 
15 However, these two activities do not influence energy consumption considerably. 
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Table 6.7 Change of the specific electricity consumption of various paper and pulp products 
from the 1970s 
1970s 2005 Change 
GJ/t GJ/t % 
Newsprint 2.30 2.05 -11 
SC. fine paper 2.52 2.30 -6 
Wood-free uncoatedfine paper 2.77 2.34 -16 
Kraftliner 2.16 1.93 -11 
Fluting 2.05 1.87 -9 
Sack paper 3.96 3.60 -9 
Tissuelsofteaper 3.96 3.60 -9 
1970s 1995 Change 
Gro 4ndwoodpulp - rough 5.11 5.58 +9 
Groundwoodpulp -fine 6.48 6.73 +4 
Refined mechanical pulp 7.56 8.42 +11 
Unbleached sulphate pulp 1.94 1.85 -5 
Bleached sulphite pulp 2.30 2.14 -14 
Tnble 1.94 1.87 -4 
Source: Labepelto 1998, p. 100,102; Carlsson and Heikkila 1998. 
Conversion from original data in kWb: I GJ is equivalent to 277.7 kWb. 
The development of heat intensity shown in Table 6.8 differs from dynamics of the above 
electricity intensity. Similarly to electricity intensity, the heat intensity of paper-making 
has reduced during the observation period. However, the heat intensity of mechanical 
pulping has reduced significantly as a result of the introduction of process heat recovery 
from the pulping process. 
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Table 6.8 Change of the specific process beat consumption of various paper and pulp 
products from 1970s 
. 
1970s 2005 Change 
GJ/t GJ/t % 
1 5.9 5.1 -14 
SC_fine pqper 6.1 5.1 -16 
Wood free uncoatedfine paper 7.9 6.7 -15 
Kraftliner 6.5 5.9 -9 
Fluting 6.3 5.6 -13 
Sackpaper 7.6 6.9 -9 
Tissue / sqfi paper 7.6 6.9- -9 
Groundwoodpulp - rough 0.2 0.0 -100 
Gro indwoodpulp -. fine 0.2 -0.1 -150 
Refined mechanicalpulp -1.0 -2.8 -180 
Source: Ubepelto 1998, pp. 104-105. 
6.7 Pulp and paper sector in Russia 
The pulp and paper sector accounted for 1.7% of the added value generated by Russian 
industry in 2001 (Goskomstat, 2002b, p. 24-25). The dynamics of the Russian production 
of pulp. paper and cardboard in 1992-2003 is illustrated in Figure 6.9 which shows the 
significant decrease of the production in the 1990s and the recovery of the figures 
reaching the 1992 level of production as a result of growth since 1998. The main paper 
product is newsprint. Its share of the total paper production has increased significantly 
during the observation period, from 26% in 1992 up to 48% in 2003 (Federal Service of 
State Statistics, 2004, p. 197). 
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Figure 6.9 Development of the production of the main pulp and paper products in Russia 
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Source: Federal Service of State Statistics, 2004, p. 197. 
The sector is concentrated in a few Russian regions. The main pulp production regions 
are the Archangelsk, Irkutsk, Leningrad and Karelia regions while the Karelia, Perm, 
Nizegorodskii, Komi, Leningrad and Archangelsk regions produce the majority of paper, 
i. e., pulp and paper production is concentrated in 7 of the 88 Russian regions. The 
Archangelsk region is by far the largest producer of cardboard, followed by the 
Leningrad region (Goskomstat, 2003, pp. 458-460). Historically, forestry industry has 
been important at both of the case regions providing a large share of the industrial 
productions, for instance, forestry industry provided some 62% of industrial production 
in Karelian (then Olonetsk) region in the beginning of the 20h century (Dudarev et a]. 
2004, p. 11). Based on this, covering the Archangelsk and Karelia regions is likely to 
provide meaningful results which may be applicable to other regions. However, this is 
difficult to prove. In addition, the forestry industry plays an important role in the 
economy of north-west Russia (Dudarev et al., 2003, p. 45) which makes these regions 
interesting to focus on. Figure 6.10 illustrates the importance of forestry industry in the 
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Russian economic areas clearly showing the importance of the sector in the North-West 
Russia. 
Figure 6.10 The importance of forestry sector in the Russian economic areas 
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Source: Goskomstat, 2003.2003, pp. 418-421. 
The share of goods with high added value is relatively low in north-west Russia's forestry 
sector as most products tend to be of low quality (Lesprom. 2004, p. 6). However, pulp 
and low-grade paper can be of relatively good quality (Dudarev et al., 2003, p. 46). The 
quality of infrastructure and labour allows the production of cost-competitive products 
only (Dudarev, 2003, p. 60), which are, in practice, simple, bulk products. Figures 6.11 
and 6.12 illustrate the development of the importance of the Russian regional economic 
areas as producers of pulp. paper and cardboard. The relative importance of the North- 
West and Sibirskii economic areas has increased at the expense of the Far Eastern area 
during 1990-2002. The figures also demonstrate the dominant role of the North-West 
Russia as a producer of pulp and paper products. 
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Figure 6.11 Shares of the production between Russian economic areas in 1990 
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Source: Goskornstat, 2003, pp. 458-460. 
Figure 6.12 Shares of the production between Russian economic areas in 2003 
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Russia produced 4.2 percent of world wood pulp and 2.1 percent of paper and paper 
board in 2005. The wood pulp production was up from 2.4 percent and paper and paper 
board froml. I percent in 2002 (FAOSTAT). 
Domestic consumption has grown since the systemic change, and imports are required to 
supply the market. The market is also expected to grow in the future, which has already 
attracted some external investors to the region. The most important export products of the 
sector include newsprint and pulp (Dudarev et aL, 2003, p. 50-52). The share of Russia of 
world exports of wood pulp was 4.9 percent and paper and paper board 2.8 percent in 
2005 (FAOSTAT). Export has a long tradition, especially from the Archangelsk region 
which mainly exported its forestry products already in the early 1900s (Dudarev et a]. 
2004, pp. 11 - 12). 
in general, the lack of investment during the transition period led to a low level of 
replacing obsolete equipment and, consequently, the capital stock turnover was limited 
(IEA, 2002a, p. 271; Dudarev et a]. 2004, p. 13). Existing production capacity is, on 
average, out of date and requires modernisation. The level of wear and tear of the assets 
is more than 90% of the total capacity. Increased production is based on using existing 
capacity and redistributing it between products (Lesprom, 2004, p. 2). No new pulp and 
paper mills have been constructed in Russia since the 1980s (Kortelainen and Kotilainen, 
2003, p. 386). Local machine producers cannot provide good quality equipment and 
consequently both new and second-hand equipment are imported to update the sector 
(Dudarev et al., 2003, p. 46-47). 
During the first half of 2004,82% of investments were from own capital in the north- 
west Russian pulp and paper industry (Sovershayeva, 2004). According to Graves (2004), 
the weighted average cost of capital is up to 13% in Russia while the same figure for 
European (Finnish, Swedish, Norwegian, Austrian and Spanish) was between 7.8% and 
9.5%. According to an expert interviewee, the interest rates were up to 18-25% in the 
mid-2000s (Interview with Archangelsk expert). 
As a result of the general problems of Russian industry, namely out-of-date equipment 
and infrastructure, a focus on low-added-value products, the high cost of capital, the 
vagueness of property rights, the lack of transparency and low level of corporate 
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governance, and problems specific to the Russian pulp and paper industry, including out- 
of-date forestry legislation, corporate conflicts, capital intensity and the long payback 
period for investments, the sector lacks attractiveness to investors (Smushkin, 2004). The 
privatisation of the sector led in some cases to serious interruptions of production, and the 
redistribution of the property is still ongoing (Dudarev et al 2004, p. 14). 
The government has been accused of not helping to maintain and modernise the sector 
(Lesprom, 2004, p. 2). Even though the transport network in north-west Russia is better 
than on average in Russia, it still limits the potential of development of the forestry sector 
(Dudarev et aL, 2003, p. 46-47). The lack of forest roads leads to seasonality of the 
sector as raw material cannot be transported year-round (Lesprom, 2004, p. 6). Forestry 
companies are also burdened with social responsibilities as dependent communities grew 
around them (Dudarev et al., 2003, p. 60). 
The majority of the sector's large enterprises were established as open joint-stock 
companies with state participation in 1992 (Butrin, 2002. ) The main interest groups 
related to ownership of the plants are: 1) mill employees and managers; 2) emerging new 
Russian corporations; 3) Russian businessmen and oligarchs; and 4) foreign investors. 
Some new Russian corporations which have emerged have experienced difficulties with 
the oligarchs struggling for control over plants. Corporate interest in the pulp and paper 
sector is only just emerging in Russia as most assets in the more lucrative sectors such as 
oil and metal have already been divided up. There are also cases in which workers and 
plant managers have successfully retained control of plants while foreign investors have, 
in most cases, been less successful (Kortelainen and Kotilainen, 2002. p. 387-389,398. 
Butrin, 2002). 
The forestry industry's first decade after the systernic change passed quietly as no 
external investors were allowed to make quick money from the sector. The sector 
experienced a crisis from the mid 1990s onwards, during which many plants were close 
to bankruptcy. However, selling companies in credit-for-loans auctions was often 
opposed by the workers and managers. The workers' community is indeed an important 
element in the Russian pulp and paper sector as taking over a pulp and paper plant against 
the will of the workers has proved to be difficult and, in addition, many plants retain 
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social and technical linkages with the town in which the workforce lives. Regional 
governments have often played important roles in dealing with unsuccessful foreign 
investments and retain shares of the plants (Butrin, 2002). 
The pulp and paper sector is important to the economies of some regions. However., its 
share of the total electricity consumption by industry was only 4.5% in 2001 
(Goskornstat, 2002b, p. 156). Only 20-30% of the energy supply of the Russian pulp and 
paper industry is based on bio fuels, compared with 52% in Europe (BASREC and NMR, 
2002, P. 15). 
Table 6.9 compares the share of the main cost categories of the Russian and EU-based 
pulp and paper industry. It is striking that the Russian pulp and paper industry has only 
slightly more than half of the energy costs of EU plants, even though the sector is less 
efficient in Russia. Raw materials also employ a large portion of the costs. However, this 
can be explained by the very low level of labour costs, which emphasises the share of raw 
material of total costs. 
Table 6.9 Structure of costs in pulp and paper industry in Russia and the EU 
Cost Russia EU 
Raw materials 60% 40% 
Labour 15% 25% 
Energy resources 12% 20% 
Capital invesbnents 13% 15% 
Source: Chuiko, 2004. 
6.8 Summary 
The research objectives of this chapter were the following: 
7. Introduce pulp and paper sector, including manufacturing technologies, their 
energy consurnption, developments of the sector in Finland since the 1970s, and a 
short review of the sector in Russia. 
8. Provide a vocabulary to explain the technology paths presented in case studies. 
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This chapter introduced pulping and paper-making processes and technologies, and the 
main products. The technologies are diverse depending on the type of paper produced, 
and their energy consumption per product unit varies. Mechanical pulping is more 
energy-intensive than chemical pulping, while bulk papers are less energy -intensive to 
produce than speciality papers. This chapter also provides the vocabulary necessary for 
understanding the technology-path methodology used in Chapters 7,8 and 9. 
This chapter has presented the developments of the Finnish pulp and paper sector since 
the 1970s as a comparison %rith the developments of the Russian regions discussed in 
subsequent chapters. The Finnish pulp and paper sector has improved its energy 
efficiency very significantly since the 1970s. The chapter also provided a short 
introduction to the Russian pulp and paper sector. 
One of the main tasks of this chapter is to provide enough information to the reader to 
understand the technology paths presented in each case study (research objective 8). 
Therefore, section 6.4 lists the relevant vocabulary for the reader to refer back to when 
reading chapters 7,8 and 9. 
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7. Results of interviews: the Republic of Karelia 
7.1 Background 
The Republic of Karelia is located in the north-west of Russia and is bordered by the 
Leningrad and Vologda oblasts in the south, the Arkhangelsk oblast in the east, the 
Murmansk oblast in the north and Finland (and the EU) in the west. The capital of the 
Republic is Petrozavodsk (Yegorov, 2002). The Republic of Karelia is mostly covered by 
forests and rich in minerals. There are two large lakes, Ladoga and Onega, and several 
rivers in the territory (Yegorov, 2002). The Karelian climate is temperately continental, 
which means that the heating season may last up to seven months (Urova Arctic Centre, 
2000). The population of the region was some 716,300 people in 2002 (Karelkomstat 
website). The Republic of Karelia is divided into 18 administrative districts and towns. 
In the first half of the 1990s, the federal administration let Karelia keep its tax revenues. 
This practice was abolished in the mid 1990s (University of Joensuu, 2000, p. 1). 
Karelian payments and revenues fi7om the federal budget were more or less even in 1998- 
2000, but the region became a net contributor to the federal budget in 2001 and 2002 
(Karelkomstat, 2003a, p. 139). Consequently, it seems that the budget resources for 
policy implementation remain limited. 
7.1.1 Economy 
Karelian Gross Regional Product (GRP) declined in real terms throughout the 1990s and 
was 45% of the 1990 level in 1998 (University of Joensuu, 2000, p. 1). In the same year, 
Karelian industrial production was 48% of the 1990 level, and remains at only 66% in 
2003 (Karelkomstat data set, see also Table 7.2). The University of Joensuu (2000, p. 1) 
argues that the main reasons for the prolonged economic decline were the loss of tax 
revenues to the federal level mentioned above and restructuring that influenced the 
performance of industry, which is the most important contributor to the regional 
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economy. According to Table 7.1, the economy experienced positive real growth for the 
first time in 1999. 
Table 7.1 Development of Karelian economy, 1994-2003 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Realannualchange 
of Karelian GRP -5.9 -0.6 -9.1 -5.8 -7.2 10.9 8.3 2.8 7.5 1.6 
Source: 1994-1996: University ot Joensuu, 2UUO, p. 1.1997-2002: Rostat, 2004, p. 35 1; 2003: University 
of Joensuu, 2005, p. 1. 
industry is the most important sector of the Karelian economy, and accounted for 36.6% 
of GRP in 2002 (Rostat, 2004, p. 353). Figure 7.1 illustrates the shares of the main 
industrial sectors. The dominance of forestry sector (wood processing, pulp and paper) is 
significant. Other important sectors include metallurgy and electricity industries. 
Figure 7.1 Sectors of Karelian industry in 2002 
Main industrial sectors of Karelia 2002 
Building Food Other Electricity 
materials 12% 
% 14% 
4% --- Metallurgy 
18 % 
Machine 
Fy building 
46% 5% 
Source: Goskomstat, 2003, pp. 418-419. 
The development of the physical production index of industrial production is shown in 
Table 7.2. A year of negative growth was still reported in 1998 and significant growth in 
comparison to the previous year took place only in 1999-2000. The post-Soviet low of 
the absolute production index was reported in 1998, when the physical production of 
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industry was less than half of the 1990 level. In 2003, the Karelian industrial production 
remained almost 35% below the 1990 level. 
Table 7.2 Physical production index, % of previous year and % of 1990 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
% of previous year 86.8 79.3 102.6 83.5 101.1 97.2 121.6 107.3 100.4 103.4 100.6 
% of 1990 72.3 57.3 58.8 49.1 49.7 48.3 58.7 63.0 63.2 65.4 65.8 
Source: Karelkornstat data set. 
The main export products include pulp and paper, wood and wood products, and ores and 
metals. In 2002, the pulp and paper industry exported an average 77% of their products 
and the wood processing industry 83% (Karelkomstat, 2003a, p. 162). Consequently, the 
Karelian economy is sensitive to changes in international prices (University of Joensuu, 
2002, p. 2). The trade balance surplus is significant. In 2002, the value of exports was 
almost four times that of imports, respectively US$588 million and US$149 million. This 
reflects the export orientation of Karelian industry (Karelkomstat, 2003a, p. 161). 
However, the economy is so small that a single large company can have a significant 
influence on the GRP. In addition, Karelia is dependent on energy deliveries from other 
Russian regions. 
7.1.2 Energy sector 
Energy balance and demand 
Karelia's hydropower resources are significant and cover the majority (69.4% in 2003) of 
the regional electricity production. Hydropower plants are owned by Karelenergo, which 
is the local branch of the electricity giant, RAO UES Rossii. There is no nuclear power 
capacity in Karelia. A gas pipeline reached the capital, Petrozavodsk, and industrial town, 
Kondopoga, in the 2000s. On the regional level, the fuels used for electricity generation 
in 2002 were as follows: gas 65%, heavy fuel oil 28%, coal 3.5% and other fuels 3.5% 
(Karelkomstat, 2003C. p. I I). 
The total consumption of electricity is larger than regional production and, consequently, 
Karelia buys electricity from surrounding regions to cover about half of its electricity 
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demand. In 2001,49.3%, and in 2002 54.3%, of electricity originated from external 
sources (Karelkomstat, 2003b, p. 65). 
Heat is mainly generated by companies other than Karelenergo. Some large companies 
still provide heat to local communities. Heavy fuel oil dominates the fuels used for heat 
generation with a 50.7% share, followed by 20% for bio fuels (mostly black liquor from 
pulp production processes), 15.7% for gas and 13.6% for coal in 2002 (Karelkomstat, 
2003c, p. 12). Heat is mainly produced by CHP (Jadskelainen and Alakangas, 1999, p. 
64). 
Table 7.3 shows the slowdown of growth in demand for both electricity and heat. After 
1999, energy demand rose at a lower rate than the economy. This could be due to the fact 
that industrial production stagnated and even decreased in 2000-2001. But what is more 
difficult to explain is why both electricity and heat consumption declined while industrial 
production started to grow again in 2002 in the absence of large investments in improving 
energy efficiency. This may be explained by running production units with full capacity, 
wbicb tends to be more energy-efficient than using less of the capacity. 
Table 7.3 Development of electricity and heat demand compared to economic performance 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Electricity 5.6 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.2 
consumption, TWh 
Electricity consumption N/A 108.1 101.2 101.0 99.6 
% of previous year 
Heat consumption, PJ 34.0 37.5 38.1 38.9 37.9 
Heat consumption % of N/A 110.5 101.5 102.0 97.4 
previous year 
Economic growth % -7.2 10.9 8.3 2.8 7.5 
Industrial production % 104.4 117.0 97.9 100.1 106.8 
of pre i 
Source: Karelkomstat, 2003c, pp. 4-5; University of Joensuu, 2002, p. 1. 
industry is by far the largest consumer of energy in Karelia. The sector consumed 98% of 
total gas, 92% of heat, 90% of heavy fuel oil and 70% of coal in 2003. The main energy- 
consuming industrial sectors are the metallurgy and forestry industries. The sbare of the 
forestry industry is outstanding as it consumes 77% of heat, 64% of heavy fuel oil and 
60% of coal of the region's total consumption (Karelkomstat data set). The energy 
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demand of the forestry industry is dominated by pulp and paper production, which further 
underlines the influence of the pulp and paper industry in the Karelian energy balance 
(Karelkomstat, 2003c, p. U). 
Strategic energy issues 
Guaranteed availability of fuels can be regarded as the most important driver of Karelian 
energy policy and it is the main factor behind most of the strategic, local, energy-related 
issues. The region is relatively rich in hydropower and biomass resources, but dependent 
on electricity and fuels from other regions. The main problem with energy dependency is 
securing fuel supplies: fuel deliveries from other regions tend to fail, especially in 
wintertime. For instance, in winter 1997 Karelia experienced a shortage of both petrol 
(KS, 5 November 1997) and liquefied petroleum gas (KS, 17 December 1997). However, 
it remains unclear whether the problems occurred because the supplier failed to deliver 
the paid fuel or whether the fuel was not delivered due to payment failures. 
Non-payment has also been a problem in Karelia. Only 4-5% of debts to power 
companies were owed by private individuals in 1997 (KS, 26 November 1997). 
Consequently, most of the debts are owed by private companies and the public 
administration. Customer debts have caused payment problems to Karelenergo (KS, 15 
October 1997. ) According to the head of Karelenergo, it was generally regarded as 
acceptable not to pay for electricity even in 1997 (KS, 6 August 1997). In 2004, it was 
reported that more than 90% of bills had been paid (IA REGNUM, 15 March 2004), so it 
seems that the non-payment problem is being solved in Karelia, as in Russia in general 
(IEA, 2002a, p. 211). But based on the interviews, non-payment by local towns to the 
pulp and paper companies that supply them with heat continues. 
Obsolete equipment and transfer networks cause power and heat supply cuts almost every 
winter somewhere in Karelia. This problem has been brought to the Parliamentary 
discussion level because the failures often happen at the coldest time of the year. 
The gas pipeline has been seen as a partial solution to the problem of how to guarantee 
fuel supplies. Both companies and municipalities were keen on the reliable and cheap 
pipeline deliveries of gas (KS, 29 November 1997). The first part of the pipeline was 
completed in 1996 (Kamayeva, 1998) and the first house in Petrozavodsk switched to gas 
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in 1999 (KS, 25 August 1999). The building of the extension pipeline, whicb began in 
2000, experienced delays and was finally completed at the end of 2004. 
Switching to local biomass fuels has been suggested as a partial solution to the fuel 
supply problem. Biomass and peat in particular have been planned to replace external 
supplies of coal and fuel oil (ITAR-TASS, 29 November 2001). The annual potential of 
Karelian local bio fuel from the forestry industry has been estimated as 6.5 TWh (energy- 
saving expert's paper). Some bio fuel boilers were installed in 2000 (ITAR-TASS, 23 
November 2001). A programme to support bio fuels in the Karelian energy sector is 
under preparation (BASREC, 2002, p. 19). 
Energy efficiency and energy saving have been suggested as means to solve the fuel 
supply problem (Karelian government, 1999). 
7.2 Energy efficiency poficies and measures 
7.2.1 Legislation 
Soon after the adoption of the federal law on energy saving (1996), the Karelian 
government passed a regional law on energy efficiency (N264-3RK). This law 
established the elements of the federal law at regional level. The law included a division 
of responsibilities of implementation between regional actors, main policy tools (Table 
7.6) and funding sources. The main goals include: encouraging investment; switching to 
local energy resources from imports; adoption of efficient technologies; controlling 
energy consumption; and raising awareness on efficient use of energy (N264-3RK). 
To implement the 1998 regional legislation, the Karelian Administration launched the 
"Energy Conservation in Karelia until 2000" programme for the period 1997-2000 
(Karelenergonadzor, 2002, p. 23). 16 According to Kamayeva (1998), the energy strategy 
of 1997 focused on substituting fuel oil and coal with natural gas in major towns, using 
cheaper, local, energy resources in smaller towns that are not serviced by the gas pipeline 
and producing additional energy locally to cover the existing deficit. 
A copy of this strategy was not available. 
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The Parliament was planning to draft a follow-up programme to the 1997 strategy, which 
was meant to cover the period until 2005. However, according to the Karelenergonadzor 
(2002, p. 23) it had not been drafted by 2002 and a copy of this planned programme was 
not available. 
The regional energy-saving legislation was repealed in July 2004 (795-3RK). According 
to the interviews, the legislation was not necessary as it replaced the federal legislation 
which remains in force. One of the main implementing bodies also suggested in the 
interview that companies might have regarded the regional legislation as needless control. 
The fact that the legislation was never fully implemented in Karelia may also have 
contributed to its abolition. 
7.2.2 Policy instruments and their implementation 
The Karelian energy-saving legislation was in force for six years and included a set of 
policies and measures (see Table 7.4). 
Energy audits can support efforts to record energy consumption and identify where 
energy can be saved. Karelenergonadzor (2002, pp. 24-25) reported that some energy 
audits had been implemented, which was also confirmed by some of the pulp and paper 
plants. However, both the administration and the audited companies agree that the audits 
had no effect on energy-saving measures. One representative of a pulp and paper mill 
stated that "audits are produced only to be put on shelves". These statements provide 
evidence that the law had indeed been implemented but it had not spurred action to save 
energy. 
The regional non-budgelary energy-saving fund was first mentioned in the 1998 law 
(N264-3RK) and fixther developed in the 1999 statute (N8), which even included a 
detailed plan for establishing and operating the fund. However, a law passed in 2001 
repealed the energy-saving fund from the previous legislation (N478-3RK). 
Karelenergonadzor (2002, p. 25) was still emphasising the importance of establishing an 
energy-saving fimd in its 2002 report. According to interviews, a fund was established 
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and then closed by the 2001 law. However, a revolving fund 17 for Petrozavodsk city was 
established in 2001, partly ftmded by the Nordic Environmental Financing Corporation 
(NEFCO). A revolving fund was also established in Segezha in 2004 (Smirnov, 2004, p. 
2). So it seems that the implementation of this policy by the Karelian regional 
administration failed, but foreign organisations together with local administrations 
implemented something similar. 
The requirement to start metering energy consumption by 2000 had not been fully 
implemented in the public administration (Karelenergonadzor 2002, p. 24). If 
implemented fully, the requirement to meter energy consumption would create a basis for 
further policies and measures. 
Using electricity and heat tariffs as media to reward or penalise depending on 
consumption performance is an innovative economic instrument. Sanctioning wasteful 
energy use sounds like benchmarking, i. e., the standard level of energy use which is not 
penalised must be defined. Energonadzor has the task of reviewing the energy 
consumption of companies. However, the representatives of the agency felt that this 
information provided was not always applied by the REC in a tariff setting. According to 
the REC, energy prices can be negotiated with companies that have implemented energy- 
saving measures. Tariffs can also be used to finance energy projects such as the 
Petrozavodsk gas pipeline. 
The education of local experts has been implemented, at least to some extent, in 
cooperation with the EU Technical Aid for the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(TACIS), Karelian Energy Efficiency Center (KAEEC) and Norwegian Energy 
Efficiency Group (NEEG). The Nordic Council of Ministers has also been involved. The 
awareness programme includes seminars and exhibitions which have become a tradition 
(Barentsenergy, 28 January 2004). Energy-saving competitions for companies are also 
organised in the context of energy exhibitions (see for instance ITAR-TASS, 17 
December 2002, http: //www. boiler. ru/pv/konkurs. htm]). Again, these activities have been 
implemented without the regional administration's involvement. 
17 A revolving fund finances small energy-saving projects and receives a share of the money saved to be 
reinvested (Smirnov. 2004. p. 2). 
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According to Karelenergonadzor (2002, p. 24), 15 of the 19 local administrations had 
drafted a local energy savingprogramme by 2002. Therefore, it seems that this policy is 
being implemented. However, it remains unclear what these local programmes contain 
and whether they have been put into practice. Karelenergonadzor also points out that the 
implementation of these programmes has been heavily dependent on funding from local 
private companies. 
Tbe legislation analysed to date has no direct mention of limiting the energy consumption 
of organisations receiving public funding. However, Karel energonadzor (2002, p. 26-27) 
reports how different administrative levels have met the set limits of energy consumption. 
it seems that federal budget funds were the most likely to be used for energy 
consumption exceeding the limits. Both republic and local budgets performed better and 
their consumption was somewhat below the set limits. 
Domestic production of enerD, -saving equipment is one of the goals of the federal 
energy-saving policies even though it has not been emphasised by local legislation. In 
1998, Petrozavodskmash started manufacturing small-rating power equipment such as 
stearn and hot-water boilers running on liquid fuel, gas, wood waste and peat. More 
recently, mass production of modem electricity meters started at the Petrozavodsk radio 
plant (Barentsenergy, 25 February 2004). Consequently, there are some signs of 
emerging regional production of energy -efficient equipment. 
it was announced that the implementation of the legislation would be funded from the 
republic budget, local government budgets and the planned Energy Saving Fund (N264- 
3RK), which was repealed as mentioned above. In addition, the Energy Saving Fund had 
some detailed funding tools (N8) although they were never implemented. 
Karelenergonadzor (2002, p. 23-24) also reported that the 1997-2000 energy-saving 
program-me was seriously under funded; only some RUB 240 million of the required 
RUB 900 million was allocated by Karelian companies and the government. 
Karelenergonadzor emphasises the importance of private-sector funding in implementing 
local energy-saving programmes. 
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Table 7.4 Energy-saving policy tools introduced in Karelia 
Tool Status of implementation Target group Effectiveness 
Energy audits Auditors have been trained. Companies and Audits facilitate no 
Audits have been organisations practical 
implemented by improvements 
Energonadzor ***** 
Non-budgetary Repealed individually All energy Revolving funds 
energy-saving fund Foreign organisations and consumers and established 
city administrations producers 
established revolving funds 
Requirement to meter Public sector metering poorly N/A N/A 
consumption from implemented 
2000 * 
Tariff discounts and Have been used in some Companies and Implementation 
penalties based on cases, but not widely applied organisations criticised 
efficiency of energy 
use * 
Economic sanctions No evidence Companies, N/A 
of wasteful use of organisations, 
energy * households 
Education of local Some education organised in Companies and Mainly implemented 
experts cooperation with TACIS and organisations but by foreign 
NEEG also individuals orizanisations 
Awareness Some articles in newspapers; All energy Seminars mainly 
various seminars and consumers and initiated by foreign 
exhibitions organised; producers, organisations 
energy-saving competition competition for 
industrial actors 
Recommendation to 15 of the 19 local Local N/A 
local governments to administrations had drafted a administrations 
draft energy-saving programme by 2002***** 
programmes ** 
Energy-saving and Some investments reported Energy N/A 
fuel-switching production 
projects **** 
Limits to energy - Some organisations comply Public N/A 
consumption ***** . organisations 
Federal: domestic - Some production started ompanies N/A 
production of energy- locally 
saving equipment 
Sources: * N264-3RK; ** N8; *** N478-3RK; **** Kwnayeva 1998; ***** Karelenergonadzor 
2002, p. 24,26-27. 
To conclude, the energy-saving legislation of the region has been repealed. Official 
policies were lacking both public funding and practical implementation by the regional 
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administratlon. It is striking that most policies that were implemented received funding 
and initiative from foreign sources. 
7.2.3 Energy price policies 
According to plant interviews, electricity cost RUB 1-3/k-Wh (1EO. 034/k-XVh) In 2004. This 
is a very low price is compared with Finnish prices of Industsial consumers (IFO. 071 /kWh) 
(http: //www. energia. fi/page. asp? Section=2724). 
Figure 7.2 shows that all energy prices paid by industrial producers increased in Karelia 
in 1998-2002. Two trends can be observed. Prices for regulated electricity and gas rose 
only a very little while the prices of all oil products rose dramatically. The prices of oil 
products reflect the development of the oil price on the world market. while the prices of 
electricity and gas are regulated by the state. 
Figure 7.2 Price of energy for industrial producers in Karelia 
Price of energy for industrial producers in Karelia 
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Coal 
Gas 
m2002 
Fuel oil 
m 2001 
m2000 
131999 
Diesel oil o 1998 
Petrol 
Electdcity 
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 
Source: Karelkornstat, 2003b, p. 131, 
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Gas: RUB/I 000 m Electncity: RtTB/I 000 kWh. 
Growing energy tariffs have been a major issue in Karelia, as in many other Russian 
regions. The growth has been blamed for causing difficulties for the regional economy 
(ITAR-TASS, 15 April 2002). Two representatives of the Karelian administration stated 
that energy prices have already gone up enough to spur energy saving. However, one 
interviewee recognised that energy prices might be regarded as high but it leads to hardly 
any energy-saving measures. He explained such behaviour by the Soviet tradition that the 
price of the commodity is meaningless. Based on this, it looks like hard budget 
constraints had not yet been introduced. Indeed, one interviewee recognises that gas is 
sold at a price that is lower than its production and transportation costs. Some Karelian 
interviewees argue that federal-level electricity sector reform has ceased, at least in 
Karelia. There is no free electricity market, independent producers or competition. In 
practice, the old regional monopoly, Karelenergo, has been divided into 5-6 units. 
7.2.4 Investment policies 
Support by the regional administration to industry can contribute to the performance of 
the economy. However, as discussed above, too much assistance maintains the soft 
budget constraint, which is harmful to the economy. The Karelian administration has 
emphasised its support to industry. For instance a regional programme, "Main prospects 
of government policy on the growth of industry in the Republic of Karelia", was 
launched as a sub-progranune of the "Framework for social and economic development 
in the Republic of Karelia for the period 1999-2002-2020" (Government of Karelia, 
1998). 
The Ministry of Economic Development and Trade established a regional body in 2002 
to facilitate investments in Karelia. The body has drafted the "Investment policy of the 
Karelian government" docw-nent for 2003-2006, and launched a website to promote 
investments in Karelia (http: //www. kareliainvest. ru/? /investd/investpolit/). Budget credits 
are being allocated to good Karelian investment projects through bids. The total annual 
investment under the programme has been some RUB 150-200 billion (E4.0-5.5 billion). 
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Under the regional programme, companies that are favourable to receive investments can 
receive various forms of government support: 
1) budget credits with interest rates about one-third lower than the Bank of Russia's 
reference rate; 
government guarantee for investment projects; 
3) tax breaks; and 
discount investment credits. 
The representative of the Ministry of Economy of Karelia argued that the budget 
investments are too small for the pulp and paper industry. However, the administration 
website lists some planned investment projects, apparently open to investment offers. 
Based on the interviews with Karelian experts, Karelian pulp and paper companies are 
not willing to accept equity investments. A representative of the regional administration 
explained this by the background of socialism and the transition to a market economy: 
when control over a previously state-owned company has finally been gained, the new 
owners are reluctant to hand parts of the ownership to foreigner investors. 
There is an example of failed foreign investment in the Karelian pulp and paper industry. 
A Swedish company bought a pulp and paper mill in 1996 with an American partner. 
Soon after that the plant was closed down. According to a Karelian interviewee, this was 
because the Swedish company wanted to get rid of the Karelian plant as it was a 
competitor, though the official line of company is that the plant was closed for renovation 
(Alexandrov, 2001, pp. 18-19). The local community suffered and the local forces, 
including the regional government, turned against the foreign investors. In the end, the 
foreign investor gave up its ownership of the company. This is a perfect example of 
rejecting external ownership, and the regional administration exercising powers that are 
no longer part of its remit. 
In the mid 1990s, Karelian companies collected huge tax debts over time and the regional 
administration provided assistance to deal with these. In 1997, the commission on the 
state of emergency contracted a gradual payback by companies into pension funds (KS, 
25 June 1997). The republic administration also allowed forestry companies to pay their 
debts by barter, both to the state budget and to other debtors via a middleman. A share of 
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this income from the barter arrangement was used for companies' investments while a 
share paid their debts. (KS, 4 February 1998. ) The fact that barter does not generate 
income for investments was thus addressed. However, the arrangement definitely 
maintains a soft budget constraint and institutionalises barter as a legitimate method of 
transaction. The regional government has also converted unpaid loans to grants (KS, 6 
September 1997), which can be regarded as a subsidy. 
7.3 Case studies 
7.3.1 Plant I 
Plant I was established in 1929 and is currently 20%-oNkmed by a foreign investor, 
various Russian investors (30%), the government of Karelia (10%) and the management 
and workers of the plant. It produces some 100,000 tonnes of sulphite pulp and some 
470,000 tonnes of groundwood for its own use. In addition, some 65,000 tonnes of pulp 
is purchased. The main product is newsprint, the annual production of which is some 
700,000 tonnes, and to a smaller extent packaging paper. 70% of the production is 
exported. The main sources of investments are bank loans and foreign funding. As shown 
in Table 7.5, Plant I has made a profit every year in the 2000s. However, 2003 shows a 
smaller profit, which may be due to a major investment in a new paper machine (see 
technology path below). Plant I bought a smaller plant in the same region in 2004. 
Table 7.5 Net profit of Plant 1, US$ m 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Net profit 42,895 52,116 12,048 4,316 13,323 
Source: www. competitiveness. ru. www. skrin. ru. 
Plant 1 produces both electricity and heat. Some of the heat is sold to the local 
community. The plant is suffering from the non-payment of these deliveries. At the time 
of the interview, the debt of the local administration was some RUB 130 million. Some 
70% of electricity was bought from the grid in 2004. In December 2004, electricity from 
the grid cost Plant 1 some RUB 1.3 per kWh while its own production cost RUB 0.35- 
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0.65 per kWh. Of fuels used, 73% was heavy fuel oil before being replaced by gas when 
the plant was connected to the gas pipeline in late 2004,22% coal and 5% wood waste. 
The share of energy costs is some 38% of total costs. 
Plant I is using two different methods of producing pulp; chemical sulphite pulping and 
mechanical stone groundwood pulping. Two main waves of upgrading technology are 
visible in Table 7.6. The first took place in the 1970s and included expansion of 
production capacity. Secondly, a groundwood plant, a new paper machine and some new 
boilers were introduced and the majority of paper machines upgraded. The second 
significant decision to modernise happened in the 1990s when most paper machines were 
upgraded and three out-of-date paper machines were decommissioned. From an 
investment point of view, there has been further development in the 2000s when a new 
paper machine and a new CHP plant were introduced. 
The age of paper machines varies between 1929-2003. However, most paper machines 
date back to the 1960s or earlier. The energy infrastructure remains fairly old except for 
CIAP-3 and the bark boilers were converted to fluidised bed boilers in 1991. The 
decommissioning and modernisation of old paper machines has improved the energy 
efficiency of Plant 1, but also reduced the paper production capacity. The product mix 
remains the same. 
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. patb of 
Plant I Table 7.6 Technology 
Equipment 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990S 2005s 
Sulphite pulp 
plant, periodic I com. 1965 1 com. 1972 1 com. 1981 
batch cooking Digesters 2-4 
com. 1935 1984-1989 
der-Am. 
Grom ýom 1960s e'trofit 1978- 
plant 3 grinders 
ýl 
981 
Groundwood Com. 1977 
plant 23 grinders 
1979 
PM1 newsprint R built 1984 Rebui]11992 
"Fullner" 
com. 1929 
PM2 newsprint Decom. 1992 
"Petrozovodsk- 
bumash" 
com. 1941 
PM3 wrapping 
"ll Pyatiletki" paper 
com. 1937 
PM4 Com. 1963 
"Black newsprini 
Clawson" 
Com. 1961 Rebuilt1975 Decom. - 1-9-9-2 m -ýW`rlsilii" 
newsprint 
Com. 1960 1 D-lý--- - CýM. "V ý6 built 1973 
ith, 
1971 
V ith' newsprint 
PM7 Com. 1965 Rebuilt 1974 Rebuilt 1993 
"Black newsprint and 1978 
Clawson" 
PM8 Com. 1981 Rebuilt 
"Voith" newsprim 1990-1993 
PM9 Com. 1978 Rebuilt 1ý87 
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"Bummash newsprint 
lzhevsk" 
5 coal boilers 
2 bark boilers 
parmneters 
revised 1986. 
Oldest 
modernised in 
1988. 
ers rebuilt 
9,1960, 
1. New 
1.1963 and 
CHP turbine Com. 1960S 
plant 42 
CHP turbine 
plant #3 
II 1960s I 1970s I 1980s 1 1990S 1 2000s 
Table 7.7 below reports the energy efficiency indices of Plant 1. Energy efficiency 
indices are calculated to make comparisons between the case plants. When the index 
decreases, the plant becomes more energy efficient and vice versa. The values of EEI 
compare the case plants to a reference plant which EEI is 1. The EEI methodology was 
discussed in detail in chapter 4 (see p. 82). 
This calculation is based on the data set provided by Plant 1. Based on these aggregate 
figures, the efficiency of electricity use has not changed since 1991. However, these two 
data points do not reflect the developments of the 1990s. The efficiency of heat 
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PMlO Com. 2003 
"Beloit" newsprint 
consumption has decreased since 1991 - this can be explained partly by the closures of 
paper machines which consume some 80% of the heat used by an integrated paper plant. 
Tsible 7.7 Enerp-v efficiencv indices of Plant I 
1991 2003 
Electricity 1 1.13 1 13 
Heat 1 1.10 
The main drivers of and barriers to investment in modernisation of Plant I are illustrated 
in Table 7.8. Barriers are mainly funding and policy-related while drivers are technology 
and market-based. The old vintage of equipment and the desire to increase the capacity of 
production were the most emphasised drivers. Low domestic energy prices are recognised 
as a reason for the lack of investment in modernisation in general. and energy pricing and 
saving policies are regarded as a failure. However, energy is regarded as expensive. Plant 
I has hardly any of its own fuel supplies. and therefore, remains dependent on purchased 
electricity and heavy fuel oil. In addition, the energy costs of the total production costs 
are very high - up to 38%. Consequently, it looks more as if the references to the high 
price of energy refer to energy costs as a whole rather than the price per unit. Ile lack of 
funding reported as a barrier limits the retrofit activities. which have been stalled since 
the early 1990s. while the reported funding is focused on new capacity. This follows the 
market-related drivers by delivering more production capacity and improvement of 
product quality. 
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Table 7.8 Drivers of and barriers to modernisation investment of Plant I 
F-BARRIERS FACTORS DRIVERS 
Funding 
to invest Loans are available, but they cost 
[D: Tft c up Itieswi floi -ba jA9V Wt 
Ffýýadminisfimtion fhils to 
pay for the beat plant delivers 
2- Corporate policy 
Unclear whelber energy experts 
are involved in investment- 
related decision-making 
____ 
logy and raw material 
I 
Side effects of investments that Basic reason for 
are made for other reasons may modernisation is the ageing 
also deliver energy-saving results of capacity and its speed 
[4 
- EnergY saving and other policies 
I 
F Energy audits are regarded as a 
, tool to charge companies and 
they are only drafted to fill up 
shelves 
Energy_price and tariffs 
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support energy saving by the market signals as energy oil are expensive, and 
REC resources cover 38% of the cost approaching the price levels 
------ 
of Finland ric 
F6 
- Market signals 
The most important 
factor is the capacity of 
production due to the 
economics of scale 
Important to emphasise the 
quality of the product by 
improving packaging, 
--presentation _etc -- - ---- --- 
[ Improvement of product Zity I ý' 
q 
Demands of market drive 
investments. 
7 --Transition and attitudes 
Old-fashioned attitudes 
to irds energy saving 
Summary 
Plant I produces both pulp and groundwood, the latter of which is an especially 
el ectri city -intensive production method. The main end-product is newsprint. which is 
fairly simple and not very el ectri city -intensive to produce. The pulp production facilities 
mostly date back to the 1960s and 1970s. Modernisation was ongoing in the Soviet years, 
and after the collapse of the Soviet Union a mass closure of the obsolete paper machines 
was carried out. Since then, not much modernisation has taken place. However. a new 
paper machine has been commissioned in the 2000s. No modernisation strategy seems 
obvious based on the technology path since the 1990s. I am confident with the data; 
however, the lack of data points limits its usefulness for comparison. At the end of the 
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observation period, the efficiency of electricity use remained unchanged while the 
efficiency of heat use had improved. The mass decommissioning of the obsolete paper 
machines explains the improvement in heat efficiency. Drivers and barriers are fairly 
equally divided between categories and reflect the modernisation investments outlined by 
the technology path. 
7.3.2 Plant 2 
Plant 2 was established in 1939 and is currently owned by insiders, company 
management and workers. In 1997,50% of the mill was bought by foreign investors who 
closed the plant down. The new management had disagreements on how to run the plant 
with both the federal and regional administrations and finally sold the plant to the 
government of Karelia in 1998. The plant went bankrupt and a new company was 
established to take over the plant. Currently, the majority owner of Plant 2 is the 
management of the company. 
The production capacity of the plant is some 330,000 tonnes of kraft paper and 660,000 
tonnes of unbleached sulphate pulp of raw wood material per year. The final products 
include sack kraft, paper sacks, packaging board and kraft liner. A large share of 
production is exported, for instance, 60% of sack paper. Plant 2 has been profitable since 
1999. However, this trend started to turn in 2003 and the net outcome of the 2004 was a 
significant loss (Table 7.9). The main sources of investment are bank loans - the plant 
has developed a strategic partnership with a bank. 
Table 7.9 Net profit of Plant 2, US$ m 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Net profit 9.229 11.907 8.450 10.708 0.134 -9.207 
Source: www. competitiveness. ru. www. synn. ru. 
Plant 2 generates enough electricity to cover about half of its consumption and purchases 
the rest from the grid. Fuel consumption consisted of 67% heavy fuel oil, 26% black 
liquor and 7% other wood waste during the first half of 2004. The plant sells heat to the 
local town, which typically fails to pay for this service. The share of energy costs is up to 
30% of total production costs. 
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Table 7.10 Drivers of and barriers to modernisation investment of Plant 2 
Equipment 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990S 2000s 
Chemical ConL 1964 Decom. 1996 
pulp plant 
"Kamyr" 
Chemical ConL 1966 Decom. 1995 1 
nt 
'mical 
pulp) plant 
Chemical 
sulphite 
pulp plant 
"Kamyr" 
Chemical 
sulphite 
pulp plant 
"Kamyr" 
"Valmet" in Retrofit speed 
1975, Rebuilt of cooking 
1979 upgraded 
[-: a r]ketepu I Decom. 1992- 
in 1993 macLhinep 
PM com. krqflliner Decom. in the 
pre-1960 early 1990s 
PM 9 
I'Valmet" 
PM 10 
I'Vaimet" 
1 PM Ill 
ravod Petro 
7 
skmash" 
F Sack 
production 
Com. 1973 Retrofit 2002 
Krafiliner 
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Com. in the mid Stopped in Back in 
1 996 in 1970s I operation 
I line, manualý 
2 Sack 
production 
lines, 
automatic 
K-ck----7 
pa! 
k 
r printing line 
IIIj 
Ad 
Com. 2003 
L! II1 
Recovery 2x Ix Recovery Ix "Tampella7 
boilers "Tampella" boiler com. 1970 retrofitted 2000 
"Tampella" Com. 1962 and 
1964 
Boflers 
2x 
Belgorodskii 
Com. 1939 
Ix "Ahstrom- AhIstrom and I 
com. 1975 x Belgorodskii 
decom. Ix 
Belgorodskii 
modernisallon, I 
x fluidised bed 
boiler com. 2004 
198os 19gos 2000s i 
Plant 2 closely missed its next turn to receive investments ftom the Soviet government 
when the systemic change took place in 1991. The first obvious wave of modernisation 
was implemented in the 1970s when a lot of new equipment was commissioned. The 
second significant modernisation happened in the early 1990s when two old paper 
machines and the old market pulp plant were decommissioned. A decade later in 2003, 
two modem sack production lines and a printing machine were introduced. The soda 
regenerating boiler was retrofitted in 2000 and in 2004 the first fluidised bed boiler was 
commissioned. It is likely that such improvements to the production infrastructure 
improve energy efficiency. Currently, most equipment dates back to the mid 1970s, 
although some modernisation has been carried out. The product mix has changed during 
the observation period, namely the conversion of the paper produced to paper sacks. In 
addition. market pulp capacity has been phased out along with the only old market pulp 
drying machine. The investments in sack production lines reflect a business strategy to 
increase the degree of working up the paper produced. 
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Table 7.11 below reports the EEI figures of Plant 2, and Figure 7.3 illustrates this data. 
The data for the calculation was received from Plant 2 and found at 
www. competitiveness. ru. These figures for 1993-2003 show a decrease in both 
electricity and heat intensity; however, the mid 1990s peak inefficiencies are also clearly 
visible. According to these figures, the efficiencies were below the 1993 levels at the end 
of the observation period. 
Table 7.11 Energy efficiency indices of Plant 2 
1993 1994 1995 1996 ý 1997 1998 1999 2000 1 2001 2002 2003 
Electricity 2.08 2.50 2.25 2.7.. I__ 3.07 2.63 2.29 1.93 1.77 1.82 1.83 
Heat 3.70 4.75 
. _4.03 
4.38 1 4,65 3.68 3.11 2... 52 1 2.36 2.41 1 2.29 
Figure 7.3 Development of energy efficiency indices of Plant 2 
Plant 2: development of electricity and heat 
efficiency indices 
5 
4.5 
4 
3.5 
3 
2.5 
2 
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1 
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Electricity Heat 
Figure 7.4 demonstrates the development of EEls in the context of total pulp production. 
Heat use became dramatically - 38% - more efficient during the observation period. The 
ultimate peak of inefficiency was caused by the takeover and closure of the company by a 
foreign investor in 1997. Both electricity and heat use have returned to the efficiency 
level of the beginning of the observation period, and started to improve compared to the 
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1993 level since 1998. This could be explained by the deconunissioning of obsolete 
equipment shown in the technology path, and, to lesser extent, by modernisation. 
Figure 7.4 Electricity and beat efficiency indices in the context of total pulp production of 
Plant 2 
Plant 2: Energy efficiency indices vs. 
total pulp production 
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Source: Plant data 
The main barriers fall into the categories of funding and transition while the main drivers 
appear in the market category. Reducing the cost price of production is regarded as an 
important driver of modernisation, as is the general desire to stay in the market regardless 
of competition. The approach to the energy price and its importance as a driver is 
confusing. On one hand, the interviewee argued that the energy price is not high enough 
to trigger action, while on the other hand, he claimed that the price of energy is an 
important factor for investments as it is high. Perhaps the first statement is a more 
theoretical, general assessment of the situation while the high share of energy costs, up to 
30%, may contribute to the importance of energy costs in practice. 
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Table 7.12 Drivers and barriers identified by Plant 2 
I BARRIERS I F- FACTORS ---l I DRIVERS] 
II- Funding ---i 
Non-payment by the local 
administration of -delivered 
heat is a big problem 
__ 
infrastmcture are large and 
capital intensive, and 
impossible to meet in the 
short tem 
_. 
Investment needs to update 
infrastructure are large and 
capital intensive, and 
impossible to meet in the 
short tem _. - 
Arrangement with a bank to 
finance modernisation 
[-2 
- Corporate policy 
Energy experts do not have 
an established role to advise 
, -on investment-related 
issues 
Desire to reach Western 
energy consumption norms 
13 
- Technology and raw material I 
Technology has to be 
imported 
Some equipment is difficult 
to modemise as spare parts 
I are no longer available on 
the market 
[ Equipment is not that oK only 
m the 1970s. 1-berefore, it is 
ýtrofitted, 
not replaced 
[ -4- Energy saving and other policies I 
r Energy policy does not 
stimulate energy saving. No 
policy tools to reward energy 
[-15 
- Energy price and tariffs 
At the momenL the energy The share of energy of the total F -ne -eime -rP-v rice is an 
r ,c 
-9 
rice is an 
Ie is not high. A higher important factor, because pr c __j 
product, ion costs is high and 
I! 
mýmtyaY=ctoause 
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price would support moving consequently is an im, portant factor energy is -expensive 
towards cheaper fuels fas 
ýininvestments 
F-6- Market signals -l 
Desire to stay in the 
market 
-7- Transition and attitudes 
:: 1 
Many dependent activities 
which are no longer in use, 
but need to be heated, looked 
after etc. 
Attitude that old equipment 
is modernised for as long as 
possible and new purchased 
only when it is impossible to 
L-99 on modernising __ 
In addition, Plant 2 can cover only less than half of its fuel demand from its own sources 
and therefore remains dependent on the unregulated price of heavy fuel oil, which may 
further explain the contradiction of statements. Another interesting, typically Russian. 
point of view is that it is best to renovate old equipment rather than replace it with new as 
the existing capital has already been paid off. This attitude can delay required 
replacement investments. When it comes to the links between the technology path and the 
drivers and barriers, some investments have been made, while it has been reported that 
there is not enough money for adequate refurbishment of the plant. The statement that 
energy is currently not expensive may contradict the fact that the heaviest modernisation 
has been carried out in the energy production facilities. 
Summary 
Plant 2 produces chemical pulp which provides bio fuel, the fairly simple kraft paper and 
a selection of more complex final products. The pulp and paper production facilities date 
mostly back to the 1970s. However, most of the energy production equipment has been 
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modernised or replaced in the 2000s. The old pulp production facilities and some paper 
machines were decommissioned in the 1990s and moderate modernisation has been 
carried out in the 2000s. The new sack production line would suggest a strategy towards 
specialisation. I have confidence in the data. Inefficiency of energy use peaked in 1997, 
Heat efficiency remained dramatically below pre-transition level in 2003, while 
electricity consumption has also become somewhat more efficient. The improvement of 
the efficiency of heat use could be linked to the decommissioning of the old paper 
machines in the early 1990s. ne inefficiency peak of the mid 1990s was most likely 
caused by running the plant at very low capacity due to the ownership struggles. Barriers 
dominate drivers and do not clearly reflect the reality of modernisation. 
7.3.3 Plant 3 
Plant 3 was established in 1914. A foreign company officially owns 77% of the plant but, 
based on market intelligence, this major shareholder is controlled by the top management 
of Plant 3. The trading house Karellesprom and the government of Karelia also control 
some 20% of the plant. The plant experienced serious economic problems in the 1990s 
and went bankrupt in 1998 when new management was introduced. It produces some 
70,000 tonnes of bleached sulphate market pulp from virgin wood material per year while 
the annual capacity is some 90,000 tonnes. The level of export varied in the 1990s. At the 
time of the interview, the share of production exported was some 70%. Plant 3 has made 
a loss for most of the 2000s (Table 7.13), apparently due to the bankruptcy procedures. 
Bank credit is the main source of funding while foreign investments have also been 
received. But self-govemance of the company is more important than investment and 
consequently limits the amount of external investment accepted by the management. 
Table 7.13 Net profit of Plant 3, US$ m 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Net profit 0.705 5.408 N/A -0.655 -0.577 -0.173 
Nource: www. compeL'Llveness. ru. www. sicnn. ra. 
Plant 3 covers its demands by generating its own electricity. However, when demand for 
heat is lower in summer, some electricity is bought from the grid. Of fuel used, 61% is 
heavy fuel oil, 33% black liquor and 6% wood waste. The share of energy costs of the 
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total varies between 25-44%, depending on the changes in the price of energy and pulp. 
Plant 3 provides heat to the local community. 
Table 7.14 Technology path of Plant 3 
Equipment 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990S 2000s 
Suipbate pulp 
plant 
ýulp -dryinlg I 
imna chi n7e 
[-Pulp drying 
machine 
1970 
marketpuf; 
]_ 
Retrofit 2002 
1970 
marketpu 
Pulp drying 1970 
machine marketpulp 
[Eva )-Ora-t-in-g-P-I-a-ntý 
2x Recovery 
boiler 
, Mit-. ubishi' 
CHIP I Com- 1967- Given to the 
1968,4 city 
boilers, 2 
turbines 
itsubishi, 
ýýHP ý2 
'Mitsubish 
rH -P3 
itsu Mitsubishi' 
Com. 1970 
'1 
I Decom. 1990s 
II 1960s I 1970s 1 1980s. 1 1990S 1 2000s I 
Plant 33 underwent one visible major modernisation during the period 1960-2004. The 
modernisation took place in the early 1970s when a lot of new equipment was introduced. 
Some modernisation activities were carried out in the 2000s when some of the existing 
equipment was updated and bark boilers changed. The equipment dates back to the late 
1960s and early 1970s. The product mix has remained the same as has the production 
1965,8 
digesters, 2 
190 
capacity, except the decommissioning of one pulp drying machine. As no significant 
changes in production infrastructure have been carried out, energy efficiency has not 
improved since the 1970s and may be worsening now as the equipment becomes further 
obsolete. 
Plant 3 provided no data. However, I got hold of two limited data sets. Table 7.15 shows 
the energy efficiency indices. The data shows a slight decrease in both electricity and 
heat intensities. 
Table 7.15 Energy efficiency indices of Plant 3 
2002 2003 
Electricity 1.36 1 1.23_j 
He 
Source: plant data, expert paper. 
Drivers and barriers to modernisation investments are outlined in Table 7.16. Market- 
related drivers are by far the most significant category while policy-related drivers are 
also reported. All emphasised drivers fall into the market category, including the desire to 
develop niche markets, add to the value and competitiveness of products and receive 
larger profits. The interviewees stated that there are no real barriers to modernisation. 
This statement and the vast amount of market-related drivers reported contradict the 
reality of an almost complete lack of modernisation investments. Management expressed 
concerns over allowing foreigners to gain equity of the company. However, at the same 
time, foreign owners hold a majority of the company. The very high share of energy 
costs, some 25-44%, and dependency on heavy fuel oil might be expected to support the 
view that energy is an expensive commodity. However, its own electricity facilities 
covering most of its demand and waste liquors providing some 40% of fuel demand may 
have had the opposite effect. The representatives of Plant 3 expressed no clear views as to 
whether they regard energy as expensive. 
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Table 7.16 Drivers of and barriers to modernisation investments in Plant 3 
I BARRIERS I F- FACTORS 1 DRIVERS I 
Funding 71 
F-2- Corporate policy I 
F3 
- Technology and raw materials 
I 
[4- Energy saving and other policies I 
Government supports the 
rights of labour in a case of 
force majeure caused by 
modernisation 
Energy audits genuinely 
monitor the energy 
cons ýTpj ion of compnies 
[5- Energy price and tariffs ----I 
The price of energy is a factor The high share of energy 
when considering modernisation costs makes it is difficull to 
compete with energy- 
efficient Scandinavian 
products 
16 
- Market signals 
I 
Modernisation is done in 
order to develop niche. 
products 
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Nowadays production 
needs to he competitive - 
no one buys an expensive 
product 
Main reason to modernise 
is to make larger profit 
17 
- Transition and attitudes 
Management would rather 
maintain their ownership of 
the company than allow 
foreigners to take over some 
of the equity against capital 
Summary 
Plant 3 produces chemical market pulp. which provides a fair share of fuel demand. The 
production facilities date back to the mid 1960s and early 1970s. Not much 
modernisation was carried out during the observation period and the lack of a 
modernisation strategy is obvious from the technology path. I am not confident about the 
energy consumption data because the plant data covers only a very limited period of time. 
As a result, no clear trends in energy intensity can be established. Drivers dominate 
barriers and the reality of the technology path contradicts the drivers and barriers 
reported. 
7.3.4 Plant 4 
Plant 4 was established in 1845 and is currently owned by an external Russian holding 
company. In 2003, the situation between the management and workers inflamed as a 
result of non-payment of salaries and the company was declared bankrupt in 2004. The 
current owner purchased Plant 4 in 2004 and closed it down in order to modernise. 
Consequently. all production activities were closed at the time of the interview. The new 
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management was in the process of planning investments in the near future. Shareholders 
of the holding company are the main source of investment. 
The production capacity of Plant 4 is some 9,600-14.400 tonnes of paper annually. The 
plant has produced various types of paper in the past including newsprint (until 1973). 
packaging paper (1973-1975), wallpaper (1975-1999), writing paper (1999-2002), and 
kraft (2003). Plant 4 bases its production partly on recycled paper material while 
purchased virgin pulp covers the rest of pulp demand as the plant has no own pulp 
production line. 
Plant 4 has its own hydropower plant, which provides the unit with a self-sufficient 
supply of electricity. The main fuel is coal. The plant was previously supplying the local 
community with heat, but suffered from the non-payment problem. The energy 
consumption data of Plant 4 is not available. 
Table 7.17 Technology path of Plant 4 
I Equipment I 1960s I 1970s I 1980s 1 1990S 1 2000s I 
PM I newsprint printingpaper; Retrofit 1985 Retrofit F99-1 writingpoper, 
, voith, 1971-1973 wallpaper krqft, closed in 
com. 1914 newsprint; 2004 
packaging 
paper, 
wallpaper 
PM 2 newsprini printingpaper, Retrofit 1985 Retrofit 1991, Back - 
'Fullner' packaging wallpaper closed 1996 2001- 
com. 1902 paper, wrifin 
wallpaper krafl, 
2004 
n use 
2002 
z paper, 
. losed 
Hydropower Used for 
di ood 
ýla=nt 
grinding w 
I Boilers I Com. 1960s I" 
Groundwood ý ýUnclear ýwhenýýý 
plant, 4 units I decom. 
I Decade I 1960s I 1970s 1 1980S 1 1990S I- 2000s 
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Plant 4 has been operating very old equipment. Its paper machine 2 is more than one 
hundred years old while paper machine I is of only slightly more recent vintage. The 
paper machines were retrofitted several times during the observation period. However, 
the age of the machines limits what can be achieved by renovating them further. The 
product mix has changed; however, no clear strategy can be observed. It is easy to 
understand the urge of the new owners to close the plant down and invest in its 
modernisation. Indeed, the holding company representative stated that the plant was 
making a loss at the time of purchase. The energy efficiency of such equipment must be 
quite low. However, self-sufficiency in electricity may have contributed to the potential 
to use the obsolete equipment over the expected lifetimes. 
Market-based drivers are the main reason to modernise. However, the support of the 
regional administration was also mentioned. The most important issues influencing 
modernisation include shareholders, quality of products and volume of production. The 
new owner of Plant 4 claimed that currently there are no major barriers to investment, but 
admitted that the previous ownership arrangement may have hindered modernisation 
investments. It is interesting to observe how the new management is convinced, and may 
be correct to say, that it will not experience the same barriers as the previous 
management, such as non-payment and problems in arranging larger investments. Given 
the recent transfer of ownership, it cannot be judged whether the drivers listed have 
relevance to modernisation in reality. However, the closure of the plant due to 
unprofitability would suggest the new owner is seriously planning to carry out 
modernisation. The fact that the previous ownership arrangement did not support large 
investments would seem to explain the lack of modernisation observed in the technology 
path. 
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Table 7.18 Drivers and barriers to modernisation of Plant 4 
I ]FACTORS I DRIVERS I 
[I 
- Funding 
I 
12 
- Corporate policy 
I 
[-3 
- Technology and raw materials 
I 
saving and other policies 
I 
price and tariffs 
Energy-sector refonn Electricity price is irrelevant as the 
policies create uncertainties 
Jýlant 
is self-sufficient 
Market signals 
Profit driver for 
investments 
F-jýuprovement of the 
quality of products 
Increasing the volume of 
production 
Transition and attitudes 
Previous ownership 
arrangements did not support 
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TV 
The self-sufficiency of hydropower reduces the relevance of electricity prices while fuels 
for heat generation will be required. The availability of cheap electricity and the fact that 
the new management has little practical experience of operating the plant so far may 
explain why the energy price is not emphasised in the drivers and barriers discussion. 
Summary 
Plant 4 does not have own pulp production facilities in use, only paper machines, and 
before its closure in 2004 relied on recycled paper as raw material. The product mix has 
been volatile. The existing infrastructure is very obsolete, dating back to the early 1900s. 
Some retrofitting was carried out in the early 1990s. However. no major changes were 
reported during the observation period. No energy consumption data was available for 
analysis. Drivers dominate barriers and the interviewee claimed that there are no major 
barriers to investment. The main drivers are market-related and do not really connect with 
the reality of modernisation measures. However, this may be irrelevant due to the recent 
change of ownership. 
7.4 Comparison of case studies 
7.4.1 General trends 
All four plants introduced above had some elements in common. First, their production 
had collapsed by the mid 1990s, and a peak in energy intensity around the same time was 
typical. Second, based on the energy efficiency indices, energy efficiency had improved 
somewhat, while heat consumption efficiency had improved more than that of electricity. 
However, only half the plants provided a useful data set for this comparison. 
Another general division is related to investment activities. Two of the plants have made 
some investments that can be observed in the technology paths, while the remaining two 
have hardly invested at all. Ownership arrangements are still very much based on control 
by the plants' management even though some of the plants have foreign shareholders. 
Control by insiders prevails, despite the bankruptcies of three of the four case-study 
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plants in the 1990s. Based on this, it seems that bankruptcy is regarded more as a too] to 
get rid of debts and start again or to get rid of an unwanted external owner than about 
closing companies which are not viable. Dubious transfers of assets have been reported in 
Russia also by other observers (@ratings 2002). 
7.4.2 Regional level data 
Table 7.19 shows the development of energy efficiency in the region. Based on this data, 
on average electricity efficiency remained above the 1990 level in 2003, while heat 
efficiency has improved. The trend in electricity efficiency contradicts that of plants I 
and 2 while the trends in heat efficiency are similar. 
Table 7.19 Regional energy-efficiency indices of Karelia 
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 
1.34 1.52 1.64 1.63 1.62 1.48 1.52 1.49 
Heat 2.44 2.32 2.76 2.41 2.33 2.10 2.19 2.06 
Source: Karelkomstat dataset. 
Figure 7.5 illustrates the dynamics of the Table 7.19 data. 
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Figure 7.5 Regional energy-efficiency indices of Karelia 
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of Karelian pulp and paper sector 
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Figure 7.6 presents the energy efficiency indices in the context of total paper production. 
it is obvious that the paper production volume remained some 38% below the 1990 level 
in 2003. This can be explained by the wave of decommissioning old equipment at the 
beginning of the 1990s. Heat efficiency improved dramatically, by 16%, while electricity 
efficiency worsened by 10%. 
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Figure 7.6 Energy efficiency indices in the context of total pulp production, regional average 
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7.4.3 Drivers and barriers 
Plants 
There are various similarities among the reported drivers and barriers of the Karelian 
plants. Two of four companies claimed that there are no real barriers to modemisation 
but, perhaps ironically, these were the plants that had implemented the least 
modernisation. When asked why the required modernisation has not been implemented so 
far in the absence of barriers, interviewees responded that the previous ownership 
arrangements did not support large investments. So it seems that ownership arrangements 
may act as either a driver or a barrier. The unfavourable ownership arrangement referred 
to was an early post-Soviet, communal-ownership arrangement created by the voucher 
privatisation, which has been reported to act as a barrier to investment in other sources 
too (Commander et aL, 1996, p. 4). Indeed, plants controlled by externals seem to report 
fewer barriers to modernisation investments than the plants owned by insiders. However, 
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this contradicts the implementation record as the main investments in Karelia have taken 
place at the plants owned by the insiders. This might be a coincidence in such a small 
observed population, but certainly contradicts previous theories (Rautava and Sutela. 
2000, p. 215,247). 
It is also commonly argued by the plants that profit cannot cover all the investment needs. 
There were differences in how this problem was addressed. Some plants had found 
investors while others argued that it is difficult to finance modernisation by borrowing 
money. Most of the plants suffer from non-payment problems by the local 
administrations purchasing heat from the plant. When asked why they continue to deliver 
the heat in the absence of payment, the interviewees argued firstly that there would be no 
other buyer for the beat, which is in many cases is generated as a side product of 
electricity by CHP plants, while the old-fashioned role of industrial actors providing for 
their workforce also came up. 
Few signs of corporate policy could be observed in Karelia. perhaps because most of the 
plants are still managed by insiders and remain mostly independent. The role of energy 
experts in investment decision-making remains unclear in most cases, which can be a 
barrier to energy saving. Two interviewees said that energy experts are consulted, at least 
to some extent, one did not want to answer the question and one said the question was 
difficult to answer. So it seems that the expertise of energy specialists is not always used 
fully or at all when investment decisions are taken. The difficulty of the whole question 
may reflect the tradition of separating technical and economic decision-making. 
All plants except Plant 4, which is self-sufficient in hydropower, mentioned the high 
share of energy costs as a driver of modernisation on cost-saving grounds. Two plants 
(which had made some modernisation investments) argued that energy is expensive, but 
also that energy is not expensive enough to trigger fin-ther energy-saving activities. This 
might indicate recognition that the price is now higher than in Soviet times, or the latter 
argument might be a more academic one, expressing an understanding of the fact that the 
price of energy has not led to large-scale changes in society so far, and therefore, has to 
be too low. The mixed messages may also reflect the softness of budget constraints, i. e., 
the fact that companies can still survive without being competitive (see Chapter 2. p. 53). 
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Or Karelian plants may be in the process of moving from soft to hard budget constraints 
that would force them to rationalise their performance. In this scenario, the plants 
stressing the importance of energy prices and investing in modernisation are already 
facing hard budget constraints, while the ones failing to recognise energy prices as a 
driver may be behind the front runners still applying the soft budget constraint out of 
habit. 
Energy saving and other regional government policies divided the views of the plants in 
two. Half the plants argued that energy-saving policies do not work while the other half 
emphasised the support from the regional administration for investments in general. One 
plant claimed that energy audits make no difference while another regarded them as 
genuinely helpU in keeping track of energy consumption. It was also stated that 
government policies do not hinder modernisation and that individual companies are free 
to modernise if they can afford it. This reflects the echoes from the Soviet system when 
companies had no right to take investment decisions. 
The market was, overall, the most important category of emphasised drivers. Two of the 
plants stated a desire to stay in the market and two a desire to develop niche markets as 
drivers to modernisation. Otherwise, the market-related drivers covered a large selection 
of issues. However, these drivers were not widely observed in the technology paths of the 
plants as the amount of modernisation done in the region is very limited. 
Transition and attitude-related issues consist of barriers only. These included old- 
fashioned attitudes towards energy saving and the typically Russian attitude that it is 
better to modernise old equipment for as long as possible rather than replace it in order to 
save money. A reluctance to hand equity over to foreign investors was also expressed, 
especially by one plant. This supports the statements of experts who claim that Russian 
pulp and paper companies are reluctant to accept equity investments (Larson, 2004; 
discussions at Adam Smith conference). During the early years of transition, the tax 
legislation was complicated and confusing and provided both incentives and 
opportunities for rent-seeking (see for instance Summers, 2000, p. 1). As discussed in 
Chapter 2, tax arrears and tax evasion were common, and companies may be reluctant to 
open these files to external review. These issues may provide some explanations. 
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However, half the plants have some foreign shareholders, which would contradict the 
statement unless the "foreign" owners are Russians living overseas. In addition, private 
ownership and independence of a production unit are still fairly new concepts in Russia 
and might be seen as the goal of privatisation by some Russian actors. Becoming 
dependent on foreign owners may contradict this goal. 
Regional administration and experts 
Representatives of the regional administration and local energy experts were interviewed 
in order to triangulate the statements from the plants. The group of officials from the 
Karelian regional administration and other experts interviewed consisted of 
representatives of the following organisations: the Department of Economic 
Development, Energonadzor, the Regional Energy Commission, Karelkomstat and the 
Karelian Energy Efficiency Centre. 
The lack of adequate financial resources was regarded as one of the main barriers to 
modernisation investment by all the administration representatives. The difficulty of 
obtaining loans was mentioned as part of this, as was the reluctance to hand equity over 
to foreigners, which was explained as a reluctance to open up account information to 
external review. 
General attitude problems were discussed, especially by one of the administration 
agencies. According to the latter, during the planned economy days no one cared how 
much production cost, and as domestic energy resources were so large and the energy 
price so minimal they were hardly considered by companies. This attitude of indifference 
is now very difficult to change. It may also provide evidence of some remaining elements 
of soft budget constraints that would reduce the willingness of directors and managers to 
invest in energy efficiency. A related "we live in a forest but have no firewood" attitude 
refers to the thinking that the state had responsibility for fulfilling the basic needs of 
society, while individuals became used to having no responsibilities. 
Some of the representatives of the Karelian administration argued that the Russian pulp 
and paper companies are less interested in their energy consumption than their Western 
colleagues because they are used to spending a large share of their budget on energy. In 
addition, labour costs are low which leaves headroom for high energy costs. However, 
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another interviewee contradicted the previous statement by claiming that pulp and paper 
plants invest in energy saving because of the high share of energy in the production costs, 
which makes energy an obvious potential source of savings. 
Uncertainty over future developments was regarded as a barrier to long-ten-n thinking 
such as investment decisions. It was also argued that investment decisions are often based 
on political rather than economic factors. This could act either as a driver or a barrier. 
The reduction of production costs was regarded as one of the main reasons to invest in 
modernisation. This is because cost price is dependent on the efficiency of energy use. 
Prices are rising constantly and the amount of money that can be used for buying energy 
is limited. The desire to increase production volumes was also regarded as a driver of 
energy efficiency, as was keeping up with international standards as most of the 
production of Karelian pulp and paper industry is exported. 
An agency involved in tariff setting claimed that the regulating agency is not using the 
data provided concerning the manner of energy use of the companies in order to ensure 
that tariffs are set based on objective evaluation. This could be regarded as a barrier as it 
outlines a problem within the division of responsibilities between agencies. The fact that 
electricity-sector reform has ceased in practice and the market remains monopolistic can 
also be a barrier to efficient energy use. 
It was also argued that cleaner production is not a goal or reason to improve energy 
efficiency because environmental fines are too small to provide an incentive to reduce 
pollution. 
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Table 7.20 Drivers and barriers identified by Karelian administration and experts 
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Comparison ofplants and regional administration and experts 
The views of the representatives of the plants and those of the regional administration and 
experts on the drivers of and barriers to modernisation investments in pulp and paper 
industry do not contradict each other, and the overview of the drivers and barriers covers 
more or less the same issues. The representatives of the plants discussed a much larger 
range of drivers, barriers and factors than the representatives of the regional 
administration. The economic issues, mainly drivers, in particular were emphasised in the 
views of the plants compared to those of the administration and experts. This is hardly 
surprising as plants as private enterprises would naturally look at the question from an 
economic perspective as their main task is to make a profit. Even though a range of 
barriers was detected. representatives of half the plants stated that there are no major 
barriers to modernisation. This was not the view of the administration and experts who 
recognised the existence of barriers as well as drivers. It is also interesting that both 
groups had a similar internal confusion over the issue of the energy price and whether it 
is high enough to stimulate energy saving. 
7.5 Summary 
Research objectives of this chapter were: 
8. Provide background to Karelia. including developments of the economy, the 
energy sector and energy policies relevant to the topic. 
9. Report the outcomes of interviews on plant-level case studies, including 
description of the plant's products, facilities and ownership. technology path, 
development of energy efficiency based on energy-efficiency indices (where data 
is available), and drivers of and barriers to modernisation. 
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10. Summarise each plant on whether modernisation has been carried out. whether 
this is reflected in the energy efficiency trends (where data is available). and 
conclude whether the drivers and barriers to modernisation were consistent with 
the technology path. 
11. Investigate the development of energy efficiency in the pulp and paper sector at 
regional level based on energy-efficiency indices drawn from regional statistics. 
12. Triangulate the drivers of and barriers to modernisation reported by the plants, 
with the drivers and barriers reported by the regional administration and experts. 
Forestry industry dominates the economy and energy consumption of Karelia. Four case 
plants - all the plants in the region - were covered. The production of the plants had 
collapsed by the mid 1990s, and they had experienced an inefficiency peak in the mid- 
1990s. Energy efficiency had improved somewhat during the observation period in the 
1990s and 2000s, while heat consumption efficiency had improved more than that of 
electricity. Two of the plants have modernised their capital stock while the other two had 
hardly invested at all. Ownership arrangements were still very much based on insider 
control. Market signals and high share of energy costs were regarded as the main drivers 
to modernisation while barriers included the lack of financial resources, large investment 
need, transition-related barriers and almost complete absence of strategic corporate 
policies. 
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8. Results of interviews: Archangelsk oblast 
8.1 Background 
Archangelsk oblast, including the Nenets autonomous district, is the largest region in 
north-west Russia, covering 589,900 km2. Archangelsk city is the capital, and the region 
includes several large islands. The region is bordered by the Republic of Karelia in the 
west, the Vologda and Kirov regions in the south, the Komi Republic in the south-east. 
the Tyumen region in the east, and the waters of three seas wash the coast of the region. 
The total population of the region in 2002 was 1.35 million (Goskomstat, 2003, p. 42). 
Archangelsk region has inherited serious environmental problems such as industrial 
contamination (Pravda Severa, I March 2005), drinking water supplies (Biznes-klass, 17 
December 2003) and nuclear waste (Bellona Web), both in obsolete storage facilities and 
dumped into the sea from the Soviet Union. 
The region consists of the Nenets autonomous district, 20 administrative districts and 14 
towns (Archangelsk oblast website). Archangelsk region supported an administrative 
merger with the Nenets autonomous district in the 2000s (BarentsObserver. com, 26 May 
2004; Hey Vada, 16 August 2004), and succeeded in taking over the management of tax 
revenues from this mineral-rich district (Biznes-kJass, 15 November 2004). 
Typically for a Russian region, Archangelsk region has lost some of its independence 
regarding its tax revenues to the federal level. Budget allocations by the federal 
government tend to remain unchanged over the years while the responsibilities of 
regional and local authorities increase (Pravda Severa, 12 November 2004). However, the 
reduced administrative independence of the Nenets autonomous district means that some 
of its oil revenues will stay in the coffers of Archangelsk regional administration (Izvestia 
NAO, 25 November 2004). As a result, it looks as if the region could afford to implement 
some policy measures. 
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8.1.1 Economy 
Table 8.1 shows that the economy of Archangelsk region has experienced strong growth 
in 1999-2000, and that this tendency has been fading away by 2002. 
Table 8.1 Development of Archangelsk economy 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Real annual change of GRP, % -3.8 -3.8 11.4 16.4 5.8 1.6 
Source: Rosstat, 2004, p. 351. 
Industry accounted for 42.4% of the GRP in 2003 (Archangelsk oblkomstat dataset). The 
main industrial sectors are forestry (mechanical, pulp and paper), energy and metals, and 
machine-building industries. Forestry, wood processing and the pulp and paper industries 
are very important sectors of the economy - contributing 45% to the total for industry 
(Figure 8.1 ). 
Figure 8.1 Main industrial sectors 
Main industrial sectors of 
Archangelsk 2003 
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Source: Goskomstat, 2003, pp. 418-419. 
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The development of the physical production index of industrial production is shown in 
Table 8.2. The first half of the 1990s Aitnessed negative growth which turned to positive 
in 1997. Post-Soviet industrial production reached its lowest point in 1996 when it was 
some 56% of the 1990 level. However, strong growth in the 2000s has improved the 
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situation significantly and in 2003 the industrial production index of Archangelsk was for 
the first time above the 1990 level, at some 118% of the 1990 production level. 
Furthermore, according to the Ministry of Economy for Archangelsk region, the growth 
of industrial production in Archangelsk is the second strongest among the federal subjects 
in north-west Russia. Industrial production grew by 35% in 2004 compared with the same 
period in the previous year (Biznes-klass, 23 November 2004). Indeed, industry is the 
motor of growth in the region. 
Table 8.2 Physical production index, % of previous year and % of 1990 
1993 1"4 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
% of previous year 94.2 79.0 92.1 1 93.0 100.3 - 102.7 122.3 130.1 105.6 101.1 121-0 
% of 1990 82.3 65.0 5 ý. 9 5 5.7 55.8 5- - 70.1 91.2 96.3 97AT 117.9 
source: ArcnangeiSK ODIKOMStal cLata set 
The region's economy is export-oriented - the main export articles include timber, pulp, 
paper, cardboard, crude oil and oil products (see Table 8.2), while imports consist of 
machinery, new technology, food products and oil products (Archangelskii oblkomstat 
2003, p. 112). The trade balance surplus of the region is very significant. During the first 
six months of 2004, exports were II times higher than imports, respectively 523 and 46 
million tonnes (Pravda Severa, 7 July 2004). 
8.1.2 Energy sector 
Energy balance and demand 
The Archangelsk economy is heavily dependent on fossil fuels as there is no hydro or 
nuclear capacity in the region. Offly 8% of the energy supply is covered by local 
firewood, wood waste and peat (Archangelsk administration fuel and energy commission, 
2002). Heavy fuel oil is expensive as it has to be shipped from Central Russia (Yegorov, 
2003) as there is no oil pipeline to Archangelsk. A gas pipeline crosses the region in the 
south and supplies the city of Kotlas. However, there is no extension to the area of 
Archangelsk city. 
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The total electricity consumption of the region is somewhat larger than its own electricity 
production. However, own production is mostly based on fossil fuels purchased from 
other Russian regions. In 1990,14%, and in 2003 17% of of electricity originated from 
external sources (Archangelsk oblkomstat data set). The main sources of electricity 
consumed in Archangelsk region in 2000 included industry (41 %), Arhenergo (3 7%) and 
FOREM (20%) (Archangelsk administration fuel and energy commission, 2001). 
Heat is generated by Arhenergo, the local branch of the RAO UES, and municipal boilers 
and boilers owned by industry. CHP plants dominate heat production in the region with a 
68% share of total heat production (energy experts' paper). 
Table 8.3 shows a decrease in both electricity and heat consumption in the mid 1990s, 
and a trend in strong growth of consumption from 1999. The growth of the consumption 
of both electricity and, especially, heat again slowed down or even fell in 2002-2003. 
The 2000 peak is linked to the growing economy and industrial production. However, the 
2003 industrial production peak is not reflected in energy consumption. This may be a 
statistical error. 
Table 8.3 Development of electricity and beat consumption compared to economic 
performance 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Electricity consumption, 
TWh 6.7 6.7 6.8 7.1 7.3 7.7 7.7 7.9 
Electricity consumption % of 
previous year 94.8 100.6 100.8 104.0 102.6 105.2 101.2 102.0 
Heat consumption, PJ 55.8 53.2 50.1 53.9 56.1 57.9 58.3 5 5.5 
Heat consumption % of - 
previous year 88.0 95.4 94.2 107.7 104.0 103.2 100.8 95.1 
Economic growth, % of 
previous year N/A N/A -3.8 -3.8 11.4 5.8 1.6 N/A 
Industrial production % of 
T - T 
12.7 122.3 ]30.1 105.6 101.1 121 
Sources: Archangelsk obIkOmstat dataset, Archangelsk Oblkomstat 2003, p. 15. 
Industry is a very significant energy consumer in the region accounting for 90% of heat, 
86% of heavy fuel oil, 80% of coal and 50% of gas consumption in 2003. Forestry 
industry is a significant consumer as such using 74% of regions total heat demand, 46% 
of gas, 36% of coal and 15% of heavy fuel oil. (Arhangelsk oblkomstat data set. ) 
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Strategic energy issues 
The guaranteed availabiliry qf fuels is still a looming problem in the 2000s. 
Municipalities have experienced difficulties in covering the rising cost of fuels for 
heating (Pravda Severa, 12 August 2004), and an interviewee argued that it is unreliable 
to deliver fuel during the winter, which is necessary due to the lack of adequate storage 
facilities. 
The electricity transfer network is becoming obsolete due to the lack of maintenance, and 
the region is at risk of experiencing power shortages if the power supply infrastructure is 
not renovated (Yegorov, 2003). An interviewee argued that this is because the network is 
not "owned" by anyone, and therefore, nobody's responsibility. Tbefts of metal 
components from the power grid have also resulted in more than 200,000 inhabitants 
having lost power supplies for shorter and longer periods in 2002-2004 (Pravda Severa, 
20 October 2004). 
Non-payment is a partial reason for the low fuel-supply security. Newspapers report that 
many cities are experiencing major problems with hot-water supplies due to the local 
housing companies' debts to power suppliers (Pravda Severa, 2 August 2004, Biznes- 
klass I June 2004). The debts to the suppliers of coal may lead to disruption of deliveries 
in the future (Arnews. n. 4 6 November 2003). However, an expert interviewee was not 
aware of such problems and argued that there is no large scale non-payment problem 
between electricity and heat producers and fuel suppliers that are private companies and 
would simply stop supplying fuel to a non-paying customer. 
Switching to the economically available local bio fuels is ongoing. However, the supply 
of bio fuel is too small to replace afl the fossil-fuel deliveries even though Archangelsk 
region has one of the largest bio fuel potentials - some 25 TWh annually - in north-west 
Russia (energy experts' paper). Renewable eneqy resources remain mostly unexploited 
in Archangelsk region. The hydropower potential has been estimated as 24 GWh and 
wind-power potential as 0.9 TWh per year (Draft energy saving programme of 
Archangelsk region). ' 8 
" The source provides no information whether the figures indicate the theoretical or economic potential, 
however, the size of the wind-power potential would suggest that the figures refer to theoretical potential. 
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The construction of gas pipelines is a topical issue in Archangelsk. A pipeline currently 
serves the city of Kotlas and construction of a pipeline from the neighbouring Volodga 
region to the Archangelsk region was started in 1992 (Nezavisimoe Obozrenie, 19 
December 2003). The longer-term plans of Gazprom include the construction of a new 
gas pipeline system firom the Yamal Peninsula, running partly through the territory of the 
Archangelsk region (BarentsObserver. com, 1 April 2005). Both Gazprorn and Tatneft are 
exploring the region in order to establish new gas and oil fields in the region (Pravda 
Severo-Zapada, 26 August 2004; Arnews. ru, 9 December 2004). So far, all these 
potential fuel supplies remain plans only. 
Building a nuclear power plant has also been discussed. Some officials of the 
Archangelsk administration support the idea (Amews. ru, 25 October 2004) and it has also 
been mentioned as an option by the Archangelsk administration fuel and energy 
department (2001, p. 35). There is also public support for nuclear power (Pravda Severa, 
31 October 2003). But an expert interviewee argued that there is currently enough power 
production capacity in the region and, consequently, a nuclear power plant is not needed. 
Building a nuclear power plant would require a very significant investment, which might 
be better used in renovating the existing capacity. 19 This option has been recognised by 
the Archangelsk regional fuel and energy department as well (2001, p. 36). The 
interviewee also explained that people tend to compare the higher fuel prices in 
Archangelsk to the lower prices in Murmansk 20 . 
8.2 Energy efficiency policies and measures 
8.2.1 Legislation 
Archangelsk region adopted an energy-saving law, "Ob energosberezenii i ponizenii 
energozatrat", in 1997 (N272). This piece of legislation established the 1996 federal 
'9 The IEA (2002a, p. 282) concludes the same issue at federal level, arguing that there is no pressing need 
for new generation capacity when it would be a better idea to invest in the maintenance of the existing 
capacity. 
'0 in Murmansk, electricity prices are lower because the building costs of the nuclear power plant were 
covered by the Soviet state rather than from the profits made by the plant. Any new plant would have to 
cover the costs by selling electricity. 
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energy-saving law at regional level. The main elements included a division of 
responsibilities between regional actors, the main policy tools and financial aspects of 
implementation of the law. The goal of the law is to establish a basis for optimising the 
efficiency of energy use and reducing the cost price of products and services. The priority 
activities highlighted in the legislation include stimulating investment in energy -efficient 
equipment, establishing a system to control energy use, increasing awareness of energy 
saving and establishing a regulatory system for energy use and saving in the region 
(N272). 
Some ftirther legislation has since been passed, for instance "About stimulating energy 
saving in the Archangelsk region" in 1999 (N I 10). In addition, Archangelsk region 
adopted the "Improvement of efficiency of municipal heat suppliers in Archangelsk 
region in 2003-2005" programme in 2003 (N 112). The focus of this programme is not 
relevant to this study and no ftirther programmes concerning industrial energy 
consumption have been adopted. 
A draft version of an energy-saving programme for Archangelsk region was available. 
The main goals listed in the programme include gasification of the region, ftuther 
exploitation of local and renewable energy sources, further stabilisation and improvement 
of efficiency in the energy sector and, as a result, a positive effect on the growth of the 
economy and protection of the environment in the region. 21 
8.2.2 Policy instruments and their implementation 
According to the Archangelsk administration and expert interviews, the regional energy- 
saving legislation is of declarational character and cannot be implemented as such. A 
major factor behind this is the fact that the federal-level energy-saving legislation has not 
been implemented either. 
As discussed above, one regional-level programme was adopted; however, it is not a 
general energy-saving programme as anticipated by the energy-saving law. The draft 
energy-efficiency programme mentioned above is not an official, approved version. The 
2' As this programme was never published, this information is not ftirther discussed here. 
214 
main reasons for not producing a programme include the lack of funding and expected, 
new, federal energy-saving legislation to guide the process. Some norms for energy use 
have been established (Energy Efficiency in the Barents and Baltic Regions, October 
2002), and Archangelsk administration has decided to purchase energy meters. The 
energy use of at least some manufacturing industry units and heating boilers have been 
audited (Archangelsk administration fuel and energy commission, 2001). 
Archangelsk Oblast Energy Efficiency Centre was established in 1999 by the Norwegian 
Energy Efficiency Group (NEEG 2003, p. 3). There is no regional-level energy-saving 
fund in Archangelsk. The energy-saving office tried to establish a revolving fund, 22 but 
did not succeed as the regional election mixed the unfinished negotiations (Energy 
Efficiency in the Barents and Baltic Regions, 2002). However, Novodvinsk municipality 
has established a revolving fund (Frunzye, 2005). According to the interviews, even 
recently it was possible to direct 1% of the energy tariffs to the energy-saving fund. 
However, this was forbidden by the federal legislation as it was regarded as a tax that was 
not authorised by the Tax Code. 
All the above-mentioned measures are, however, only a shadow of the policies and 
measures planned under the regional law, which has, indeed, been a declaration rather 
than a serious plan of action, as also recognised by the interviewees. In addition, one 
interviewee argued that any energy-saving legislation is superfluous as it is the market 
price of energy that dictates whether consumers AU or will not act to save energy. 
22 A revolving fund finances small energy-saving projects and receives a share of the money saved to be 
reinvested (Smirnov, 2004, p. 2). 
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Table 8.4 Energy-saving policy tools introduced in Archangelsk 
Tool Status of implementation Target group Effectiveness _7 
Energy-saving One programme drafted on Industrial/public No regional-level 
programmes the energy efficiency of sector/residential programme due to 
municipal beat providers in lack of funding, 
2003. Energy administration however, some local 
was still planning to draft a programmes 
ro amme in 2001 *** 
Energy contracts: No guaranteed return from Industrial/public Failure of 
guaranteed return energy-saving investments to sector/residential implementation 
from energy saving public sector - organisations 
lose some of their budget 
allocation if they cut their 
energy expenses 
Tax credits and tariff Local experts tried to Industrial/public Failure of 
cuts for energy- establish such a mechanism sector/residential implementation 
saving programme but failed.. " 
participants 
Limitation of energy Norms established** N/A Unclear whether the 
use by norms norms have been 
impleme ted 
Requirement to Administration has decided Industrial/public Some activity in 
measure energy to buy energy meters but sector/residential public sector but 
consumption unclear whether this has unclear how much. 
happened so far Pulp and paper mills 
measure their energy 
consumption 
Tax relief for No evidence of Industrial/public N/A 
overperformers implementation sector/residential 
Tax breaks for No evidence of Industrial N/A 
production of energy- implementation 
saving technologies 
Tax breaks for use of No evidence of Industrial N/A 
secondary energy implementation 
sources 23 
Tax breaks for No evidence of tax breaks Industrial N/A 
refurbishment works but some administration 
aiming at fulfilling financing available to cover 
energy consumption costs of refurbishment loans 
norms 
Exemption from pre- Not working; public-sector Public sector Failure of policy 
ordered energy organisations will have their 
delivery payments if funding allocation cut if they 
fall in demand is reduce their energy 
caused by consumption 
coordinated energy- 
saving activities 
23 Secondary energy sources refer to using waste streams as energy sources. 
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Tax breaks for share No evidence of Industrial N/A 
of profit from energy- implementation 
saving measures 
Energy audits Some energy audits have Industrial Unclear how 
compulsory for units been implemented in the pulp effective, but 
consuming over and paper sector, and some implementation 
6,000 tyt heating boilers have also ongoing 
been audited *** 
Grants to develop Department of economic Industrial Unclear if happened 
energy-saving development can provide in practice 
technologies and new some support for loan costs 
sources of energy 
Grants for No evidence of Industrial N/A 
development of implementation 
database of energy- 
saving technologies 
Grants for Gosstroi funded a regional Public sector Gosstroi provided a 
development of programme on municipal one-off fund, experts 
administrative- heating but no funding for claim that there is no 
legislative basis for general energy-saving funding for drafting 
energy saving programme energy-saving 
programme 
Grants for technical Norwegian government has Industrial/public Some 
training of experts funded some training sector implementation 
programmes funded by foreign 
organisations 
Source: N272; * Pravda Severa, 19 September 2001, "Managers studying 'clean production"', 
Energy Efficiency in the Barents and Baltic Regions, October 2002; Archangelsk 
administration fuel and energy commission, 2001. 
The planned sources of funding to implement the law include investments by Russian and 
foreign juristic or natural persons, allocations from the federal budget and from regional 
and local budgets, off-budget expenditures, revenues from economic sanctions and 
money saved related to energy saving, and from additions to the energy tariff (N272). In 
practice, funding has been a problem. One study has been funded by Gosstroi, and some 
foreign activities such as the energy-saving centre and expert training have taken place. 
However, no ftinding has so far been allocated for the regional-level energy-saving 
programme. 
To conclude, even though Archangelsk's energy-saving legislation remains in force, it 
has indeed been declarational rather than practical. 
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8.2.3 Energy price policies 
In Archangelsk region, the pressure to increase prices is high due to the fuel dependency 
of the region. Archangelsk region's capacity to receive electricity from the grid is limited 
24 due to the low capacity of the connection to the network . Consequently, the region has 
to generate most of its electricity locally and therefore cannot enjoy the lower electricity 
prices that prevail in the grid in springtime due to peaking hydropower production. As an 
example, in 2000 the FOREM price for electricity was RUB 0.256/KWh while 
Arhenergo's production costs were RUB 0.28/KWh (Archangelsk Administration Fuel 
and Energy Commission, 2001). Heat produced by the communal boilers tends to be 
significantly more expensive than that of Arhenergo. 25 
In January 2004, electricity prices were RUB 1.04/kWh for households in the cities and 
RUB 0.73/kWh in rural areas (Pravda Severa, 12 November 2003). Percentage-wise, 
price increases seem high to consumers (Pravda Severa, 4 November 2004). Fuel prices 
are very important to the Archangelsk region due to the dependency on fossil fuels 
purchased from other regions. Heavy fuel oil is widely regarded as expensive. An 
interviewee reported that the price is some RUB 2,750-3,000 per tonne. while coal costs 
some RU 650 per tonne. 26 The price of gas is lower as it is subsidised by the government. 
However, building a gas pipeline to the Archangelsk city area is not seen as an 
appropriate solution by all due to the expected gas price rises. 
While some of the administration representatives and experts believe that energy prices, 
especially fuel, are indeed high, some of them argue that one can only measure the true 
cost of energy against the saving efforts of the consumers. One interviewee stated the 
following: "Even though everybody is shouting that tariffs are high, it can be observed 
objectively that they are actually low. In reality, a consumer will only start saving energy 
when it will be profitable to him". Another interviewee highlighted the prevailing attitude 
The inadequacy of the interconnector between north-west Russia and central Russia has also been 
reported by the lEA (2002b, p. 200). 
" Communal boilers do not combine beat and electricity generation, which would have a higher efficiency. 26 ()n these prices, heavy ftiel oil is much more expensive per MJ of heat than coal. The Lower Heating 
Values of heavy fuel oil and hard coal are 40.2 GJ/t and 24-31 GJ/t, respectively (Biok, 2003, p. 16). Based 
on these figures, and the given fuel prices, generating I GJ of heavy fuel oil would cost RUB 68-74 while 
the respective figure for coal would be only RU13 21-27/GJ. 
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that energy is expensive against its real price by saying "... we claim that heat is 
expensive and then do not save it". One interviewee argued that the idea of cutting costs 
by saving energy has become an automatic way of thinking by now. Consequently, it 
seems that society is familiar,, Aith the idea of energy saving, while there is no pressing 
need to put this idea in practice in most places due to the low energy prices. 
8.2.4 Investment environment and policies 
An interviewee specialising in the regional administration investment policies regards the 
main task of the department as supporting businesses which draw investments to the 
region. The administration can provide some support for interest payments on credits to 
companies in the forestry and agricultural sectors, and in energy saving. The results of 
this support have been positive and have contributed to the growth of GRP. ne 
administration helps companies to draft business plans and guarantees large loans such as 
those of the World Bank. In theory, regional budget funds can also be allocated, but the 
amounts are fairly small from industry's point of view. These funds are distributed on a 
competitive basis. There is also an investment company for small businesses that does not 
work with the pulp and paper sector as its investment requirements are too large. 
Of funds invested in Archangelsk, 90% are own funds of the pulp and paper industry 
generated from profit. It looks like companies are willing to hand over equity to foreign 
investors, as there are examples of this. There have not been any significant problems 
with foreign investors. However, foreign investments only make up a small share of total 
investments. This is mostly due to the lack of trust in the Russian legal system. An 
interviewee argued that not many bankruptcies have been declared and business tends to 
be profitable and therefore regarded this attitude as reluctance or fear. But it has to be 
noted that the lack of bankruptcies could cause some of this reluctance. 
The press reports that the forest industry accounts for 60% of the region's total debts of 
RUB 4.9 billion to the tax authorities in Archangelsk oblast in 2004 (Pravda Severo- 
Zapada, 26 November 2004). This could be regarded as a potential subsidy to the forestry 
industry if the debts are left unresolved. 
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8.3 Case studies: Archangelsk 
8.3.1 Plant 5 
Plant 5 was established in 1935. Almost half is currently owned by Russian juristic 
persons and some 30% by Russian individuals, presumably workers and management. 
The state also remains an owner of 20% of the company. A Russian-Finnish company 
also owns a minority share. The company has experienced at least one loss-making year 
in the 2000s. 
The capacity of the plant is 208,000 tonnes of sulphate kraft pulp per year. Other 
products include wrapping paper, some 3,700 tonnes in 2003, and wood chemical 
products. The level of export is more than 80%. 
Table 8.5 Net profit of Plant 5, US$ in 
2000 2001 2002 
Net profit 6,402 -3,141 1,718 
Source: www. skrin. ru 
The main source of funding is own capital from profits made. However. funding by 
shareholders remains an option. The plant experienced difficulties finding sufficient 
good-quality raw wood material deliveries in the 1990s and consequently the company 
started producing its own wood chips. 
The plant's own electricity production slightly exceeded 75% of consumption in 2001, 
and the rest of its electricity was bought from local grid operator, Arhenergo. The main 
fuel in use is waste liquor (42%), while heavy fuel oil and coal accounted for 21 % and 
10%, respectively, in 2003. The share of wood waste was 8% in 2001 but had increased 
to 23% by 2003 at the expense of heavy fuel oil and coal. The shares of fuels are 
balanced, based on changes in fuel prices and the availability of local bio fuel. 
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Table 8.6 Technology path of Plant 5 
Equipment I 1960s I 1970s I 1980s 1 1990S 1 2000s 
Sulphat-e pulp-J-Djecom- 
plant, periodic 
cooking, com. 
1935-1936 
Sulphate pulp Com. 1976- 
plant, periodic i 1979 
, --cooking 
L 
Sulphate pulp 
plant, 
continuous 
cooking, 2x 
'Kamyr', 
Com. 1969 
Pulp drying Market pulp Decom. 1969- 
machine 1,1972 
com. 1930s 
Pulp drying pulp Decom. 1969- 
machine 2,1972 
com. 1930s 
Pulp drying Mar*et pulp Decom-. -in the 
machine 3 1980s 
com. pre-1960 
Pulp drying Markel pulp i Decom. in the 
machine 4 1L 
com. pre-1960 
1980s 
-T 
Pulp drying Market pulp Rctmfit 1986- 
machine 5 com. 1969 1988 
Pulp drying com. 1972 Retrofit 1986- 
machine 6 Market pulp 988 
PM'Yankie' 
com. 1936 
Screening, 5 
units 
Com. 1995- 
1996 
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Washii 1969 II 
Washing unit 
ý, 
Dm. 3972 
T-Unit 5 
com. 2002 
1, Steam Unit 4 com. Unit I ret CHP 
boilers, 3 units 1968 
_com. 
1936 
CHP-2,2 Units 1-2 com- I Unit 3 ýcom- 1984 Units 1-2 
recovery 1968 retrofit 
boilers in use, 
I in reserve 
CHP Units - 1-2 - com---- Unit 3 com. 
Evaporation 1969-1972 1981, Units 1-2 
decom. 
1960s 1970s 1980s 1990S 2000s 
Plant 5 underwent a major modernisation in the 1980s, when two market pulp drying 
machines were decommissioned and a paper machine and two pulp drying machines 
retrofitted. No major pulp production facilities have been closed down. replaced or 
retrofitted in the 1990s and 2000s. The age of the equipment varies starting from the 
1930s. However, most of them originate from the 1960s and 1970s. Modernisation 
activities have been more focused on the energy production infrastructure than on pulp 
and paper production facilities. The product mix remained the same throughout the 
observation period and production capacity has not changed significantly since 1980s. 
The technology path does not reflect improvements in energy efficiency. 
Table 8.7 Energy efficiency indices of Plant 5 
1990 1994 1 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Electricity 
- 
1.37 2.02 1 1.78 1.68 1.54 1.37 1.25 1.23 
Heat 2.43 3.12 1 2.1 1.97 1.92 1.88 1.91 
Source: Plant data, -` expert paper. 
Table 8.7 presents the development of heat and electricity efficiency indiceS28. Both 
electricity and heat efficiencies have improved. The change in heat efficiency has been 
" The boundary of the plant data remains unclear. For more information, see chapter 4 
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significant, 28%, while electricity efficiency improved by 10%. This is also illustrated in 
Figure 8.2. 
Figure 8.2 Development of energy efficiency indices of Plant 5 
Plant 5: Development of electricity and heat 
efficiency indices 
3.5 
3.0 
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2.0 
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1.0 
0.5 
0.0 
1990 1994 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
-o- Electricity --a- Heat 
Figure 8.3 shows the development of electricity and heat efficiencies in the context of the 
total pulp production of Plant 5. Both heat and electricity efficiencies remained below 
1990 level in 2003. However, major modernisation that could have explained the reduced 
electricity intensity has not been carried out. The dramatic improvement of heat 
efficiency, in particular, cannot be explained based on the material available. However, 
behavioural changes in the operation of the plant could be a possible explanation. 
28 Energy efficiency indices are calculated to make comparisons between the case plants. When the index decreases, the 
plant becomes more energy efficient and vice versa- The values of EEI compare the case plants to a reference plant 
which EEI is 1. The EEI methodology was discussed in detail in chapter 4, p. 82. 
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Figure 8.3 Electricity and heat efficiency indices in the context of total pulp production of 
Plant 5 
Energy efficiency indices vs. total pulp 
production 
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Source: Plant data 
The main barrier categories are transition and funding-related issues while the market, 
policies and energy prices dominate the themes of drivers. Financial barriers were the 
most emphasised by the interviewees, while the reduction of cost price and fuel price as a 
natural focus of savings, desire to stay in the market and increasing production volume 
were the main drivers. The corporate policy approach seems quite strong and the 
representatives of Plant 5 are fairly positive about energy saving and other government 
policies. Transition-related barriers reflect the inertia still prevailing at various levels 
including the regional government which requires companies to "participate" in social 
welfare costs i. e. applies an unlawful tax scheme. The uncertainty over the future and 
property rights are central to investment decisions. 
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Table 8.8 Drivers of and barriers to modernisation investments in Plant 5 
I BARRIERS II FACTORS II DRIVERS I 
II 
-Funding 
I 
FýIle main barriers 2re Amouni of profit varies from year 
I financial to year due to the volaffle market 
price of 
2- Corporate policy I 
Corporate strategy influences Cooperation with Fi nnish 
which investments are made experts supports 
improvements in energy 
efficiency 
Established system to 
choose projects to invest in, 
which involves energy 
_experts JI 
Shareholders only take 
dividends when the 
company has a good year 
1- 3- Technology and raw material I 
Availability of local wood 
waste limits the potential to 
modernise boilers in order to 
convert them to bio ftiel 
Coal to increase 
electricity production 
capacity: own electricity 
production is cheaper 
than purchased 
4-- Energy saving and other policies 
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Energy-efficiency policy 
has helped to establish local 
experl organisations 
Environmental regulations 
require some investments 
flof can supporl further 
modernisalion 
[Governmeni recently 
abolished export duty on 
pulp 
15 
- Energy price and tariffs 
Energy is one of the main 
elements to save on as 
there is pressure to raise 
salaries. 
16 
-Market signals 
I 
Discrimination of Russian Investment decisions are based on Need of competitive 
products in international market forecast advantages drive 
market on environmental investments 
basis 
Market price of pulp is Competitiveness of Russian Competitiveness of 
volatile products based on low cost price. specialist product 
But prices are rising and this 
competitive advantage will soon be 
lost 
Desire to stay in the 
market 
17 
- Transition and attitude 
1 
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Invesftnents -focused on other 
things than modernisation, 
such as new offices 
Regional administration puts 
indirect pressure on the 
company to "participate- in 
social welfare costs of the 
region and municipality 
Makes moire -sense to keep 
the plant going as long as 
possible and make all money 
possible as the equipment 
would be worth very little if 
it was sold 
Uncertainty over the firture: 
company management does 
not invest because ownership 
rights could be violated by 
the overnment 
Investment in a new mill 
would be large and take 
years to pay for itself. only 
large plants make a profit 
This is against the Russian 
investment mentality to 
The fact that own bio fuels cover half of the fuel demand and that energy is a natural 
focus of cost savings are reflected in the technology path as modernisation of energy 
infrastructure. The reported lack of funding, and also the uncertainties and additional 
expenditures reported in the transition category, would fit the lack of modernisation after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union. If the drivers exist in reality, the lack of modernisation 
would suggest that they are much weaker than the barriers. 
Summary 
Chemical pulp is the main product of Plant 5. The waste liquor of the pulping process 
provides the main fuel for the plant. Most of the pulp and paper production facilities date 
back to the 1960s and 1970s. Significant modernisation activities were carried out during 
Soviet times and these activities show a clear strategic pattern. However, hardly any 
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modernisation has taken place in the 1990s and 2000s and no decommissioning wave 
typical to Russian plants happened in the early 1990s. I have confidence in the data sets 
the plant provided. Inefficiency of energy use peaked in the mid 1990s and remains 
below the 1990 level in the 2000s. The technology path cannot explain this improvement. 
but the reduction of production volume does explain the inefficiency peak in the mid 
1990s. Equally, drivers and barriers are recognised. They may have a link to the 
modernisation pace shown in the technology path if drivers are weaker than barriers. 
8.3.2 Plant 6 
Plant 6 was established in 1940 and is currently mainly owned by a foreign company. 
The plant experienced difficulties in the mid 1990s, when it was on the verge of 
bankruptcy. The plant has made a profit during the last couple of years, as shown in 
Table 8.9. The main source of funding is its own profit. However, World Bank loans for 
specific projects and short-term loans from Russian banks have also been acquired as 
well as some loans from foreign banks for specific modernisation projects. 
Table 8.9 Net profit of Plant 6, US$ in 
2002 2003 2004 
Net profit 11,287 19,427 16,389 
Source: www. skrin. ru 
Plant 6 produces 770,000 tonnes of pulp from wood raw material, 250,000 tonnes of 
kraffliner, 130,000 tonnes of fluting, and 80,000 tonnes of various types of paper per 
year. The paper is further converted to school notebooks, copy paper and labels. kraftliner 
to cardboard boxes, and part of the pulp is sold as market pulp. The level of export is 
some 35%. 
The plant's own electricity production covers all its needs, and the plant purchases coal 
and heavy fuel oil, which define the price of electricity. The fuel balance is dominated by 
these two fossil fuels, even though their share decreased by some 10% at the cost of bio 
fuels during the period 1990-2003, due to the plant's policy to switch to bio fuels. Plant 6 
supplies the local community with heat and sells some electricity to the grid. 
Table 8.10 Techimology path of Plaint 6 
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[Equipm-ent- 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990S 2000s 
Sulphite Com 1962- Decom. 1997 
pulp plant 1966 
Retrofit 1984-- Sulphate 2x Kamyr 
pulp plant com. 1968- 
L2 1972 
ECF pulp Retrofit: digester Sulphate Kamyreom. -1-technology 
pulp plant 1975-1977 bleaching 2000, 
3 causticising 
introduced in 2003 
1999 
Pulp 
drying 
machine 
"Rauma 
Repola" 
cOM. 1975- 
1977 
Decom. 1997 
Decom- 1980s 
PM 3 Com. 1962- 
1966 
paper 
PM 5 TCom- -1968- Decom. 2000s 
'Yank 1972 
PM 6 Com. 1968- 
'Yank e' 1972 
paper 
cm I Com. 1968- Retrofit: press 
lValmet' 1972 and head box 
kraftliner 2000 
CM 21 Com. 1968- --- - ---- -I- Re-tTof it: pres-s 
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ý zavodn' I fluting I11 1997-1998 
1 ýj 
CHP-1 Com. 3 new Com. of 3 new Com. oflnew C-o-m -of- ]---new---- C- -0 M------O-f-3---n--c--w----j4 
3 boilers boilers boilers boiler ;i boiler, decom. of boiler, decom. of 
com. 1940s, 3 boilers (1940, 1 boiler (1965) 
I com. 1959,1963) 
1959 
CHP-2 2 recovery Lime kiln retroft 
'Tampelia' boilers com. 2003 
1968-1972 
CHP-3 
1 
'Tampellaf, 
2 'Parsons- 
Wittmoor' 
recovery boiler 
, )An, ) 
1960s I 1970s I 1980s 1 1990S 1 2000, s= 
The technology path illustrated in Table 8.10 shows three major modemisation waves. 
First, there was the introduction of sulphate pulp plant 2 and CHP-3 in the late 1970s. 
Second, the old sulphite pulp plant and paper machine I was retired, cardboard machine 2 
was retrofitted and the boilers in CHP- I were replaced in the mid- I 990s. Third, there was 
a major wave of retrofitting existing equipment in the 2000s. The existing pulp 
production equipment dates back to the 1970s, while cardboard and paper production 
inftastructure is slightly older. The energy infrastructure is fairly recent. It is significant 
that no major decommissioning was carried out in the early 1990s. unlike at many other 
plants. Modernisation has probably improved energy efficiency, however, it has not 
caused significant changes in production capacity. The product mix has been wide 
throughout the observation period and, consequently, it is difficult to estimate the 
influence of the modernisation on the product mix. 
Table 8.11 shows that the inefficiency of both heat and electricity conswnption peaked in 
the mid 1990s. Heat intensity remained 18% below the 1990 level in 2003 while 
electricity intensity was 12% higher in 2003 than in 1990. 
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Table 8.11 Energy eMciency indices of Plant 6 
1990 1992 1994 1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Heat 1.70 1.98 2.43 1.6-7 1.58 1.56 1 41 1.39 
Electricity 0.94 1.11 1.24 1.10 1.05 1.08 1.06 1.05 
Source: plant data. 
These developments are illustrated in Figure 8.4 which shows the significant 
improvement of beat efficiency very clearly. 
Figure 8.4 Development of energy efficiency indices of Plant 6 
Plant 6: development of heat and electricity 
efficiency indices 
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Source: Plant data 
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Figure 8.5 Electricity and beat efficiency indices in the context of total pulp production 
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Source: plant data. 
The production volume of pulp remained significantly below the 1990 level in 2003. At 
the same time, efficiency in electricity use worsened while heat efficiency improved. The 
decommissioning of the old pulp plant and the old paper machine I may have improved 
heat efficiency. It is difficult to explain the less-efficient electricity use based on this data. 
However, the introduction of oxygen bleaching and the new presses in the cardboard 
machines may consume more electricity than the replaced techniques. 
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Table 8.12 Drivers and barriers to modernisation investments in Plant 6 
I BARRIERS I F- FACTORS -i F- DRIVERS I 
[-I 
- Funding 
:: 1 
[2- Corporate policy I 
F3--Technology and raw material I 
[4- Energy saving and other policies I 
is no energy-saving There s no energy-s 
, 
isl; o n 
[41e4gýislafion 
F 15 - Enemy price and tariffs 
1 
Because energy resources are 
domestic, it is difficult to 
implement measures to save 
them or increase the price 
Price of fuels (fuel oil and 
coal) support energy saving 
FPPriiice -ofeccoooaaall and beavy fuel 
LOWrive-util-i-sation of-own 
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Energy costs account for a 
large share of the total 
production costs: cut in 
energy consumption 
reduces cost price of 
16 
-Market signals 
Demands of customers 
define modernisakm needs 
17 
- Transition and attitude 
The main barrier category is the lack of funding, while the market and energy costs 
provide the main categories of drivers of modernisation, emphasising productivity and 
increase in the volume of production. Plant 6 seems quite dissatisfied with regional 
policies. The price of fuels drives switching to its own bio fuels and energy saving, partly 
due to the high share of energy costs. These drivers are indeed reflected in the practical 
measures shown in the technology path, which show mainly as improving heat efficiency. 
The policy to switch to the cheaper bio fuel is reflected in the investment decisions as the 
energy production facilities have been prioritised, while the lack of funding may 
correspond to the lack of modernisation of paper production facilities. 
Summary 
Chemical pulp, kraftliner and fluting papers are the main products of Plant 6. The age of 
the pulp production facilities dates to the late 1960s and 1970s, while paper and 
cardboard machines date back to the 1960s. Hardly any modernisation of the pulp and 
paper production facilities took place in Soviet times. Typical mass decommissioning 
was not carried out in the beginning of the 1990s. However. some paper machines have 
since been decommissioned. Some modernisation activities have taken place, especially 
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in pulp, cardboard and energy production facilities. However. most paper machines 
remain unmodernised. I have confidence in the data set provided by the plant, as it is very 
detailed and covers a long period of time. Inefficiency in energy use peaked in the mid 
1990s. Heat efficiency improved during the observation period, while electricity use 
became less efficient. The decomi-nissioning of obsolete paper machines in 1997 and 
2000 could explain the improvement in heat efficiency, and changes in processes could 
have caused electricity efficiency not reaching the pre-transition level. Slightly more 
drivers were mentioned than barriers, and they seem to be reflected in the technology 
path. 
8.3.3 Plant 7 
Plant 7 was established in 1961. Ownership is 26% by a Russian corporation, 25% by a 
Russian bank, and the rest by Russian companies and individuals, possibly the workers. 
The main products include market sulphite viscose pulp, bleached sulphate pulp, sack 
paper, wrapping paper, kraftliner and paper bags. Wood is used as the raw material for 
pulp. Production capacity is some 330,000 tonnes of market pulp, 250,000 tonnes of 
paper, and 290,000 tonnes of cardboard. The export share is some 80-90%. 
Table 8.13 Net profit of Plant 7, US$ in 
2002 2003 2004 
Net profit 15,663 8,109 31,503 
Source: www. skrin. ru 
The main source of funding is its own profit, as well as loans from local and international 
banks. The corporate owning the majority of Plant 7 has been subject to a takeover 
attempt, and corporate conflict which followed the attempt during recent years. 
The plant produces electricity and supplies some to the grid. The fuel balance of Plant 7 
consists of gas, coal, black liquor and wood waste. The share of purchased energy costs 
per product is as follows: viscose pulp 9%, kraftliner 12%, fluting 17% and hardwood 
bleached kraft pulp 19%. 
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Table 8.14 Technology path of Plant 7 
Equipment 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990S 2000s 
Sulphite Com. 1961 Retrofit: new 
pulp plant 14 digesters recovery 
'KMW'and boiler, 
'Uralhimmasb' screening 
Semi- Com. 1965 
chemical 2x 'Pandija' 
pulp plant 
sulphate Com. 196ý Uom. IxIx Karnyr 
nuliD Want 2x Kz Kmyr 1974 
1 
rebuilt 1986 
co Retrofit: Retrofit: winder 2004 PM1 I 
pella' 
1964 --T]982 
'T-am sack 
PM2 Com. 1964 -- FRetrofit: - new Retrofit: winder, 
'Tampella' sackpaper I screening regulation/optimisation 
IQQR 2000 
PM5 
'Artema' 
PM6 
'Artema' 
Com. 1972 Retrofit: 
Retrofit 1979 regulation/optimisation 
printing system 
paper 
CM3 Com- 1965 Retrofit: screening 
Iý 
2003 'KNIW' 
CM4 Com. 1965 Retrofit: Retrofit: new winder 
1995 
f 
Pulp drying Com. 1962 
machine I 
'Artema' 
Pulp drying 
machine 3 
Com. 1974 
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'Rauma 
Repola'.. 
_ 
CHP-1 Mostly com. Some boilers 
12 x boiler 1960s com. 1970s, 
7x turbine Ix turbine 
com. 1975 
CHP-2 Com. 1960s Retrofit: 
4x steam recovery 
boiler boilers 1993- 
2x 1995 
recovery 
boiler 
'Tampella' 
3x turbine 
CHP-3 
3x 
recovery 
boiler 
'Tampella' 
1x turbine 
2x recovery Ix recovery Recovery Recovery boilers 
boiler, Ix boiler com- boilers retrofit and increase of 
turbine com. 1988 Retrofit capacity 2002-2005 
1974-1975 1993-1995 
1960s I 1970s 1 1980S 1 1990S 1 2000s I 
Most of the technology at Plant 7 is the original from the 1960s when the plant was 
established. Sulphite pulp technology, which has been mostly decommissioned in 
Europe, is still in use and Plant 7 is under pressure to close it down due to the 
enviromnental impact. The local government has given permission to continue using this 
technology against the environmental regulations for now as closing it down would have 
a social impact. ne sulphate pulp production line was developed during the Soviet years 
and some new paper machines were introduced in the 1970s. Not much retrofitting was 
carried out before the 1990s. However, the equipment was fairly new and therefore less 
in need of updating. In the 1990s and 2000s, paper and cardboard machines have been 
retrofitted. However, the corporate war has held back large investments as the owners 
have spent most profit made for a legal battle, and as they remain uncertain of their 
ability to enforce their property rights they are reluctant to Invest into the plant instead of 
small maintenance investments. The only major change in the product mix and increase 
in capacity was the introduction of printing paper in the 1970s. As no major 
237 
modernisation has been carried out, the infrastructure is probably in need of some 
investment in order to maintain its level of energy efficiency. 
Plant 7 did not provide production and energy consumption data and, consequently. no 
calculations could be conducted. 
Table 8.15 Drivers and barriers identified by Plant 7 
[-BARRIERS I F- FACTORS I F- DRIVERSI 
[-l-- Funding 
ailability of capital: ver 
e financing available in 
2- Corporate policy 
At the beginning of Shareholder value Energy c1liciency is part of 
perestroika, profit was investment decision- 
mostly divided between making as a cost reduction 
owners rather than invested point: energy experts are 
involved 
Need to plan strategy for Corporate needs tojudge which 
the mill to direct site is the best to invest in 
investment 
3- Technology and raw material 
The mill is complex which Fibre supply security: state Need to maintain old 
makes it more difficult to allocates, long-term stability equipment 
Lp. lan modernisation equimd for investments 
Existing machines m 
soon be too small calibre if 
customers are going to 
upgrade theirs 
prjýd, every 
polluting pulping 
p4 ss 
Ix 
Lprrocesss needs to be closed 
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Stability of production 
-Process 
is important 
r-T-Energy saving and other policies 
I 
of state support for 
-- no help building 
roads, railway lines 
Environmental issues 
drive investments. 
Impossible to comply with 
Russian, envirOnmental 
regulations, need to 
neeotiate deadline with 
[ 
-5 - 
Energy price and tariff policy 
16 
-Market signals 
I 
[ Macroeconomic conditions Market consists of a small number Quality of product 
n Ru__:! iLa_- L-ýýf 13ýers 
tuoss 
Domestic market remains 
small 
Russian domestic market is 
growing fast 
L-Wighrisks 
L Increasing production 
cnavlacý-- 
Demand for the existing 
in the market 
F7 
- Transition and attitude 
I 
Corporate war: delays Willingness to invest More expertise developing 
-1 
in Russia investments as unclear 
whether ownership rights 
will be violated 
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Window of stability is very 
short in Russia due to 
political and economic 
reasons: short-term 
planning - where will the 
Notraditiontomrodemisein [ iý ___ 
14e 
Zoviet 
Union 
The main category of barriers is the transition-related barriers, while ftmding and market 
barriers are also important. The main single barrier to modernisation has been the 
corporate conflict, which made it irrelevant to invest larger sums of money in the plant 
for years in case it had been taken over by the intruder. Without this barrier more 
modernisation may have been carried out. Indeed, the lack of enforced property rights 
and the short window of political and economic stability are emphasised as barriers. The 
main drivers are related to the market, but also to environmental issues, which reflects the 
need to close the obsolete pulp production process Plant 7 continues to operate. The 
organisational structure of this plant is closest to a conventional corporate of all the 
Russian plants observed. Own electricity generation, availability of waste liquors and the 
relatively small share of energy of the total production costs (in Russian terrns) may draw 
attention away from energy saving. However, a further switch to its own bio fuels is 
recognised as a driver. Market-related drivers seem to have relevance to real action as 
modernisation of facilities is ongoing. However, the interviewee confirtned that the 
corporate conflict has delayed many planned larger investments. 
Summary 
Plant 7 uses two types of technologies to produce chemical pulp, one of which is 
obsolete. The main products are market pulp and various types of paper, including sack 
paper and kraftliner, and paper bags as a further conversion of the paper produced. Pulp 
production facilities provide waste liquor to be used as a fuel. The production facilities 
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mostly date back to the 1960s and 1970s. Some modernisation was canied out in the 
1980s although the main modernisation wave started in the 1990s and continued in the 
2000s. The corporate war has delayed planned modernisation investments. Drivers and 
barriers are equally divided and are reflected in the investment decisions shown in the 
technology path. The most emphasised barrier is the corporate war blocking investments. 
8.4 Comparison of case studies 
8.4.1 General trends 
A common feature among the plants that provided data was the collapse in production 
and peak in energy intensity in the mid 1990s. The production volume has started to pick 
up, although it still remains mostly below the 1990 level. Electricity use is becoming 
slightly less efficient while heat efficiency is improving compared with 1990. 
A corporate-ownership structure is emerging in Archangelsk region. Plant 7 operates 
completely within a corporate organisational structure, while Plant 6 also has some 
features of an emerging structure. Plant 5 remains under insider control. The ownership 
arrangements may also be reflected in investment practices, as Plants 6 and 7 have 
modernised their equipment while Plant 5 has done very little since the Soviet 
modernisations in the 1980s. 
8.4.2 Regional level data 
Table 8.16 outlines the development of the energy efficiency of the regional pulp and 
paper sector. Heat efficiency improved more, by 20%, during the observation period than 
electricity efficiency which improved by 12%. Figure 8.6 illustrates these dynamics. 
Table 8.16 Regional energy efficiency indices of Archangelsk 
1990 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 
Electricity N/A 1.72 1.94 1.96 1.54 1.70 1.63 1.51 
Heat 2.08 2.18 2.34 2.35 1.91 1.91 1.81 1.67 
Source: Archangelsk obikomstat. 
241 
Figure 8.6 Regional energy efficiency indices of Archangelsk 
Development of average energy efficiency 
indices of Archangelsk pulp and paper sector 
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Source: Archangelsk oblkomstat dataset. 
Figure 8.7 illustrates the changes in electricity and heat efficiencies in the context of the 
total pulp production of the region. The volume of production recovered to almost exactly 
the same level by 2003 as it was in 1991. The fact that the same amount of pulp was 
produced by using less energy per tonne provides evidence that some energy efficiency 
improvements must have taken place. Had the efficiency of energy use remained the 
same during the inefficiency peak (mostly caused by running the facilities at low 
capacity, which is less efficient than full capacity use), it would have returned to the 1991 
level together with the production volume increase. 
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Figure 8.7 Average energy efficiency indices of pulp and paper production in the context of 
total pulp production 
Archangelsk: average energy efficiency 
indices vs. total production of pulp 
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Source: Archangelsk oblkornstat dataset. 
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Figure 8.8 Average energy efficiency indices of pulp and paper production in the context of 
total paper production 
Archangelsk: average energy efficincy 
indices vs. total paper production 
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Source: Archangelsk oblkornstat. 
Figure 8.8 illustrates the development of energy efficiency in the context of the total 
paper production, which still remains slightly below the 1991 level, and shows the same 
trends as Figure 8.7. 
8.4.3 Drivers and barriers 
Plants 
All Archangelsk plants recognise the lack of funding or the high cost of capital as a 
barrier to modernisation. Two of the three plants recognise the importance of corporate 
strategy as a guideline for investments, but only one of the plants refers to a financial 
system based on corporate ownership and competition between units. Consequently, it 
seems as if the corporate organisational structure was in the process of taking over the 
Archangelsk pulp and paper sector. All plants have an established role for energy experts 
in investment-related decision-making, which drives investments that improve efficiency 
m energy use. 
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The views on regional energy-saving legislation and policies vary. One of the plants 
regarded energy-saving policies, and especially energy audits. useful, while another plant 
claimed there is no such energy-saving legislation. This illustrates how little impact the 
legislation must have had on the sector. One plant emphasised the importance of 
negotiation with regional-level authorities when planning how to fulfil specific 
environmental requirements. This may be an example of the negotiable character of 
Russian law (see for instance Schaffer, 1998, and Gaidar. 1999, p. 8), as it may 
demonstrate how rule of law and equality before the law have not been completely 
implemented. It is usually the case that environmental standards in legislation are 
enforced not legislated. 
Two of the three plants agreed that environmental regulations may spin off some 
additional investments in energy saving as well, while the third plant regarded this money 
as lost from the energy-saving perspective and, therefore, environmental fees as a barrier 
to modernisation investments. The lack of Russian governmental support for building 
forest roads was recognised by two of the plants and seen as a failure of the government 
to support the forestry industry in Russia. 
Technology and raw-material -related drivers and barriers show no clear trends among 
plants. Issues such as availability of local wood waste and raw wood material were 
mentioned as well as the desire to increase electricity production capacity. Stability of the 
production process and the size of current obsolete paper machines, which may soon 
prove to be too small for customer needs, are also mentioned as drivers to modemise. 
All plants agreed that the price of fuels currently supports energy saving. The trend is to 
switch to cheaper fuels, which in practice is often their own bio waste. Two of the plants 
also highlighted the fact that energy is the obvious expenditure to save as its share of the 
total production costs is high. A further interesting point made by one of the plants was 
how politically difficult it is for the authorities to increase the price of energy or 
implement energy-saving measures as the energy resources are domestic. However, 
plants in Archangelsk are instead focusing on making the most of their fuel options as 
hard budget constraints make purchased fuels less economically attractive. Only one 
plant reported non-payment problems, which is a positive trend. 
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Most plants reported various identical market-related drivers, namely competitiveness, 
increase in production volume and reductions in cost price. Two of the plants also 
mentioned the general economic performance of the country as a factor. If compared to 
the technology paths, two of the plants have invested according to the market drivers 
reported, while in one case these drivers, even though reported, seem to be weaker than 
the barriers and little investment has been made so far. 
Most transition and attitude-related issues fall into the category of barriers. One common 
feature of two of the plants is the uncertainty whether the property rights of their owners 
can be enforced, which delays or stops plants from investing. One of the plants 
experienced a takeover attempt due to unclear property rights. According to the plant, this 
stalled most modernisation activities for several years. Another issue recognised by two 
of the companies was the necessity to keep the regional government satisfied - if the 
government expects companies to make financial contributions towards local needs it is 
best to fulfil these expectations to avoid conflicts. Also Ahrend and Tompson (2005a, 
pp. 53-54) report difficulties caused by similar inconsistency in the interpretation and 
administration of regulations. Issues such as inertia in investment-related decision- 
making were also mentioned, as well as the Russian attitude to keep operating an old 
plant as long as possible instead of replacing the equipment. This is because it is 
considered more sensible to keep an obsolete plant going rather than close it as the 
equipment is worth very little. 
Regional administration and experts 
The group of Archangelsk regional administration officials and experts interviewed 
consisted of representatives of the following organisations: the Department of Economic 
Development, the Department of Heat and Energy, the Department of Forestry Industry, 
Investment company Archangelsk, Archangelsk State Technical University, Centre for 
Environmental Investments and Archangelsk Centre for Energy Efficiency. 
In general, drivers of modernisation investments dominate the barriers in the minds of 
regional administration and experts. Three of five interviewees argued that there are no 
real barriers to modernisation investment. The main barriers reported are important 
though, especially the high interest rates and the fact that loans are only given for a short 
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period of time and the conditions make it difficult to use these loans in investments as 
payback begins immediately. 
The strongest argument on energy prices is that they are high enough to stimulate energy 
saving. And it is true, as also highlighted by the expert interviewees, that switching from 
purchased fossil fuels to local bio fuels is ongoing due to the high price of purchased 
ftiels. However, the earlier quotations (see section 8.2.3 in this chapter) illustrate the 
dualistic approach to this issue, i. e., that energy is often regarded as expensive even 
though this spurs no action in practice. Indeed, even though the energy price is also 
regarded as one of the main drivers of modernisation investments, and some argued that 
it is high enough to stimulate energy saving, other interviewees were more reserved. One 
interviewee argued that as the energy price is the only real reason to save energy, it 
cannot be anything but the main driver, even though it is not such a strong driver at the 
moment. The high share of energy costs when compared to the total production costs was 
also recognised as a driver. 
Support from the regional administration for investment is highlighted in Table 8.17, 
probably at least partly because many of the interviewees are administration 
representatives. In particular, support for interest rates of credits, guarantees for loans and 
guidance with business plans were mentioned. In general, regional policies - except the 
energy-saving policy which was regarded as declarational - are regarded as drivers. Not 
many market-related drivers and barriers were identified by the administration and 
energy experts. 
Emerging corporate policy structures are shown in administration's references to the 
requirements of corporate management to provide a plan of modemisation. Also the 
openness of the economy and government support to economic structures such as 
legislation were mentioned as drivers. Some of such regional administration's activities 
aim at reducing the prevailing uncertainty which is widely regarded as a barrier to 
investments. 
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Table 8.17 Drivers and barriers identified by Archangelsk administration and experts 
I BARRIERS I F- FACTORS I F- DRIVERS I 
II 
-Funding 
WIgb interest rates of loans 
Conditions of loans available 
are not suitable for 
investment and loans are 
short term 
Administration support for 
interest rates of credits 
Administration provides 
guarantees to loans 
F-2- Corporate policy 
Lack of project M anagement needs to understand Every plant needs to draft a M 
[: 
at reducing energy expenses is modernisation programme implementation discipline 
one way to improve profitability for Board of Directors 
[3- Technology and raw material I 
Cooperation with foreign raw material supply 
technology provi er. s 
[4- Energy saving and other policies 
Clear gmidelines on 
econom ie ael iv ity 
[5- Energy price and tariffs 
Energy price is high 
enough to stimulate some 
energy-saving projects 
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Switeh to local wood waste 
fiam fossd fuels 
Energy, costs are one of the 
few available costs possible 
to cut 
16 
-Market signals 
Due to the northern conditions, I Openness of economy 
basic costs are high and only high- 
quality products can be profitable 
Comparison ofplants and regional administration and experts 
The views of the representatives of the plants and those of the regional administration and 
experts on the drivers of and barriers to modemisation investments in pulp and paper 
industry mostly do not contradict each other. The representatives of plants discussed a 
much wider range of issues than the representatives of regional administration and 
experts. 
Administration and experts provide support for the plants' views on the difficulties with 
loans by reporting that most loans available are not investment loans, i. e.. the repayment 
has to begin immediately, which does not allow the investment to start providing the 
expected benefits to cover the cost of the loan. 
Plant representatives mentioned many more economic drivers than did the representatives 
of administration and experts. The plants also criticised the regional administration for 
demanding funding for social projects and failing to build forest roads while the support 
for investment emphasised by the administration representatives was mostly unnoticed by 
the plants. The energy price divided views amongst the representatives of administration 
and experts while the plants regarded the current energy price as a driver of 
modernisation investments. 
249 
8.5 Summary 
Research objectives of this chapter are: 
13. Provide background of Archangelsk, including developments in the economy, 
energy sector and energy policies relevant to the topic. 
14. Report the outcomes of interviews in plant-level case studies, including a 
description of the plant's products, facilities and ownership, technology path, 
development of energy efficiency based on energy efficiency indices (where data 
is available) and drivers of and barriers to modernisation. 
15. Surnmarise for each plant whether modernisation has been carried out, whether 
this is reflected in the energy efficiency trends (where data is available) and 
conclude whether the drivers of and barriers to modernisation were consistent 
,, Aith the technology path. 
16. Investigate the development of energy efficiency in the pulp and paper seetor at 
regional level, based on energy effieieney indiees drawn from regional statisties. 
17. Triangulate the drivers of and barriers to modernisation reported by the plants 
with the drivers and barriers reported by the regional administration and experts. 
Archangelsk economy and energy demand are dominated by the forestry sector. Three 
case plants - all the plants in the region - were covered. The production of the plants had 
collapsed by the mid 1990s, and they had experienced an inefficiency peak in the mid- 
1990s. Energy efficiency had improved somewhat during the observation period in the 
1990s and 2000s, while heat consumption efficiency had improved more than that of 
electricity. Only one plant has carried out significant modernisation. All plants recognise 
the lack of financial resources as a barrier to modemisation. Also the arbitrary practices 
of the regional government constitute a barrier as well as the uncertainty of property 
rights which has led to takeover attempts. Corporate organisational structure has started 
to penetrate Archangelsk region that drives modernisation as well as market signals. 
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9. Results of interviews: Finland 
9.1 Background 
Finland is located in Northern Europe and has borders "Arith Sweden, Norway and the 
Russian Federation. The capital is Helsinki. Finland is mostly covered by forests and 
lakes and has several major rivers. The Gulf Stream adds to the temperature. which 
would otherwise be lower. The population of Finland was some 5.2 million in 2004 
(Statistics Finland: Vqest6). 
Finland is a parliamentary democracy and a member of the European Union. The country 
consists of six provinces, which are further divided into 432 towns and cities 
(www. kunnat. net). Finland has one of the highest tax-to-GDP ratios in the EU (European 
Commission, DG Taxation and Customs Unit, 2005, p. 6). Finnish local authorities er1joy 
a strong, self-governing status. Local authorities have the right to levy taxes and they also 
receive transfers from central government (www. local fin] and. fi). Most energy-saving 
policies are implemented at state level. 
9.1.1 Economy 
The Finnish economy was characterised by negative growth in the early 1990s as a result 
of the "crazy years" of 1987-1989. During most of the first half of the 1990s, Finland 
was in the deepest depression in its history, and the cost of this was some 13% decline in 
GDP. The banking crisis wiped out a large share of the banking sector and moved non- 
performing loans to a junk-loan institution. The cost of bank support was 10% of GDP 
and 21% of all companies failed. This economic depression was caused by the 
combination of a failed financial liberalisation of the economy and the collapse of trade 
with the Soviet Union, which declined from 13% of total export earnings in 1990 to 5% 
in 1991. Finland joined the EU in 1995 and has experienced steady growth ever since 
(see for instance OECD, 1995, p. 7; Ahtiala, 2005, p. 1-3. ) 
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Table 9.1 Annual change of the volume of GDP of Finland 
I1 1990 1 1993 1 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
1 %1 oI13.8 3.9 6.3 5.0 3.4 5.1 1.2 2.2 2.4 
Source: Adato Energia Oy, 2003, p. 11. 
The Finnisb economy is based on a diverse selection of industrial sectors, the most 
important of which include the electronics, forestry and machinery industries as shown in 
Figure 9.1. Chemical wood processing accounts for some 70% of the value of the Finnish 
forestry industry's output (Finnisb Forest Industries Federation, 2006a, p. 20). 
Figure 9.1 Main sectors of industry in 2004 
Main industrial sectors of Finland 2004 
wood and wood 
electrical and other food products 
optical 47 '1ý 4% pulp, paper, 
equipment paper products 
24% 12% 
---- -------- 
gold hitshing and printing 
engineerin(ý 6% 
15% metallurgy and 
ical 
13% 
metal products 
15% 
Source: StatistIcs Finland: Teollisuus. 
The industry share of GDP was 25.2% (together with construction, 30.5%) in 2004, while 
industry consumes 50% of the country's energy needs. The volume of industrial 
production in 2004 was 56.4% higher than in 1995 (Statistics Finland: Teollisuus). Table 
9.2 shows how growth was fastest towards the end of the 1990s and declined to be more 
modest in the 2000s. The table also shows that production of the pulp and paper industry 
has its own dynamics, which do not closely follow the development of the general 
industrial production. 
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Table 9.2 Industrial production, % of previous year 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
All industry 103.3 108.4 109.1 105.8 111.8 100.1 102.1 101.3 104.7* 
Pulp and paper 97.0 114.5 104.1 103.6 105.0 94.2 104.1 102.8 106.0* 
*advance information 
Source: Statistics Finland: Teollisuus. 
The main export products of Finland include electronics, pulp, paper, wood products, 
machinery, equipment, vehicles and metal products. Finland has had a surplus of trade 
balance for the last decade and exports remained 20% higher than imports in 2004 
(Statistics Finland: Kauppa). 
9.1.2 Energy sector 
Energy Balance and Demand 
More than half of Finland's Total Primary Energy Supply is covered by fossil fuels. 
namely 25% oil, 15% coal and I I% gas, with 21 % of the supply being biomass and 16% 
nuclear. Domestic biomass and peat resources are significant. Gas is supplied by a 
pipeline from Russia. 
The total electricity consumption of Finland was some 85.2 TWh in 2003. Nuclear power 
covered about a quarter of this and fossil fuels, including domestic peat, some 38% 
combined. Renewable energy resources are significant, accounting for almost 30% of the 
electricity supply, namely hydropower 17% and bio fuels 12%. Electricity generated 
from bio fuels mostly comes from the pulp and paper industry using waste liquors in 
CHP processes. However, domestic electricity generation cannot cover the country's 
needs and some electricity, 14.3 % in 2002 (down to 5.8% in 2003), is imported, some 
95% of this from Russia (Finnish Energy Industries website). 
Finland is one of the leading countries for CHP production: 34% of electricity and some 
76% of district heating is generated by CHP (Finnish Energy Industries website). 
253 
Table 9.3 DeveloDment of electricitv demand comnared to economic nerformnnri- 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Electricity consumption, 
TWh 70.0 73.6 76.6 77.8 79.2 81.2 83.5 85.2 87.0 
Electricity consumption 
% f i N/A 105.1 104.1 101.6 101.8 102.5 102.8 102.0 102.1 o prev ous year 
Economic growth, % of 3.9 6.3 5 3.4 5.1 1.2 2. - 2.4 N/A previous year I I Industrial production % 
f revious ear 
97.0 114.5 104.1 103.6 105.0 94.2 104.1 102.8 106.0 o p y 
:!, ource: r innisn rnergy inausmes weosite, --tjectricity net production, imports and exports 
(GWh) in Finland"; Statistics Finland: Teollisuus; Adato Energia Oy, 2003, p. 11. 
Table 9.3 summarises the development of electricity consumption and compares it to the 
developments of the economy and industrial production. Electricity consumption has 
gown steadily every year and does not seem to react to GDP growth trends or industrial 
production trends. 
Energy security 
The domestic energy resources of Finland are limited to hydropower, peat. biomass and 
small-scale renewable energy. All fossil fuels have to be imported which. makes energy- 
supply security one of the key areas of the Finnish energy policy (Government of Finland 
2005, p. 14). Both gas and most of the external electricity supply is imported from 
Russia. This source has been quite reliable, and gas is backed up with on-site oil products 
and a propane-air mixing station (IEA, 2004, p. 21). However, at the time of writing 
Russia cut its electricity exports to Finland by 30% at short notice due to its own 
electricity shortage caused by cold weather (STT, 19 January 2006). In addition to the 
imports from Russia, Finland also imports some electricity from the Nordic Power 
Exchange, Nordpool. 
As a response to this energy dependence, Finland has two nuclear power plants with two 
units each. The units were built in the late 1970s and, even though their licences run only 
until 2007 and 2018, their estimated lifetimes extend beyond these limits. The Finnish 
government decided in favour of permitting the construction of a fifth nuclear power unit 
in 2002 (lEA, 2004, pp. 95-98). 
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9.2 Energy efficiency policies and measures 
9.2.1 Policy instruments and their implementation 
The main actors for Finnish energy policy include the Ministry of Trade and Industry, 
which has an overall coordination and planning role. The Energy Market Authority is the 
Finnish energy regulator, which promotes competition in the electricity and gas markets. 
Motiva Oy is a partly state-owned company whose basic task is to implement 
government policies on energy conservation and promotion of renewable energy (IEA, 
2004, pp. 18-19). 
Finland's energy policy focuses on energy security, economic development and 
environmental sustainability. The main objectives of the energy policy are: 
9 Reduction of greenhouse gas emissions; 
Free energy markets; 
Energy efficiency and conservation; 
Promoting bio energy and other indigenous energy sources; 
Maintaining high technological standards in the energy sector; 
Diversification of energy supply; and 
Energy security (IEA, 2004, pp. 17-18). 
The promotion of energy efficiency has been an important part of Finnish energy policy 
for a long time and the level of energy efficiency can be considered high (Kostama, 1997, 
p. 1; IEA, 2004, pp. 39-42). There is no energy-efficiency law, but an Act on Energy 
Efficiency of Appliances came into force in 1997. In addition, a series of energy- 
efficiency programmes have been drafted. The first dates back to 1992, the second to 
1995, and the third energy-efficiency programme was drafted as part of the National 
Climate Strategy in 2000 and updated in 2002 (KTM, 2003). The programmes have set 
targets for energy saving - the current target, set in 2000, is to reduce total energy 
consumption by 4-5% by 2010 (PEEREA, 200 1, p. 14). The general target adopted for 
energy consumption in 1997 is to stop the growth of total energy consumption within 10- 
15 years, i. e., around 2015. The current target is to reduce the energy consumption of 
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energy using equipment by 5-10% by 2010 in the industry, service and household sectors 
(KTM, 2003, pp. 25-26). 
The Finnish energy-saving policy is based on the voluntary agreements scheme, which 
originally targeted the energy use of industry but the transport. construction and 
residential sectors were added later (Motiva leaflet). The agreements include monitoring 
energy efficiency, implementing energy audits and the introduction of new technologies. 
(Motiva leaflet; Hietanierni and Ahtila, 2004, p. 2). A company joining the scheme is 
committed to appointing a person in charge of energy conservation, drafting a 
conservation plan, taking measures according to the plan and reporting back to the 
authorities annually. The voluntary agreements cover 85% of industrial energy 
consumption (Motiva leaflet). The scheme of voluntary agreements was established in 
1997 and the contracts were extended in 2005 by two years. A further developed 
voluntary agreement scheme is under preparation and planned to begin in 2008. The 
achieved energy saving is some 6.1 TWh per year, including both electricity and heat 
(Motiva 2006). According to an independent review, as a rule joining organisations 
perceive the voluntary agreements as binding and the scheme has worked well to achieve 
its goals (KTM, 2005, p. 5). 
Government grants are closely linked to the voluntary agreements scheme and mostly 
used to implement the improvements suggested by energy audits. This energy aid 
(625/2002) is allocated based on national energy-policy programmes, namely the 
National Climate Strategy, Action Plan for Renewable Energy Sources, Energy 
Conservation Programme, and for promoting new technology. In 2003, E31.2 billion was 
earmarked for energy aid (KTM website). The share of energy aid of the total cost of 
subsidised energy-saving projects is a maximum 30-40%. Industry has widely used these 
grants to implement energy-saving measures recommended by energy audits, but also 
own funding resources have been allocated (KTM, 2005, p. 4). In addition, the 
government subsidises some 40-50% of the energy audits under the voluntary 
agreements (IEA, 2004, p. 45). 
The Building Code is constantly under revision and the latest energy-related revision was 
made in 2003 (IEA, 2004, p. 48). Energy labelling and energy -efficiency standards for 
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domestic appliances have been adopted from EU legislation. These tools include 
information campaigns (PEEREA, 200 1, p. 16). 
The public sector, including local authorities, has to include energy -efficiency 
considerations in all decisions and programmes of significance and the Ministry of Trade 
and Industry has provided general recommendations on the selection process (KTM, 
2000). 
Motiva Oy established a Finnish ESCO concept and planned model documentation to 
promote these private-sector activities. Projects have been implemented by various 
ESCOs, mostly in the industrial and municipal sectors (Motiva website). 
There is an ongoing assessment of the success of energy-efficiency policies led by the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry (PEEREA, 2001, p. 18). The assessment process aims at 
objective results and, as mentioned above, outside consultants have been used for this 
(see for instance KTM, 2005). 
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Table 9.4 Enerav-savine volicies and measures 
Tool Status of implementation Target group Effectiveness 
Energy efficiency Updates made, outlined All sectors Energy- 
programmes in policies and measures efficiency 
1992,1995 and implemented and outcomes policies and 
2000 assessed measures in 
progress. and 
real energy 
savings achieved 
Voluntary Includes audits, reporting, Industry /municipal 85% of industrial 
agreements appointing responsible sector/transport energy use 
person, target setting. covered. 6.1 
Implemented since 1997, TWh annual 
agreements renewed in 2006 savings 
Grants for energy Since 1992, revised in 1997 Industry/public sector Ongoing 
saving 
studies/audits 
Grants for pilot RandD funding started in the Industry/residential/ Ongoing 
demonstration 1970s, since 1992 for industrial 
investments and residential sector 
energy-saving 
investments 
Building Codes: Revised in 1985 and again Residential Ongoing 
mandatory in 2003 to reduce energy 
standards consumption by 30% 
Mandatory labelling Since 1995 Residential Ongoing 
Mandatory energy- Since 1998, EU standards Residential Ongoing 
efficiency standards 
Recommendations Rule to include energy Public sector Ongoing 
on energy efficiency in public- 
efficiency in public spending criteria. General 
spending guidelines established in 
2000. 
ESCOs Motiva developed Finnish Industry/public sector Projects 
ESCO concept and related implemented 
documents since 1998 based on private- 
sector contracts 
Information/ Motiva Oy, and ESCO All sectors Ongoing 
awareness established by the Finnish 
government, established in 
1993 
Energy-saving Introduced in education Transport Ongoing 
drivers' skill given for driving licence 
ýýource: paruy oaseu on rr-r-A-r-A (/-UU 1, pp. ] 9-23). 
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9.2.2 Energy price policies 
Energy production, generation, transmission and use are subject to light regulation in 
Finland, while energy prices are in general market-based (lEA, 2004. pp. 18-19). The 
electricity price consists of the market price of electricity, a transfer fee. and taxes. 
namely surtax, security of supply fee, and value added tax (22%) 
(Energiainarkkinavirasto website). The shares of these costs have been estimated to break 
down as follows: market price of electricity accounts for some 40%, the transfer fee 35% 
and taxes 25% (Lappeenranta Technical University website). 
C02 taxation is relevant to energy saving as it increases the price of fossil fuels. Finland 
was the first country to introduce a C02 tax in 1990 and has adjusted the tax several times 
since (IEA, 1999, p. 40). At the time of writing, C02 tax appears in the form of a surtax 
collected on fossil fuels and electricity. Since 2003, the surtax has been IF] 8.05 per tonne 
Of C02 (with some exceptions). Fuel for electricity generation is tax-free, and the tax is 
collected at the consumption stage (IEA, 2004, pp. 22-23 1, 
KTM website). 
Table 9.5 List prices of electricity in Finland, eurocents/kWh 
1991 1992 1993 IM 1995 19% 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Household 6.8 7.1 7.7 7.8 7.9 8.5 8.6 8.8 8.6 8.4 8.5 8.9 9.7 10.0 9.7 
Industry 5.0 5.0 5.4 5.3 5.3 5.6 5.7 5.6 5.3 5.1 5.2 5.5 6.8 7.1 7.0 
Including taxes and transmission fees. Example days per year. Individual prices may vary due to 
competition between companies and industry's ownership shares in electricity producers 
Source: Energiateollisuus ry website. 
The rising trend in electricity prices towards the end of the observation period is shown in 
Table 9.5, as well as the differences of household and industrial electricity prices. 
9.2.3 Investment policies 
The government of Finland, with the Ministry of Trade and Industry as the responsible 
actor, provides financial aid to small and medium-sized businesses in order to promote 
long-term competitiveness and the operational environment. Local offices manage the 
distribution of this form of financing. The investment company of the Finnish 
government, Finvera, grants loans and guarantees. Finnish Industry Investment Ltd, 
operated by the Ministry of Trade and Industry, provides growth companies with equity 
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financing, corporate arrangements and major technology prqjects. In addition, the EU 
provides funding for diversifying the business structure and improving employment. 
(KTM website). The above-mentioned grants for energy-saving projects, renewable 
energy etc. by the Finnish government are also relevant to this category. 
9.3 Case studies: Finland 
9.3.1 Plant 8 
Pulp production at Plant 8 was established in 1919. The plant was owned by the Finnish 
government and was later merged with another corporation that is co-owned by a further 
three Finnish corporations. 
Plant 8 produces some 560,000 tonnes of bleached sulphate pulp from wood. However, 
the product mix has changed recently as cardboard production at Plant 8 was sold in 
2002. Only slightly less than half of the production is exported as the cardboard plant 
next to Plant 8 (even though it is now owned by another company) buys the majority of 
the production. Profit is the main source of funding for the corporation. 
Plant 8 is self-sufficient in both beat and electricity production and sells both heat and 
electricity as side products . 
29 Black liquor is the main fuel, covering 80% of demand, and 
own waste bark accounts for 15%. Only 5% of fuels - peat and heavy fuel oil - are 
purchased. 
29 However, the local municipality, which buys some of the excess heat, is planning to build its own heat facility, which would reduce demand. 
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Table 9.6 Technology path of Plant 8 
I Equipment I 1960s I 1970s I 1980s 1 1990S 1 2000s 1 
Sulphite Decom. 1976 
pulp plant 
Com. pre- 
1960 
Sulphate Com. Ix Oxygen 
pulp plant Kamyr digester bleaching 
Kamyr 1988 system 1990 
digester x 
com. 1927 
Recovery 
boilers x2 
cm 
recovery boiler, 
old decom. 
So Id to 
corporation C 
2002 
New coating 
system 1990, 
new wet end, 
shoe press, lime 
kiln and 
improvement of 
pulp washing 
unit 
Pulp drying 
machine I 
ý Pu I pý dry 
ýing 
'him 
I 
m 
-ac 
hi 
IZ 
2 
Wood room 
(wet), com. 
Dre-1960 
F-w-ood room 
(dry) 
Biological 
waste water 
treatment 
__plant 
Com. 1970s Retrofit------ 
Decom. 1991 
Com. 1993 
[Turbines 1xIIII- om. old -1 
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Evaporation Decom. 2002 
plant 
1x 1960 
Ix 1970 
1x 1980 1 
vaporation E ip po tion 
plant 
ý 
II 1960s I 1970s 1 1980's 1 1990-s 1 2000% 
The technology path of Plant 8 shown in Table 9.6 illustrates continuous modernisation 
and development of the plant. The equipment mostly dates back to the 1970s and 1990s. 
Several large investment programmes are visible. The first large investments were the 
introduction of a cardboard machine and two pulp drying machines in the early 1970s. 
This changed the product mix of the plant. Pulp production capacity was increased by 
investment in a new digester in 1988, and the quality of the product improved by 
introducing a modem bleaching system and cardboard coating system in 1990. Further 
significant investments were made in the early 1990s by replacing old recovery boilers, 
retrofitting a pulp drying machine, and replacing the old wet wood room by a new dry 
one. Rebuilding the cardboard production line continued strongly in 1997, and the 
production line was sold in 2002. Significant energy-efficiency improvements were 
achieved by replacing the old turbines with a new one in 1996, and replacing old 
evaporation plants with a new one in 2002. The comprehensive change of Plant 8 has 
been from a multi -producti on-line unit, which was based on several small sets of 
equipment, to a one-production-line unit with large up-to-date machinery mostly 
regarded as BAT. The corporation has a strategy of a few large investments instead of 
continuous, multiple, small-scale repair investments. 
Plant 8 did not provide data for EEI calculations. 
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Table 9.7 Drivers and barriers to modernisation investments in Plant 8 
I BARRIERS I r- FACTORS I F- DRIVERS I 
11 
-Funding 
:: 1 
[-2 
- Corporate policy 
Strategic plan of the corporate 
directs investment 
Decision-making on 
investments well 
established, energy experts 
participate routinely 
Strategic decision to 
purchase Best Practical 
Technology 
F -3- Technoiogy and raw material I 
jite energy effici 
to find further 
e energy-saving 
or pure energy- 
y improvements 
Aeat relationship is 
: electricq production 
heat savings. 
Always a technical 
bottleneck somewhere in 
the plant which limits 
production volume. 
Investment opens up 
Energy-eff iciency Energy-saving investments are Repair investments come 
investments often require integrated into general naturally over firne when 
interruption of production by development activities. Changes replacing old equipment. 
stopping the whole plant in energy consumption mostly 
side effect of other investments 
14 
- Energy saving and other policies 
-1 
policies such as taxation 
hold back investments 
le companies wait and 
how new policy fonns 
g agreements may have 
erated some energy-efficiency 
tments, but would have been 
without the policy in any case 
Government policies have 
created significant new 
investment needs 
Energy 
-price 
and tariffs _1 
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Taxation of fuels influences 
investments 
Priceof electricity is relevant, 
however, mostly through the 
income from electneity supplied to] 
the girid 
6 -Market signals 
With larger investments, the Investments depend on the Increase and maintenance 
economic trends of production capacity main barriers are the market 
II 
trends 
--W7 Main'ta--ining quality 
_product 
Drivers and barriers to modernisation investments are outlined in Table 9.7. Corporate 
policy and market-related issues are identified as the main driver categories while the 
main barriers appear in the technology and raw material category. Of the market-based 
drivers, increase and maintenance of production capacity are emphasised while general 
economic trends could act either as a driver or a barrier. Investment in technology 
bottlenecks provides bridges to further investments and energy saving is mostly 
integrated into other investments. Government policies on energy saving are recognised, 
but not regarded as influential. Plant 8 purchases only 5% of its fuel needs and supplies 
both heat and electricity to the grids. As a result, energy price is more a matter of income 
rather than expense, which is reflected as a list of factors but not drivers or barriers. 
Drivers can be regarded as real as there have been investments in modernisation. 
Summary 
Chemical market pulp is the only product of Plant 8 and the associated waste liquor 
covers the majority of fuel needs. Plant 8 is still operating some old pieces of equipment, 
but technology mostly dates back to the 1970s and 1990s. Modemisation has been 
ongoing - however, more investments have been made towards the end of the 
observation period. The strategy to specialise in one product only was clearly 
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demonstrated by giving up cardboard production. Plant 8 did not provide data for EEI 
calculation. Drivers dominate barriers; however, many barriers and factors were also 
reported. The technology path reflects the drivers reported. 
9.3.2 Plant 9 
The first pulp production unit of Plant 9 was established in 1930. Originally, the 
production activities were owned by the state but the plant is currently owned by a 
Finnish corporation. 
Plant 9 produces 375,000 tonnes of bleached sulphate pulp, and various types of paper: 
some 930,000 tonnes uncoated fine paper which is mostly used as copy paper and the raw 
material of envelopes, and 440,000 tonnes of coated printing papers. The product mix has 
changed dramatically from sulphite pulp to sulphate PUIP30 and from newsprint towards 
fine papers and printing papers. The level of export is some 90%. 
Black liquor covered some 55%, wood waste 25%, peat 18% and oil 2% of the fuel needs 
of the plant in 2004. The plant generates some 55% of its electricity needs while 45% is 
purchased. The price of heat at the corporation is based on the combination of the price of 
fuel, running costs, and interest to the corporation. Its own electricity is priced similarly. 
However, the price of purchased electricity is based on long-term contracts, shares of 
power plants owned by the corporation and the grid price. 
30 Sulphate pulp can be used as raw material for fme papers, 
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Table 9.8 Technology path of Plant 9 
I Equipment I 1960s I 1970s 1 1980S 1 1990S 1 2000s. -1 
Sulphite Bleaching Decom- 1977 
pulp plant, installed 1960 
com. 1930 
iuýlýphate 
plant p pulp plant 
Ground Com. 1960 Retrofit 1981 Peroxide 
wood plant bleaching 
intToduced 
2004 
PM1 newsprint and coatedprinting Retrofit 1983 
'Valmet', printingpaper paper double coated 
Com. 1955 printingpaper 
Coating Com- 1969 itýingcoj --ýýOating co, 
ChIne for machine for 
PM1 
Rebuilt 1983 
PM3 II jinepaper 
PM4 - Com- as 
fluting Decom. 1970s 
(originally machine in 
pulp drying 1965 
machine), 
com. 1930s 
Shoe press 
PM5 Com. 1972 LWC 
newsprint 
Coating Com. mid 1980s 
machine for 
PM5 
Sheeting 1981, 
it: capacity department 1 retrof- 
increase 1985 
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Furnace 
com. 1x 
1930/40s 
Ix 1950s 
[6W-boiler 
Fluid bed 
boiler 
iRýecoveqv [)v 
bo-ilerelý 
Turbo 
generators 
Decom. 1996 
Com. 1971 Decom. /in I 
reserve 1 
ý6 
Com. 1977 
II 1960s I 1970s I 1980s 1 1990S 1 2000s 
Pulp production facilities at Plant 9 have been modernised. The original sulphite pulp 
plant was replaced with a sulphate pulp plant in 1977, mainly in order to improve product 
quality. The development of paper types from basic products towards high-quality 
products during the observation period is shown in Table 9.8. The groundwood plant has 
also been upgraded over the years in order to improve the quality of the product, 
however, production capacity has not increased dramatically since the early 1970s. Most 
of the paper machines date back to the 1960s, although most paper machines were rebuilt 
in the 1980s. Constant smaller updates have also increased the capacity of the paper 
machines. The introduction of coating machines and the sheeting department show the 
implementation of quality improvement strategy. A large power plant modemisation took 
place in 1996 when most of the existing energy capacity was retired or shifted to reserve 
and replaced by a new fluid bed boiler and a new turbo generator. This modemisation 
provided the company with a significant energy -efficiency improvement. Fuel strategies 
have also played a role in the modernisation planning. The power plant modernisation 
closed the oil combustion facility and introduced new technology which allows wider use 
of biomass in the form of its own black liquor. 
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Energy efficiency index 31 data in Table 9.9 shows similar trends. Heat efficiency 
improved by I I% and electricity efficiency is almost the same at the beginning and end 
of the observation period. The consumption of heat has decreased in paper production. 
which outweighs the increase of heat consumption in pulp production. Figure 9.2 
illustrates these dynamics. 
Table 9.9 Energy efficiency indices of Plant 9 
1991 1992 1995 1997 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Electricity 1.37 1.33 1.33 1.26 1.31 1.27 1.30 1.29 1.34 1.36 
Heat 0.94 0.89 0.97 0.93 0.90 0.83 0.86 0.86 0.84 0.84 
Figure 9.2 Development of energy-efficiency indices of Plant 9 
1 2- 
Plant 9: Development of electricity and heat 
efficiency indices 
. 
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Source: plant data 
Figure 9.3 presents the electricity and heat indices of Plant 9 in the context of its total 
paper production. It shows clearly that the paper production volume grew significantly, 
" Energy efficiency indices are calculated to make comparisons between the case plants. When the index decreases, the 
plant becomes more energy efficient and vice versa. The values of EEI compare the case plants to a reference plant 
which EEI is 1. The ED methodology was discussed in detail in chapter 4, p. 82. 
268 
57%, during the observation period. This did not have any significant influence on 
electricity efficiency. while heat efficiency was slightly more volatile. 
Figure 9.3 Electricity and beat-efficiency indices in the context of total paper production at 
Plant 9 
Plant 9: Energy efficiency indices vs. total paper 
production 
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Figure 9.4 illustrates the same data in the context of total pulp production of Plant 9. The 
volume of pulp production increased less than that of paper, 19%, during the observation 
period. During the modernisation of paper machines 2 and 3, heat efficiency was lower 
than before and after this operation. 
2004 
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Figure 9.4 Electricity and beat efficiency indices in the context of total pulp production of 
Plant 9 
Plant 9: energy efficiency indices vs. total pulp 
production 
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Source: plant data. 
Drivers of and barriers to modernisation investments are outlined in Table 9.10. 
Corporate strategy provides important drivers, including the emphasised requirement to 
invest in Best Available Technology. Corporate strategy also influences the importance 
of government subsidies that provide individual plants with a chance to increase their 
independent, unit-level budget, which is otherwise regulated by the corporate. 
Furthermore, market drivers are important; quality and competitiveness of products were 
especially mentioned. The main drivers fall into the categories of corporate policy and 
market while the majority of barriers are funding-related. Plant 9 finds government 
energy-saving policies supportive of modernisation. 
2004 
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Table 9.10 Drivers and barriers to modernisation investments in Plant 9 
I BARRIERS II FACTORS II DRIVERS I 
11 
- Funding 
I 
Plant specific investinent 
quota which is managed by 
the plant itself is small 
Competition of funding inside 
coqporation 
Units no longer have mu 
decision-making power i 
investments that boost 11 
importance of governme 
subsidies for energy-sav 
that can be administered 
Large corporate provides a 
larger sum of investments 
to allocate. It is easier for a 
corporate to fund large 
projects than for an 
independent unit 
ate policy 
I 
Payback period is decisive when Corporate policy to make 
choosing investments comparisons between units, 
provides data to evaluate 
own development of energy 
consumption 
Investing in the best 
possible technology in 
order to fulfil the BAT is 
required by corporate 
strategy 
Management of the unit has 
traditionally been interested 
__, 
Ln enerW issues 
13 
- Technology and raw material 
I 
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Scarcity of wood material is 
more severe than scarcity of 
energy. Consequently, saving 
wood is a more significant 
driver of investments than 
saving mostly through Replacc-meni investments 
ents with other goals inevitably based on the 
fifecYcle -of existing 
equipment 
14 
- Energy saving and other policies 
Voluntary energy-saving 
agreement with the Finnish 
_Soveipment 
Government provides 
grants for energy-saving 
investment's of up to 30% 
of costs, which supports 
investment 
15 
- Energy price and tariffs 
I 
alation defines the unit 
y favourable energy 
which makes the 
stment proposals of the 
less competitive in the 
oration funding 
technology with new in 
order to switch from 
expensive to cheaper fue 
FE prict rr re cý 
nerj nces have risen in 
eel recent_years_ 
16 
- Market signals 
-1 
Increasing production 
volume, especially that of 
paper 
Strategy to produce 
highest possible quality 
products, to be a leader in 
quality 
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Energy prices defined by the corporate tend to be cheaper than the market price. 
However, the marginal fuel price still applies, as demonstrated by the desire to switch to 
cheaper fuels. Currently. 80% of fuel demand is already covered by bio fuels, mostly 
from the unit's waste stream. It is also interesting that the corporate energy-price 
calculation., which varies between units, is further reflected in the internal competition 
between units' investment proposals. The strategies to improve the quality of products 
and increase the production volume of paper appear in the technology path as 
investments in equipment, such as bleaching of pulp and coating of paper, and in a new 
paper machine. 
Summary 
Plant 9 has a wide selection of products including chemical pulp, groundwood, coated 
printing paper and uncoated fine paper. The pulping process provides waste liquors as 
fuels while wood grinding is a very electricity -intensive process. Fine paper production 
tends to be fairly complicated and therefore electricity-intensive. The main equipment 
mostly dates back to the 1960s and 1970s, while energy infrastructure is more recent. 
Modernisation has been ongoing, and the technology path demonstrates a strategy of 
replacing obsolete equipment with new. The development of the product mix towards 
fine-paper-based specialist products can be also observed, as a second coating machine 
and sheeting department add to the volume of conversion of the basic products. Plant 9 
provided a long run of very good quality data in which I have full confidence. However, 
all trends do not always match the technology path. Drivers dominate barriers and are 
reflected in the technology path. 
9.3.3 Plant 10 
Plant 10 started paper production in 1875, and was bought by a corporation in 1904. It 
produces some 320,000 tonnes of coated paper. However, the product mix has changed 
dramatically since the 1970s. The level of export is more than 90%. 
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The plant no longer has its own energy production infrastructure and, consequently, all 
electricity and heat is purchased. The only fuel purchased is liquefied gas. which is used 
to dry paper. Electricity is purchased centrally by the corporation, which distributes it to 
the plants. The plants are required to forecast their electricity needs and are fined if they 
misestimate these. Electricity prices provided by the corporation to the plants are tens of 
per cent cheaper than the price of electricity from the grid. The share of energy costs of 
the total is some 7%. In 2004, electricity and heat each accounted for 3.4% of turnover. 
The plant purchases all raw material for paper, chemical pulp from a unit of another 
corporation, and groundwood from another unit of the corporation. 
Plant 10 has undergone major changes and updates, and completely changed its product 
mix since the 1990s. Many of the machines were retrofitted in the 1960s. A new paper 
machine was installed in 1974, and the oldest paper machine was closed in 1978. 
Parchment paper production was mostly exported to the Soviet Union and, when the 
market disappeared together with the Soviet Union in 1991. parchment paper production 
was closed altogether, which led to decommissioning of a significant share of production 
capacity. The sheeting department and power station have also been closed, and these 
services are currently bought from subcontractors. The existing paper machines were 
dramatically rebuilt during the observation period, and the product mix has developed 
from uncoated fine paper to coated fine paper. Many old products have been removed 
from the product selection, and new developed. Retiring old production capacity has 
improved efficiency in energy use. 
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Table 9.11 TechDOlOgy path of PlaDt 10 
Equipmeint I 1960s I 1970s 1980s 1990S 2000s 
irchment Decom. 199 
achine 1 
m. 1927 
PMI Retwfit 1960s , Decom 1978 
com. 1936 uncoatedfine 
paper 
PM3 s Decom. 19 1 
com. 1947 base paperfor 
_ __pqrchment 
Parchment Retrofit 1960s Decorn. 1991 
machine 2 
com. 1951 
1 
PM4 
§beeting Sheeting 
departm7enit 
Com- 1974 Rebuilding: Wire and Rebuilding: 
uncoatedfine headbox 1981, bead box shoe press, new 
paper press section 1994 dry end: new 
modernised calender, reeler, 
1983, size press coating, 
1988 winder, new 
copypaper building 2001 
coatedp ýer j 
Com. 1974 Corn. cu ing Closed and sold 
cutting machine 4 in 2001 
machines 1-3 1996 
Power plant Com. 2x boiler Heat 
and smoke- production 
cleaning decom. 1988, 
system 1972 electricity 
production 
decom. 2001 - 
switch to 
purchased heat 
and power 
1960s 1970s 1980s 1990S 2000s 
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Table 9.12 Energy efficiency indices of Plant 10 
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Electricity 2.01 1.71 1.41 1.40 1.27 1.35 1.83 1.61 1.40 1.39 
Heat 1.47 1.04 0.92 0.94 0.85 0.90 1.05 0.94 0.76 0.73 
Source: plant data. 
The EEI data in Table 9.12 shows a dramatic improvement in both electricity and beat 
efficiency, by 31% and 50%, respectively. Figure 9.5 illustrates these dynamics. 
Figure 9.5 Developments of energy efficiency indices of Plant 10 
Plant 10: Development of electricity and heat efficiency 
indices 
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Source: plant data. 
Mass decommissioning of obsolete equipment in 1991 can be observed in Figure 9.5 as 
improved energy efficiency. Retrofitting of paper machines in 2001 caused an 
inefficiency peak due to interruption of production during the modernisation, the time 
required to optimise the running of the new equipment, etc. It fell to the same level of 
electricity efficiency and improved heat efficiency by 2004. 
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Figure 9.6 Electricity and beat efficiency indices in the context of total paper production of 
Plant 10 
Plant 10: energy efficiency indices vs. total 
paper production 
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Source: plant data. 
Figure 9.6 puts the 2001 peak into perspective by showing the dramatic reduction in 
production volume during modernisation. The figure also shows the trend in improving 
efficiency and the increase in paper production happened in tandem after 2001. 
As Plant 10 used to export its products to the Soviet Union, and closed some of its 
obsolete facilities due to the disappearance of the Soviet market, it can be argued that the 
modemisation - and improved energy efficiency - was economic-transition-related. 
Consequently, this could be regarded as an example of how a Finnish paper mill working 
in a market-economy environment would react to an economic shock similar to the one 
the Russian pulp and paper mills experienced in the 1990s. 
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Table 9.13 Drivers and barriers to modernisation investments in Plant 10 
BARRIERS FACTORS I F_ DRIVERS 
I- Funding 
zonomy of the corporation Competition for funding between Short payback period E 
iscurrently tight: less money units of corporation 
7 
for investments, acceptable 
payback period shortens 
Unit-specific investment 
quota allocated by the 
corporate is small 
2- Corporate strategy 
Corporate strategies define Energy experts are involved 
investment goals 
]ý 
in investment decisions 
13 
- Technology and raw material 
Plant is situated close to the Energy saving is often a side effect Improvements in 
centre of a major city, which of investments 
I 
limits capacity expansion 
functionality and reliability I 
of machines to minimise 
Cu ts in production and 
rejects 
Increasing speed of paper 
machine 
[4- Energy saving and other poiicies I 
Some environmental ESCO projects: concept exists but Government's voluntary 
investments may overrule planned projects were too enerD-saving agreements 
finther investments that expensive and have been put on support energy 
would save energy hold for now considerations in the 
context of investments 
Government norms to ban 
some old technologies in 
industrial use, for instance 
electric beaters 
15 
- Energy price and tariffs 
278 
Importanceof energy price in 
investment decision depends on the 
investment, but isa factor 
Market signals I 
Increasing production 
capacity 
Drivers of and barriers to modernisation investments are outlined in Table 9.13. 
Technology-related drivers make up the main category while government policies and the 
market also drive modernisation. Funding is the main barrier. Government energy-saving 
policies are regarded as a weak driver. It is also interesting that the importance of energy 
price is not higher when it comes to investments, even though Plant 10 buys all its 
electricity and heat. However, the affordable price of electricity provided by centralised 
buying, and the low share of energy costs in turnover may explain this. Considerations 
between fuels based on price are recognised as a factor, though. The focus on technology 
and the market as drivers is reflected in the technology path as investments in 
modernisation. Improving technological perfon-nance is especially mentioned as a driver, 
such investments can indeed be observed in the technology path. Modemisation has 
probably cut the energy bill of Plant 10 as cutting the cost price was mentioned as a 
driver to modernisation. 
Summary 
Plant 10 produces coated paper only. The product mix changed dramatically during the 
observation period as a result of the collapse of the Soviet market. All the older paper 
machines were decommissioned in 1991 and the energy department closed altogether in 
the 2000s, which left Plant 10 with equipment that dates back to the 1960s and 1970s. 
279 
Modernisation of this remaining equipment has been active and aimed at improving 
product quality as well as energy efficiency. The data set provided by the company is 
very good quality and I have full confidence in it. The trend in improving energy 
efficiency has been strong. The closure of obsolete equipment in 1991 had a significant 
impact on efficiency, and the modernisation of paper machines provided further 
improvements towards the end of the observation period. Indeed, Plant 10 is a good 
example of what happens when a Finnish plant working in a market-economy 
environment faces a collapse in the market similar to that experienced by Soviet plants. 
Drivers dominate barriers somewhat, and are reflected in the technology . path. 
9.3.4 Plant 11/12 
Plants II and 12 are units of the same corporation. The plants are currently under the 
same management, and therefore, the interview was conducted with a person who is 
responsible for both of them. Consequently, the drivers and barriers section applies to 
both units whereas the technical details are discussed separately. 
Plant II 
Plant II was established in 1952 to produce newsprint. Today, Plant II produces 
annually some 130,000 tonnes of newsprint, 270,000 tonnes of uncoated printing paper 
and 300,000 tonnes of coated magazine paper, partly from its own TMP groundwood 
production of 500,000 ton-nes per year. Pulp and recycled paper is bought within the 
corporation, and Plant II produces 150,000 tonnes of de-inked recycled pulp per year. 
The level of export is 95%. 
Plant II has its own heat production, and in addition, some 40% of steam demand is 
recovered from the TMP process. Some electricity is produced by the CHP; however, 
most is purchased. The fuel balance is based on bio fuels, mainly waste wood. Peat 
covers some 30% of the demand while oil is a reserve fuel. Electricity is bought from the 
corporation, which has a centralised electricity purchasing department. Units order the 
required amount of electricity annually and pay a penalty if they cannot meet their 
estimate. 
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Table 9.14 Technology path of Plaint II 
I Equipment I 1960s I 1970s I 1980s 1 1990S 1 2000s I 
Groundwood Decom- 1989 
plant com. 
1952 
TMP Com. 1975 Decom. 1989 
experimental 
plant 
I TMP plant I 
fM: i PpI ýaino it2 F 
PM2 ý newsprint ý magazine Decom. 1988 
com. 1956 paper 
PM4 Com. 1960s Retrofit: wire, 
newsprint 
II 
dry end 
II 
PM6 
rý-7 
Com. 1987 
printing pqper 
c(:, r Cc 1 
ýnews print 
De-inking 
department 
CHP 
2 boilers +1 
Com. 1989 
increase of 
capaci 
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reserve + Decom., of 
turbine com. oK I fluid 
1950S bead boiier + 
reserve 
- --------- - 
II 1960s I 1970s I 1980s 1 1990S 1 2000s 
Plant II implemented a significant update of its mechanical pulp production technology 
and pioneered a move from groundwood pulp technology to the better quality 
thermornechanical pulp technology in the 1970s. The pulp production capacity was 
replaced completely in the late 1980s after a testing period for the new technology. The 
paper machines can be divided into two generations. Paper machines 1,2 and 5 were 
decommissioned in the late 1980s and replaced by paper machines 6 and 7. The new 
paper machines also introduced a new raw material to the side of mechanical pulp. 
Recycled paper had been taking over the share of the purchased chemical pulp since 1989 
when the de-inking plant made it possible to process recycled paper. Using recycled 
paper is significantly less energy -intensive than producing mechanical pulp. However. 
recycled paper has mostly replaced purchased pulp production, which has never been 
included in the plant's energy balance. The old energy infrastructure was replaced in the 
1990s with a fluid bed boiler. The share of own heat recovered from the TMP process is 
high, which has reduced the need to generate heat by combusting fuels. The product mix 
has not changed much, and the basic paper products remain the same since the 1970s. 
The move from groundwood pulping technology to TMP increased the energy intensity 
of the plant and power-plant modernisation improved energy efficiency in the 1990s. 
The calculations below are based on publicly available data from Plant 11. The energy 
efficiency indices presented in Table 9.15 make it possible to compare the plant with 
others but as only one year is provided, no estimate of the development of energy 
efficiency over the observation period can be made. 
Table 9.15 Energy efficiency indices of Plant 11 
2004 
Electricity 1.27 
Heat 0.96 
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Plant 12 
Plant 12 was established in 1889 to produce chemical sulphite pulp. It currently produces 
610,000 tonnes of uncoated and 120,000 tonnes of coated magazine papers. and 140,000 
tonnes of speciality papers per year. The raw materials for these products are own 
thermornechanical pulp, 450,000 tonnes per year, and recycled paper. The level of export 
is 95%. 
Plant 12 has its own CHP plant, which produces some 15% of electricity needs and heat 
needs, which are required in addition to the heat recovered from the TMP process, 
covering 40% of total demand. The main fuels are bio fuels which cover some 70% of the 
energy balance, while peat accounts for the remaining 30%. 
Plant 12 has undergone similar changes to those of Plant 11, with the exception that Plant 
12 originally produced chemical pulp. The old pulp plant was decommissioned in 1980 
and replaced by a TMP. Capacity later increased as a result of the introduction of a 
second TMP unit. A major modernisation of equipment was implemented in the 1960s 
when two old paper machines were closed and a new one commissioned. Over time, three 
more paper machines have been installed in order to increase capacity. The product mix 
has developed from wood-free paper to coated and uncoated magazine papers as a result 
of the change from sulphite pulp to mechanical pulp. The power plant was modernised in 
the 1990s, which improved energy efficiency. 
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Table 9.16 Tecbnology patb of Plant 12 
[Decade I 1960s I 1970s I 1980s 1 1990S 1 2000s I 
Sulphite 
pulp plant, 
com. end of 
1800s 
TMP plant 1 
FT-W'jI! antt. Ll 
PMI Decom. 1960s 
Com. pre- wood-free 
1960 PaPer 
PM2 Decom. 1960s 
Com. pre- wood-free 
1960 paper 
PM3 I Com. 1960 
PM4 
PM5 
PM6 
CHP 
2 old boilers 
+ turbine 
com. pre- 
1960 
Decom. 
labelpaper 
Com. 1992 
uncoated 
paper 
Old boilers 
replaced by] 
fluid bed 
boiler. New 
chipping 
reception of 
II 1960s I 1970s I 1980s 1 1990S 1 2000s I 
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Com. 1981 
uncoatedpaper 
The calculations below are based on publicly available data from Plant 11. Table 9.17 
shows the energy -efficiency indices for comparison with other case-study plants. 
However, as only one year's data is available, the development of energy efficiency over 
time cannot be estimated. 
Table 9.17 Energy efficiency indices of Plant 12 
2004 
Electricity 1.41 
Heat 0.99 
Drivers and barriers - Plants II and 12 
Drivers of and barriers to modernisation investments are outlined in Table 9.18. 
The main driver category is related to the market. However, corporate policy and 
technology-related drivers are also important. Barriers are mostly technology -related. 
Government policies directing investments are regarded as important, as are productivity, 
quality and fulfilling customer needs, which is partly linked to the production of 
speciality papers. Government energy-saving policies are not regarded as drivers but 
rather as factors. The interviewee felt strongly that the government's task should be to 
support the basis for industrial activity in the country and gave the recent permission to 
build a nuclear power plant as an example of a supportive policy. The general state of the 
economy worried him as it reflects on the business. The energy price did not seem to be 
such a worry, which could be explained by the centralised purchase of electricity by the 
corporate and the source of heat from the wood-grinding process. Market-related drivers 
such as productivity and quality of the final product were reflected in the modernisation 
policy as both plants are operating fairly up-to-date technology. 
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Table 9.18 Drivers of and barriers to modernisation investments in Plants II and 12 
I BARRIERS I [- ]FACTORS I F- DRIVERS I 
11 
-Funding 
Limited amount of funding Nowadays hardly any investments 
available from cOrPoration made with borrowed money 
[-2 
- Corporate policy 
I 
Information exchange No guideline for payback period, Corporate has internal 
between corporates has small investments have shorter reference consumption 
reduced dramatically over payback periods while larger and figures. Comparisons to 
the last 20 years. Less more significant investments are BAT useful, information 
compaýn. data allowed longer payback periods about unit's develop rnent 
F-3- Technology and raw material 
Producers of equipment 
aiming at high efficiency, 
thus replacing old 
equipment, leads to 
automatic improvement of 
any pure energy- 
lefl 
ood material is a scarcity factor, 
ve to decide between the scarcity 
wood and electricity 
improving quality of paper Energy saving mostly through Changes in customers' 
increases energy investments with other goals requirements (for instance 
consumption due to their new technology 
/product) lead to fast 
1___investments 
No technology available for 
dramatic energy efficiency 
improvements 
14 
- Energy saving and other policies 
I 
Voluntary energy-saving Limitations esIab_Iis_h___ed___b__y_ý 
agreements, would have done the the government direct 
investments 
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IN- - Energy price and tariffs 
Wool-gathering EU policies Reducing energy price would not Government support 
hinder investments lower investment criteria while provides safeguards such as I 
rising energy price would make permission to build a new 
more energy-saving investments nuclear power plant 
profitable 
Electficity consumption needs to 
be forecast annually, lowest price if 
forecast is 
6- Market signals 
Chan es in demand and General development of the Productivity 9 
weakening profitability may economy 
lower general state of 
produc 
Fulrilling requiremeints 01 ý Leustomers 
Summary 
Plant 11 produces groundwood. newsprint, uncoated and coated fine papers, and Plant 12 
groundwood, uncoated, coated and speciality papers. Groundwood production is an 
electricity-intensive process, and the high quality of papers adds to it. The equipment of 
Plant 11 mostly dates from the late 1980s, while Plant 12 is operating 1980s and 1990s 
machinery. However, some older pieces of equipment remain in use. Both plants seem to 
have a clear strategy to replace obsolete equipment with new. and Plant 12 has also 
invested in increased capacity. Some modernisation has been carried out at Plant 11. 
However, little modernisation would be needed by either plant due to the fairly recently 
commissioned infrastructure. Plants II and 12 did not provide data for analysis, and I do 
not have confidence in the very limited public data available as the source does not define 
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what it includes. The number of common drivers and barriers for the plants is fairly equal 
and reflected in the technology paths. 
9.3.5 Plant 13 
Pulp production was established in 1935 at Plant 13. The unit has experienced difficulties 
and a lack of investment in the past. Investments by the corporate which currently owns 
the plant led to a very significant update of technology in use. 
Plant 13 produces sulphate pulp, and fine paper (coated, wood-free, art printing papers). 
Production capacity is 370,000 tonnes of pulp and 915,000 tonnes of fine paper per year. 
By-products include energy supply to the industrial site. The plant buys some 130,000 
tonnes of pulp per year to top up its own pulp production. Export accounts for some 98% 
of paper production. 
The unit has sold the chemical plants it originally owned, and currently buys in products 
to cover the plant's needs. The unit also sold its energy production in 1993 to a company 
it partly owns in order to gain tax benefits, and purchased it back in 2004 when such 
benefits were running out. 
The fuel balance of Plant 13 is mainly based on bio fuels. In 2004, black liquor accounted 
for 60% and solid bio fuels 16% of fuel demand. Peat covered some 14%, and other 
fuels, including oil, some 10% of the total demand. The share of energy costs of the total 
is estimated to be some 20%. Before the paper machines were introduced, no external 
support fuels were required. Own electricity production covered 58% of the plant's needs 
in 2004, and the rest was purchased. The energy price is defined by the corporation, 
which has a centralised electricity and fuel purchasing system. The units have different 
departments, including an energy department which charges other units for heat and 
electricity supply inside the unit. The price of heat is based on the price of marginal fuel, 
i. e., the purchased fuel the unit cannot do without. In the case of Plant 13, marginal fuel is 
peat. The price of fuel is converted to the price of heat based on the efficiency of the 
boiler and adding in nmning and capital costs (some 50-100% addition to the fuel cost). 
The target of the unit's energy department is balancing costs and zero income. Own 
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electricity production is priced the same way as heat. The price of purchased electricity is 
lower than the price from the grid due to centralised purchasing, long-term contracts and 
shares of ownership in some electricity-producing companies. Energy saving is not 
especially rewarded; however, saving influences the energy bill of each department. 
Plant 13 underwent major waves of updates during the observation period. The old pulp 
plant was replaced by a new one in the 1970s and an old pulp production technology 
batch cooker replaced with the more modem continuous cooker. The largest change ftom 
the product-mix point of view was the introduction of paper production to the pulp plant 
in the 1990s. This also led to the reduction of pulp drying capacity when the plant started 
to pump pulp directly to the new paper machines, i. e., operate as an integrated pulp and 
paper mill. The quality of paper did not change during the 1990s. although the production 
technology and quality of pulp have changed since the 1960s. In the 1960s, some pulp 
was used or sold partly unbleached. In the 1970s, bleaching was introduced for all pulp 
produced, and the bleaching process changed from chlorine to the less environmentally 
hazardous chlorine dioxide (elemental chlorine-free) and further partly to oxygen 
bleaching. The plant has also developed to be simpler by replacing numerous production 
lines with one large production line. Another important change was the reduction of 
controlling units and the increase of automation. Most of the technology in use dates back 
to the late 1980s or 1990s and is, therefore, close to BAT. 
289 
Table 9.19 Technology path of Plant 13 
Equipment 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990S 2000s 
Pulp plaint, Decom. 1974 
several 
digesters 
(batch 
cooking), 
com. pre- 
1960 
Sulphate 
pulp plant ,1 
digester 
(continuous 
cooking) 
Recovery 1-4 decom. 5 decom. 1988, 
boilers 1-4 1964,6 com. 7 com. 1988,6 
com. 1930s, 1964 to reserve 
5 com. 1950s 
Pulp drying Decom. 1988 
machine I 
Com. 1930s 
Pulp drying Decom. 1988 
COM. 
1930s 
Pulp drying 1960s 
machine 3 
M ying M. 1988 
4 
PM] Com. 1991 
"Valmet- magazine 
Metso" pqpe!: 
PM2 Com. 1997 
"Valmet- magazine 
Metso" pa per 
Generators 4 com. 1964 1-4 decom. 
1-3 com. 1988 
1930S 5 com 1988 
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Fluid bed 
boiler 
Com. 9 997 
II 
_1960s 
I 1970s I 1980s 1 1990S 1 2000s I 
Plant 13 did not provide data for calculating EEls. Drivers of and barriers to 
modernisation investments are outlined in Table 9.20. 
Most drivers are related to corporate policy and technology while policies and technology 
are regarded as barriers. The voluntary energy-saving agreement between the plant and 
the Finnish government was regarded as a driver. Not that many investments are 
necessarily made; however, annual reporting to the government and topics posed by the 
government help to monitor its own energy saving and potentials. Again, energy price is 
not regarded as a strong driver, which may largely be due to the dominance of the plant's 
own bio waste as a fuel. However, the impact of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme on 
electricity prices is mentioned. The claim that energy-saving investments are linked to 
larger investments may be reflected in the policy of replacing old equipment with new 
rather than modemising the old equipment. 
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Table 9.20 Drivers of and barriers to modernisation investments in Plant 13 
I BARRIERS I r- FACTORS I F- DRIVERS I 
F1 
- Funding 
:: 1 
F -2- Corporate policy 
I 
Long-term corporate strategy Energy experts always 
directs investments involved in investment 
decisions 
Energy-saving investments are Corporate implements 
required to pay for themselves internal audit in order to 
within two years benchmark plants 
-- 
13 
- Technology and raw material 
I 
Lack of availability of bio Sometimes the option is left open Modemisation cycle is 
fuels hinders further for future energy saving by sbortenin g 
investments in them investing in a certain technology-- 
- -I 
Pure energy consumption- Economics of scale: large size of At some point, old 
related investments are rarely production brings savings machinery needs to be 
done any more replaced due to 
obsolescence 
L Saving electTicity is more attractive Zn 
saving beat. 
F- Energy saving and other policies 4- 
[6immpulso ýenvironmental- _J 
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investments may take 
fimding from energy-saving 
investments 
Expected change of 
govenunent policy creates 
uncertainty. Companies wait 
to invest until policy 
confirmed 
agreements with 
gove=eni 
Financial support by the 
govemment for energy- 
saving studies: support for 
investments with payback 
period of up to five years 
15 
- Enemy price and tariffs 
I 
Energy saving is rewarded on Electricity price rising due I 
electricity bill only, no corporate to EU ETS and other C02 
strategy to reward hading directs investments 
6- Market signals 
Investments are always based on Increase of production 
production grounds volume drives especially 
large investments 
Summary 
Plant 13 produces chemical pulp and fine papers. The waste liquors from the pulping 
process cover more than half the fuel needs. The equipment is quite new. mostly from the 
1980s and 1990s. The modernisation strategy has focused on replacement investments. A 
large decommissioning and investment wave took place in the late 1980s and 1990s. 
Plant 13 provided no data for analysis. Drivers dominate barriers, and may be reflected in 
the technology path. 
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9.4 Comparison of case studies 
9.4.1 General trends 
The general trend in the Finnish pulp and paper industry is steady growth of production. 
Given the size of the Finnish sample and the reluctance to give out energy-related data. 
the case studies provided a very limited set of data with which to draw conclusions on the 
development of energy efficiency. 
Even though the case studies do not provide conclusive data on the trends in energy 
efficiency, finiher support can be found in national-level data sets. In addition, the 
representatives of plants interviewed and some of the expert interviewees discussed the 
trend in rising electricity intensity due to the complicated processes of specialist paper 
production. The plants also stated that electricity is appreciated over heat, and that 
increasing the share of electricity produced by CHP is a driver to modernisation. This 
provides finther evidence of the trend. 
Corporate ownership is the dominant type of ownership of the Finnish pulp and paper 
plants. Four large corporates, a unit from each of them included in this study, dominate 
the sector while some smaller companies remain in the market. Investment in 
modemisatior4 both replacement of obsolete equipment and refurbishment, is continuous 
in the case of the Finnish plants. Investments are driven by corporate policies and plans 
which consider individual Production units in the context of the whole corporate. 
Strategies concerning what is produced, bow much and for which market direct these 
investment decisions. 
9.4.2 Regional level data 
The data presented below originates from a data set collected by "Development of energy 
and emission scenario model" project in 1997-1998 (see Chapter 4 for further details), 
and is referred to as the "Finnish project data". It covers the whole Finnish pulp and 
paper sector, and relevant data which is not available from the national statistics office. 
This comparison data covers the years from 1970 until 1995, while the data sets of the 
case-study plants tend to begin from the early 1990s and run until the 2000s, 
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Consequently, the country-level comparison data only covers part of the plant-specific 
data. However, the development of the Finnish pulp and paper sector was steady during 
the observation period and it is therefore useful to compare the trends up to the first half 
of the 1990s with the data provided by individual plants, and further with that of the 
Russian plants and regions. 
Table 9.21 Energy efficiency indices of Finland, average 
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 
Electricity 1.10 1.15 1.18 1.19 1.24 1.27 
Heat 1.53 1.48 1.50 1.40 1.22 1.20 
Source: Finnish project data 
Table 9.21 reports the trends in electricity and heat efficiency. According to these figures. 
electricity use became 15% less efficient while heat efficiency improved by 22% during 
1970-1995. Figure 9.7 illustrates these trends. 
Figure 9.7 Development of energy efficiency in the Finnish pulp and paper sector 
Finland: development of average energy efficiency 
indices of pulp and paper sector 
1.6 
1.5 
1.4 
1.3 
1.2 
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Source: Finnish project data 
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Figure 9.8 Energy efficiency indices in the context of total pulp production, national average 
Finland: Development of energy efficiency 
vs. total pulp production 
1.8 
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Source: Finnish project data 
Figures 9.8 and 9.9 present the energy-efficiency indices in the context of total pulp and 
paper production volumes. The volume of both of these main product categories has 
grown steadily since 1970. The decrease in electricity efficiency may have been caused 
by the shift from mechanical pulp production towards a more electricity-intensive 
direction. The EEI methodology does not differentiate between mechanical pulping 
processes, which are becoming more electricity -intensive. The same shortcoming of the 
methodology applies to the processes added to fine paper production, such as coating and 
customer-specific demands for quality. Heat efficiency may have improved at least partly 
due to the heat recovery introduced to mechanical pulping processes. The shift from 
consumption of heat to consumption of electricity in advanced pressing technologies in 
paper drying also partly explains these trends. 
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Figure 9.9 Energy efficiency indices in the context of total paper production, national 
average 
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Source: Finnish project data 
9.4.3 Drivers and barriers 
Competition for funding among the units of the corporate is a common factor for all the 
plants, due to the structure of the Finnish pulp and paper sector as discussed in Chapter 6. 
The corporates tend to allocate a basic investment quota to all the units for small-scale 
maintenance investments, while higher levels of administration decide on the more 
significant investments. Most plants regard this quota as small, and therefore a barrier. 
However, one plant also recognised the fact that it is easier to finance larger investments 
as a corporate than as an independent unit. 
All plants confirm that energy experts are involved in investment-related decision- 
making, whicb can be regarded as a driver of energy saving. Most of the plants also 
recogmsed the corporate's internal benchmarking and strategic decision to purchase 
either Best Practical Technology or Best Available Technology as drivers. Indeed, some 
of the Finnish plants are operating a largely BAT infrastructure, so this driver seems to 
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have influenced the technology paths. Three of the plants reported that corporate strategy 
directs investments, and two mentioned corporate strategy to draft energy-saving reports. 
There is a slight difference in views on the government's main energy-saving policy, 
voluntary energy-saving agreements offered to the plants. All plants had joined the 
scheme - however, only three regarded this policy as a driver of modernisation while two 
recognised it as a factor only, stating that the measures would have been implemented 
even in the absence of this policy. Two of the plants recognised the government subsidies 
for drafting energy-saving studies as drivers. Two of the plants recognised that 
government policies direct investments, and gave environmental investments as an 
example of an investment need that reduces the amount of money available for 
modemisation. Two plants also agreed that unresolved policies that are expected in the 
future may put investments on hold until the situation is clarified. The taxation of pine oil 
32 
was given as an example 
All plants agreed that energy-saving measures are merged with investments with other 
goals rather than implemented as separate investments. This can be explained by the 
current level of efficiency that provides only few, separate, profitable energy-saving 
opportunities, and also by the high cost of interruptions to the production process that 
energy-saving investments often require. The plants agreed that the capital cycle would 
automatically improve energy efficiency over time without any specific focus on it. This 
might sound like a serious barrier to energy -efficiency improvement investments. 
However, given the high efficiency of the Finnish pulp and paper industry, and the 
dominance of corporate policy supportive of high energy efficiency for competitive 
reasons, this approach is unlikely to be a serious barrier to energy efficiency. Three of the 
plants agreed that saving electricity is more attractive than saving heat, which is due to 
the increasing electricity intensity of the industry as a result of end-products becoming 
more specialised and complicated, as discussed in Chapter 6. Two of the plants argued 
that wood is a scarcer resource than energy and is therefore the main focus of 
economising, sometimes at the expense of energy. 
" it was impossible to decide on investment in new equipment while the government was preparing a 
decision on the taxation of pine oil as the investment was decisive on which fuels could be used in the 
future. Taking the wrong decision may have caused economic disadvantage over the lifetime of the new 
equipment. 
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Energy price is regarded as a factor rather than a driver of energy saving and 
modernisation by the Finnish plants, and is used to calculate the payback period of an 
investment. However, fuel-switching decisions are motivated more by the price of fuel 
than investments related to energy-saving. Corporates have centralised energy -purchasing 
systems and calculate their internal, and in some cases unit-specific, prices for beat and 
electricity, which are lower than the market price due to ownership by the corporates of 
electricity producers and long-term contracts. Units have to forecast their annual 
consumption and are penalised if the forecast is wrong (and in some cases are rewarded 
with a lower price if the forecast is correct). Internal investment proposals are bid based 
on these corporate or plant-specific energy prices. Even though in theory this system 
sounds discouraging of energy-saving investments, it does not seem to make a significant 
difference in Finland as most separate energy-saving investments have already been 
made and energy saving is mostly integrated into larger investments. Indeed, one 
interviewee argued that even if the price of energy fell, the same standard of energy 
efficiency would be maintained. 
Market-related issues are mostly drivers, the most common of which include increases in 
maintenance and production capacity, high quality, competitiveness and reduction of cost 
price. Economic trends were recognised as potential barriers by some of the plants. At 
least three of the plants had acted on the market drivers reported, which can be observed 
in the technology paths. 
Regional administration and experts 
The group of Finnish pulp and paper experts interviewed consisted of representatives of 
Helsinki University of Technology, Metso Corporation (producer of paper machines), the 
Finnisb Federation of Forestry Industries and Motiva. 
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Table 9.22 Drivers and barriers reported by Finnish pulp and paper experts 
I BARRIERS I r- ]FACTORS I r- DRIVERS I 
11 
-Funding 
:1 
Payback time of investment is not 
decisive but the context, Le., 
convenient window to combine 
energy saving with larger projects 
12 
- Corporate policy 
71 
Quarterly reporting on Energy issues secondary - main Some corporates use 
productivity business to produce pulp and paper market price of electricity 
as a reference price when 
calculating payback periods 
The "if you sign a paper, 
you will also implement" 
Finnish attitude supports 
energy-saving contracts 
even though they are 
voluntary 
Saving is not psychologically 
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The payback time of investments was regarded as both a driver and a barrier. Even 
though it can be a barrier as energy-efficiency improvement measures tend to have longer 
payback times than many other more productive investments, most energy-saving 
investments are linked to larger infrastructure investments, which create a window of 
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opportunity rather than just the payback period. Energy-saving investments are seldom 
implemented separately. 
Corporate policies were regarded mostly as barriers by the experts. Requirements to 
report quarterly on productivity reduced the attractiveness of longer-term investments, 
which energy-efficiency improvements tend to be. It was also reported that energy- 
related issues are regarded as secondary considerations by industrialists, while the main 
business is to produce pulp and paper. Indeed, another interviewee stated illustratively: 
"Energy efficiency is not the first priority. one just has to live with it". This is 
understandably the basis of all energy-saving activities. Industrialists' resistance to 
change such as energy economic thinking was also mentioned, and the psychological 
preference of investment in new equipment over saving investments is also an influence. 
The fact that some companies use the market price as a reference price for calculating the 
payback period for energy-saving investments, even though electricity costs them much 
less in practice, is a driver. The Finnish know-how cluster in the pulp and paper sector 
was regarded as a driver. For instance, two-thirds of European paper engineers graduate 
in Finland. The know-how of Jaakko Pbyry Consulting and the Finnish paper machine 
producer, Metso, were also mentioned as part of the know-how cluster. However. the 
lack of cooperation between customers and equipment providers was regarded as a 
barrier to further energy efficiency. 
Technology-related issues were regarded as both drivers and barriers by the Finnish 
experts. It was noted that in practice producing high-quality paper consumes more energy 
per unit than producing lower-quality paper, even though the new production process was 
technically more efficient than the old (see Chapter 6). Customer-specific production may 
mean making changes to the production process, even daily, and adds to energy intensity. 
Such products fall into the above-mentioned category of high-quality paper products. The 
imbalance between the electricity and heat needs of processes was regarded as a barrier 
because CHP produces a fixed amount of heat per electricity produced, and even though 
demand shifts from heat to electricity, as is the case with many new processes, the CHP 
system cannot stop producing beat. Consequently. the local heat that will be produced in 
any case in the process could replace electricity bought from the market. If the trend to 
switch to electricity continues, some of the heat may be wasted. However, it was pointed 
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out that the process was still becoming technically more energy -efficient. There are still- 
unresolved technological problems that are regarded as a barrier to further energy 
efficiency. The high electricity intensity of mechanical pulping was mentioned as one. 
Government policies were regarded as drivers only. Energy-saving contracts between the 
government and companies were reported to combine things that had already been done 
but separately. The systematic approach of identifying energy-saving potential was 
especially mentioned as a merit of the contracts. The Finnish attitude of taking a 
commitment seriously, even though voluntary, was also regarded as a related driver. 
Energy prices were regarded as the most important driver of energy efficiency as high 
energy prices make the saved energy more valuable. 
in the category of market signals, global competition was mentioned as a driver because 
it makes circumstances harder for an individual company. Consequently, more thought 
has to be put into how to bring costs down. As a demand factor, the requests of customers 
for environmental values linked to the products were regarded as a driver of energy 
efficiency. For example, Finnish pulp and paper companies report energy consumption- 
related information on their packaging. 
Comparison ofpIants to administration and experts 
The views of the representatives of the plants and those of the state administration and 
experts on the drivers of and barriers to modernisation investments in pulp and paper 
industry mostly do not contradict each other, and the overview of the drivers and barriers 
covers many of the same issues. 
Energy-saving contracts are recognised by both the representatives of plants and experts. 
However, while all experts regard the contracts as drivers of energy efficiency, some of 
the plants only regard them as factors, claiming that the same measures would have been 
carried out in the absence of the contracts. 
Both groups agreed that as a rule that energy efficiency and energy-saving investments 
are merged with larger investments. But representatives of some plants argued that not 
that many energy-saving and energy -efficiency improvement opportunities are available. 
An expert interviewee disagreed, arguing that all plants still have such opportunities left. 
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However, this may be the two groups looking at the same issue from different 
perspectives rather than having contradictory views as everybody agrees that some 
opportunities remain. 
While the representatives of the plants agreed that saving electricity is more attractive 
than saving heat, an expert interviewee expressed concern over the rising tendency of 
electricity intensity, which leaves some of the heat produced by CHP unused. These 
arguments, closely related to specialist products, seem to be again looking at the same 
issue from different angles. 
Some plants reported that plant-specific electricity prices are used to calculate payback 
periods of energy-saving investments. However, according to a representative of the 
administration some corporates use the (higher) market price of electricity for such 
calculations. It looks as if the policies of various corporations get mixed up in the 
discussion, and it is difficult to conclude anything except that corporate policies can have 
a significant impact on payback period calculations. However, in practice the window of 
opportunity for energy-efficiency improvements recognised by both groups may be a 
more important factor than the payback period. In general, experts were more negative 
about the impact of corporate policy on energy efficiency than the plants were. Indeed, it 
seems that many elements of corporate policy support constant improvement in energy 
efficiency. 
Representatives of plants discussed market-signals-related drivers and barriers more 
widely than the experts, although both groups regarded them mostly as drivers. 
9.5 Summary 
The research objectives of this chapter are: 
18. Provide the background of Finland, including developments in the economy, 
energy sector and energy policies relevant to the topic. 
19. Report the outcomes of interviews for plant-level case studies, including a 
description of the plant's products, facilities and ownership. technology path, 
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development of energy efficiency based on energy -efficiency indices (where data 
is available), and drivers of and barriers to modemisation. 
20. Summarise for each plant whether modernisation has been carried out, whether 
this is reflected in the energy-efficiency trends (where data is available) and 
conclude whether the drivers of and barriers to modernisation are consistent with 
the technology path. 
21. Investigate the development of energy efficiency in the pulp and paper sector at 
regional level, based on energy -efficiency indices drawn from regional statistics. 
22. Triangulate the drivers of and barriers to modernisation reported by the plants 
with the drivers and barriers reported by the regional administration and experts. 
Forestry sector is a significant contributor to the Finnish GDP, however, there are other 
more important industrial sectors. Six case plants were chosen from a large population of 
plants to provide a comparison to the Russian plants. The production of the case plants 
has increased steadily during the observation period in the 1990s and 2000s, and the 
plants have on average become more heat and less electricity efficient. All case plants 
have modernised their capital stock. Ownership arrangements are completely based on 
corporate ownership which contributes to the strategic approach to investment. The main 
barrier to investments was the lack of funding, however, every plant has a steady stream 
of annual funds from the corporate. Market signals and government energy saving 
policies drive modernisation of capital stock. 
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10. Discussion: Analysis of Energy Efficiency Case 
Study Results 
10.1 Energy efficiency 
This section focuses first on comparisons of electricity efficiency. and then on heat 
efficiency, on both regional and plant levels. Then. findings are discussed and 
summarised. 
10.1.1 Electricity efficiency 
Figure 10.1 illustrates the development of the average electricity efficiency indices 33 in 
Karelian, Archangelsk and Finnish pulp and paper sector. Both Karelia and Archangelsk 
have experienced an inefficiency peak in the mid 1990s, and the situation has normalised 
towards the end of the observation period. Overall, electricity consumption has become 
more efficient in Archangelsk and less efficient in Karelia as the EEI in 2003 is smaller in 
the former and larger in the latter when compared to the beginning of the observation 
period. Electricity use was slowly becoming less efficient in the Finnish pulp and paper 
sector during the observation period, which might have been caused by the trend for 
higher quality products which are more energy intensive to produce (see Chapter 6). It is 
also somewhat surprising that the differences in electricity efficiency are not that 
significant between Finland and the Russian regions as the conventional wisdom is that 
the Finnish pulp and paper sector is more energy efficient than that of Russia. The EEI of 
Archangelsk and Karelia was only some 25% higher in 2003 than that of Finland in 
1995 34 . Next, comparisons are made on plant level. 
'-' The Energy Efficiency Index compares the regional or plant level efficiencies to a reference plant which 
is presented as EEI value 1. When the EEI decreases, energy efficiency improves, and vice versa. For 
further details on the Energy Efficiency Index methodology please revisit Chapter 4, p. 82. 
" The 1995 data of Finland is compared here to the 2003 data of Russia because a) no more recent data of 
this detail is available of Finland, and b) using the data of the Russian peak inefficiency years would not 
provide a realistic comparison. 
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Figure 10.1 Comparison of electricity efficiency indices of pulp and paper sector between 
regions 
Comparison of electricity efficiency indices between regions 
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The most efficient electricity users are the Finnish Plant 9 and the Russian Plant 6 in 
Archangelsk. The EEI of the Finnish (improving) Plant 10 remains 35%, the Karelian 
Plants 2 and 3,76% and 18% respectively. and the Archangelsk Plant 5,48% higher than 
that of the best performers in the end of the observation period. Indeed, the difference in 
electricity efficiency is fairly small between the plants at the end of the observation 
period, apart from Plant 2, which uses electricity much less efficiently than other case- 
study plants. Even though the sample is too small to be representative, it does not 
contradict the regional averages, i. e., Finland is not much more efficient than Russia, and 
there are plant-specific differences. 
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Figure 10.2 Comparison of electricity efficiency indices between plants 
Comparison of electricity efficiency indices between plants 
3ý5 
3- 
2.5 
2 
1.5 
1 
0.5 
Plant 1 KAR Plant 2 KAR Rant 3 KAR Plant 5 ARC 
a Plant 6 ARC Rant 9 FIN a Rant 10 FIN 
The other Finnish Plant 10 does not perform as well as Plant 9, although it has improved 
its electricity efficiency by 31% during the observation period. This can be regarded as an 
illustration of how a Finnish plant working in a mature, market-economy environment 
would react to a macroeconomic shock similar to the one the Russian plants experienced 
ucts. l. in the early 1990s, i. e., the collapse of the market for the prod This spurred Plant 
10 to modernise and improve its energy efficiency significantly. 
" For finther details of Plant 10 see Chapter 9. 
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Figure 10.3 Electricity efficiency index vs development of paper production volume on plant 
level 
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Figure 10.3 shows the electricity efficiency of the plants in the context of paper 
production volume 36 . Here, the plant-specific variations become obvious. Plant 6 in 
Archangelsk is approximately as efficient as Finnish Plant 9 even though its paper 
production volume is much smaller than that of the Finnish plant. They are both close to 
the efficiency of the reference plant. Plant 10 in Finland. on the other hand, remains less 
efficient than Russian Plant 6 with only a little larger output of paper. Figures 10.3 and 
10.4 show the typical inefficiency peaks at Russian plants in the mid 1990s. 
36 it is important to note that the efficiencies are not product-specific, but product-weighted aggregate 
efficiencies of each plant as discussed in the methodology section (Chapter 4). 
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Figure 10.4 Electricity efficiency index vs development of pulp production volume on plant 
level 
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The improvement in electricity efficiency at Plant 9 as a result of modemisation can be 
observed as a remarkable reduction of EEI in Figure 10.4. Plant 2 remains the least- 
efficient electricity consumer. The figure also explains part of the background of the 
electricity efficiency of Plant 6. Its pulp production volume is very large, which may 
provide economics of scale that are reflected in the total efficiency of the plant. 
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10.1.2 Heat efficiency 
Figure 10.5 Comparison of beat efficiency indices of pulp and paper sector between regions 
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Figure 10.5 shows, that Finland is a significantly more efficient heat consumer than 
Russia. The EEI of Archangelsk was some 39%, and Karelia some 72% higher in 2003 37 
than that of Finland in 1995. The heat-consumption pattern of the Russian pulp and paper 
sector was similar to that of Finland in the 1970s at the end of the observation period i. e. 
improving steadily. 
" The 1995 data of Finland is compared here to the 2003 data of Russia because a) no more recent data of 
this detail is available of Finland, and b) using the data of the Russian peak inefficiency years would not 
provide a realistic comparison. 
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Figure 10.6 Comparison of heat efficiency indices between plants 
Comparison of heat efficiency indices between plants 
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The same difference between the countries can be observed in Figure 10.6. Finnish plants 
are distinctly more-efficient heat consumers than the Russian plants. Both the Finnish 
plants -9 and 10 - have been more heat-efficient than the reference plant. i. e.. their heat- 
efficiency indices are mostly below 1. The EEI of Plants 2 and 3 are dramatically, some 
213%, higher than that of the best performer Plant 10. Plant 6 in Archangelsk is again 
performing well, even though in the case of heat it does not quite reach the Finnish 
standard, and its EEI remains 90% higher than Plant 9. 
Plants 2,5 and 6 illustrate the Russian inefficiency peak in the mid 1990s (even though 
there are gaps in the data), and show that these plants improved their efficiency during 
the observation period, as the 2003 figures show higher efficiency than those at the 
beginning of the observation period. 
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Figure 10.7 Heat efficiency index vs development of paper production volume on plant level 
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In Figure 10.7, the comparison of the heat efficiency indices in the context of total 
production volume 38 of paper reiterates the average trend of Finnish plants being more 
heat-efficient than Russian plants. The paper production volume of Plant 9 was more than 
four times that of the other plants at the end of the observation period which could make 
a difference in the energy efficiency due to economies of scale 
38 It is important to note that the efficiencies are not product-sPecific, but product -weighted aggregate 
efficiencies of each plant as discussed in the methodology section (Chapter 4). 
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Figure 10.8 Heat efficiency index vs development of pulp production volume on plant level 
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Figure 10.8 shows the large production volume of pulp by Plant 6 which could be a 
potential factor of higher efficiency, although the smaller plant in Finland still performs 
better. 
10.1.3 Discussion on energy efficiency 
The comparison of the average energy -effi ci ency indices of the focus regions (Figures 
10.1 and 10.2) indicates that the pulp and paper industry in Finland is considerably more 
heat-efficient (EEI of Russia plants some 90-213% higher) but not much more electricity- 
efficient (EEI of Russian plants some 18-76%) than that of the Russian regions, Karelia 
and Archangelsk. This can be partly explained by the increasing importance on electricity 
over heat in the Finnish pulp and paper production as a result of improving product 
quality which increases electricity use per unit of product. However. also the 
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shortcomings of the EEI reference figures add to this trend as increasing energy intensity 
appears as decreasing energy efficiency in the absence of process specific reference 
figures. 
Table 10.1 Comparison of beat and electricity efficiency indices between plants 
1990-1993 2 000 2 003 
Location Heat Electricity Heat Electricio, Heat Electricitv 
Plant 1 KAR 2.1 1.13 N/A N/A 2.23 1.05 
Plant 2 KAR 3.7 2.08 2.52 1.93 2.29 1.83 
Plant 3 KAR N/A N/A N/A N/A 2.29 1.23 
Plant 5 ARC 2.81 1.38 1.9" 1.54 N/A N/A 
Plant 6 ARC 1.7 0.94 1.58 1.05 1.39 1.05 
Plant 9 FIN 0.94 1.37 0.83 1.00 0.84 1.04 
Plant 10 FIN 1.47 2.01 1 0.90 1 1.35 1 0.76 1.40 
Comparison of efficiency indices among the plants in the first year of the observation 
period (varies between plants within 1990-1993), 2000 and 2003 in Table 10.1 provides 
ftirther evidence of this. This result might be distorted as Plant 10 is small and less 
efficient than an average Finnish plant. Had all the case-study plants provided adequate 
data for the comparison, the outcome might be significantly different. However. these 
results do not contradict the comparison of regional average efficiencies. 
Finnish pulp and paper production was already on average more efficient in 1970 than the 
Russian sector is in the end of the observation period. The Finnish average data also 
illustrates how the Finnish pulp and paper sector has become more beat-efficient and less 
electricity -efficient since the 1970s. The electricity consumption of the pulp and paper 
industry in the Russian regions, especially Archangelsk, at the end of the observation 
period was close to that of the Finnish sector in the 1970s. 
Another major observation, which has been consistent throughout the study, is the mid 
1990s energy-inefficiency peaks in Russia. The main reason was the dramatic reduction 
in production volume, but also statistical failures such as production for plant managers' 
own accounts outside bookkeeping may have played a role, i. e.. some production may 
have not been reported to the statistics, which contributes to the amount of energy used 
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per unit that appears to have been produced. Based on this data. on average the sector has 
overcome the peaks of the late 1990s and. with the exception of the efficiency of Karelian 
electricity use which remains less efficient in the end of the observation period than it 
was in the last days of the Soviet Union in 1990. The main reason for the higher average 
energy efficiency in the end of the observation period is more likely to be the wave of 
decommissioning of obsolete capacity in the early 1990s rather than modernisation. This 
is because the technology paths do not provide evidence of significant modernisation 
waves in Russia. 
Table 10.2 Definitions of levels of energy efficiency in Table 10.3 
status Electricity Heat 
Low Over 1.5 Over 2.0 
Average 1.1-1.5 1.0-2.0 
High Below 1.1 Below 1.0 
However. trends are different among plants. Table 10.3 collects the plant level 
observation of those plants which provided enough data for EEI calculations. The case 
plants missing from Table 10.3 will be added based on qualitative data in Section 10.21. 
The definitions of low, average and high levels of energy efficiencies are shown in Table 
10.2 and based on the performance of the plants against each other. i. e.. there is no 
external benchmark except the reference plant of the Energy Efficiency Index method 
(see Chapter 4, p. 87). Status was regarded as reliable when a plant provided data points 
over five years without gaps, and less reliable if the time series was shorter, or if there 
were gaps which cut the five-year runs. Efficiency of most plants has been improving 
during the observation period. The difference of energy efficiency between the Russian 
regions is obvious as the level of energy efficiency of Karelian plants is mostly ranked as 
"low"while the overall outcome of Archangelsk is "average". 
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Table 10.3 Comparison of energy efficiency performances of case-study plants 
Plant Development Level of energy Period Basis of argument Reliability 
of energy efficiency: of analysis 
efficiency Heat/Electricity 
1 KAR Improving Low / High 1991-2003 EEI data but lacks 
points 
2 KAR Improving Low / Low 1993-2003 EEI data 
3 KAR Declining Low / Average 2002-2003 EEI data but lacks 
points. No capital 
stock turnover. 
only little retrofit 
5 ARC improving Average / Average 1990-2001 EEI data but lacks 
points 
6 ARC improving with Average / High 1990-2003 EEI data 
beat, declining 
with electricity 
9 FIN improving High / High 1991-2004 EEI data 
electricity, heat 
stabile 
1 10 FIN Llmproving_ 
I High / Average 1990-2004 EEI data 
Key to reliability of analysis: 
*** Reliable = Energy Efficiency Index data or total lack of modernisation of old equipment 
** Less reliable = based on technology path data only/technology path and limited set of EEI data 
10.2 Development of technology 
Technology paths were constructed for each case-study plant. The main tasks of the 
technology path are to explain the technology factors behind the development of energy 
efficiency, to estimate the approximate development and level of energy efficiency of 
those plants unable to provide adequate data for quantitative analysis, and to validate the 
analysis of drivers and barriers by showing whether the statements by plant managers are 
reflected in the technological development (see Chapter 4. p. 95). 
10.2.1 Technology vs energy consumption 
Table 10.4 below summarises the plant-specific trends concerning the change in energy 
efficiency and volume of production already discussed in the previous section, and the 
trends in decommissioning, modernisation and product mix. The aim of the table is to 
make it possible to compare the developments in energy -consumption trends to those of 
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technical change reported in the plant-specific technology paths. The arrows show the 
total outcome of the development between the beginning of the observation period 
(1990-1993 - this is plant-specific) and the end of the observation period (2003-2004 - 
plant-specific). 
The table clearly illustrates that just over half the plants could not provide suitable data 
for energy -efficiency analysis. This failure percentage was highest in the case of Finland, 
due to corporate policies against providing outsiders with plant-specific data. Production 
volumes at Russian plants mostly remained lower at the end of the observation period 
compared with at the beginning, while the opposite is true in the case of Finland. 
Table 10.4 Summary of trends of energy consumption and developments of technology per 
plant 
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The decommissioning of obsolete equipment in the 1990s was very common in Russia. 
and was true in five cases out of seven. In Finland, it was more common in the 1980s: 
three cases out of six. Modernisation in the 1990s was slightly less common in Russia: 
four cases out of seven. All the Finnish plants with older equipment modernised in the 
1990s, and all Finnish plants modernised during the 1980s and 1990s. This was also the 
case for most Russian plants. However, Plant 3 did not modernise during this period. 
Product mixes have remained the same in Archangelsk since the 1990s. while half the 
Karelian as well as the Finnish plants have changed their production pattems. 
Table 10.5 collects the average age of equipment. and the timings of retrofitting and the 
capital stock turnover of each plant. The main aim of the table is to provide a qualitative 
basis for the comparison of the energy efficiency of the case-study plants. The table 
covers the years 1970-2004, and reports pulp and paper production equipment only. 
Energy infrastructure is excluded, except recovery boilers, which are included as they are 
required for pulp production. This focus is in line with the systemic boundaries set for the 
energy efficiency comparisons (see pp. 85-86). The average age of equipment was 
calculated as the average year of the commissioning years of all the pulping and paper- 
making equipment and recovery boilers. In the case of pulp production. only one relrQfil 
is required to be recorded while at least two paper machines need to have one retrofit or 
one paper machine more than one retrofit in order to count as a retrofit of the plant. This 
is because pulp production facilities tend to have larger capacity than paper production 
facilities. In capital stock turnover column, commissioning and decommissioning refer to 
introducing or closing single pulp or paper production lines. 
Russian equipment mostly dates back to the 1960s and 1970s but older pieces of 
equipment are still in use. The average commissioning year of plants' capital stock listed 
in Table 10.3 is 1971, although if plant 4 is included the average is only 1961. As Plant 4 
is an abnormally old, small plant amongst the Russian case-study plants, and at the time 
of writing closed for modernisation, it was not included in the first of the above estimates 
as it would have distorted it. As is obvious in Table 10.3,1961 is far from the truth even 
though it might be the statistical average when Plant 4 is included. The Finnish capital 
stock is somewhat more recent, and the average equipment was commissioned in 1978. 
However, these figures for the average ages of equipment do not take into account the 
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retrofits done, which can, in practice, update the technology to work in a more efficient 
way than the commissioning year would suggest. 
Decommissioning due to the declining demand in the market was a trend in Russia in the 
1990s as four out of seven plants decommissioned during the decade. Plant 5 
decommissioned in 1970s and 1980s, which probably made decommissioning in the 
1990s unnecessary. There are no trends in decommissioning among the Finnish plants, 
and the timing of decommissioning is plant-specific. However. individual Finnish plants 
seem to switch from old to new equipment within a short period of time in order to 
replace the decommissioned equipment, i. e., they have a straleQ, to replace obsolete 
equipment. Russian technology paths show less of such planning. The Finnish Plant 10 is 
an abnormality as it follows the Russian trend of decommissioning equipment in 1991 
when its Soviet market collapsed. This can be explained by the importance of the Soviet 
market to Plant 10. 
The most popular time to retrofit existing equipment was in the 1980s in Russia. Many 
plants also retrofitted their equipment in the 2000s. In Finland. there were fewer retrofits 
as the equipment is more recent than in Russia. 
The comparisons of energy -effi ci ency indices have provided an estimate of the energy 
efficiency of the case-study plants that delivered the necessary data. Even though it is 
impossible to estimate the development in energy efficiency at the plants that did not 
provide the necessary data, the details collected in Table 10.5 give an indication what the 
plant-specific trends might be. 
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Table 10.5 Comparison of the age of equipment, modernisation patterns and capital stock 
turnover status of the case plants 
Plant Average age of Retrofit Capital stock turnover 
pulp and paper 
production 
equipment 
1 1966 1970s, 1980s, 1990s Com. 1970s, 1980s, 1990s 
KAR Decom. 1990s 
2 1976 1970s, 2000s Com. 1970s 
KAR Decom. 1990s 
3 1970 2000s Com. 1970s 
KAR Decom. 1990s 
4 1908 1980s, 1990s NO - closed for 
KAR modemisation in 2000s 
5 1970 1980S Com. 1970s 
ARC Decom. 1970s, 1980s 
6 1972 1980S, 1990s, 2000s Com. 1970s, 1980s 
ARC Decom. 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, 2000s 
F 1969 1980s, 1990s, 2000s Com. 1970s, 1980s, 1990s 
ARC Decom. NO 
8 1977 1990S Com. 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, 2000s 
FIN Decom. 1970s, 1990s, 2000s 
9 1970 1980s, 2000s Com. 1970s, 1980s 
FIN Decom. 1970s 
10 1969 2000s 1980s, 1990s, Com. 1970s 
FIN Decom. 1970s, 1990s 
11 1985 1980s Com. 1970s, 1980s 
FIN Decom. 1980s 
12 1980 1990S Com. 1970s, 1980s, 1990s 
FIN Decom. 1980s 
13 1988 NO T Com. 1970s, 1980s, 1990s FIN Decom. 1970s, 1980s 
Table 10.6 adds the quantitative estimates of energy -efficiency performance at the plants 
that did not provide adequate quantitative data for Table 10.1, which reports the 
outcomes of the qualitative energy -efficiency analyses. Table 10.6 includes less reliable 
data than Table 10.1. However, some of the technological changes provide quite a 
reliable idea of the developments in energy efficiency, as recently installed new 
technology is almost certainly more energy -efficient than the two-to-three-decades-old 
previous capital stock. These levels of reliability are provided in the table. However, 
energy intensity is more difficult to estimate this way as recent pulp and paper production 
technologies tend to be more complicated and more energy -intensive even though the 
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technical efficiency of energy use improved. Compared with Table 10.1, Table 10.4 
includes some longer observation periods as short-term energy efficiency change is more 
difficult to estimate based on qualitative than quantitative data. 
Table 10.6 Comparison of energy efflciency performances of case plants 
Plant Development of Level of energy Period Basis of argument Reliability 
energy efficiency efficiency: of analysis 
Heat electricity 
1 Improving Low High 1991-2003 EEI data but lacks 
KAR points 
2 Improving Low Low 1993-2003 EEI data 
KAR 
3 Declining Low Average 1960s- No capital stock 
KAR 2000s turnover, only little 
retrofit 
4 Declining Low Low 1960s- No capital stock 
KAR 2000s turnover, very old 
equipmen 
5 Improving Average / Average 1990-2001 EEI data but lacks 
ARC points 
6 Improving with Average / High 1990-2003 EEI data 
ARC heat, declining 
with electricity 
7 Improving Average / Average 1960s- Modernisation 
ARC 2000s ongoing 
8 Improving Average / Average 1960s- Modernisation 
FIN 2000s 
9 improving High / Average 1991-2004 EEI data 
FIN electricity, heat 
stabile 
10 Improving High / Average 1990-2004 EEI data 
FIN 
11 Improving High / High 1960s- Capital stock 
FIN 2000s turnover 
12 Impr)ving High / High 1960s- Capital stock 
FIN 2000s turnover, retrofit 
13 Improving High / High 1960s- Capital stock 
FIN 2000s turnover 
Key to reliability of analysis: 
*** Reliable = Energy Efficiency Index data or total lack of modernisation of old equipment 
** Less reliable = based on technology path data only/technology path and limited set of EEI data 
* Unreliable = no numeric data available, technology path provides limited clues. 
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Table 10.6 shows that Finnish plants perform better than Russian plants. The only 
declining energy efficiencies were identified in the case of Russian plants 3 and 4 which 
did not replace any of their old equipment during the observation period, and in addition 
in the case of Plant 4, the capital stock is very old. The level of energy efficiency was 
estimated as low only in the case of some Russian plants, while there were also average 
and even high performances in Russia. The energy efficiency of the Finnish plants is 
mostly high and in some cases average; however, the data available was very limited. But 
recent (I 980s-I 990s) capital stock turnover in Finland can be regarded as quite a reliable 
indicator of high energy efficiency as the efficiency of new pulp and paper equipment 
improves constantly. The analysis of Plant 12 was regarded as unreliable as the plant 
significantly changed its pulp production method during the observation period and it was 
therefore more difficult to estimate the level of energy efficiency. 
10.2.2 Technology vs drivers and barriers 
The comparison of the plant-specific technology paths and the drivers and barriers 
reported by each plant shows whether the statements of drivers and barriers are linked to 
reality, i. e., whether the drivers and barriers have directed the development of technology 
at the plant. However, the statements mostly cover only the last decade as drivers of and 
barriers to modernisation change over time. A striking example of this occurred in the 
beginning of the systemic change in Russia when the old investment criteria, i. e., a place 
in the funding queue at the relevant ministry, was abandoned and replaced by various, 
more market-based criteria. 
Table 10.7 surnmarises my plant specific findings on reflecting the reported drivers and 
barriers in the technology path. The relationship of the technology path and drivers and 
barriers has been divided into three categories: 1) yes i. e. drivers and barriers have been 
reflected in the technology path; 2) not clearly i. e. some signs of the drivers and barriers 
directing the technology path could be found but they remained unclear; and 3) no i. e. 
drivers and barriers reported seemed to contradict with the technology path. 
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Table 10.7 Are drivers and barriers reflected in the technology path? 
Karelia Archangelsk Finland 
Yes 1 
_3 
4 
Not clearly 2 0 1 
No 1 0 0 
Based on the data in Table 10.7, the drivers and barriers reported directed the technology 
paths of all plants based in Archangelsk and almost all plants based in Finland. In 
Karelia, the drivers and barriers of only one plant had clearly directed investments while 
the case of two other plants remained unclear. One plant listed drivers and barriers that 
contradicted its technology path. Consequently, Karelian drivers and barriers seem a less 
reliable basis for analysis than those of Archangelsk and Finland. 
it is not obvious why the Karelian drivers and barriers did not clearly reflect the 
technology paths, although some reasons can be suggested. First, transition factors still 
seem to influence Karelia more than Archangelsk, as the principles of market economy 
are applied less often. Second, Karelian plants retain more features of insider 
management than those in Archangelsk while corporate governance has completely 
penetrated the Finnish pulp and paper sector. As a result, decision-making may be less 
structured and lack strategic thinking. 
However, it remains interesting to ask why an interviewee would outline an imaginary 
driver or a barrier. I am confident this is not the case with any of the plants. I believe that 
the continuing confusion over the mixture of soft and hard budget constraints leads to 
situations where a driver seems obvious but implementation of an investment is either 
very slow or does not happen at all, as there is no desperate need to reduce costs and/or 
increase profits. 
10.2.3. Summary of discussion on development of technology 
Based on the technology path analyses, Russian capital stock mostly dates back to the 
early 1970s while on average Finnish capital stock was commissioned towards the end of 
the 1970s. It can be concluded that decommissioning equipment as well as retrofitting 
were fairly common in Russia in the 1990s. There are also plants in Russia that did not 
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decommission obsolete equipment but retrofitted them slightly. All Finnish plants with 
capital stock older than 20 years retrofitted their equipment in the 1990s. Finnish plants 
replace decommissioned equipmentwith new more often than Russian plants do, which 
may derive from corporate governance always relying on an investment strategy. As 
some of the Finnish plants are fairly recently built, not all of them are in need of 
modernisation. 
The technology path analysis was also used to amend the energy-efficiency comparison 
of plants presented in section 10.2 based on energy efficiency indices. In this additional 
analysis, Finnish plants perform better in terms of energy efficiency than Russian plants. 
The only declining energy efficiencies were identified in Russia. Energy efficiency is low 
in the case of some Russian plants, although average and high performances were also 
detected. Finnish plants mostly maintain a high level of energy efficiency, although the 
performance of an odd plant is partly only average, and therefore, similar to some 
Russian plants. But the limited availability of Finnish data may distort the results in this 
case, and the differences between electricity and heat efficiencies cannot be detected. 
Drivers and barriers were reflected in the technology paths at most Finnish and all 
Archangelsk-based plants while the Karelian situation appeared less clear. Consequently. 
it may be concluded that the Finnish and Archangelsk statements are more reliable than 
the Karelian. The contradictions between statements and action are likely to have been 
caused by the remaining elements of soft budget constraints, for instance, regional 
government transfers, the lack of implementation of the insolvency legislation and 
remaining payment arrears, which reduce the urgency for action. Therefore. the 
mentioned reasons for modernising may still be valid even though they have not been put 
into practice so far due to soft budget constraints. 
10.3 Summary 
The research objectives of this chapter were to: 
13. Compare the development of energy efficiency between pulp and paper plants. 
and the pulp and paper sectors of the focus regions. 
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14. Compare the development of technology between plants based on the technology 
path analyses, and suggest trends in energy efficiency to plants which did not 
provide quantitative data. 
Pulp and paper sector on average is more energy -efficient in Finland than in the case- 
study Russian regions. However, the difference appears mostly in heat efficiency while 
the differences in electricity efficiency are minor and in some cases non-existent at plant 
level. 
Most Russian plants decommissioned obsolete capital stock in the 1990s. Even though 
this energy efficiency improvement disappeared in the inefficiency peak of the 1990s 
caused by running the remaining equipment on reduced capacity, it shows in the end of 
the observation period when the volume of production starts to increase. The amount of 
modernisation in Russia was fairly modest during 1991-2003 compared to Finland. The 
Russian capital stock remains on average some seven years older than that of the Finnish 
case plants. Energy efficiency was judged to be declining in the case of three Russian 
plants, two of them in the absence of adequate data for EEI analysis, and therefore. based 
on the complete lack of decommissioning and modernisation shown in their technology 
paths, and one based on an EEI analysis. The reported drivers and barriers were most 
clearly reflected in the technology paths of Archangelsk and Finland based case plants. 
and less so in Karelia. 
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11. Discussion: Analysis on Drivers and Barriers 
11.1 Main drivers and barriers identified 
11.1.1 Drivers and barriers in Russia 
The most important barriers to modernisation in Karelia and Archangelsk include lack of 
funding (including bank credits and non-payment problems with local administrations), 
the low energy price, lack of enforced property rights, pressure by local administrations 
to finance social programmes, and lack of government support for general infrastructure 
in the region. 
The most important drivers of modernisation in Karelia and Archangelsk are mostly 
market-signal-related, including increasing production capacity, reducing cost price, 
competitiveness, making a profit and the quality of the product. Fear of bankruptcy also 
fuels modernisation. Energy price was reported as a driver of modernisation by quite a 
few plants. However, in practice, modernisation measures have focused on fuel 
switching. This provides evidence that regulated energy prices, namely electricity and 
gas, are not high enough yet to spur modernisation. The high share of energy costs of the 
total production costs was mentioned as a driver as well. 
11.1.2 Drivers and barriers in Finland 
The most important barriers to modernisation in Finland are also related to money as the 
plants reported that corporate investment quotas are too small. The lack of profitable 
energy-saving and energy efficiency improvement opportunities due to the high level of 
energy efficiency (Finland Forest Industries Federation, 2006b, p. 24) is also regarded as 
a barrier, and it was widely argued that the capital stock cycle, i. e., investments for 
reasons other than energy efficiency (Hardell & Fors, 2005, p. 19, IEA, 1987, pp. 60-61) 
provide most of the efficiency improvements. Open government policies which may 
influence the taxation of fuels were mentioned as barriers. 
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The main drivers include market-signal-related issues such as increasing production 
capacity, quality of the product and cutting cost prices. Corporate practices to compare 
plants within the corporate and to invest in BAT were regarded as important drivers of 
modernisation. Government energy-saving and energy efficiency improvement policies. 
especially grants for investments, were recognised as drivers by most plants. The energy 
price was mentioned as a factor and a driver, but not emphasised as the most important 
driver. 
11.1.3 Comparison of drivers and barriers between countries 
it is significant that the main barrier, the lack of money, and main driver, market signals, 
recognised in both countries are the same. However, plants lack financial resources for 
different reasons, i. e., in Russia due to the poor investment climate and in Finland due to 
corporate strategies that dictate the most efficient allocation of financial resources. The 
barrier is much more serious, and structural, in Russia than in Finland. 
However, all the rest of the most important barriers to modernisation were different, quite 
clearly because the comparison is between a transition economy and a market economy. 
In Russia, they relate to the lack of structural reform of the economy i. e. shortcomings of 
the legislation and its enforcement, and the arbitrary governance practices (Ahrend and 
Tompson, 2005a, pp. 47-48) that appear in this study as the practices of the authorities 
that do not follow rules established by law. As a result of this uncertainty. the Russian 
plants are willing to participate in social schemes unlawfully imposed by the local 
governments as well as supplying heat to the local community without receiving 
payments because. In Finland, plants cannot find any more profitable energy-saving and 
energy efficiency improvement opportunities. 
The common main driver of investments, market signals, includes issues such as 
competitiveness, increase in production capacity, surviving in the market and reducing 
production costs which are all linked to making profit which is the main task of a 
company. The rest of the main drivers, again, differ radically between the countries. The 
Finnish drivers focus on the signals established by the corporate strategy and 
government's energy-saving and energy efficiency policies. In Russia, the high share of 
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energy of the total production costs was emphasised while energy price was also 
mentioned. 
11.2 Lessons from drivers and barriers 
The purpose of this comparison of drivers and barriers between the countries and regions 
is to identify similarities and differences between them. First, the focus is on establishing 
what lessons Finland could offer Russia, based on drivers and barriers identified, and 
second, estimating whether both the Russian regions should learn the same lessons from 
Finland or are the lessons region-specific. In the first section, the conclusions on Russia 
are generalised over the two regions and the second section highlights the regional 
differences inside these trends. 
11.2.1 Lessons from Finland for Russia 
The main difference between the countries is the ownership arrangement of the plants, 
which is reflected throughout all the drivers and barriers. In Finland, the corporate 
organisational structure has penetrated throughout the pulp and paper sector (Finnish 
Forest Industries Federation, 2006a, p. 13). All the Finnish plants included in this study 
are owned by a corporation. In Russia, independent ownership structures dominate while 
the corporate organisational structure is only just emerging (see Table IL]). Martinot 
(1995, p. 124) reports how the high degree of control of the company by the workforce 
causes significant resistance to economic efficiency measures such as reducing the 
workforce. This could be an example of some of the pathologies management may inflict 
on a company introduced by Fox and Heller (2000, pp. 1727-1739), namely, failure to 
use existing capacity efficiently and a failure to implement positive net present value 
projects (see pp. 45-46). It seems that in Karelia bankruptcy has been used as a tool to 
restart the same business in some cases. 
Corporate governance means that a single unit has much less decision-making power than 
independent plants do, but the investment potential of a corporate is much larger than that 
of an independent unit Corporate strategy acts as a guideline to investments in Finland, 
where the competition for funding between the units of a corporation is a factor of daily 
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life. Even though some Finnish plant managers argue that the basic investmeni allocation 
by the corporation is too small for their needs, they also recognise that if the unit wins the 
funding competition inside the corporation, funding large investments is easier than it 
would be for an independent unit. 
Table 11.1 Ownership structures of Russian plants compared to some indicators 
Plant Ownership Strategic planning Role of energy Modernisation* Drivers and 
experts barriers 
1 20% foreign Not obvious Unclear Average Reflect 
KAR technology path 
2 Insider Some signs such as No Low No clear link to 
KAR specialising technology path 
3 - 77% foreign Not obvious Unclear Low Contradicts 
KAR but controlled technology path 
by insiders 
4 Outsider Yes Established Average Unclear as under 
KAR Russian new management 
holding and plant closed 
company for modemisation 
5 50% Russian Not obvious, even Established Low Seem to reflect 
ARC companies, though strategy technology path 
30% insiders mentioned but 
inertia in decision- 
making 
6 Mainly owned Some signs Established Average Reflect 
ARC by foreign technology path 
company 
7 26% Russian Yes, competition Established High Reflect 
ARC corporation, between units of technology path 
25% Russian corporate 
bank, insiders 
*Key to levels ot "modemisation": Low - below 20%; Average - 2u---)uýlo; Hign - over --, u-I.. 
Based on the scrutiny and strategic planning of corporate governance, investments are 
allocated to the most cost-effective and strategically favourable proposals. In Russia. 
investment-related decision-making tends to be less structured and planned than in 
Finland. The time span of investment-related decision-making is considerably shorter, as 
(Bazhanov, 2000, p. 4), and the uncertainty of the future in general and property rights 
specifically make investments with a longer payback period unattractive or even 
impossible. Inertia in decision-making was also observed. These cases also fall into 
various pathology categories of Fox and Heller (2000), for instance one plant had 
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invested in a new modem office while the plant next to it was badly in need of 
modernisation (pathology 3: misinvestment of internally generated cash flow. see p. 46). 
More investment planning was reported by corporate-govemed plants, which suggests 
that insider and mixed-ownership patterns promote investment planning less than 
corporate ownership. Table 11.1 illustrates that modernisation has been more active at 
plants owned by outsiders. 
The role of energy experts is a good example of the differences between the governance 
systems, and linked to the favourability of organisational structure to energy efficiency 
(Sorrell et al., 2000, pp. 53-56) as discussed in Chapter 5. Energy experts have an 
established role in investment-related decision-making in Finland. but less so in Russia. 
However, Russian plants with elements of corporate governance had more often 
established the role of energy experts in decision-making than those which reported no 
elements of corporate governance (see Table 11.1). Failure to establish a role to the 
energy experts in investment related decision-making could be regarded as Fox and 
Heller's pathology number 2, failure to use existing capacity efficiently (see p. 45). 
Lack offunding seems more acute in the case of the Russian plants than the Finnish ones. 
All Finnish plants have their annual funding allocation from the corporate and the 
potential to receive more funding for the best proposals, while there is a constant shortage 
of money in most cases for the Russian plants, as profit is not high enough to cover 
investment needs. The basic difference in backgrounds is significant. The task of the 
Finnish plants is to keep their fairly up-to-date and well-maintained equipment 
functioning as efficiently as possible with a limited but annual funding allocation, and 
without a direct short-term link to the sale of products of this particular unit'9. Most 
Russian plants are trying to update their mostly old and out-of-date equipment (Lesprom, 
2004, p. 2) with only very limited funding earned by running the mentioned equipment, 
and therefore, very dependent on profits made. For the Finns, it is possible to plan 
investments as the equipment mostly runs fairly smoothly while when Russian equipment 
fails, there may be money to fix only the most acute failures. 
" As corporates are profit seeking organisations they would naturally eliminate a loss-making unit over 
time. But the corporate support enables units not to make profit during modernisation or other disruption in 
production and continue to receive investments as long as the unit is expected to make profit in the future. 
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The lack of funding also reflects the transition related lack of stability in the Russian 
economy and the distrust investors feel towards it. High interest rates and the 
unavailability of investment loans are also results of the risks investors experience. and 
the short-term approach of the Russian economy is a reaction to the ongoing change in 
the economy. The attitude of banks makes sense; why lend money over long periods of 
time and let borrowers delay beginning repayment when the value of money, property 
rights and political developments at the highest level remain uncertain? In addition to the 
lack of funding, also the reluctance of the plant owners to invest in modernisation due to 
the weakness of property rights is a related issue which defers investment (Ahrend and 
Tompson, 2005a, p. 34). The stability of the Finnish system provides a more reliable 
basis for banking business and consequently similar problems do not occur in Finland. 
The profile of energy efficiency and energy-saving investments is different in Finland and 
Russia. The Finnish plants and experts argue that energy efficiency improvements are 
merged into larger investments, partly because it is not practical to carry out specific, 
individual investments that would often require bringing the production process to a halt 
as also recognised by Sorrell et al. (2004, p. 68), but also because the natural capital cycle 
improves energy efficiency. These ideas were clear to the Finnish interviewees, and 
energy-consumption issues had obviously been considered carefully. Some Russian plant 
managers suggested similar ideas; however, in general energy efficiency and energy- 
saving investments were regarded less as integrated investments in Russia. This may 
partly reflect the huge Russian energy-saving potential that makes individual investments 
widely available (which is less the case in Finland), and partly the fact that the strategic 
nature of energy efficiency has been considered less by Russian plant managers that falls 
in Fox and Heller's pathology category 4: failure to implement positive net value projects 
(see p. 45). 
The way Finnish and Russian plants see their relationship with the authoritieS40 is 
dramatically different. In Russia, implementing legislation (and its enforcement) can be 
neglected, or even negotiable in some cases, while in Finland the rule of law is non- 
40 In the Russian cases mostly regional authorities, and in the case of Finland with national level authorities. 
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negotiable and based on the rulings of the courts 41 . Regional authorities also require some 
Russian companies to fulfil social responsibilities, as they used to do in the Soviet Union, 
by contributing financially to social schemes. At the same time, local authorities fail to 
pay for the heat the plants deliver, which can be regarded as a kind of governmental fee 
in practice as the plants have little chance to change the situation. Some plant managers 
argued that it is necessary to keep the authorities satisfied in order to avoid difficulties. 
This enforcement of unlawful tax schemes is based on the threat of difficulties the 
regional administration could cause, such as revising an informal agreement between the 
administration and the plant on bow to adjust the implementation of environmental 
legislation, which is too strict to be implemented as such, arranging tax or other 
inspections or withdrawing support for international funding applications. I have no 
empirical evidence of such things happening at any of the plants included, but the 
interview evidence suggests plant managers fear this could happen should they refuse to 
contribute as requested. This uncertainty over this tax burden so typical to a transition 
economy also represents an example of the instability of relations with authorities and 
hence, the difficulty of investment planning. 
The approach to environmental investments 42 required by the authorities was in general 
negative in Finland, based on the argument that such investments consume money that 
could be invested in energy efficiency and energy saving. In Russia, the views on similar 
environmental investments were more positive, and the majority regarded them as 
supportive of energy efficiency and energy saving (similarly to the theory on drivers to 
energy efficiency, see p. 115). However, Finnish plants have already invested significant 
amounts to solve environmental problems (see p. 18), which may explain their negative 
approach when yet more is required. In both countries.. the plants expected general 
support from the authorities for the sector. Russian plants felt that the federal government 
4' The Finnish voluntary targets on energy saving do not contradict this statement as the legislation on the 
voluntary targets has been implemented by the Finnish administration even though the measures by the 
industrial actors are voluntary. In general, the threat of compliance with tough targets to be enforced 
through the rule of law is likely an explanatory factor behind the success of the Finnish voluntary 
agreements. Had a problem similar to that of the Russian lack of implementation appeared in Finland, the 
whole scheme of voluntary targets may have not been established. Voluntary targets can be joined by 
industrial energy users who wish to do so, and as a result, have been established to be negotiable by the 
law. As a comparison, the Russian authorities sometimes negotiate with companies what parts of legislation 
that establish compulsory measures should be implemented and what pans can be ignored. 
42 For instance, cleaning the exhaust air and water, and purchasing greenhouse gas emitting allowances. 
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was not providing enough support for building forest roads, while the Finnish authorities 
were praised for giving pennission to build a fifth nuclear reactor as it contributes to the 
energy security of the country. 
The performance of energy-saving and energy qfficiency policies and measures were 
regarded as positive in Finland and mostly negative in Russia. This difference in 
approaches can be explained by the fact that the Finnish set of policies and measures has 
been a success and plants have participated actively in implementation (KTM. 2005. p. 5) 
while the Russian regional legislations have spun off only a few measures or positive 
results, none of them in the pulp and paper sector. Finnish experts argue that their 
systematic approach to potential energy-saving and energy efficiency improvement 
opportunities makes investing easier, and that the Finnish approach to keep one's word 
even under a voluntary agreement supports the success of the chosen policy tools. 
Both the Russian regions had similar problems with energy-saving and energy efficiency 
policies and measures, namely lack of implementation, lack of funding and lack of clarity 
as to bow the declared policies should be implemented. This was partly due to the lack of 
central coordination of implementation as regional legislation is based on the federal 
legislation, and partly the lack of attention by the regional administration. 
The successful Finnish energy-saving policies consisted of two main elements: voluntary 
agreements between the government and stakeholders to audit energy use, identify 
energy-saving opportunities, implement some of the identified measures and report back 
to the government body annually; and government grants to support both energy audits 
and implementation of the identified measures. There are also national and EU-level 
energy-efficiency standards and norms that provide benchmarks for the plant-level 
activities, and the price of energy is fairly high which makes energy saving profitable. 
The plant level activities are under constant review due to the annual reporting, which 
adds to the urgency of implementing this voluntary activity, and the national-level targets 
and activities are reviewed both by the administration itself and by outside consultants. 
Energy price was regarded as a factor rather than a driver of modernisation in Finland 
while Russian views were less clear. Finnish corporates provide their units with 
335 
electricity and heat below market priceS43 (see pp. 247,283,292-293,301) as does the 
Russian government by selling energy below market prices (see p. 73), which might act as 
a barrier to energy saving in theory. However, prices are significantly higher in Finland 
than in Russia (see p. 66). Even though the Finnish corporates provide plants with below- 
market energy prices in Finland, energy use still remains more efficient than in Russia. 
Russian experts claim that the current energy prices are high enough to stimulate 
modernisation. Even though energy efficiency indices slightly improved at the end of the 
observation period compared with at the beginning, no major modernisation waves can 
be observed in the technology paths apart from some exceptions. This suggests that the 
improvement in energy efficiency was more likely to have been caused by the wave of 
decommissioning. As a comparison, the level of energy efficiency in Finland provides 
evidence that prices are high enough to stimulate energy saving. Consequently. it can be 
concluded that Russian prices are not high enough yet even though some analysts have 
argued that energy prices are high in Russia (Martinot and Usiyevich 2001, p. 1). The 
views of Russian energy experts and administrations may be based on social rather than 
econormc grounds. 
But rising energy prices will not make much difference in Russia if companies are 
operating under soft budget constraints, i. e., are not accountable for all their spending 
(Aslund, 2002, p. 289) as outstanding debts are not routinely challenged and debts to 
authorities can be deleted by administrative action (this happened in Karelia. see p. 186). 
Economic accountability is a framework required for an energy-pricing instrument to 
deliver lower energy consumption. Nor would the rising energy prices deliver significant 
investments to modernisation as long as property rights remain weak. The trend to switch 
to cheaper fuels was observed in both Finland and Russia, which would suggest that the 
market mechanism works and that budget constraints are either hard or moving in that 
direction as they should during economic transition. 
" According to the plant level case studies, corporates provide plants with energy below market prices. 
However, the units were not willing to give me the exact price of energy they buy through the corporate. 
The closest I could get as reported on page 280 was the statement that the corporate provides electricity 
'tens of percents' below market price. 
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The share of energy costs of the total production costs is dramatically higher in Russia 
than in Finland (see p. 164), and in Russia many low-hanging fruits for energy saving and 
energy efficiency are still available (Bashmakov, 1993. p. 469). This suggests that 
increasing energy prices would trigger further measures faster in Russia than in Finland. 
The markel signals-based drivers do not differ significantly between the countries. 
However. the Russian plants are in general more worried about staying in the market, 
increases in volume of production, and competitiveness, mostly in the international 
market. A fall in cost price by reducing energy consumption is regarded as a driver of 
investments more by the Finnish plants. 
Table 11.2 collects the findings of the drivers and barriers analysis discussed above, and 
outlines lessons from Finland for Russia. The implementation of these lessons in Russia 
is also discussed. 
Table 11.2 Lessons from Finland 
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The lessons discussed in Table 11.2 can be divided into four categories: 1) systemic, 
which refers to the change Russia is going through during economic transition-, 2) 
institutional, which is related to the arrangement of governance and policy tools; 3) 
energy; and 4) general. The lessons suggested in Table 11.2 can be sum-mari sed as: 
corporate ownership; (systemic) 
financial help from the state for modernisation; (general) 
stable economy as a basis; (systemic) 
neutral role of administration; (institutional) 
business activities require a functional basic infrastructure provided by the state, 
(general) 
- policies need to be directly linked to implementation; (institutional) 
- policies should be seen as interdependent aggregate packages; (institutional) 
energy prices should be increased (energy); and 
hard budget constraints act as a framework for modernisation (systemic). 
11.2.2 Implementation of Lessons 
Recommendations on how to implement these lessons have been divided into two 
sections. First, the recommendations are discussed per theme, namely structural reforin of 
the economy. administrative reform, policy and implementation strategy, and individual 
policies which are closely linked to economic transition discussed in Chapter 2. Second, 
energy-saving and energy efficiency policies are discussed as an example of the 
interdependence of reforms and policies. 
Recommendations per theme 
Structural reform of the economy is a requirement for wide-scale modemisation. 
Currently, most investors, both domestic and foreign, avoid the Russian pulp and paper 
industry as due to the lack of structural reforms. Property rights are not fully enforced, 
the rules of the game are not transparent to outsiders, and the rule of law has yet to 
penetrate the regional governance (Ahrend and Tompson, 2005a, pp. 34,49). 
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Structural reform (discussed in Chapter 2) would introduce hard budget constraints by 
forcing unviable companies out of the market as a result of the enforcement of 
bankruptcy legislation. For example, in Karelia ownership structures have not improved 
much even though most of the case pulp and paper plants were declared bankrupt in the 
1990s. This is linked to the dysfunctional institutions created by incomplete structural 
reform as also recognised by Rautava and Sutela (2000. p. 114) and the fact that soft 
budget constraints allow loss-making companies to survive (Commander et a] 1996. p. 8). 
Hard budget constraints would force companies to improve the efficiency of the 
activities, including energy use, in order to make enough profit to survive, and therefore, 
improve the availability of investment loans as unviable companies would go bankrupt 
rather than to the next bank when they run into financial difficulties. Getting rid of the 
pathologies of managerial behaviour and introducing longer-term thinking. including 
investment planning, core business issues related to product mix and other strategic 
considerations related to modernisation is, consequently, dependent on the successful 
implementation of a structural reform of the economy. 
Corporate ownership with its coordinated and effectiveness maximising governance 
would also be more likely to penetrate to Russia on a larger scale if the structural reforms 
were finalised. This could provide external financing and better planning of 
modernisation. There is evidence that this development has already started in Russia. The 
small company size created by the privatisation of the Soviet production units as one- 
plant companies has been increasing significantly during 1991-2001 as a result of 
horizontal integration driven by the growth of business empires and financial -industrial 
groups (World Bank 2005, pp. 102-107). 
Administrative reform at regional level is another requirement for large-scale 
modernisation of the Russian pulp and paper industry. Currently, the arbitrary conduct by 
regional administrations typical to transition economies makes the future unpredictable 
for businesses as also recognised by the Ahrend and Tompson (2005a pp. 40,47), and 
therefore, too risky to invest in modernisation. 
Figure 10.8 shows which parts of the governance would benefit from further transitional 
reforms in order to provide a ftmctional framework for implementing policies. First. 
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regional policies should be planned based on ]on -term strategies and coordinated by 91 
studying the potential impact of new policies in the existing framework (Ingram and 
Mann. 1980, p. 22; Birkland, 2001, p. 159). Involving stakeholders through consultations 
and in the implementation of policies improves the chances of success for policies 
(Nagel, 2001, p. 86). Transparent criteria for public investments gain credibility. Second, 
implementation of policies requires a division of responsibilities and accountability 
among public agencies (Ingram and Mann, 1980, p. 25). Setting targets is important in 
order to review the work that reflects the success of implementation. For now. 
governance has been based on the division of responsibilities among agencies in the case- 
study regions, although no serious targets have been set and the outcomes of policies 
have not been reviewed. In general, implementing policies has not been taken seriously 
by public officials. Consequently, the third important governance reform needed is 
dealing with misconduct by officials which has been common during the economic 
transition. The legally set roles of regional officials must be enforced, stakeholders 
encouraged to reporting misconduct, and officials punished when they fail to follow the 
code of conduct established by law (Berman, 1980, p. 209). 
Figure 11.1 Focus of administrative reform required 
I ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM I 
Planning& Implemen- Misconduct 
involveinent tation 
II 
- long-term - divide - enforce 
approach responsibilities legislation 
- coordinate between - encourage 
the impact of agencies reporting 
policies - divide misconducts 
- transparent accountabilities - punish officials 
criteria of between and local 
public agencies authorities for 
investment - set targets misconducts 
decisions - review work to 
-i nvo Ive ensure 
stakeholders: implementation 
consultations 
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Strategic planning of policies as packages, together with their implementation in a 
coordinated way is crucial, but often missing in transition economies as the various 
simultaneous reforms are difficult to coordinate (see for instance Rautava and Sutela 
2000, pp. 112-113). Both the Russian regions had, in principle, outlined some good 
policy tools, but they remained unlinked and there were too many of them. A policy 
package must have clear goals (see for instance Nagel. 2001, p. 8-3), and each policy tool 
needs to have a well-defined role that contributes to the overall goal of the policy 
package (Birkland, 2001, p. 167). Each tool needs an implementation plan, and a 
responsible agency. New policy tools must also be coordinated within the existing 
framework of policies (Ingram and Mann, 1980, p. 21) in order to include only measures 
that are functional in the general legislative framework. International regimes requiring 
action at national level also belong to this framework (e. g., WTO, OECD membership). 
The choice of policy tools must be based on the possibility of their implementation in the 
existing (and often changing in the case of transition economies) policy framework 
(Ingram and Mann, 1980, p. 21) and the expected outcome (Berman, 1980. p. 208). 
Targets should be expressed in numeric terms (for instance 12% cut in heat consumption 
of pulp and paper sector in Karelia region by 2010 compared to 2002 consumption) that 
are strictly enforced or otherwise rewarded in the case of good performers. It is awkward 
to launch a policy that has no fixed target, as was the case for both regional energy- 
saving and energy efficiency policies. General targets are inadequate as it is impossible to 
evaluate the success of the implementation of policies against general targets, such as 
"higher level of energy efficiency" (Birkland, 2001. p. 158). Such targets can be partly 
explained based on the remaining Soviet traditions which accept that policies can be 
declarational and may not be implemented. 
The financial aspect of a planned policy is crucial (Birkland, 2001, p. 167). The current 
regional policies have suffered from lack of funding as part of the planned financing was 
supposed to come from the private sector, and there has been hardly any public money 
available for implementation. This can be explained by the poor economic conditions 
throughout most of the 1990s as a result of the economic transition related recession (see 
p. 40). Modernisation of the pulp and paper sector is, indeed, a significant task, and the 
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sector needs financial support from the state if large-scale modernisation is desirable for 
the government within the next decade. Grants and tax breaks could, therefore, encourage 
the private sector to act faster. Whether the government should provide direct financial 
support to industrial sectors is a wider discussion, and one may argue that this should not 
happen in a market economy. But the scale of modernisation need is very significant, and 
as the pace of modernisation has been very slow during the first 15 years of transition, the 
production infrastructure may physically collapse before the investment climate improves 
enough to attract investment for modernisation. Focused grants distributed through a 
bidding process, 44 and tax breaks for desirable performance (improvement of energy 
efficiency, exceeding the goverment energy efficiency target level etc. ) by industrial 
actors 45 have been implemented in market economies, and would be unlikely to cause 
damage to the emerging market economy. 
In addition, constant evaluation of the outcomes of the implementation is a key to 
successful governance. Stakeholders must be engaged in implementing the measures and 
this activity has to be supported both financially and by providing an easy and structured 
way for the stakeholders to implement the measures. However, given the Russian 
attitudes and the prevailing lack of responsibility (Chugrov, 2000; Melberg, 1997) related 
to economic transition, voluntary approaches like the Finnish may not work and may 
have to be legislated in order to stand a better chance of enforcement. 
A better-structured federal governance of energy-saving and energy efficiency policies 
and measures, or breaking the link between the federal and regional policies altogether by 
allocating the task completely to the regions, would also improve the chances of success 
for regional policies. 
Some individual policies and measures which could improve the chances of plants 
modernising were identified, including: 
" As discussed in Chapter 9, the Finnish government distributes grants for energy-saving and energy 
efficiency investments. 
" Hennicke et al., (1998, p. 72). Denmark has introduced tax breaks for different types of energy use, and 
for companies that join a voluntary scheme. According to TEA (2003, pp. 51-52), Japan has implemented 
policies to provide tax breaks for companies implementing desirable energy-saving measures. lEA (2003). 
Energy Policies ofIEA Countries. Japan. 2003 Review, IEA/OECD, 2003. 
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increasing the energy price and bringing permanent, market dynamics to energy 
pricing; 
making importing foreign production technology easier; 
supporting investments planning; and 
encouraging companies to sue insolvents. 
Increasing the energy price is crucial (market-based energy prices are often referred to as 
the single main driver of energy efficiency, see for instance IEA, 1997, p. 99,105; 1EA. 
2000, p. 57; APERC, 2002, p. 43). The current low level of energy prices maintains the 
soft budget constraint that the economic transition aims at reforming (Rautava and Sutela, 
2000, p. 107). and therefore, does not stimulate modernisation. Without higher energy 
prices any energy-saving and energy efficiency policies are bound to fail. Without the 
financial driver of achieving savings from energy costs, it must be accepted that the level 
of efficiency is not going to change significantly. But a higher energy price alone is 
unlikely to work as long as structural reforrn remains unfinished making investing risky 
due to uncertain property rights. 
Energy-saving and energy efficiency policies as an example of inierdependence of 
reforms andpolicies 
Energy-saving and energy efficiency policy tools cannot work independently and. 
therefore, have to be set up as a systematically structured package to support each other, 
including well-planned policy tools, a functional system for implementing and 
monitoring the outcomes of the policies, and adequate funding (Ingram and Mann, 1980, 
pp. 19-22; Nagel, 1980, p. 8; Birkland, 2001, pp. 159-167). But the success of a policy 
package depends even more on the level of the energy price and the framework of 
transition-related reforms, especially structural reform, that create the rules of the game 
for business activities. Figure 11.2 illustrates this dependency of energy-saving and 
energy efficiency policies on the wider framework by presenting both structural reform of 
the economy and energy-price policy as the prerequisite for energy-saving and energy 
efficiency policies and measures. In Figure 11.2 the structural reform is shown as the 
base that needs to be implemented first in order to establish a transparent and functional 
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energy prIce policy. Based on these frameworks, energy saving policy could be 
successfully implemented. 
Figure 11.2 Framework of successful energy-saving and energy efficiency policies and 
measures 
STRUCTURAL REFORM 
ENERGY PRICE POLICY 
ENERGY SAVING 
POLICIES AND 
MEASURES 
Structured coordinated package of tools 
Establishes energy as a commodity worth saving 
Establishes hard budget constraints, the rule of 
Without hard budget constraints, certainty of ownership rights and the energy price at a 
level that makes energy worth saving, it is likely to be impossible to implement a 
successful energy-saving and energy efficiency policy package. 
11.2.3 Lessons and the Russian regions 
The task of this section is. first, to discuss the similarities and differences of the Russian 
case-study regions, and second, to identify whether the relevance of the lessons from 
Finland differs between the regions. 
. 
Ter? How do the drivers and barriers in Karelia and Archangelsk dýf 
Many plants and both regional administrations argue that the lack of. funding is a barrier 
to modemisation as profit is regarded as being too small to cover modernisation needs. 
The high cost of capital is one of the reasons behind the lack of financing available in 
both regions. Some foreign-equity investment has been gained, although not all plants are 
willing to sell a share to foreigners. In Karelia. one plant expressed views against handing 
equity over to foreign investors, while another plant in the same region had gone through 
a long ownership dispute with a foreign investor who eventually withdrew. In addition, 
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investment decisions are often taken on political rather than economic grounds in Karelia, 
which highlights the need for investment planning. 
The non-payment problem (see pp. 67,134) still prevails. especially in Karelia where 
plants not receiving payments against the heat they deliver to local administrations is 
common. I have no direct evidence whether the administration does nol have the money 
to pay, or if the problem is caused by arbitrary governance practices. i. e.. administrative 
units as debtors are able to abuse their position in order to refuse to pay. In Archangelsk. 
this problem has been mostly solved as only one plant reports such failures. The non- 
payment problem reduces the amount of money the plants can invest and therefore 
contributes to the chronic lack of fimancial resources. 
There is a significant difference between the regions when it comes to ownership 
structures. In Archangelsk, corporate organisational structures are emerging as one of the 
three plants is owned by a corporate while another plant also recognises that corporate 
governance influences the direction of investments. In Karelia. corporate organisational 
structure has yet to emerge even though two of the plants are owned at least partly by 
outsiders, and one Russian corporate recently bought Plant 4. In Archangelsk, all plants 
had an established role for the experts, while in Karelia some plants do not report 
involving energy experts. One of the reasons the Karelian ownership structures have not 
changed as fast as in Archangelsk may be the ownership disputes between a Karelian 
plant and a foreign investor. The Karelian government repossessed the plant purchased 
by the foreign investor, and handed it over to the plant management. As a result, foreign 
investors have been reluctant to invest in the region. 
Regional energy-saving and enerýU qfficiency policies had been received with mixed 
feelings in both Karelia and Archangelsk region. Basic laws in both regions were drafted 
to implement the federal law. In practice, the Karelian law was later repealed. and most 
of the Archangelsk legislation was never implemented. In both regions about half the 
plants regarded energy-saving and energy efficiency legislation as dysfunctional, or even 
non-existent, while the other half considered some of the measures implemented, mostly 
energy audits, as useful. In general, negative views seemed louder than the positive ones, 
and the legislation did not seem to involve the pulp and paper sector in practice. While 
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the Archangelsk administration admitted that the legislation was a failure, their Karelian 
colleagues only gave unclear responses. 
Views on government support for the pulp and paper sector were different in the regions. 
In Archangelsk, the main focus was on the failure of the government to build forest roads 
while some Karelian plants recognised the support of the regional government for 
investments, especially in the form of partial guarantees. In general. the relationship 
between the pulp and paper plants and the Archangelsk authorities sounded negative as 
the administration requires financial contributions for social schemes. Such arbitrary 
measures have also been recognised by Arhend and Tompson (2005a, p. 41-42,48). 
Karelian plants did not have as many general views on the activities of the regional 
authorities, but it was argued that the regional government leaves them alone. and 
therefore, does not hinder modernisation. This statement may sound absurd, and it has to 
be seen as a reflection of the planned-economy system under which production units had 
no official decision-making power as discussed in Chapter 2 (p. 49). 
In Archangelsk. plants regarded energy price as a factor rather than a driver of 
modernisation. However, the price of various fuels was argued as a driver of switching to 
cheaper fuels. In Karelia, the views of plants were confused, and some of them argued 
that energy is expensive but not expensive enough to trigger investments. Interestingly, 
administrations in both regions mostly regard energy as expensive enough to stimulate 
investment. However, plants in both regions agreed that the share of energy costs of the 
total is so large - in some cases up to 40% - that it is an obvious expense to save on. This 
is a new finding as the previous evidence (see page 163; Chuiko 2004) suggests that the 
share of energy costs of the total costs is lower in Russia than in the EU. 
The lack of stabiliry of the economy was recognised as a barrier by both administrations. 
The single most important transition-related barrier seems to be the lack of well-defined 
and enforced property rights (Ahrend and Tompson, 2005a, p. 34). This barrier was 
recognised in Archangelsk only, even though the ownership dispute between one of the 
Karelian plants and a foreign investor provides evidence of the widespread impact of the 
problem. The corporate dispute in which one of the Archangelsk units had been involved 
in paralysed its investment activities almost completely. The representative of an 
349 
Archangelsk plant described the impact of the takeover attempt. saying: "Dunng the 
period of the conflict you could not focus attention on the capital investments when you 
had a question mark whether you owned those assets[ ... ] You don't put [ ... ] money in 
right now questioning whether in two year's time you own the mill[ ... ] You keep [the 
mill] nmning[ ... ] but you don't put in major capital. " 
Are the same lessons relevant to both regions? 
Table 11.3 compares the relevance of the Finnish lessons to the case-study Russian 
regions. Most lessons are similar to both regions, although there are some differences: 
Corporate organisational structure has emerged in Archangelsk but it is only just 
emerging in Karelia; 
Archangelsk plants are more critical about the support they get from the 
govemment. 
Archangelsk interviewees provided more detailed information on the problems that might 
distort the results. However, the attitude of the Karelian plant managers was less open. 
which makes it difficult to collect equal sets of data from both regions. This attitude may 
be a sign of the insider approach that it is best to keep outsiders at a distance and not to 
provide any information which may be used against the informant in the future. Indeed, 
the Archangelsk-based informants have mentally adopted the market-economy system 
better than the Karelia-based informants, who provided many pI anned-economy -system - 
related views. Consequently, many problems that were not reported by the Karelian 
informants but occurred in Archangelsk may be as bad or even worse in Karelia (for 
instance, malpractice by the regional administration). The local informants may have 
either been willing to tell this information to an outsider, or did not regard these as 
problems. 
Table 11.3 Relevance of Finnish lessons to the case-study Russian regions 
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11.2.4 Summary of lessons from Finland to Russia 
Finland provides lessons for Russian regions. Most of the lessons are transition-related as 
economic reform is not fmalised in Russia. There are no significant differences between 
the regions, although Archangelsk is slightly further ahead in its reforms than Karelia. 
The most important lesson is the lack of coordination between policy frameworks. For 
instance, it will be impossible to create drivers for energy saving and energy efficiency 
improvements in the absence of economic reform and a higher energy price. The link, 
between policy tools and their implementation is also of the utmost importance. 
11.3 Comparison of empirical results to theory 
The task of this section is to survey the potential linkages between the theoretical 
literature discussed in Chapter 5 and the empirical material on drivers of and barriers to 
modernisation acquired by interviews, and identified in the case studies reported in 
Chapters 7-9. The aim is to conclude whether this empirical material is consistent with 
the existing literature, or whether it suggests the reconsideration of existing the theory. 
Therefore. the statements of relevance made in this section apply only to this empirical 
material, and is not meant to be wider hypotheses. In some cases it could probably be 
proved that a certain driver or barrier is relevant based on other material. however. this is 
not the task of this section. 
11.3.1 Relevance of theory 
Some drivers and barriers identified by the theoretical literature (Chapter 5) appeared in 
the empirical material almost identically. while most linkages were weaker as empirical 
material is typically more detailed than the theory. Some theoretical drivers and barriers 
had no points of contact with the empirical material. and vice versa. 
Table 11.4 compares the relevance of the theoretical drivers and barriers to the empirical 
material. In the table, the category relevant means that a single theoretical driver/barrier 
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or its elements were found in the empirical material. Irrelevant theoretical drivers/barriers 
or their elements were not identified in the empirical material at all, and therefore. were 
not regarded as relevant to this study (but may remain relevant to other studies). 
The theoretical drivers and barriers presented in Table 11.4 were outlined in Chapter 5. 
The most relevant categories of theoretical drivers and barriers are economic. 
institutional, technology -related and organisational. The least relevant theoretical 
categories were behavioural barriers, while quite a few barriers specific to Russia are also 
irrelevant, which would suggest that some of the barriers which were relevant at the 
beginning of economic transition have been solved by now. Many of the irrelevant 
drivers and barriers are theoretically complex and fairly narrow such as asymmetric 
information and split incentives that may contribute to their irrelevance. The irrelevant 
drivers and barriers may also be more focused on individual -level energy-saving 
decisions, and therefore, less applicable to industrial energy saving / energy efficiency. 
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Table 11.4 Relevance of theoretical drivers and barriers to empirical drivers and barriers 
Theoretical driver or barrier Relevant Irrelevant 
Econondc drivers 
Market-based energy price x 
Competition x 
Financial pressure x 
Image improvement x 
Core business considerations x 
Considerations of energy industry x 
Energy import dependence x 
Guaranteed supply of energy x 
Sustainable economic growth x 
Institutional drivers 
Environmental regulation x 
Taxation x 
Energy-saving/ energy efficiency programmes x 
Energy-saving companies and agencies x 
TechnoLo& drivers 
Domestic innovation systems x 
Opportunities provided by capital cycle x 
General conservatism/management innovation x 
Market-related barrkrs 
Externalities x 
imperfect information x 
Public goods x 
Asymmetric information x 
Access to capital x 
Hidden costs x 
Risk x 
inseparability of features x 
Split incentives -x 
Institutional barriers 
Regulated. energy prices x 
Subsidies x 
Imperfect competition/monopolistic energy sector x 
Behavioural barriers 
Bounded rationality x 
Form of information x 
Credibility d trust x 
Inertia x 
Values x 
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Organisational barriersldrivers 
Organisational structure x 
Power/intemal key actor x 
Organisational culture x 
Rules and routines x 
Extemal actor x 
Barriers specifw to Russia 
Instability of economic situation x 
Lack of institutional support x 
Existing infrastructure and lack of it x 
Lack of skills and experience x 
Corruption/mafia x 
Lack of metering and control x 
Focus on meeting production goals x 
Limited availability of energy efficient equipment x 
Lack of habit to select between products x 
Non-payment problem x 
Running capacity on low production volume x 
Low energy priCe x 
Weakness of contract institutions x 
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Table 11.5 Reasons why some theoretical drivers and barriers were judged irrelevant 
Irrelevant drivers and barriers Explanation 
Econondc drivers 
Considerations of energy industry Improving energy efficiency in order to increase fossil-fuel 
export opportunities and delaying the need for investments 
in new energy-supply capacity by improving energy 
efficiency did not come up in the empirical material. 
Energy import dependence Energy import dependence is relevant at regional level. 
especially in the case of municipalities. but the pulp and 
paper sector had not experienced problems with fuel 
supplies recently. The main reason to switch to local bio 
fuels is the lower price compared with external fuels. 
Market-related barriers 
Asymmetric information No references to principal-agent relationships that influence 
energy-saving /energy efficiency investments were 
mentioned by the plants. 
Split incentives No references to split incentives in the empirical material. 
perhaps partly because further interviews covering the 
internal decision-making process more in detail would have 
been required to discover issues related to them. 
Behavioural barriers 
Form of information Form of information was not relevant to investment 
decisions. 
Credibility and trust Trust in information was not relevant to investment 
decisions. 
Barriers Tecifw to Russia 
Lack of metering and control Pulp and paper plants measure their energy consumption - 
the problem has been solved on this sector. 
Focus on meeting production goals This approach was not detected. so the problem has 
probably been solved. 
Lack of habit to select between 
products 
Russian plants showed no evidence of finding it hard to 
choose between products, for instance paper machines. 
available in the market, so this Soviet tradition-related 
problem has probably been solved. 
Running capacity at low production Pulp and paper plants have largely returned to the pre- 
volume transition level of production/economical level of capacity 
use, and therefore, this problem is not relevant any more 
(however, it can be observed in the 1990s data). 
Table 11.5 provides explanations as to why some elements found in the theoretical 
literature were judged irrelevant to the empirical material collected for this study. Some 
of the categories may have been relevant but not important enough for the interviewees to 
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mention. These theoretical categories, here judged as irrelevant. may remain relevant to 
other studies. It is encouraging that some of the transition-related categories are no longer 
relevant as the Russian pulp and paper industry has overcome some of the problems 
experienced during the early transition. 
Tables 11.6-11.17 illustrate how empirical drivers and barriers fall into the categories 
established by the theoretical literature. Empirical drivers and barriers can appear under 
more than one theoretical category of drivers and barriers. as many of the empirical 
drivers and barriers required more than one theoretical driver/barrier as explanation. 
Market-signal-related drivers are linked to a large empirical category. which 
predominantly focuses on drivers. The only theoretical driver that has been regarded as a 
barrier in the empirical material is image improvement related issues (p. I 12). This is 
because the Russian association on company's image was negative as the lack of an 
environmental friendly image can be a barrier in the export markets. The most striking 
difference between the theoretical driver and the empirical material is the number of 
issues related to the category of core business considerations (p. 112). This category 
could be usefully divided into three sub-categories: corporate stratekn'. product 
development and market dynamics. Financial pressure was found to be a barrier in some 
cases in Russia, for instance because the cause of the financial pressure (volatile price of 
pulp) discourages companies to take a risk by making an investment. Opportunity costs 
included in the category 'financial pressure' were lowered by the regulated energy prices. 
and as a result reduce the pressure to cut energy consumption. According to the Russian 
plants, the price of electricity sold to the local monopolist electricity company is too low 
to drive investments in saving electricity by improving energy efficienCY46 . 
Opportunity 
costs can also be confused by the difficulty of enforcing payments from the local 
administration on heat. Even though it was profitable to invest in energy saving at the 
plant in order to sell more heat to the local administration based on the prices, the non- 
The price difference between own generation and electricity bought from the grid was RUB 1.3 
KWh vs. RUB 0.35-0.65 / KWh for own generating depending on the fuel (gas and coal) used 
(plant 1). 1 have no information of the price the monopolist pays to private electricity generators. 
and there might still be a marginal for profit. The fact that this does not trigger more energy 
efficiency investments could be either because the sale price is below production cost or due to 
the elements of soft budget constraints remaining in the economic system and delaying profitable 
investments. 
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payment problem adds to the uncertainty of this investment. In addition. some driver-, fall 
outside these sub-categories. The division between these sub-categories is illustrated in 
Table 11.7 which could contribute to the theory. 
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Table 11.6 Theoretical categories vs empirical material: market signals 
THEORIETICAL D/B I D/B ENIPIRICAL D/B I D/F/B 
I 
FIN 
D/F/B 
RUS 
DRIVERS: Market si gnals 
Markel-based energy 
prices 
D Fuel prices drive investments in switching to cheapest 
fuel 
F D 
Saving electricity overrides saving heat F/D N/A 
Competition D/B Competitiveness D D 
I 
_ Low price of products as competitive advantage N/A I D 
Financial pressure D/13 Volatile market price of products creates financial 
uncertainty 
N/A B 
High share of energy costs of the total costs 
stimulates energy saving / energy efficiency 
N/A D/F 
Shareholder value N/A F 
Easier for a large corporate to react to customers' 
demands as enough to invest in one unit first 
D N/A 
Payback period F B 
Low price of products as competitive advantage N/A D 
Cost price D D 
Low price of electricity if sold to the grid to the 
monopolist 
N/A B 
Core business D/B Corporate strategy directs investments F F 
considerations Easier to finance a large investment through a 
corporate 
D N/A 
Easier for a large corporate to react to customers' 
demands as enough to invest in one unit first 
D N/A 
Shareholder value N/A F 
Need to change activity /product mix D N/A 
Volume of production - economics of scale D D 
Desire to stay in the market N/A D 
Value of products N/A D 
Development of niche products N/A D 
Specialisation D D 
Domestic market is growing fast N/A D 
Domestic market is small N/A B 
Demand in the market N/A D 
Productivity D D 
Demands of customers D D 
Quality of product and emphasising it through 
packaging 
D D 
Increase of electricity generation capacity D D 
Plant situated in a centre of a major city, which limits 
expansion 
B N/A 
Lack of strategic mill-level investment plan N/A B 
Image improvement Attitude of the market on environmental issues N/A B 
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Table 11.7 Suggested division of the theoretical category core business considerations into 
sub-categories 
THEORETICAL D/B I D/B ý EMOPIRICAL D/B I D/F/B 
FIN 
D/F/B 
RUS 
DRIVER: Core business considerations 
Corporate strategy D/B Corporate strategy directs investments F F 
Easier to finance a large investment through a 
corporate 
D N/A 
Easier for a large corporate to react to customers' 
demands as enough to invest in one unit first 
D N/A 
Lack of strategic mill-level investment plan N/A B 
Market dynamics D/B Desire to stay in the market N/A D 
Domestic market is growing fast N/A D 
Domestic market is small N/A B 
Demand in the market N/A D 
Demands of customers D D 
Product development D Need to change activity/product mix D N/A 
Volume of production - economics of scale D D 
Value of products N/A D 
Development of niche products N/A D 
Specialisation D D 
Productivity D D 
Quality of product and emphasising it through 
packaging 
D D 
Increase of electricity generation capacity D D 
Other D Shareholder value N/A F E Plant situated in a centre of a maClor city. which limits 
expansion 
B N/A 
1 
Table 11.8 summarises the empirical material falling into the category macrocconomic 
drivers. Sustainable economic growth and stability (p. 1] 4) has an inverse (see below) 
sister category under Barriers specific to Russia. 
361 
Table 11.8 Tbeoretical categories vs empirical material: macroeconomic drivers 
THEORETICAL D/B I D/B EMPIRICAL D/B I D/F/B 
FIN 
D/F/B 
RUS 
DRIVERS: Macroeconomic 
Guaranteed supply of 
energy 
D Government support for energy supply provides 
safeguards for industry 
D N/A 
Sustainable economic D 
_General 
economic trends B/F B/F 
growth and stability Government policies under development create 
uncertainties 
B B 
Uncertainty of ownership rights: corporate wars N/A B 
The category of institutional drivers is fairly equivalent to the empirical material. 
However. environmental regulations (p. 115) are seen as barriers to modernisation rather 
than drivers by some plants. Environmental investments were regarded as barriers to 
modernisation by Finnish plants which argued that the environmental improvements 
required by the government occupy financial resources which could otherwise be 
invested in modernisation. In Russia some plants argued the same while others felt that 
investments in environmental protection support modernisation. This may be partly due 
to the fact that in Russia almost any investments in capacity improve the overall 
performance of the plant, and because replacing some old polluting production processes 
by new technology is supported by the environmental legislation (see for instance the 
case of Plant 7 (p. 24 1 ). ESCOs (p. 116) have not been as successful in practice either. as 
the theory assumes. This can be partly explained by the transition factors hindering 
effective implementation of projects (in Russia) and the lack of easily accessible 
profitable energy saving investments (in Finland). 
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Table 11.9 Theoretical categories vs empirical material: institutional drivers 
THEORETICAL D/B I D/B I EMPIRICAL D/B I D/F/B 
FIN 
D/F/B 
RUS 
DRIVERS: Institutional 
Environmental 
regulations 
D Old, polluting production process needs to be closed 
jown 
N/A D 
Environmental investments can support / hinder 
energy-saving / energy efficiency investments 
B D/B 
Government norms to ban some old technologies D N/A 
Energy-saving / energy efficiency policies D/F D/F/B 
C02 trading increases the price of electricity B N/A 
EU policies hinder investments B N/A 
Taxation D/B EU policies hinder investments B N/A 
I Government recently abolished export duty on pulp N/A D 
Energy-saving energy D Energy-saving / energy efficiency policies D/F D/F/B 
efficiency programmes Government grants support investments as unit- F/D N/A 
specific investment quota is too small 
Cooperation with external experts N/A D 
D SCO project was too expensive F N/A ý 
E Energy saving / energy efficiency policies D/F D/F/B 
Table 11.10 Theoretical categories vs empirical material: tech nology- related drivers 
THEORETICAL D/B I D/B EMPIRICAL D/B D/F/B D/F/B 
FIN RUS 
DRIVERS: Technolo gy-relate 
Domestic innovation D/13 Technology is expensive N/A B 
systems 
opportunities provided D/B Capital cycle F F 
by capital cycle Capital cycle automatically improves energy D N/A 
efficiency 
Energy saving / energy efficiency is often delivered _ F _ -T- 
as a side effect of other investments or integrated into 
other investments 
Large modernisation needs are impossible to meet in N/A B 
short term 
Management D/B Capital cycle is shortenin D N/A 
innovation/general Management of the unit has traditionally been D N/A 
conservatism interested in eneMjssues 
Old-fashioned attitudes towards energy saving N/A B 
energy efficiency 
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The theory on lechnology-related drivers also corresponds well with the empirical 
material. Opportunities provided by the capital cycle (p. H 8) are indeed recogni sed and. 
according to the plant's capital cycle, provides some automatic improvement of energy 
efficiency, as this is often delivered by investment prqjects not focusing on energy 
efficiency only. 
Table 11.11 Theoretical categories vs empirical material: market failures 
THEORETICAL D/B I D/B EMPIRICAL D/B I D/F/B 
FIN 
I D/F/B 
RUS 
BARRIERS: Market failures 
Extemalities B C02 trading increases the price of electricity D N/A 
Imperfect information B Uncertainty of ownership rights: corporate wars N/A B 
Loans are available/unavailable N/A D/B 
Lack of information exchange between corporates B I N/A 
Public goods B Difficult to implement measures to save energy as 
resources are domestic 
N/A B 
Given the importance of markelfailures as a theoretical category, it was not that relevant 
to the empirical material collected. No evidence of asymmetric in rmalion (p. 121) was . 
fo 
detected, and only few examples of the other categories were found. The most important 
category is imperfect information (p. 122). which is linked to property rights and 
availability of loans to Russian plants. 
Access to capital is the most significant empirical category under market barriers. Again. 
the theoretical category could be usefully divided into sub-categories, as illustrated in 
Table 11.11 
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Table 11.12 Theoretical categories vs empirical material: market barriers 
THEORIETICAL D/B I D/B EMPIRICAL D/B I D/F/B 
FIN 
D/F/B 
RUS 
BARRIERS: Market barriers 
Access to capital D/B Lack of money to invest B B 
Difficulties with bank credits/easy to find funding N/A D/B 
Loans are expensive N/A B 
Unit-specific investment quota is small B/F N/A 
Project financing by International Financial 
Organisations 
N/A D 
Loans are available/unavailable N/A D/B 
Profit is too small to cover the modemisation needs N/A B 
Easier to finance a large investment through a 
corporate 
D N/A 
Competition of funding inside corporate F F 
Shareholder support N/A F 
Large modemisation needs are impossible to meet in 
short term 
N/A B 
Guarantees by government to investments N/A D 
At the beginning of perestroika. profit was mostly 
divided between owners rather than invested. 
N/A B 
Hidden costs B Energy-saving / energy efficiency investment often B N/A 
causes interruption of production 
Loans are avai lab] e/unavai lable N/A D/B 
Risk B Large investments with a long payback period against 
Russian mentality to make money fast 
N/A B 
Volatile market price of products creates financial 
uncertainty 
N/A B 
Easier for a large corporate to react to customers' 
demands as enough to invest in one unit first 
D N/A 
Payback period F B 
Uncertainty of ownership rights: corporate wars N/A B 
Inseparability of 
features 
D/B Energy saving / improved energy efficiency is often 
delivered as a side effect of other investments or 
integrated into other investments 
F F 
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Table 11.13 Suggested division of the theoretical category access to capital into sub- 
categories 
THEORETICAL D/B IRI CAL D/B I D/F/B 
FIN 
D/F/13 
RUS 
DPJVER: Access to cap ital 
Loans D/13 Difficulties with bank credits/easy to find funding N/A D/B 
Loans are expensive N/A B 
Loans are available/unavailable N/A D/B 
Corp: )rate financing D/F/B Unit-specific investment quota is small B/F N/A 
Easier to finance a large investment through a 
corporate 
D N/A 
Competition for funding inside corporate F F 
Transition D/13 Shareholder support N/A F 
At the beginning of perestroika, profit was mostly 
divided between owners rather than invested. 
N/A B 
Large modernisation needs are impossible to meet in 
short term 
N/A B 
Profit is too small to cover the modernisation needs N/A B 
Other D/B Guarantees by government to investments N/A D 
Project financing by International Financial 
Organisations 
N/A D 
Lack of money to invest B B 
Theoretical and empirical institutional barriers correspond well. However, the influence 
of corporate energy-price setting to the attractiveness of modemisation should be added 
to the theory as it is currently not recognised by the theoretical literature. 
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Table 11.14 Theoretical categories vs empirical material: institutional barriers 
THEORETICAL D/B I D/B ENWIPJCAL D/B I D/FIB D/F/B 
FIN RUS 
BARRIERS: Institutional 
Regulated energy price B Corporate energy price calculations manipulate the F/B N/A 
competitiveness of investments inside corporate 
Energy price is heavily subsidised in Russia N/A B 
Subsidy B Local authority does not use energy tariffs to N/A B 
stimulate saving / energy e iciency 
Corporate energy price calculations manipulate the F/B N/A 
competitiveness of investments inside corporate 
imperfect competition B Surplus electricity has to be sold to local monopolist N/A 
on low price 
Table 11.15 Theoretical categories vs. empirical material: bebavioural barriers 
THEORETICAL D/B I D/B 71RICAL D/B I D/F/1B D/F/B 
FIN RUS 
BARRIERS: Behavioural 
Bounded rationality B Large investments with long payback period against N/A B 
Russian mentality to make money fast 
Too many unused facilities to maintain. which adds to N/A B 
costs 
Nowadays hardly any investments made with F N/A 
borrowed money 
Inertia B Lack of strategic mill-level investment plan N/A B 
_ Management reluctant to hand over ownership of the N/A B 
plant against investments 
Investments focused on other targets than production N/A B 
rocess 3 
t the beginning of perestroika, profit was mostly N/A B 
divided between owners rather than invested. 
Values D/B I Management of the unit has traditionally been D N/A 
I I 
interested in energy issues I 
The theoretical category of behavioural barriers included two barriers that were not 
detected in the empirical material. The empirical material falling into the category of 
inertia includes transition-related elements, which could amend the theory. 
367 
Table 11.16 Theoretical categories vs empirical material: organisational barriers 
THEORETICAL D/B I D/B EMEPIRICAL D/B I D/F/B 
FIN 
D/F/B 
RUS 
BARRIERS: Organisational 
Organisational D/B Ownership format of the company D D/B 
structure Competition for funding inside corporate F F 
Involvement of energy experts in investment-related 
decision-making 
D D/B 
Power D/B Involvement of energy experts in investment-related 
decision-making 
D D/B 
Government policies do not hinder modernisation N/A F 
Shareholder value N/A F 
Organisational culture D/B Lack of information exchange between corporates B N/A 
Management of the unit has traditionally been 
interested in energy issues 
D N/A 
No corporate strategy to reward energy saving 
energy efficiency improvement 
F N/A 
Rules and routines D/B Involvement of energy expert-, in investment-related 
decision-making 
D D/B 
Nowadays hardly any investments made with 
borrowed money 
F N/A 
Management of the unit has traditionally been 
interested in energy issues 
D N/A 
Strategic decision to purchase Best Practical 
Technology 
D N/A 
Corporate policy to compare units provides 
benchmarks 
D N/A 
Extemal actors D oreign investors provide new technology___ N/A D ý 
C Cooperation with external experts N/A D 
Organisational barriers were found in the empirical material, although credibility and 
trust (p. 132) was not detected. Organisafional structure (p. 130) and rules and routines 
(p. 13 1) are closely linked to the corporate ownership structure. The theoretical categories 
of rules and routines and bounded rationality (p. 128) under the category of behavioural 
barriers overlap as they are very similar. 
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Table 11.17 Theoretical categories vs empirical material: barrier-, specific to Russia 
THEO"TICAL D/B I D/B I EMPHUCAL D/B I D/F/B 
FIN 
D/F/B 
RUS 
BARRIERS: specific to Russia 
Instability of Russian B Window of stability is short in Russia N/A B 
economic situation Large investments with long payback period against 
Russian mentality to make money fast. 
N/A B 
Loans are available/unavailable N/A D/13 
Attitude: focus on modemising old equipment as long 
as possible rather than replacing with new 
N/A B 
Lack of institutional 
support for energy 
B Energy-saving /energy efficiency policies support/fail 
to support energy saving / energy efficiency 
D/F DIB 
saving /energy 
efficiency improvement 
Government norms to ban some old technologies D N/A 
Existing infrastructure 
or lack of it 
B Old equipment might be difficult to modemise as no 
spare parts available 
N/A B 
Technical bottlenecks can limit investments D N/A 
Sometimes option for further investment is left 
open/should have been left open by earlier technology 
choice 
F B 
Existing machines can soon be too small to produce 
what customers want 
N/A D 
Complexity of the mill makes it difficult to invest N/A B 
Stability of production process D D 
Lack of government investment in infrastructure such 
as roads 
N/A B 
Lack of skills and 
experience 
B More expertise developing in Russia N/A D 
Corruption/mafia B Uncertainty of ownership rights: corporate , A, ars N/A B 
Limited availability of B Technology is expensive N/A B 
energy -efficient 
equipment 
Technology has to be imported 
I 
N/A B 
I 
Low energy price B Energy was regarded as both cheap and expensive by 
Russian plants 
N/A D/B 
Non-payment problem B Non-payment problem hinders investments N/A B 
Weakness of contract 
institutions 
B Non-payment problem hinders investments N/A 
I 
B 
II 
Barriers specific lo Russia collect transition-related barriers. It is encouraging that many 
barriers presented in the theoretical literature were not detected in the empirical material 
as this provides evidence that some barriers have been solved, at least in this sector. since 
the theoretical material was published. Unfortunately, many transition-related barriers 
remain relevant. However, not all barriers were limited to economic transition and 
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Russia. The category of existing ir? frastructure or lack of it (P. 133) also collected some 
Finnish empirical statements, which suggests that the category of lechnolok'l'-relaied 
drivers requires a sister category of barriers to be introduced in the literature. 
Tables 11.6-11.17 also compare the status of theoretical and empirical issues as drivers. 
barriers and factors. The majority of these categories match the theoretical and empirical 
material. Those that have a contradictory status as drivers, barriers and factors are 
collected in Table 11.18 and discussed. 
Table 11.18 raises the issue of inverse categories, which explains some of the 
mismatches between theoretical literature and empirical findings. Some theoretical 
drivers and barriers are based on particular targets (for instance. the OECD economies) 
and, consequently, do not apply to a setting in which the reality is the opposite. inverse. A 
good example is "sustainable economic growth", i. e., economic growth based on a 
market-economy system that regulates business activities by the rule of law. which has 
been regarded as a driver. Even though this argument remains valid, in Russia economic 
growth has not been sustainable, i. e., most of the 1990s growth was based on Soviet-style 
state subsidies rather than competitive production of goods and services and. 
consequently, the driver also collects many issues that indicate the lack Qf sustainable 
economic growth and actually compose a barrier. Such additional drivers or barriers 
suggested to be introduced to accommodate these differences of realities are referred to 
as inverse categories. 
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Table 11.18 Mismatching status between theoretical and empirical drivers and barriers. 
Theoretical D/B Empirical Discussion: why empirical material does not match 
category equivalent theoretical material 
Competition D/B D It is difficult to see how competition could be a barrier 
to energy efficiency even though one theoretical source 
claims this. 
Energy-saving D D/F/B Energy-saving / energy eff iciency programmes 
energy efficiency constitute a wide category which fails to capture manN 
programmes details, especially the fact that programm -s may fail. I 
Environmental D D/B Theory fails to capture the potential alternative use of 
regulations money which is required for fulfilling environmental 
regulations 
Existing B D/13 This category was originally related to Russia only. but 
infrastructure or lack it collected also many Finnish empirical issues. many of 
of it which were drivers. The technological category should 
be added into the theory to accommodate these issues. 
Externalities B D C02 trading internalises former externalities (carbon 
! 
emissions), which drives energy prices up. constituting I 
a driver for modernisation. Inverse category required. 
inseparability of D/B F The inseparability of energy saving / energy efficiency 1 
features from the capital cycle is not regarded as a driver by 
plants, but as a factor, i. e. in some cases it could act as a 
driver and in others as a barrier. 
Lack of institutional B D There is institutional support in Finland. Inverse 
support category equired. 
Lack of skills and B D Skills are developing in Russia. Inverse calegon 
expertise required as barrier is being overcome and becoming a 
driver. 
Low energy price B D/B Russian plants fail to agree whether energy is currently 
cheap or expensive, i. e.. are prices low or not? In 
comparison o Finland. they obviously are low. 
Market-based energy D F Market-based pricing does not seem to constitute a 
price strong driver in Finland. This may be partly as a result 
of internal subsidies by corporates. I 
Sustainable D B Economic growth does not seem to be sustainable as - 
economic growth most issues falling into this category are barriers. 
Inverse category appears in Barriers specýfic io Russia. 
Key: L) = (Iriver, t3 = barrier, Jý = lactor, i. e., can be enner ariver or barrier 
Some theoretical categories also need amending as not all sides of the issue are covered 
by the current categories. Technology is a good example, as the theoretical category 
4cexisting infrastructure or lack of it", originally focusing on Russia (appearIng in the 
category "Russia specific barriers"), also collected many issues from Finland which 
confuses the category. Therefore, this driver / barrier may also be usefully adopted in the 
general theoretical framework instead of the Russia specific theory only. 
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11.3.2 Shortcomings of theory 
Some empirical driversýbarriers had no points of contact with the theoretical literature on 
energy efficiency47 (covered in Chapter 5). or the level of detail In the theoretical 
literature was so general that it provided little help with analysing the driver/barrier. 
Table 11.19 lists and analyses these drivers and barriers. 
Table 11.19 Empirical drivers and barriers which have no point of contact with theory of 
energy efficiency 
EMPIRICAL D/B FIN RUS ANALYSIS 
Lack of modernisation Purely related to systemic change. but was not 
tradition in the Soviet Union recognised by the category "Russia specific 
N/A B barriers"'. 
Electricity consumption is The theoretical literature completely misses the 
forecast by the unit for the internal pricing policies of corporates. and the 
corporate purchase. Wrong organisational elements included in the theory are 
forecast triggers penalties very general. This is likely to be a sector-specific 
issue as the pulp and paper industry produces 
F N/A energy4g. 
Fibre supply security is Core business considerations are related. However, 
crucial to investments F F this factor is sector-specific. 
Scarcity of wood resources 
overrides scarcity of energy B/F N/A Sector-specific factor. 
improvement of reliability of 
machines D N/A Technology -related driver 
Increasing the speed of paper 
machines D N/A Sector-specific,. technology-related factor. 
This technology -related barrier might apply to other 
Improving quality of paper industrial sectors as well. It is related to specialist 
increases energy consumption B N/A production. 
Support/lack of support for 
industry by the (regional) B/F/ 
government D D lnstitutional ý 
Availability of local bio fuels _ 
limits investments in them B B Sector-specific, technology -related factor. 
Government support for 
labour during modernisation I N/A ID Institutional- 
4- ' However, it is possible that these issues have been discussed in literature in general without including 
them in the theory of energy efficiency. 
48 Pulp and paper corporates have a lot of their own CHP which can be distributed inside the corporate. In 
addition, they produce a lot of wood waste which can be used as a fuel. Most other industrial sectors do not 
have these features which are likely to promote internal pricing, however, it is possible that also other 
corporates bought and priced energy centralised manner similarly to this sector. 
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Key: D= driver, B= barrier, F= factor i. e. can be either driver or barrier, n/a = not 
available 
ne drivers and barriers presented in Table 11.19 fall into four obvious categories: I) 
systemic; 2) sector-specific; 3) technology -related; and 4) institutional. This suggests that 
these categories require ftirther defi-nition in the theoretical literature related to energy 
efficiency. Sector-specific drivers and barriers could be expected to fall outside the 
general theoretical drivers and barriers, adding it would be useful so that further research 
would expect to find it. A similar finding was made by the McKinsey Global Institute 
(1999, p. 4) who recognise that the industrial sector level barriers lead to low productivItN' 
and investment. The category of institutional drivers and barriers could be amended. as 
well as barriers related to systemic change. 
11.3.3 Lessons for theory 
Table 11.20 collects all the suggestions to amend the theoretical literature based on this 
study. The table suggests one main category, sector specfflc drivers and barriers, to be 
added into the theory. The contents of this category will vary between sectors and some 
examples of the pulp and paper sector have been highlighted in Table 11.20. 
Some of the original theoretical categories did not seem to be relevant to this study. and 
some of the most obvious cases have been mentioned in the Table. However. I do not 
suggest these categories be removed as they will be relevant to some other cases. But 
caution should be applied to these categories when studying industrial drivers and 
barriers as they are more likely to apply to individual energy-saving or energy efficiency 
improvement decisions. 
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Table 11.20 Suggested amendments to the theoretical literature 
Theoretical drivers and barriers 
__j -Action 
Economic drivers 
Market-based energy price Complicated issue, inverse categories "regulated 
energy prices" and "low price of energy" under 
other categories. Combine/link categories? 
Image improvement Expected image can constitute a barrier to 
Russian roducts in international market. 
Core business considerations Amend more specific categories as shown in 
Table 10.14: corporate strategy. market 
dynamics, production development. 
Sustainable economic growth Inverse category "instability of Russian 
economy... under category Barriers specific to 
Russi& Combine/link categories? 
Institutional drivers 
Environmental regulation Depending on the design and implementation, 
environmental regulation can fail to be a driver, 
or even be a barrier to modernisation. Add 
option "barrier". 
Energy-saving / energy efficiency programmes Add option "barrier", as not always a driver 
when ol cy fails. 
Support/lack of support for industry by 
government 
Add new category. 
Technology drivers and barriers: Amend calego tocoverbarrierstoo 
Security of raw material availability reflects on 
longer-term investment plans 
Add new category 
Many other drivers and barriers could also move to this caiegori, fi-om other theoretical 
categori es 
Market-related barriers 
Externalities Interrialising externality (environmental cost) 
can constitute a driver as, adds to the 
attractiveness of energy saving / energy 
efficiency improvement. Add option "driver". 
Asymmetric information May be relevant to other studies on pulp and 
paper. 
Access to capital 
rmend 
more specific categories as shown in 
Table 10.20: Loans, corporate financing. 
transition. 
Split incentives May not be relevant to pulp and paper. 
institutional barriers 
Regulated energy prices See category "market-based energy price" 
above. 
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Behavioural barriers 
Form of information May not be relevant to pulp and paper. 
Credibility and trust May not be relevant to pulp and paper. 
Inertia Includes some transition features which could 
be added to theorv. 
barriers1drivers 
External actor Amend to cover others besides expert actors. Iý 
such as authorities, neip-hbours and comnetilors. 
Sector specific drivers / barriers: Add new cale orV 
Corporates subsidise energy prices Add new category 
Improvement of functionality of equipment Add new category 
Increasing the speed of paper machines Add new category 
important to acknowledge that this category exists even though details cannOt he given. for each 
sector 
Barriers specifw to Russia 
instability of economic situation See category "sustainable economic growth- 
above. 
Lack of institutional support Add inverse category: institutional support. 
Existing infrastructure and lack of it Also relevant to Finnish plants. Move to 
technology -related drivers/barriers. 
Lack of skills and experience Add inverse category as skills and expertise are 
becomin a driver in Russia. 
Lack of metering and control Not relevant to pulp and paper sector. 
Focus on meeting production goals Not relevant to pulp and paper sector. 
Lack of habit to select between products Not relevant to pulp and paper sector. 
Running capacity at low production volume Delete. Overcome. as illustrated by energ) 
efficiency analysis. 
Low energy price See category "market-based energy price- 
above. 
Lack of modernisation tradition in the Soviet 
Union 
Add new category. 
Regional and local administration-related 
drivers and barriers 
Add new category. 
As the transition countries develop, the identified drivers and barriers will change. What 
was previously relevant may become irrelevant and new ones may appear. As the target 
is moving, identifying these elements is difficult. But even though the list constantly goes 
out of date, it could help non-Russians especially to understand the Russian wav of 
thinking (for instance short-term thinking which limits profitable investments with long 
payback periods) that will be reflected in actions and. potentially. in new drivers- and 
barriers, for a long time after the originally identified drivers and barriers have faded 
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away. Some barriers under the category barriers specýfic Io Russia should be deleted as 
they have been solved by now. I have also included a new category Regional and local 
administration related drivers and barriers identified by this study. 
Some of the institutional drivers and barriers need to be amended. The categories cnergn- 
saving / energy efficiency programmes and environmental regulations fail to recognise 
that they may also constitute a barrier should their implementation fail or. in the case of 
environmental regulations, divert fmancial resources which may support energy saving / 
energy efficiency more if spent on something else. The recognition that energy-saving / 
energy efficiency programmes or environmental regulation do not automatically drive 
energy saving / energy efficiency should be added to the theory. 
The categories core business considerations and access to capital are wide and constitute 
just one driver in the theory. Therefore, I would suggest dividing these categories into 
more sub-categories. 
The technological drivers category requires further amending as, it did not accommodate 
all the technological drivers and barriers that emerged from the empirical material. The 
fact that improvements in product quality tend to increase the energy intensity of 
production in the pulp and paper industry is especially important. In addition. the 
category existing infrastructure or lack of it, originally belonging to Barriers specific to 
Russia, also attracted Finnish statements and, consequently. it would better fit under 
technological drivers. 
Energyprice related drivers and barriers aim to cover very complicated issues. Tak-en that 
the Russian case-study plants did not provide a clear signal as to whether the energy price 
is high enough to provide stimuli to save energy, and that the Finnish plants did not 
regard the market-based energy price as a driver, it is difficult to amend the drivers and 
barriers theory based on this study. But it can be concluded that the complexity of the 
energy price and its influence on modernisation is a subtle issue. especially in the case of 
Russia, and requires further research beyond a strict drivers and barriers analysis. 
Some inverse categories could be usefully added into the theory to accommodate the 
difference of realities between market economy and transition economy environments. 
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11.4 Summary 
The research objectives of this chapter were as follows: 
15. Draw lessons from Finland on how to support the modemisation of pulp and 
paper sector in Russia based on the drivers and barriers analyses. and regional 
backgrounds. 
16. Compare the drivers and barriers identified in the theoretical literature to those 
found in the empirical material. Analyse the relevance of the theory and suggest 
amendments to the theory. 
One of the main lessons from Finland is that corporate ownership supports modemisation 
because corporate governance guides investments, contributing to the coordination of the 
modernisation process. Finnish and Russian plants are in different positions as Russian 
plants need more modernisation more urgently. As resources to modemise are limited. 
not all the required modernisation can be implemented. Both Archangelsk and Karelia 
regions experience similar funding-related barriers mostly caused by the lack of stabilitN 
of the economy. Corporate ownership has developed further in Archangelsk than in 
Karelia. 
Profiles of energy-saving / energy efficiency investments differ between the countries. 
Finnish energy-saving / energy efficiency policies and measures have been successful 
while Russian policies and measures have not succeeded. 
Due to economic transition, the Russian economy remains an unstable business 
environment and therefore fails to attract investment. The Russian governance system is 
arbitrary and companies have fewer tools to fight for their rights as authorities can make 
difficulties for them. Implementation of laws can be "negotiated". Finnish authorities 
base their governance on law that supports confidence in the business environment. 
The energy price is high enough in Finland to stimulate energy saving and improvement 
of energy efficiency but in Russia no significant changes have been detected. which 
suggests that energy prices remain too low to trigger energy saving. The Russian 
potential for energy saving is so large that increasing energy prices should easily make 
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energy saving and energy efficiency improvements attractive as long as budget 
constraints are hard. 
Empirical drivers and barriers to modernisation correspond fairly well with the 
theoretical drivers and barriers to energy efficiency as only 10 of 51 theoretical drivers 
and barriers were not identified in empirical material. and only 10 out of 103 empirical 
drivers and barriers did not fall into any of the theoretical categories. The main 
amendments to the theory include adding a new main category "sector specific drivers 
and barriers", updating transition related barriers as the Russian economy constantly 
progresses towards market economy, adding sub categories to -core business 
considerations" and "access to capital", and finally, adding some inverse categories to the 
existing ones. 
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12. Conclusion 
12.1 Main conclusions 
12.1 .1 Conclusions specific 
to the case plants 
Finnish plants use heat more efficiently than plants in Karelia and Archangelsk, while 
electricity use is only slightly more efficient or of the same efficiencv as that of the 
Russian regions. This is a somewhat controversial finding as Finland has been regarded 
as one of the most energy efficient pulp and paper producers in the world (Finnish Forest 
Industries Federation, 2006b, p. 24), and significantly more energy-efficient than Russia. 
However, this result is unlikely to be applicable to the whole Finnish pulp and paper 
sector. This is because a) the lack of plant-specific data made it impossible to establish 
whether the case-study plants that provided data for EEI analysis were representative of 
the total population. b) the regional-level EEI analysis shows that Finland remains more 
electricity -efficient even though the difference is less significant than in the case of heat: 
and c) the EEI methodology is currently unable to take into consideration the differences 
of energy intensity between various pulping and paper-making processes due to the lack 
of reference weighting figures. 
On average, Russian equipment is older than Finnish, dating back to 1971, while Finnish 
equipment was commissioned on average in 1978. The difference in the age of the 
equipment is not that significant. However, what matters more is the amount of 
rebuilding and retrofitting that has been carried out since commissioning. and 
documented in the technology paths. There is a notable difference in the occurrence of 
such modemisation between the case-study countries. as Finnish plants have invested 
more in keeping their equipment up to date, in the case of older equipment. In addition. 
the technology paths show that some of the Finnish capital stock is so new that no 
modernisation is currently required. 
Energy efficiency was estimated to be declining during the observation period on1v in the 
case of two Karelian plants, while all other plants were either improving or remaining 
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stabile with their performance. The plants with declining energy efficiency had either 
very old equipment or had hardly modernised at all since the early 1990s. 
Pulp and paper plants in Karelia and Archangelsk face an overwhelming modemisation 
task (Lesprom, 2004, p. 2), and the lack of financial resources was one of the most widelv 
recognised barriers to modemisation. The availability of bank, credits and foreign 
investments is not going to improve before the business environment becomes more 
predictable and ownership rights are better enforced. This can only be achieved by 
completing the unfinished economic transition. Given the slow pace of modemisation 
during the first 15 years of transition, support bj, the government will be required if' 
modernisation of the Russian pulp and paper sector within the next decade is desirable. 
The current equipment cannot provide enough profit to cover the required modemisation. 
However, it must be mentioned that this conclusion invites a wider discussion on the role 
of the government in a market economy. Indeed. it would be ideal if market signals 
facilitated the required change as under these circumstances unviable companies would 
be more likely to be eliminated. But given the stalled reforms. prevailing uncertainties 
and slow pace of modernisation so far, major modernisation is unlikely to happen without 
government support. However, it must be emphasised that government support - like any 
subsidy - should be allocated based on transparent rules. and the need for assistance 
reviewed frequently and rigorously (MoItke et a], eds., 2004, p. 19). Such programmes 
have also been implemented in the OECD (IEA, 2003, pp. 51-52, Hennicke et a]. 1998. p. 
72) including Finland. 
Statements by plant managers are linked to modernisation patterns, at least somewhat. in 
the case of all but one plant. Anchoring the modernisation patterns to the drivers and 
barriers provided evidence of the validity of the statements. However. statements 
contradicting the modernisation activities can be partly explained as transition factors 
deferring planned activities, and the lack of serious planning in the longer term 
(Bazhanov, 2000, p. 4). Therefore, some statements by plant managers may be more 
speculative or theoretical in Russia than in Finland. 
The pulp and paper sector in Archangelsk region is slightlj,. further ahead in economic 
transition than the sector in Karelia. Corporate organisational structures especially have 
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penetrated Archangelsk more than Karelia. This provides evidence that drivers and 
barriers can vary between Russian regions. However, most of the same lessons apply to 
the pulp and paper sector in both regions. 
12.1.2 Conclusion on drivers and barriers 
The most important barriers to modernisation in Karelia and Archangelsk include lack of 
funding, low energy price, lack of enforced property rights, pressure by local 
administration to finance social programmes and lack of government support for general 
infrastructure in the region. The most important barrier to modernisation in Finland 
consists of the lack of funding and the lack of profitable energy-saving opportunities left, 
The most important drivers to modernisation in Karelia and Archangelsk are mostlv 
market signal related which is a sign of the progress of economic transition. while also 
energy price was reported as a driver. However, technology paths do not support this 
finding. The high share of energy costs also drives modernisation. The main drivers in 
Finland include market-signal-related issues, corporate practices and government energy- 
saving policies. The energy price was not emphasised as the most important driver. 
The theoretical literature on drivers and barriers to energy qfficiency ", as largeýv 
relevant to the empirical material, regardless of the focus of the literature on energy 
efficiency and the empirical material on modernisation. Of 50 identified theoretical 
drivers and barriers or their elements, 40 were identified in the empirical material and 
only 10 empirical drivers and barriers had no direct link to any theoretical category. One 
of the main features of the comparison of the theoretical and empirical drivers and 
barriers was the richness and complexity of the empirical material which did not always 
fall into one theoretical category or any of them. 
The most important amendments to theory based on the empirical material were 
introducing a new category to cover the sector-specific drivers and barriers. dil'iding the 
categories of "core business considerations " and "access to capital " into sub-categories 
to accommodate the wide range of empirical drivers and barriers failing into the 
categories, amending the category of "technological drivers " to also cover barriers. and 
revising various drivers and barriers to include an inverse category. i. e.. to recognise the 
381 
influence of the opposite situation (for instance, lack of institutional supporl is a barrier 
while institutional support can be a driver - both should be recognised). In addition. some 
transition-related barriers should be deleted as the problems they refer to have already 
been solved. 
The theoretical categories of drivers and barriers introduced in Chapter 5 provided a good 
background for this analysis. Table 12.1 surnmarises these main theoretical categories 
identified in Chapter 5. 
Table 12.1 Summary oturivers ano isarners joentinea in Unapter-s 
Drivers: I Barriers: 
Economic drivers 
market signals 
macroeconomic drivers 
Institutional drivers 
Technology related drivers 
Organisational drivers 
" Economic barriers 
" market failures 
" market barriers 
" Institutional barriers 
" Behavioural barriers 
" Organisational barriers 
" Barriers specific to Russia 
The strongest drivers and barriers to modernisation i. e. those that were mentioned in 
several interviews and emphasised as important, highlighted in the discussion included 
issues falling into most of these categories, however, none of them fell in the categorý, 
Behavioural barriers. In Table 12.1, organisational drivers have been outlined as an 
independent category as identified in Chapter 5. 
Economic drivers were strongly present both in Russia and Finland as plants listed items 
s falling in to the category market signals to compose the strongest driver to modemi, ati( n. 
These included the need to increase production capacity, to reduce cost price. to improve 
the quality of products and competitiveness. The Russian plants emphasised the high 
share of energy costs of the total production costs as a driver related to cutting cost price. 
They also expressed fears of a bankruptcy of the company that demonstrates financial 
pressure as a driver to modernisation. Also energy price was discussed as a market driver. 
however, it did not appear as a strong one in either of the countries. The Russian plants 
also emphasised the importance of macroeconomic stability as a driver. 
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Institutional drivers emphasised by the interviewees were few. in the case of Finland the 
importance of the government energy saving program-me was emphasised while no 
important institutional drivers were identified in Russia. There were quite a few 
lechnology related drivers, and some barriers, identified in both countries but most of 
them were plant specific. However, a wide technology related barrier was identified in 
Finland as plants emphasised that they could not find further profitable opportunities to 
improve energy efficiency. 
Organisational drivers, especially organisational structure and organisational culture 
were important categories of the strongest empirical drivers and barriers as corporate 
governance and strategic planning composed one of the main lessons from Finland to 
Russia on how to support modernisation. In addition, in Finland the competition and 
comparisons between the units of a corporate as well as the corporate policy to invest in 
the Best Available Technology were regarded as importance drivers to modemisation. 
The main barrier, lack of capital, falls into the category economic barriers. more 
specifically. in market barriers, in both countries. No market. failures were identified as 
strong categories of barriers. 
institutional barriers is an important category in Russia as both the low energy price due 
to the government regulation as well as the lack of enforcement of property rights arose 
from the interview material. The latter can be regarded as a new barrier under this 
theoretical category, and is economic transition related. Also the pressure by the local 
goverm-nent to the plants to finance social programmes which could be regarded as 
corruption as the requirement is not based on a legal mandate falls into this category. In 
Finland, uncertainty of future government policy was reported as a strong institutional 
barrier. 
Organisational barriers to energy saving and modernisation were emphasised in Russia 
as most of the plants were not managed strategic way compared to the Finnish plants. for 
instance, the role of energy experts in investment related decision-making was unclear in 
some plants even though the decisions on new technology has long-term implications on 
energy consumption, and therefore, energy costs. 
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The main barriers specific Io Russia include low energy prices (already mentioned under 
the category institutional barriers), non-payment problems with local administration. the 
lack of government support to general infrastructure. 
12.1.3 Expected conclusion applicable to other industrial sectors 
Decommissioning of obsolete equipment in the early 1990s was ven, common in the 
Russian pulp and paper sector. Even though plant-specifi c differences occur the trend is 
so clear that similar developments may have taken place also in other Russian industrial 
sectors. 
Russian plants experienced an inefficiency peak in both heat and electricitl' use in the 
mid 1990s and recoveredftom it by the end qf the decade. The most important reason 
behind this inefficiency peak was the fact that many Russian plants ran most of their 
equipment at low capacity, rather than only some of the equipment on higher capacity. in 
order to secure employment as was the tradition in the Soviet Union (IEA. 2002a. p. 234) 
It has also been suggested that failures to report part of production to official statistics in 
order to avoid taxes may have increased the statistical amount of energy consumed per 
unit Produced (Aslund, 2002, pp. 15-16). However, this study found no evidence of this. 
Most Russian plants performed better at the end of the observation period in the 2000s 
than at the beginning. This can be mostly explained based on the technology paths as a 
wave of decommissioning of obsolete, and therefore, inefficient equipment took place in 
the early 1990s. Technology paths provided no evidence of wide-scale investments made 
in retrofitting or new capital stock, and consequently, they could not explain the 
improvement of energy efficiency. The inefficiency peak recorded in the mid- 1 990s' is 
likely to occur also in other industrial sectors. This is because most sectors experienced a 
similar decrease of production volume, and at the same time. were likely to apply to 
Soviet labour policy practices i. e. not to economize the production by closing down some 
of the capacity completely due to lowering demand. 
Current energy prices are too low to make energy worth saving in Russia. Some plants 
do report the energy price as a driver of modernisation but the fact that technology paths 
show no major modernisation since 1991 provides evidence that the energy price is not 
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high enough yet to support modemisation. However, the general cost and income levels 
must be reflected in energy-price marginals on top of production and transportation costs. 
i. e., the absolute price of energy cannot be the same in Finland and Russia. Increasing 
energy prices only leads to a real change if companies have to pay their energy bills in 
cash, i. e., the budget constraint is hard. Fuel switching to local or own bio fuels by plants 
suggests that the budget constraint is hard, at least for some of the case-study plants. 
Consequently, increasing energy prices may encourage energy saving even in the absence 
of economic reforms. This could also be applicable to the modernisation of other Russian 
industrial sectors paying the same prices for energy. 
The up! finished structural reform of the economy and, especially, the lack (ýf e?? forced 
prqperiýv rights caused by it a) strongly contributes to the poor investment climate 
(Korppoo, 2005, p. 119), which can be observed as lack of financing and short-term 
thinking; and b) makes it impossible to implement energy-policy tools as they require a 
clear policy framework to support them. This only macrobarrier to modemisation must he 
solved beforefficusing on detailed policies. Even though solving this basic barrier i. e. 
moving to the next stage of transition will take some time, it is still worth discussing how 
policies would work in the absence of this barrier, for future reference. 
Neutral governance practices are crucial to the investment climate as the current lack of 
a clear code of conduct creates uncertainty (Ahrend and Tompson 2005a, pp. 41-24.48) 
and therefore discourages investments. Companies should be encouraged to report 
misconduct by officials, and disciplinary actions should be launched against arbitrary 
governance practices. Transparency in governance would also support foreign investors. 
who are currently at the mercy of regional governments. 
Corporate governance coordinates investments in a structured way and leads to the most 
efficient investment decisions in Finland. Wider penetration of corporate organisational 
structure as a result of corporate ownership could encourage modernisation in the 
Russian industrial sector. The empirical data shows that Russian pulp and paper plants 
managed by external actors had modernised more often during the 1990s and 2000s than 
those controlled by insiders. The role of energy experts in investment-related decision- 
making also provided evidence of the better coordination of activities in units owned by 
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corporates. However, corporate governance cannot be "introduced". it has to develop as a 
result of corporate ownership. 
Energy-saving policies do not work in Karelia and Archangelsk at the moment. The 
existing policies were not planned as a functional package and are regarded as dependent 
on the federal energy-saving legislation. Energy-saving policies should either be more 
coordinated at the federal level, or the link to the federal administration should be 
weakened by giving the responsibility and accountability for policy design and 
implementation to the regional level. Energy policies require numeric goals. funding and 
stakeholder participation, and a simple set of well -coordinated policy tools that fit into 
the wider governance framework (Ingram and Mann, 1980. pp. 19-221. Nagel. 1980. p. 8: 
Birkland, 2001, pp. 159 - 167). At least in the Russian case regions the same lo'Ax level of 
implementation would have also influenced other industrial sectors, and the lack of 
implementation of energy saving policies may be a wider spread problem which would 
make this finding applicable to also other regions and industrial sectors. However. býfore 
the price of energy increases, properry rights are fully enforced and transparent 
governance practices including accountabiliry are introduced in regi . onal 
. 
ference. administrations, energy-saving policies will make little dýf 
12.1.4 Unexpected conclusion applicable to other industrial sectors 
There are significant plant-specific dýfferences in if aI . 
ficiency and some Russian pI ns 
perform better, especially in electricity efficiency, than Finnish plants, However. as 
discussed above, the data available is limited, and may not be representative. Therefore. 
the conclusion that some Russian plants can be more electricity -efficient than some 
Finnish plants is valid, but cannot be used to draw conclusions on the whole population. 
Nevertheless, it is significant to note the plant-specific differences and recognise that 
there are more and less efficient plants on both sides of the border. This conclusion also 
underlines the importance of plant-level case studies, which reveal a much richer 
knowledge than statistical and economic comparisons at national or regional levels. This 
finding would suggest that even though inefficiency is widely spread in Russia. it does 
not have to be a standard in the case of all industrial production capacitv. 
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The price mechanism works in fuel switching. and wider modemisation is blocked by the 
remaining fuels provided below market prices by the state. Should the prices of the 
currently cheap fuels increase, instead of fuel switching managers may start investing in 
modernisation and improved energy efficiency. This is likely to apply to other sectors 
even more than to the pulp and paper sector which in many cases has its own waste 
stream available to be utilised as an alternative cheap fuel. 
One of the findings that contradicted the previous knowledge (Chuiko 2004) was that the 
share of enerýy costs Qf the total production costs was proved to be high. As a result. it 
seems that the Russian pulp and paper plants are more likely to look into their energy 
costs as a potential category of savings than previously assumed. This lesson may also 
apply to other energy intensive industrial sectors as the labour costs tend to be low 
compared to the high consumption of energy due to low efficiency in Russia. 
12.2 Correctness of hypotheses 
The following hypotheses were presented in the beginning of the thesis, and observed 
throughout the research project. The correctness of these statements is evaluated below 
each statement based on the main conclusion presented above: 
The Finnish pulp andpaper industry acting in a markel-economy ývstem aves 
energy more efficiently than Russia's transition-economy pulp and paper 
industry. 
--> Partly true: heat efficiency at the Finnish pulp and paper plants is significantly 
higher than that of Russian plants. However. the efficiency of electricity use does not 
seem significantly different between the countries. 
2) As an established market economy, Finland can provide lessons. for Russian 
regions on modernisation of the pulp andpaper industry. 
4 Part a great example of a functional market economy and Lly true: Finland provides 
a governance system working under the rule of law. Finnish policies are successful, 
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partly due to the efficiency of this framework system which is largely missing from 
Russia. Should the Russian economic and administrative reforms be finalised. the 
policies (for instance, energy-saving policies) could be amended based on the Finnish 
lessons but in the absence of the reforms, policies cannot work and few specific 
lessons from Finland can be drawn. 
3) Drivers of and barriers to modernisation are dýfferenl in a market economi, than 
in a transition economy. 
4 Partly true: There are many drivers and barriers that work, in exactly the sarne way 
(or conversely due to the economic and administrative framework) in both svstems. 
However, both countries report drivers and barriers that are not relevant to the other 
country. It is significant how few amendments were suggested to the theoretical 
literature developed in the market-economy context based on this empirical study 
conducted in a transition economy. 
4) The empirical study on drivers of and barriers to modernisation of the pulp and 
paper industry in a transition economy can amend the existing theoretical 
literature on drivers of and barriers to energy ýI. Tlciency. 
4 Partly true: This study can amend the theoretical literature on drivers of and 
barriers to energy efficiency. However, the main focus of suggestions was not on 
transition-related drivers and barriers. More important categories included core 
business-related drivers, technological drivers and barriers. and sector-specific drivers, 
and barriers. 
To conclude, these hypotheses on the potential of this study were partly correct. 
12.3 Revisiting the research questions 
The sub-questions to the main research question outlined in Chapter I can be answered as 
follows: 
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Hom, has energy efficiency and energy consumption on average developed in the pulp and 
.f paper sector 
in the. focus regions? ls Finland more ef icient than Russia? 
The Russian regions have experienced an inefficiency peak in the mid 1990s, and 
recovered ftom it around the year 2000. The Russian regions had mostly improved 
energy efficiency during the observation period i. e. between the beginning of the 1990s 
and early / mid 2000s (observation periods region / plant specific). Finland is more 
efficient than Russia on average, but only just in the case of electricity. The Finnish 
electricity use is becoming less efficient while heat efficiency is improving. 
Have Russian companies modernised1not modernised iheirproduction. facilities? 
Yes, they have conducted some modernisation measures but significant wave of 
modernisation was not observed. Decommissioning of old equipment has been the 
dominant form of modernisation compared over installing new capital stock. 
W`haj were the main reasonsfor the Russian companies to implement or not implement 
these modernisation measures? 
One of the main reasons for Russian companies not to modernise is the lack of funding 
caused by difficulties with bank loans, too little profit to cover the investment needs and 
the non-payment problem with local administrations. The uncertainty of property rights. 
discouraging ownership arrangements and low energy price are also blocking 
investments. Many of these factors are caused by the unfinished economic reform due to 
which market economy is not present in Russia. The main drivers of modernisation 
included mostly market factors such as competitiveness, increasing production capacity. 
decreasing cost price and quality of products which provides evidence that market-based 
thinking is spreading to Russian. Many of the units also mentioned the desire to stay in 
the market as a driver of modernisation, as well as energy, especially fuel. prices. 
Did the energy policies of Russian regional andjederal administrations contribute to the 
development qf energy efficiency? 
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No, energy-saving policies do not work, and did not contribute to energy efficiency. 
What has been the technological andpolicy path to qfficiency in the pulp and paper 
sector in Finland? What were the reasons to modernise lechnology? 
The main drivers consist of market signals that plants react to. Finnish plants are owned 
by corporates, which enforce strategic planning of investmen . Such practices sup ts port 
modernisation. Corporate policy to replace old equipment with new provides "automatic"' 
improvements of energy efficiency over time. The energy-saving policies of the Finnish 
government have also been successful in the pulp and paper industry. They were based 
on voluntary approaches and a grants scheme. 
Are there Finnish lessons to be learntfor the pulp andpaper sectors in Karelia and 
Archangelsk? 
Yes, but the more detailed lessons cannot be implemented in a meaningful way before the 
macrobarrier, the lack of economic and administrative reforms, has been solved in 
Russia. This means that finalising economic transition is a prerequisite of learning wider 
lessons from Finland. However, the higher price of energy is likely to work in Russia 
already now at some extent, as prices of fuels have spurred action in the sector. 
Are there lessons to be learntftom this empirical material to the drivers and barriers 
related theoretical literature? 
Yes, there are some minor lessons. However, the main lesson for the theory is that the 
theoretical framework of drivers of and barriers to energy efficiency developed for the 
OECD is mostly applicable to a transition economy, at least in the case of the Russian 
pulp and paper sector. The main amendments to the theory focus on categories other than 
transition. 
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12.4 Originality of research 
It is submitted that the originality of this work can be divided into three parts: 
methodological originality; 2) originality of gathered empirical material and data, and 3) 
originality of the approach of the research. 
Methodological originality includes applying the Energy Efficiency Index methodology 
to a transition economy for the first time (as far as the author is aware). as well as 
developing a specific methodology - technology path analysis - for this study in order to 
explain the dynamics of EEI analysis and estimate the development of energy efficiency 
qualitatively in the absence of numeric data. 
The originality of the material and data consists of the original plant-specific empirical 
material collected by semi-structured interviews and original. quantitative, plant-level 
energy -consumption data. Interview material is always original by definition. However. 
the interview material for this study was collected from Russian industry. There are other 
studies that have been conducted by interviewing Russian industrial actors (even though 
this can be difficult for a foreigner). The originality of this interview material lies in its 
comparative nature, i. e.. the same material was collected from all pulp and paper plants 
located in two Russian regions, and from six Finnish comparison plants. The originaliIN 
of the quantitative data collected (even though not all plants provided such data) is based 
on the fact that such data is not available and therefore had to be collected from the plants 
thernselves. 
The approach of the research is original as it is the first attempt to systematically test 
whether the theory on drivers of and barriers to energy efficiency developed in the 
context of a market-economy system is applicable to a transition economy. 
12.5 Limitations of study 
Limited plant-level data available from Finland due for the most part to commercial 
confidentiality issues made it impossible to establish firmly whether electricity efficiency 
is higher in Finland than in Russia. The collected data suggested that the Finnish plants 
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are only slightly more efficient or at the same level of efficiency in their electricity use 
than the best Russian plants. This conclusion is valid for the plants that provided data. 
However, it cannot be generalised across the Finnish pulp and paper industrv. More 
comparison data would have helped to draw a firmer conclusion on this issue. 
Time and financial resources limited the possibilities for revisiting interviewees. 
Consequently. it was impossible to collect enough interview material in order to compare 
the views of different departments within the case-study plants, which may have revealed 
further drivers and barriers acknowledged in the theoretical literature. 
The approach to energy price by Russian plant managers could have been studied much 
more in depth. It could even be a topic for a separate study. 
Interview material missed some details on the technical changes plants had carried out. 
Consequently. the terms "rebuilding" and "retrofit" when reported in the technology path 
are vague and may overlap. This limitation makes it difficult to compare the scope of 
modernisation between plants in some cases. 
Investment decision-malcing related literature on drivers and barriers would have been 
interesting and probably relevant, but had to be left out in order to finish the study in 
time. 
12.6 Recommendations for further research 
Similar studies on other Russian regions would provide a wider understanding of the 
drivers and barriers to modernisation of the Russian pulp and paper industry. and would 
be interesting to compare with these case regions. Not that many other regions produce 
large amounts of pulp and paper - therefore, they would be quite easy to cover when 
focusing on the pulp and paper sector. It would be especially interesting to know if 
corporate governance is taking over in other regions, whether foreign investors have 
more influence than in Karelia and Archangelsk, and whether the lack of enforced 
property rights has had a major impact. 
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More quantitative plant-level analyses in Finland would provide a better understanding of 
the dynamics of energy efficiency. However, availability of data may prevent this as the 
corporations want to protect their competitiveness by withdrawing detailed data. 
More detailed benchmarks of Energy Efficiency Indices in the pulp and paper sector 
would be needed in order to differentiate between various pulping and paper-making 
technologies. Currently the problematic benchmarks include mechanical pulp/chemical 
pulp and fine paper., which in reality are developing beyond these concepts and becoming 
more complicated. Basically, producing fine papers becomes more energy -intensive 
when the quality of the paper improves. The same is true about new refining 
technologies. As a resulL the latest technology appears in EEI as less energy -effl ci ent 
than the previous generation of machines even though the technical efficiency is almost 
always higher while the intensity of energy use grows. 
Drivers of and barriers to energy efficiency have not been studied much in detail in 
transition economies. This is a moving target as transition economies are developing 
towards market-based systems. However, in the case of Russia and the majority of the 
FSU (excluding the Baltic states), the transition phase is likely to continue for years. 
Even though pulp and paper sector could apply the OECD theoretical framework of 
drivers and barriers. it would be interesting to see if this is true in the case of other 
Russian industrial sectors. This would be very useful research as key drivers and barriers 
could be analysed and addressed through policy to smooth and even accelerate the 
transition. This could also contribute to and further update the categories of transition- 
related barriers and technology-related drivers and barriers. 
12.7 Summary 
This chapter has covered the following research objectives: 
17. Provide a list of conclusions, based on the work above. 
18. Indicate the originality of the work, provide a critique of the study. and 
recommend areas for ftu-ther research. 
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Finnish pulp and paper sector is on average more energy-efficient than those in Karelia 
and Archangelsk. However, the difference in electricity efficiency is small and plant- 
specific differences mean that individual Russian plants can be as electricity-efficient. or 
even more electricity-efficient, than individual Finnish plants. 
Finnish plants have modernised more than Russian plants and Finnish modemisation is 
more strategic and linked to corporate governance. Technology paths mostly support the 
findings of the EEl findings and the statements of plant managers on drivers and barriers 
to modernisation mostly correlate with technology paths. 
it is significant that the main driver and barrier are the same in both countries: money and 
market signals. However, the rest of the most important drivers and barriers differ 
dramatically between the countries. 
The main lesson is that without administrative and economic reform i. e. finalising the 
incomplete economic transition, policy tools will not work and, therefore. most lessons 
from Finland cannot be implemented. Indeed, completed transition is a prerequisite for 
overcoming other barriers, and it seems unlikely that much progress with modermsation 
of the pulp and paper sector could be achieved in the absence of filrtber economic and 
administrative reforms. A possible exception may be the rising energy price which could 
further drive modernisation already at this stage of transition. However, even though 
increasing energy prices may work in the absence of reforms to some extent. this is tool 
is likely to be more effective in a transparent market-economy environment. 
The theory applied to the empirical material quite well. However, technological and 
sector-specific amendments especially are required. It is significant that the need to 
amend the theory was this minor when studying a transition economy and applying a 
theoretical framework developed for market economies. 
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Annex 1 List of abbreviations 
APERC Asian Pacific Energy Research Centre 
ARC Archangelsk 
Archangelsk Archangelsk Oblast Regions] Statistics Service 
ObIkornstat 
BAP Best Available Practice 
BASREC Baltic Sea Region Energy Co-operation 
BAT Best Available Technology 
BBC British Broadcasting Company 
BP British Petroleum 
CHP Combined Heat and Power 
C02 Carbon Dioxide 
Com. Commissioned 
CTMP Chemical Thermomechanical Pulping 
D&B Drivers and Barriers 
Decom. Decommissioned 
EBRD European Bank for Reconstration and Development 
ECF Elemental Chiorine-Free Bleaching 
ECS Energy Charter Secretariat 
EEI Energy Efficiency Index 
EIT Economy in Transition 
ESCO Energy Saving Company 
EU European Union 
FDI Foreign Direct Investment 
FEC Federal Energy Commission 
FIN Finland 
FOREM Russian Wholesale Electricity Market 
FSU Former Soviet Union 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GJ/t Gigajoules per tonne 
Goskomstat Soviet / Russian State Statistics Service (until 2004) 
GRP Gross Regional Product 
JEA International Energy Agency 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
ITAR TASS Official news agency of Russia 
KAEEC Karelian Energy Efficiency Center 
KAR Karelia 
Karelkomstat Karelian Regional Statistics Service 
KS Karjalan Sanomat. Karelian newspaper published in Finnish 
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KTM Ministry of Trade and Industry of Finland 
kWh Kilowatt hour 
M3 Cubic meter 
MOTIVA Finnish state energy saving agency 
Mtoe Megatonne of oil equivalent 
MWh Megawatt hour 
NEEG Norwegian Energy Efficiency Group 
NEFCO Nordic Environmental Finance Corporation 
NMR Nordic Council of Ministers 
NOx Nitrogen oxides 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OPEC Organisation for the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
PEEREA Energy Charter Protocol on Energy Efficiencyl and Related Environmental 
Aspects 
Pi Petajoule 
PM Paper Machine 
PPl Physical Production Index 
PSGW Pressurised Stone Groundwood Pulping 
RAO UES Russian AO Unified Energy Systems 
REC Regional Energy Commission 
RMP Refiner Mechanical Pulp 
Rostat Russian State Statistics Service (since 2004) 
RUB Russian Rouble 
SEC Specific Energy Consumption 
S02 Sulphur dioxide 
STT Suomen Tietotoimisto, the Finnish stale news agencý 
t Torme 
TACIS EU Technical Aid for the Commonwealth of Independent States 
TCF Totally Chlorine-Free Bleaching 
TMP Thermornechanical Pulping 
TPES Total Primary Energy Supply 
TWh Terawatt hour 
UNCTAD United Nations Conference for Trade and Development 
UNDP United Nations Development Programme 
US DoE United States Department of Energy 
US$ United States dollar 
VAT Value Added Tax 
VTT Energy Finnish state technical energy research unit 
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Annex 2 List of interviews 
23 August 2004 Kornelis Blok, Professor, University of Utrecht, Imperial College, 
London, UK 
6 September 2004 Risto TaIja & Teemu Turunen, intem, Metso Paper, Jyvasky1d, 
Finland 
7 September 2004 Pekka Ahtila, Motiva & TTK, Helsinki, Finland 
7 September 2004 Leena Timonen, Statistics Finland, Helsinki, Finland 
8 September 2004 Pertti Laine, Finland Forest Industries Federation, Helsinki, 
Finland 
28 September 2004 Miikka Saarinen, Energy Manager; Veikko Peidjist6, Head of Pulp 
and Energy Department; and Riitta Lahlinen, Development 
Manager, UPM Kyrnmene Tervasaari, Valkeakoski, Finland (pilot 
plant) 
1 November 2004 Samuel Fankhauser, Director for Policy Studies and Sector 
Strategy Office of the Cheif Economist, EBRD. London, UK 
8 December 2004 Sergei Dudnikov and Arkady Jegorov, Karelenergonadzor, 
Petrozavodsk, Russia 
8 December 2004 Oleg TeInov, Deputy Head, Regional Energy Commission of 
Karelia, Russia 
9 December 2004 Vasily Vostrikov, Main Energy Engineer, Segezha Pulp and Paper 
Plant, Segezha, Russia 
10 December 2004 Gennadi Tarasov, Main Energy Engineer and Yuri Bazzanov, Main 
Engineer, Pitkaranta Pulp Mill, Pitkaranta, Russia 
14 December 2004 Valentin Virolainen, Main Energy Engineer and Viklor Ivanov, 
Main Engineer, Kondopoga Pulp and Paper Mill, Kondopoga, 
Russia 
15 December 2004 A. Okorotysheva, Karelkomstat, Petrozavodsk, Russia 
16 December 2004 Evgenii Harlimov, Ministry of Economic Development of the 
Republic of Karelia, Petrozavodsk, Russia 
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20 January 2005 Hazrat Kokov, Head of Business Development Department, Imbera 
Holding, Moscow, Russia 
21 January 2005 Mikhail Yulkin, Director, Centre for Ecological Investments, 
Moscow, Russia 
25 April 2005 4ndrei Shregin, Head of the technological development and import 
department; Andrei, 4kishin, Expert of the energy department and 
, 41exander Plastinin, Chairman of the Board of Directors, Solombala Pulp and Paper Combine, Archangelsk, Russia 
Eygenii Mikhailovskii, Director, Department of Economic 
Development of Archangelsk Oblast, Archangelsk. Russia 
26 April 2005 Alexander Samorodov, Expert. Centre for Ecological Investments 
Reader, Archangelsk Government Technical University, 
Archangelsk, Russia 
27 April 2005 Alexander Pitukhin, Director, Archangelsk Energy Efficiency 
Centre, Archangelsk, Russia 
Alexander Gutov, Director, Investment Company "Archangelsk", 
Archangelsk, Russia 
Adolf PHr, Professor, Archangelsk Government Technical 
University, Archangelsk, Russia 
28 April 2005 Nikolai Kostogorov, Head engineer, Archangelsk Pulp and Paper 
Mill, Archangelsk, Russia 
29 April 2005 Yuri Trubin, Head of Analytical Department of Archangelsk Oblast 
Forestry Industry Administration, Archangelsk, Russia 
k7adimir Blinov, Head of Department; Nadislav PoIjakov. Mikhail 
Jukarjev and Viklor Ikonnikov, Archangelsk Oblast Prices and 
Tariffs Administration, Archangelsk, Russia 
15 August 2005 Matti Pihko, Stora Enso Oulu, Oulu, Finland 
16 August 2005 Pekka Nykdnen, Stora Enso Veitsiluoto, Kerni, Finland 
16 August 2005 Jorma Heikkild, Energy Manager, Botnia Kemi. Kemi, Finland 
18 August 2005 Markku Savolainen, Engineering and Management and Raine 
Vahler, Process Manager, M-Real Kangas. Jyvdskyla, Finland 
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18 August 2005 Hannu Miettinen, United Paper Mills Kaipola & Jdinsdnkoski, 
Rdinsid, Finland 
28 September 2005 Valery Shulkin, Head of Department; Lev Laplev, Department of 
Capital Investment; Anatoly Kryazhev, Department of Capital 
Investment; Daniel Breck, Director of the Department of Capital 
Investment, Frank Graves, Executive Vice-President, Ilim Pulp, St 
Petersburg, Russia 
15 December 2005 Janne Hietaniemi, Customer Service Manager, MOTIVA, 
Helsinki, Finland 
8 March 2006 Kornelis Blok, Professor, University of Utrecht & Ernst Worrell, 
Head of Energy and Climate Studies Group, ECOFYS, Utrecht, the 
Netherlands 
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Annex 3 Interview frame 
RUSSIAN COMPANIES (English translation - original in Russian language) 
I General 
Position in the company 
Short history of the company and possible status as a unit of a larger corporate 
ii Products 
What does the unit produce? 
Has the product mix changed since the 1970s? If so bow? 
Has the quality of products changed over time? 
What is used as the raw material of production? Wood / recycled fibres? 
Does the unit export your products? How much (%)? 
Does the unit buy / sell pulp? 
Could I use the production figures of the unit in my research? (tonnes of each product per 
year, interested in long time series) 
III Production technoloDý 
Which pulp production technologies are used? 
Please describe the technology path of the unit since the 1960-70s i. e. which 
moden-tisation and investments have been done and how the plant has changed 
technologically since the 1960-70s? 
Has the plant been modernised since 1991 ? If yes, when? Which equipment was 
replaced? 
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IV Energy consumption andproduction 
Does the unit generate / sell / buy electricity and heat? 
ViMch fuels are used? (Fuel balance 
How much purchased electricity and fuels cost? How have the prices changed since 
1991 ? 
Do you have non-productive energy consumption, mainly heating local communities? 
Could I use electricity and heat consumption figures of the unit in my research? Also 
energy intensity figures (GJ/t) would be of interest. 
v Reasons behind modernisation 
)Which were the main reasons to modernise / not to modernise the unit? 
If the plant was modernised 
1) Did the modernisation improve energy efficiency / decrease energy consumption 
per tonne of product? 
2) Did modernisation change the product mix or quality of products of the plant? 
3) Would the plant benefit from further modernisation? Or is it now Best Available 
Technology? 
What are the main potential modernising measures in the future? 
Wbo decides on investing in new equipment? Are energy experts involved in decision- 
making? 
VI Drivers and barriers to modernisation 
Which factors support modemising the plant (drivers)? 
Which factors slow down or hinder modernising the plant (barriers)? 
Have these supporting and hindering factors changed since the 1970s? 
Do energy prices play a role? What kind of role? 
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Have regional or federal governmen& policies supported or hindered modernising 
plants? 
How could energy efficiency improvements be further supported? 
Thank you for the interview. 
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